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The thesis entitled 'Reclaiming the Image' is an artistic and philosophical enquiry. It 
aims at a radical re-thinking of the concept of the image outside the accepted notions 
of realism and representation by opening up the photographic real in the process of 
bringing together photography and cinema, stillness and movement, life and art, 
aesthetics and politics. It involves a thinking and writing with Béla Tarr's cinematic 
imagery through Gilles Deleuze's philosophical concepts. Its objective is not to 
illustrate Deleuze's ideas with Tarr's images, nor to read Tarr's cinema through 
Deleuze as such, but to think with images philosophically, in the hope of opening up 
the area of theory to the creative 'powers of the false'.  I wish it to be seen as an 
aesthetico-ethical experiment which, rather than developing an overarching theoretical 
argument, constructs a critical and creative assemblage of different ideas and voices. 
On the one hand, the project seeks to creatively re-think Deleuzian concepts while 
thinking 'about' still and moving images, in relation to the real as affect and thought. 
On the other, to 'continue' films' images by opening their thinking further. The project 
of reclaiming the image as re-thinking in non-representational terms of immanent 
becoming will engage the Deleuzian- Bergsonian- Nietzschean concepts of time, life 
and aesthetics, and Tarr's intensely felt image-world in the series of encounters – 
affect-thoughts – that will undermine the normative notion of reality. The two modes 
– critical and creative – are not constructed separately but weaved together throughout 
what is 'enacted' as filmosophical "free indirect discourse" – a poetic coming together 
of film, philosophy and writing (as art). 
 
It is hoped that this will enable the potential for opening new areas of thinking and 
writing about/ with film/ photographic imagery outside the main discourses 












acknowledgements         4 
 
author's declaration         5 
 
prologue          7 
 
exposure 1: (Re)creating the Real. By way of introduction    15 
 
exposure 2: The Moving Image: Tarr's Cinema and Deleuze's Time-Image  51 
          The Quest(ion) of W(a)onderous Narrative. 
 
exposure 3: Rendering Real. Still(ed) Image and The Outside. Space  103 
 
exposure 4: Textured Soundscapes. Poet(h)ics of the Image-Sound  169 
 
exposure 5: Fleeing Poetics or Ontology of Becoming: an Aesthetico-Ethical  217
          Experiment in Thought. Becoming Artist-Child of Philosophy 
 
epilogue:    Without Conclusion; As Such       274 
 
bibliography          288 
 
filmography          299 
 
appendix          300 
 









I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Margherita Sprio for her continual support and 
encouragement, Dr Shohini Chaudhuri for the insightful commentary, the University 
of Essex and the University of Westminster for the financial assistance, my partner 
William for his kindness, understanding and unending patience, and all those whose 


























I Elzbieta Buslowska, hereby state that the material contained within this thesis is all 

































…films are our only means of authenticating our lives. Eventually nothing remains of 
us except our films – strips of celluloid on which our shadows wander in search of 
truth and humanity until the end of time. I really don’t know why I make films. 




He who has attained to only some degree of freedom of mind cannot feel other than  
a wanderer on the earth—though not as a traveler to a final destination: for this 
destination does not exist. But he will watch and observe and keep his eyes open to 
see what is really going on in the world; for this reason he may not let his heart 
adhere too firmly to any individual thing; within him too there must be something 
wandering that takes pleasure 
 in change and transience. 




The virtual structure of art and concepts bares only the potential 
 to make us come in contact with the virtual forces of the world,  
which then makes us, or make us want to, become in some sense. 
















Throw away lights and definitions 
And say of what you see in the dark … 





It was some time ago during one of my undergraduate tutorials, that the encounter 
with the films of Hungarian director Béla Tarr (1955-) began; virtually then, and 
through my own photographic practice. It was an invitation to see his films that 
started a journey leading eventually to this doctoral thesis. What stayed with me, and 
'forced' me to go back to Tarr's films again and again, was the 'photographic' or 
'photo-cinematic'. An image-sensation that is real in a very particular way – linked to 
the world but neither of the world as a copy, nor about the world as representation. 
Somewhere between reality and fiction, the real seemed to be created outside of 
recognition and referentiality or, better still, rendered 'visible'.
2
 It resonated intensely 
with my own photographic work, along with some black and white films I saw as a 
child, to which I could not put a name, and whose titles (and most of the stories they 
contained, but not the 'image', or rather, the sense of it) now escapes me. It was the 
overwhelming sensation of the visual, a strangely felt aesthetic in a sense, and the 
'real' that I have already started pursuing in my own photographic practice – the real 
that existed somehow through or alongside the image, rather than in it. It was the 
desire to 'speak' about this intensity in the intuitive mode, and the necessity to find a 
new language to invoke what I now can refer to, with Deleuze, as the 'time-image'. I 
felt that in order to search for this nagging real, it was necessary to abandon all the 
'realities' that the Western philosophical tradition offers as "image of thought": 
phenomenological, realistic, and idealistic.
3
 Amongst so many images that seem to 
                                                 
1
 Wallace Stevens, 'The Man With the Blue Guitar', in The Palm At the End of the Mind: Selected 
Poems and Plays (Vintage Books, New York, 1990), p. 149. 
2
 Rendering visible invisible forces is the Deleuzian motif adopted from Paul Klee, describing the 
nature of art. As Deleuze asserts, after Klee, the object of painting (art) is "not to render the visible but 
to render visible." Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith, 
(Continuum, London and New York 2002), p. 39. 
3
 ‘Image of thought’ is an expression developed by Deleuze which refers to the tradition of Western 
philosophy, in which philosophy or thinking has been regarded as a timeless pursuit of truth, reason or 
universals: “An image of thought called philosophy has been formed historically and it effectively 
8 
 
adhere to the dialectic imperatives of what is accepted as real, positioned against 
virtual or fictional, Tarr's cinema appeared so refreshingly and challengingly new – a 
real 'food for thought'. He seemed to 'liberate' the photographic of cinema from 
representation, realism and its affinity to storytelling; creating an image 'in itself' – a 




Difficult and demanding, Tarr's work sits uncomfortably between categories and 
styles, fleeing from positioning and naming, powerfully and uncompromisingly 
resisting conventions of mainstream cinema and yet neither 'avant-garde' nor popular, 
an art outside the opposition of high and low. Black-and-white, all shot on 35mm 
celluloid film, with no actors or ready scripts, with very long takes edited mostly 
'within shots'
5
, the very long films he creates are neither realistic/ naturalistic nor 
formalistic; in a sense neither documentary nor fiction; a strikingly distinctive 
creation. A "heroic violation" of conventional cinema, Susan Sontag wrote after 
seeing Sátántangó (1994); "first exposure to his work punctures all conventional 
expectations of cinematic time and space", notes Fionn Meade.
6
 A particular sense of 
the real is evoked within each immaculately constructed shot, and runs throughout 
Tarr's work, which he sees as a single project. It is "getting close to life", and "a 
vision." What is happening during each filming could only be described as creating 
with life, or alongside it; as a somewhat almost impossible combination of the 
director's 'vision' and what Tarr describes as "living in the situation."
7
 The kind of 
                                                                                                                                            
stops people from thinking” asserts Deleuze in the conversation with Claire Parnett. Gilles Deleuze and 
Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugo Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Continuum, London and 
New York, 2006), p. 10. 
4
 At times Tarr refers to his work as 'pure' cinema, while critics talk about the 'end of cinema'. This 
resonates with both the early perception of cinema as a predominantly visual (image based) medium 
(Antonin Artaud, Jean Epstein, Germaine Dulac), and André Bazin's remark at the end of his essay 
'Bicycle Thief': "No more actors, no more story, no more sets, which is to say that in the perfect 
aesthetic illusion of reality there is no more cinema." André Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol. II, trans. 
Hugh Gray (University of California Press, London, 1972), p. 60. Tarr's particular approach however, 
is his own paradoxical univocity of image-reality in the combination of elements that will be discussed 
throughout this thesis. 
5
 Béla Tarr talks about the editing (or not editing) of his films as something that happens during 
filming, and not in the editing studio: "This is happening in front of me, because it happened in front of 
the camera." His co-director and editor, Agnes Hranitzky, is always present during the shooting where 
all decisions are made: "Our collaboration with Béla is a little bit different, because I was always 
present at the shooting. We are always looking at the shooting on a monitor." Nicolas Rapold, 'In 
Auteur’s Swan Song, an Ode to Survival', http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/movies/bela-tarr-says-
the-turin-horse-is-his-last-movie.html. 
6
 Fionn Meade, 'Béla Tarr: Interview', http://bombsite.com/issues/100/articles/2909 
7
 This relates both to Tarr's practice of pre-production, when he spends some time living in the places 
of filming, and to his principle of not directing those involved; the non-actors. Mostly he works with 
9 
 
filming that demands a very particular execution: an 'attentive perception and very 
particular reception: an attentive 'non-recognition'.
8
 Thus, a radical challenge to the 
way we see, feel and think, Béla Tarr's image-making compels different viewing of, 
and different thinking about, life, art, and aesthetics.
9
 His films do not comment or 
illustrate philosophical ideas; they 'do' philosophy; they think. 
 
It was not the lack of a cinematic vocabulary that made it difficult to write 'about' 
Tarr's films, for as an art and film theory student I was well equipped with this 
lexicon. It was more to do with the desire to find a way to articulate the visual 
intensity and affect within the photographic 'thinking', outside the structural and 
psychoanalytic models which proved limiting – and remain so – within the theoretical 
framework set up in this thesis. Yet, it was the felt conviction about the urgency and 
importance to articulate this cinema in terms of affect and of the real, philosophically 
and creatively, finding ways in which the non-oppositional difference might be 
thought of outside the dialectics of aesthetics versus politics, form versus content. 
This required not only considering a different way to re-think the concepts, but to 
critically and creatively engage in writing with them. The difficulty in finding the 
language to do so within existing models, compelled me to risk constructing my own. 





I found that I could engage with Tarr's imagery through Gilles Deleuze's philosophical 
writings, and his conception of the 'time-image' in particular, which provided the 
concepts as well as the vocabulary and tools for opening up the area of theoretical 
inquiry. Moreover, they presented the way in which thinking and theory can, and 
perhaps must, engage with what he calls 'the false' rather than with truth, and both in 
                                                                                                                                            
the same crew; close friends who often acquire exchangeable roles. Both music composer (Mihály 
Vig), and the writer (László Krasznahorkai) are also 'actors'. Erika Bók, who began as the character of 
Estike in Sátántangó at the age of ten, has been in Tarr's films throughout his work since. 
8
 Attentive non-recognition or misrecognition is a play on the Bergsonian concept of attentive 
recognition, which will be discussed later during this thesis. 
9
 As Peter Hames asserts, Tarr "really does want us to re-see and re-experience the world in both social 
and perceptual terms. The revolutionary quality of the films rests in the fact that these objectives are 
seen as part of a single project." Peter Hames, 'Melancholy of Resistance: The Films of Béla Tarr', in 
Kinoeye: New Perspectives on European Film, http://www.kinoeye.org/01/01/hames01.php. 
10
 Béla Tarr has been making films since 1997. However, his demanding and uncompromising attitude 




relation to 'discourse' and to the style of writing.
11
 Intuition instead of knowledge, 
duration instead of chronological time, and sensation instead of representation, were 
the ways new thinking and writing with the image has become possible. For Deleuze, 
thinking, and by extension philosophy, is not about re-formulating old concepts but 
about diagnosing and creating anew. Thinking is not something we can define once 
and for all, and not something that we do but which happens to us from without.
12
 
"Lying out, inventing and creating constitute the philosophical trinity – diagrammatic, 
personalistic, and intensive features," he writes with Guattari in What is Philosophy.
13
 
Constructing and experimenting are for him the real conditions of life and art and are 
inseparable from the experience of immanence (the expression of an at once infinite 
and finite material plane on which everything happens). Daniel Frampton's 
"Filmosophy" proposes writing and thinking with (rather than about) what he calls a 
"filmmind", and Yve Lomax's theoretical-creative project of "writing the 
(photographic) image", further encouraged the following project. Frampton suggest 
the model of "filmosophical writing" or "filmosophical interpretation", which instead 
of applying existing concepts to films, consists of writing with the film-mind.
14
 Such 
an approach, motivated by a more open form of philosophical writing, is based on the 
assumption that films think affectively through style, and as such invites a different, 
performative or poetic 'translation of this film-thinking. He writes: 
 
Heidegger's poetic language, Kirkegaard's textual voices, Nietzsche's stylistic 
perspectivalism, Wittgenstein's ordinary language and Derrida's notion of 
philosophical writing, all lead us to see that film writing, to become 
filmosophical, needs to recognize its own rhetoric and embrace a performative 
                                                 
11
 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2. The Time-Image, trans. Hugo Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Continuum, London, 2005). 
12
 Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, (Routledge, London and New York, 2002), p. 38. 
13
 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh 
Tomlinson (Verso, 1994), p. 77. 
14
 Daniel Frampton, Filmosophy (Wallflower Press, London, 2006). 
There have always been (since the invention of the cinematograph) a philosophical interest in the 
cinematic and photographic image. Henri Bergson, Siegfired Kracauer, Maurice Merlau-Phonty, André 
Bazin, Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze among others. For Frampton, who attributes film image with its 
own mind, film can think and therefore 'is' philosophy. John Mullarkey brings his own view to a 
number of theories from mainly Continental but also Anglo-American traditions asserting that "cinema 
thinks, but in a non-philosophical way," (p.215), moving away from thinking towards emotion. John 
Mullarkey, Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Since 
the publication of Frampton's Filmosophy, the discussions of film and philosophy have taken form of 
the online 'film philosophy salon' with conferences organised every year in the UK.  
11 
 





Yve Lomax's project of "writing the image" also developed out of the desire to bring 
writing (about images) into the repertoire of the visual arts. Her "adventures in writing 
and theory" situate the process of writing and theory within both a philosophical and 
creative/ poetic framework of (art) practice. Crossing the boundaries between writing, 
photographic practice and spoken performance, she endeavours to question 
presuppositions held within theory and practice as well as in speaking and seeing.
16
 
Following on from this, writing with Tarr's imagery would not be possible as a 
discourse 'explaining' the work in philosophical terms, but as co-creating 
philosophically alongside it. Thus the style and the method of this thesis will acquire 
the 'logic of expression', which means bringing out sensations without dissociating 
from the material; an a-signifying semiotics of 'ands'.
17
 It is not so much turning 
language into expression, but allowing expression as an outside force to materialise 
through the 'language' imperceptibly, in-between words and images. My objective is 
to "'bring out 'another language in its language' through a kind of repetition freed from 
the phantoms of identity, and productive of difference."
18
 Through mistranslation or 
distortion, to force the sense of the image, to bring out the very force that inhabits and 
empowers it, that is, to think with it as an affirmative and joyful passion.
19
 Following 
                                                 
15
 Frampton, Filmosophy, p. 179.  
16
 Yve Lomax, Writing the Image (I B Tauris Publishers, London 2000). Her other works include 
Sounding the Event: Escapades in Dialogue with Matters of Art, Nature and Time (I B Tauris, London 
and New York, 2005), and Passionate Being: Language, Singularity and Perseverance (I B Tauris, 
London and New York, 2009). 
17
 This kind of analysis does not start with an a-priori signifier. It does not have a credo to follow, but 
in engaging with the 'material' it carries on the movement of immanence, where, in the 'spirit' of 
Deleuzian 'proposition', it takes the shape of (dis)connecting 'ands' rather than a defining 'is'. And when 
the verb 'is' is used it is to take on the force of being in becoming, as something happening in the 
process, and as one of many other 'beings'.  
The logic of expression that Deleuze finds in Spinoza is a logic of univocity, where things are thought 
in their being. As Pierre Macherey writes, expression in the Deleuzian - and the Spinozan sense - has 
nothing to do with designating or representing anything, since what is expressed cannot be dissociated 
from the act by which it is expressed. It is a logic of power and a logic of movement which is different 
from the logic of representation based on identity. Pierre Macherey, 'The Encounter with Sprinoza', in 
Paul Patton (ed), Deleuze: A Critical Reader (Blackwell Publishers, 1996), pp. 146-7. 
18
 Ibid, p. 148. 
19
 Passion is used here in the Spinozan sense of affection, which cannot be explained by the nature of 
the affected individual, but originates outside of the individual. Its nature is to fill our capacity for 
being affected. There are empowering passions of joy and disempowering passions of sadness. The 
passions for Spinoza are the question of choice and of ethics. As Deleuze writes: "Ethical joy is the 
correlate of speculative affirmation." Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert 
Hurley (City Lights Books, San Francisco, 1988), p. 27-29.  
12 
 
the ethos of creation, my approach will reside not in commenting, communicating, or 
analysing, but in expression through vibration, resonance and "forced movements."
20
 
Conceptual and aesthetic thinking/ writing alongside the vibrant (vital) rhythms of 
Tarr's films, possible with the aid of Deleuzian tools, will therefore take the shape of a 
critical and creative intervention. The theoretical crux of the thesis will consist of re-
thinking the photographic image, both still and moving, in relation to its visual –
'cerebral' and affective – significance, not in terms of oppositionist dialectics, but as a 
radical immanence – the real. This would be an aesthetico-ethical experiment where 
intuitive thinking opening up the problems will merge with poetic expression as art. 
The two modes – critical and creative – are not constructed separately but weaved 
together throughout the thesis in a kind of "free indirect discourse"; a poetic coming 
together of different voices, in an aesthetic figure of what Deleuze calls the 
conceptual personae that would carry the movement of the concepts.
21
 Its aim, rather 
than proceed from, or towards, a pre-determined goal, is to construct a discourse not 
of my own, but born out of encounters with and between films, images and 
philosophical/ theoretical openings. The real of the image and the real of thinking 
would sense and tease out the impersonal expression – a conceptual persona, or a 
'dancing star'. Thus, thinking will be a process where the concepts are (re)created 
alongside writing as art. Here "dialogical" (Kristeva) rather than discoursive/ 
symbolic encounters with words, sounds and images, sensing their coexistence and 
interrelations, hope to resonate with the films' crystalline narrative and wa(o)nderous 
aesthetics:  
 
Performative gestures weaved in the fabric of a theory-thinking which would 
work to undo the frames of contents and forms, meanings and significations. 
Unconsciously at times, coincidentally and by singular encounters. 
                                                 
20
 Ibid, p. 146-7. 
21
 Free-indirect discourse is the term coined by Deleuze after Pasolini (free-indirect-style), and 
describes the operation of cinematic imaging where the director's 'vision' and the non-human camera's 
point of view come together as something new, which is then rendered 'visible' through the character's 
'speech-act' or through the virtual percepts.  
The conceptual persona, as discussed by Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy?, is the figure of 
thought which gives a concept its specific force, life; what animates a concept. It is something that 
'happens' to the thinker/ philosopher and it is essential for the practice of concepts. Conceptual 
personae are neither psycho-social types (p. 67), nor the philosophers themselves (p. 64), but are like 
concepts created. They are related to the plane of immanence. Descartes’ idiot, or Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra, Dionysus, the last man, are such personae. It could be argued that conceptual persona in a 




Thus, neither discoursive, nor philosophical in the traditional sense, writing with and 
alongside images and concepts will undertake the Deleuzian challenge of becoming 
with the process, in the style of 'to-ing and fro-ing' in-between ideas and sensations. 
Immersed in the rhizomatic fusion of immanence (intellect and emotion), and starting 
from the middle, the writing will proceed through stutters and hesitations. The 
thinking of (and with) the photographic, or what I would call photographic thinking, 
will be positioned in the (unstable) middle, fragmented and fractured, 'contemplative' 
and non-hierarchical, and proceed alongside the borders; orphaned, homeless and 
nomadic. With time, in an attempt to overcome the opposition between an instant and 
duration on the one side, and with space as "any-space-whatever"
22
 not opposed to 
time but with(in) it, and as virtual force of the outside, on the other, it will move in a 
non-linear fashion of questioning and creating, advancing and regressing, in stutters 
and hesitations. It will move directionlessly, bringing together the philosopher and the 
filmmaker whose ideas concerning life, art/cinema, and philosophy, which are also 
critical to this thesis, resonate with an uncanny intensity. Deleuze asks for an 
immanent faith in this world through the possibility of creating new forms of life. 
Béla Tarr restores this belief excruciatingly and beautifully. Remaining with Tarr's 
strategy of thinking about his films as a single project, of imaging with the world, 
there will be no methodology of 'differentiating'/ distinguishing between each film 
within the discussion here, but rather sensing and experimenting with the visual 
material. 
It is not within the scope of this project to contribute to existing theoretical or 
philosophical discussions around the film/ image, but to open up thinking for new 
encounters. The aim of the thesis would not seek to establish or develop an argument 
in the conventional, linear sense, but to propose a set of expressions, or what Deleuze 
(and Guattari) would call blocks of becomings, that dialogue with each other in a 
polyphonic, aberrant movement of 'filmosophical' writing/thinking – listening to the 
films.
23
 It sojourns in the conviction that this is the only way, perhaps failed from the 
                                                 
22
 The concept of any-space-whatever will be addressed in Chapter/ exposure 3. 
23
 "A becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle. A becoming is neither one, 
or two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the borderline or line of flight… If becoming is 
a block (a line-block), it is because it constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernability, a no-man's 
land, a non-localizable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the 
proximity of the other - and the border-proximity is indifferent to both contiguity and to distance." 
14 
 
start, for the imperceptible, virtual power of the aesthetico-ethical effect of such 
complex and intensely 'difficult' imagery as Béla Tarr's, to render itself 'visible'. In the 
belief that something new and unforeseeable may 'express' itself in the process. 
 
– Shall I just listen? Or observe? Silently watch you show me some [shapes]? 
– Both once again or rather between the two. I'll have you observe that 
























                                                                                                                                            
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Continuum, London and New York, 2003), p. 293. 
The idea of filmosophical writing as listening to the films is inspired by Daniel Frampton's project of 
combining philosophy and film in an attempt to develop a new way of thinking about film: not to 
illustrate philosophical ideas through films' narratives or apply films to philosophy, but to be sensitive 
to films' own affective thinking. Frampton, Filmosophy, p. 181.  
24
 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, trans. Pasccale-Anne 









Expression is always on the move, always engrossed in its own course, 
overspilling individual experience, nomadically evading responsibility. 




I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an 
always decentred centre, from always displaced periphery which repeats and 
differentiates them. 






As Constantin V. Boundas writes, intensity – and I would add the real, understood as 
such – is a key notion in Deleuze's philosophical project: 
 
It manifests itself as the intensive virtual of his ontology; as the affirmative 
and creative desire of his ethics and politics; as the affect of his aesthetic 
theory; as the motivation for his methodological decision to opt for 





Intensity is also the affective-thinking force of Tarr's cinematic imaging. Intensity too, 
will be the main concept running through this thesis, resonating with and vibrating 
                                                 
25
 Brian Massumi, 'Introduction: Like a Thought', The Shock to Thought: Expression After Deleuze and 
Guattari (London: Routledge, 2002), p. xxi 
26
 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (Continuum, 2004), p. xix. 
27
 Constantin V. Boundas, 'Intensity', in The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 
131. 
Deleuze uses the concept of intensity as pure difference: a form of ontological difference that gives rise 
to 'actual' entities. As qualities, intensities are virtual but real. They cannot be directly perceived in the 
quality they give rise to.  
16 
 
through the ideas of expression, immanence, and becoming. As a conceptual tool it 
will enable me to re-think the ideas of stillness and movement, inside and outside, 
abstract and material, through the expression of an impersonal, pre-subjective 
movement of sensation (percepts and affects).
28
 As a creative apparatus, it will adopt a 




Perhaps the photographic imaging, the stillness and silence of photography once 
proposed as a process of 'breathing a life to', as something that linked us to the world 
in a 'very special way', has been rejected too soon on all sorts of accounts.
29
 As we 
became trapped in a speed of perpetual motion of appropriating, critiquing, 
deconstructing, and commenting on, had/has its 'real' potentiality as difference no 
chance to come forth, and is the ability to 'think differently' with it in danger of 




                                                 
28
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, percepts are not perceptions, and affects are not affections or 
feelings, but virtual, pre-personal, non-subjective intensities. They are 'beings' whose validity lies in 
themselves and exceeds any lived experience. Affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man, 
just as percepts […] are nonhuman landscapes of nature. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 
p.169.  
29
 I refer here particularly to the understanding of analogue photography, where the image is 'inscribed' 
by light onto the light sensitive emulsion, and which is now being replaced by the new digital 
technologies. In Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze displays ambivalence towards 
photography, which is too easily treated as an immobilised truth and a direct reification of the 
representational modes of thought and practice he devotes his oeuvre to overturning. Deleuze 
repeatedly associates photography with cliché, drawing on the double meaning of the word in French as 
both stereotypical thinking and a snapshot of reality. Cliché marks a mechanical and instantaneous act 
that requires little effort or thought, and results in a temporal freezing and spatial sectioning of an 
image of reality from its virtual and durational context.  
Many theoretical debates, and photographic practices, are still positioned around the question of digital 
versus analogue as a value/ ideology judgment. There are filmmakers and photographers who use 
analogue/ celluloid film and work outside the of oppositionistic dialectics, seeing the use of the 
medium in terms of what it can do rather than it being ideologically or technologically pertinent; as in 
the case of 16mm film, which has recently been brought to attention by British artist Tacita Dean. Béla 
Tarr also refers to his preference of working with celluloid film as a personal choice that is as valid as 
the choice of more 'advanced' digital technology. Some of the above concerns were expressed in the 
catalogue accompanying Tacita Dean's projection of ' Film' at the Tate Modern (October 2011 – March 
2012). Nicholas Culinan (ed.), Tacita Dean: Film, The Unilever Series, Tate Publishing, 2011.  
30
 'Potential' will be used here in the Deleuzian sense, which is not the same as possible. Possible for 
Dleueze is the condition that somehow 'pre-exists' the (represenational) real. It is something that can be 
'realised'. Potential, on the contrary is a virtual force (a difference) which can not be either foreseen or 




The project of 'reclaiming the image' aims at re-thinking the concept of the image in 
non-representational terms of immanent becoming. It seeks to engage critically with 
the ideas surrounding the real, and particularly the photographic (as) real through the 
understanding of the image as being its own reality, neither a unit in a chain of 
narrative, nor a language, but a correlate of a-signifying signs, as both form and 
content.
31
 This means questioning the ideas of documenting, realism, and truth 
associated with the real, but also distancing from the oppositionistic model of 'virtual 
reality'. It means opening up the space for thinking the real, through Deleuze, as being 
both actual and virtual, as material-abstract, as still-moving, creatively.
32
 Here, rather 
than replacing one model by another, the project calls for a radical rethinking of old 
and new, history and progress, aesthetics and politics. Thus, 'reclaiming' does not 
imply looking back nostalgically to what is lost, but by resisting both the dialectics of 
the 'avant-garde' (old and new) and de-constructive strategies of so called post-
modern (re)appropriation, it opens the image's real(ity) towards its unknown and 
unrealised potential in virtual coexistence of past, present and future. 
 
For Walter Benjamin, looking at Daguerreotype portraits, it was the photographic 
'aura' of the long exposure that captured a life now lost, nostalgically.
33
 For Barthes, 
the unspeakable affect piercing through the 'mad image' where time disappears in 
"[t]his will be and this has been."
34
 Perhaps what was 'captured' in the photographic 
was a life that opens up the space; a potentiality in its embryonic state rather than 
nostalgic loss. Perhaps through the (inhuman) camera, positioned between the world 
and the photographer, something has passed with light; a virtual fleeting line/life 
leaving its trace not in the image as such, but 'through' it, and through the viewer; a 
                                                 
31
 For Deleuze, cinema is not a universal or primitive language system: "It brings to light an intelligible 
content which is like a presupposition, a condition, a necessary correlate through which language 
constructs its own 'objects'. But this correlate, though inseparable, is specific: it consists of pre-
linguistic images, and pre-signifying signs." Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 262.  
The image is not representation or a copy of existing reality, but another 'plane of immanence'; its own 
world. 
32
 The actual is not opposed to the virtual, but both coexist as real. The virtual is what has not been 
actualised yet; what could have been. In cinema this is conveyed by the time-image, or crystal image, 
where the virtual image becomes actual, yet not directly. The actual in this context would be that which 
renders visible or incarnates the virtual imperceptibly.  
33
 Walter Benjamin, 'A Small History of Photography', in Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other 
Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (Verso, 1998), pp. 240-258. 
34
 Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard (Vintage 2000), p. 96. 
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line that keeps shimmering through imperceptibly. The time-image, brought to the 




Still the question poses itself: Is it possible to reclaim such an image from its 
(de)constructivist dialectical 'death sentence', and is it necessary or desirable at all? 
And if it is, how does one escape the confines of the canonical Image of thought and 
liberate 'what is' with the unforeseeable 'not yet', with time uncontrolled and space 
non-confined. For Deleuze, and for Tarr, this is 'trying out', always on the move, 
always on the lookout for the chance; "a new logic," of the sensible, characterised by 
a principle of encounters and experimentation in thinking and in relating to the 
world.
36
 Of course, as Yve Lomax reminds us after Francois Lyotard, there is no 
security here, only the process.
37
 This is the challenge of thinking which, always in 
becoming, has no pre-judged assumptions, and which resists the dogmatic itself. 
Experimenting is always that which is "in the process of coming about."
38
 "Would it 
be too much to say", Lomax asks, "that through experimenting thought gains the 
means to become an act of resistance to what is?" "I hope not", is her answer.
39
 And 
would the resistance to 'what is' not take us outside the opposition of 'what is' and 
'what is not'? 
 
In experimenting, and keeping the present in question, we expose ourselves to 
an unimaginable 'not yet', and doesn't the exposure make us open to having 
something unknown pass through us that, in effect, shows us the limits of – 
and makes us become strangers to – our times and ourselves?40  
 
Is this not that what the photographic 'is'? 
 
                                                 
35
 Deleuze refers to the time-image as a "fixed shot" to emphasise its difference from the movement-
image. Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 21 
36
 John Rajchman, 'Unhappy returns: John Rajchman on the Po-mo Decade (Writing the 80's)'. 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Unhappy+returns%3A+John+Rajchman+on+the+po-
mo+decade.+%28Writing+the...-a0101938549. 
Just as Deleuze found new ways of thinking and experimenting with 'old' philosophers, Belá Tarr took 
up anew the challenge of the real with celluloid film and black and white photography. 
37
 Yve Lomax, 'Thinking Stillness', in David Green and Joanna Lowry (ed.), Stillness and Time: 
Photography and the Moving Image (Photoworks and Photoforum, 2006), p. 57. 
38
 Deleuze, Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 111. 
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The real (both material and abstract) – a concept inspired by Deleuze's philosophical 
theory of immanence, is a core concept of this thesis, and an underlying force behind 
my investigation into 'the image' of (the photographic) image. Neither 
phenomenological existence, nor psychoanalytic lack (the Lacanian Real), yet both 
actual and virtual intensity vibrating immanently in-between presence and absence, 
stillness and movement: "a fugitive being."
41
 The underlying aspect of the concept of 
the real would be the link to this world, developed through Deleuze, and what it is for 
us and for cinema now. It would be traversed by means of Tarr's imagery, not as a 
reading in the historical or cultural contexts, but as an investigation into what he calls 
'vision', constructed throughout all of his work in the same manner.
42
 It is also a 
methodological question of creating with images; that is, constructing the thinking 
and writing as both questioning and expression. The project will not adhere to any 
particular film theoretical discussion but will look at the image from the perspective 
of relations and assemblages; a network of becomings and possibilities. As 
philosophical writing, far from analysing or interpreting films in the traditional way of 
imparting meaning, it will move between categories and definitions, seeking to open 
up areas for future concerns. Drawing on Deleuze's idea of the time-image, it 
proposes an 'image' of image as haptic and thinking, cerebral and material, affective 
and conceptual. Here Bergson's conception of perception and memory, Spinoza's 
concepts of affect, and Nietzsche's proposition of force and becoming will stipulate 
the discussion. Inspired by Daniel Frampton's method of 'filmosophy', as mentioned 
earlier, and by Guilliana Bruno's etymological reading of wandering as 'error' 
(implying rumbling, roaming or even going astray), this thesis will adopt the 
methodology of intuitive thinking with the image, which will take the form of creative 
questioning rather than aiming for a determinate outcome. Referring at times to earlier 
writings about film (Siegfried Kracauer, Antonin Artaud, André Bazin), which are 
more attentive to the cinematic image, and its own, separate reality, also facilitates the 
focus on how the image is constructed, what it 'does' rather than what it represents. As 
photographic thinking, the process will be carried through exposures, repetitions, 
                                                 
41
 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 299. 
42
 As already mentioned earlier, Tarr emphasises in a number of interviews that he makes the same 
film; getting closer to life, again and again, getting better each time. Furthermore, getting closer to life 
is an aesthetic/ visual choice of 'no more cinema', but 'pure reality' - what Bazin suggested in relation to 
De Sica's films, or, on the other hand, getting closer to the 'pure image' (which is the same as getting 
closer to life for Tarr), by re-claiming the cinematic or photographic of cinema from the burden of 
narrative and story telling. 
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constructions and re-constructions bringing forth the experience of the "real-as-
Identity."
43
 The visual examples used throughout will come from Tarr's trilogy: 




The question is how one can engage critically and conceptually with something that 
wants to defy definition, to fall outside realism and representation, and that moves 
away from structures of identity to 'expressions' of becoming. 
 
I will focus on the photographic image (moving and still) as that 'inherently endowed' 
with the conception of the real: by its relationship with 'outside reality' – the indexical 
aspect, and by the 'aura' of affect – its 'psychological' aspect, by the way of re-thinking 
both, by distancing myself from both phenomenological and psychoanalytical models, 
in pursuit of an aesthetical real. Objective and subjective, still and moving, invisible 
and visible, the "pure optical and sound situation", as proposed by Deleuze, will 
enable the 'existence' and experience of the real through the 'interrelation' between the 
physicality/ materiality of the image and its movement in space-time; to view cinema 
as an assemblage of photographic images and cinematic motion as parallel to 
movement of time, life, and becoming. A particular type of image, the time-image or 
a "pure optical and sound situation", enables the 'existence' and experience of the real 
through an immanent intertwining of the physicality and materiality of the image, its 
movement in space-time, and the virtual outside. It will extend Deleuze's 
understanding of the time-image from being exclusively 'cinematic' to becoming 
photographic.
45
 Thus, the discussion will risk proposing indexicality as a (non)relation 
to 'this world' but freed from referentiality (according to Deleuzian re-working of 
Peirce's theory of signs
46
), towards a particular ('optical') intensity, and the 
                                                 
43
 François Laruelle, The Concept of Non-Photography, trans. Robin Mackay (Urbanomic, 2010), p. 37. 
For François Laruelle, photographic thinking is a 'mode' of new thinking based on it's relation to the 
real (a photo for him introduces an experience of Identity as an experience of immanence) in a way that 
could be understood together with the Deleuzian virtual-actual immanence. The concepts of 
assemblage, fragmentation and repetition are also embedded in the idea of photographic thinking. 
44
 The rationale behind the choice of this particular filmic examples lies in the fact that the 'character' of 
what can be called the 'trilogy' is most closely related to the ethos of this thesis.  
45
 Overcoming the opposition of stillness and movement, as well as the associations of the still image 
with photography, and movement with cinema. 
46
 Charles S. Peirce, Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic, edited by James Hoopes (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Deleuze, Cinema 2, pp. 24-29 
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'photographic (un)conscious' as liberated from its affixation to the Lacanian Real.
47
 
Here the photographic still image, in a sense liberated from its immobilized position 
of spatialised time and its Euclidian perspective, would be perceived as a 'time-space' 
(in its embryonic state of potentiality), which, growing in dimensions, "never stops 
reconstructing the identity of image and object."
48
 Stillness (or 'stilling') is thinking 
when it is "a construction of a (uncontrolled) time for thought."
49
 The photograph can 
also be thought of as a 'plane' of different relations where "everything is connected to 
everything else" (Béla Tarr, Sátántangó) in a fragmentary cosmic web of 'world-
memory', and as a 'rupture', in-between of 'no longer' and 'not yet'; a 'terrifying 
meanwhile.'
50
 The 'time-image', on the other hand, can be perceived as a 'moving 
photograph' that fills the image with a temporal flow of 'pure contemplation': "The 
mental and physical, the real and imaginary, the subject and object, the world and I."
51
 
As such, the image will take a form of embodied space, actual and virtual, where the 
(e)motion
52
 of wanderings and encounters will enable the possibility of rethinking 
images in terms of stillness and movement, aesthetics and politics, materialism and 
abstraction, reality and illusion, bringing together photography and cinema in the 
photographic immanent "in the last instance."
53
 Thus, as linked to this world 
(indexically by proxy, alongside the world) and pensive (virtual but not the traumatic 
real) the time-image of my investigation will embrace life, with Deleuze and Tarr, "at 
the point where the being of the sensible reveals itself in the work of art, while at the 




                                                 
47
 It is the intensity André Bazin discovered in the photograph when he compared it to the snowflake in 
'The Ontology of the Photographic Image' (which is neither of referential nor representational quality), 
and the optical (un)conscious that Walter Benjamin found while looking at the earliest daguerreotypes 
(which might not be read as nostalgic or traumatic). Benjamin, 'A Small History of Photography'. 
48
 As Lomax, in Writing the Image, has pointed out, the idea of photography as spacializing time has 
been rejected for some time now. Photography has not, however, been entirely freed from its 
representational (and realistic) attributes (in relation to analogue photography in particular). 
49
 Lomax, Thinking Stillness, p. 57. 
50
 'A Terrifying meanwhile' is an expression Yve Lomax uses in relation to resisting the present (what 
is), and as time ‘in-between’ that is also the unknown (the Outside). Lomax, 'Thinking Stillness', p. 57. 
51
 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 15. Contemplation refers here to sensing and intuiting from without, rather 
than to its conventional understanding. Here the image (as " instances of pure contemplation") bring 
about the identity of the real (the mental and physical, the real and imaginary, the world and the 'I'). 
52
 Motion produces emotion, writes Guiliana Bruno, referring to the Latin root of the word 'emotion', 
which speaks of 'moving force'. This is a two way process - creating: making sensations felt, and 
viewing: the shock of the 'unrecognisable'. See Guilana Bruno, Atlas of Emotion Journeys in Art, 
Architecture, and Film (Verso, New York, 2002). 
53
 François Laruelle, The Concept of Non-Photography, p. 40.  
54
 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 68. 
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The distinction between film and photography, based on the difference between 
simultaneity and succession, between reality and illusion, between present and past, 
has been a subject of many debates. The desire to move away from oppositional 
thinking led me to suggest that this particular kind of 'moving image' (a long, 
disconnected shot of modern cinema) has in a sense 'freed' the still image from its 
immobilized position of spatialised time, and repositioned it within the area of 
immanent becoming. Here the time-image has brought the photographic image (as 
indexical art) to the surface, and as a surface allowed it (as the invisible trace of 
heterogeneous becomings between the camera, the photographer, the viewer, the 
image and the outside) to live in a space of movement and change. In this sense, the 
photographic image could be perceived as a 'space-time' in its embryonic state of 
potentiality. The photograph can also be thought of as a 'plane' of different relations or 
plane of composition which connects with the outside. A thinking through to the 
relationships between inside and outside, surface and depth, past and present is 
pertinent here. The 'time-image' on the other hand can become a 'moving photograph' 
that fills the image with a temporal flow of 'pure contemplation': "The mental and 
physical, the real and imaginary, the subject and object, the world and I." By means of 
these long/still hypnotic images we can in a sense see what we feel.  
 
Close attention will be paid to how images (films) look and sound and how they make 
us feel, rather than to their 'hidden' or other meanings; not to what the image 
necessarily is but what it does in terms of experience and affect-thought, which cannot 
be translated in representational, or deconstructive terms, only assessed in terms of 
their power to affect.
55
 Most of all, the image is perceived as its own reality and its 
own thinking. It is an area of film but also art and philosophy, where each plays off 
and informs each other through expression. As a pure optical and sound situation, the 
image co-exists with other such images in a non-linear, disconnected narrative of 
machinic assemblage, no longer defined by continuity or montage, but by irrational 
cut. No longer linkage but interstice, a gap between and within images opens to the 
Outside, where the virtual images/sensations, affects and percepts, are 'waiting' to be 
                                                 
55
 As Deleuze wries, an existing mode is defined by a certain capacity for being affected: "By affect I 
understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided 
or restrained…" Spinoza cited in Deleuze, Spinoza, pp. 49-50. 
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actualised, and thoughts to be thought.
56
 Not confined to the 'sensory-motor' logic of 
the narrative, outside realism and representation, such an image – never stable, never 
frozen in time – 'becomes' rather than is. It is a divergence from linear forms of 
movement (in-between stillness and movement) that participates in (rather than 
captures) processual reality, and as such renders it unrecognisable.
57
 It constitutes of a 
plane of composition, an immanent space-time which is also an aesthetical field where 
virtual sensations are created.
58
 As such, the image-world functions as a radical 
opening which is not a figure of a metaphor but the real of becoming; a living, rather 
than an intellectual, concept. It thinks via intuition.
59
 Thinking such an image on the 
other hand would require the aptitude of wa(o)nder, an opening to unknown and 
unforeseeable forces. Spaces, milieus, zones, maps, labyrinths. Wanderings, 
returnings. Connections. Formations of worlds, constellations of universes, 
landscapes.
60
 My aim is to 'investigate'/ to think and create with this real as affect-
thought, as a style of expression that is aesthetic.  
 
Objects on screen, Virginia Woolf wrote, 
have become not more beautiful in the sense in which pictures are beautiful, 
but shall we call it (our vocabulary is miserably insufficient) more real, or real 
with a different reality from that which we perceive in daily life? We behold 
them as they are when we are not there. We see life as it is when we have no 





                                                 
56
 The Outside for Deleuze is the virtual force that is not opposed to the inside but is neither a rational 
Whole. It is an open whole, an interval where the common sense perception or understanding of things 
is suspended. As this virtual force can only be 'felt' through the shock (encountering something 
intolerable or too beautiful) it 'provokes' new thinking. In the time-image cinema this is what Deleuze 
calls the "irrational cut", where the chain of events and edited images is broken in favour of the 
aberrant movement of disconnected events. See Deleuze, Cinema 2. 
57
 Unrecognisable does not mean abstract or estranged but impossible to comprehend from the 
standpoint of commonsensical, habitual laws of perception. It is the case of virtual intensities and 
imperceptible sensations (a-sygnifying signs), modes of 'seeing' not attached to the human eye 
Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, p. 32. 
58
 Plane of composition as a concept will be discussed later in this thesis, particularly in relation to the 
still photographic image in Chapter/ exposure 3. 
59
 For Deleuze through Bergson, 'connecting' with the (real) outside requires not intellect – knowledge 
or commonsensical, sensory-motor perception - but a vital intuition that brings liberated senses into 
direct contact with time and thought. Deleuze, Cinema 2. 
60
 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, p. 28. 
61
 Virginia Woolf, 'The Cinema', in Michael O'Pray (ed), The British Avant-Garde Film 1926 to 1995: 
An Anthology of Writings (The Arts Council of England), 1996. p. 135. 
24 
 
The real is important here as a link to the world, on the one hand, and as a mechanism 
for accessing a kind of beyond to everyday experience.
62
 It is not something opposed 
to the fictional or the imaginary, but where the imaginary is construed as imaging 
(bringing forth images); what Deleuze calls fabulation, not representing. "Cinema," 
Deleuze writes, "does not just present images, it surrounds them with a world."
63
 It is 
actual, not realising or reproducing but rendering visible, and virtual, not transcendent 
but immanent outside. "It is as if an image is a mirror, a photo or a postcard that came 
to life …"64 The real's ontological 'entanglement' with the image cannot be separated 
from the 'domains' of perception and aesthetics, where the question of perception and 





The concept of perception that is required here is the Bergsonian, 'pure perception' 
which happens outside of the sensory-motor reactive moment of survival, and outside 
one subjective point of view; a consciousness as something rather than of something 
outside realism and idealism. According to Bergson, matter exists in itself just as we 
perceive it; it is a "self existing image."
66
 Thus, as Quentin Meillassoux pointed out, 
human perception is the selection of only one of the rhythms of a matter-image, which 
contain each and every one of them.
67
 Extending this to Deleuze's theory of the time-
image, this indeterminate perception would be a question of impersonal affects, 
percepts and concepts, 'blocks of sensations' which cannot be 'read' but experienced 
directly, including thought. It 'forces out' a particular attention (suspension of normal 
motor activity): a condition that allows us to slow down; a break in habit, an opening 
of the "vacuoles of non-communication,"
68
 which then enable a polyphony or 
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 This is particularly 'evident' in early writing where the cinema was thought of as a predominantly 
visual, and not as a language (as mentioned earlier). It later returns with Bazin's writings on Italian 
neorealism, and Deleuze's Cinema books. 
63
 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 66. 
64
 Ibid., p. 67. 
65
 For Deleuze, "no art or no sensation have ever been representational." Deleuze, and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, p. 193. This is where cinema meets art.  
66
 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans., Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. (Zone Books, 
1991), p. 10. 
67
 "The thing in itself is all the points of view it is possible to take on that thing: from the most intimate, 
those of its finest details, to the most remote." Quentin Meillassoux, 'Subtraction and Contradiction: 




 Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (Columbia University Press, New York, 
1995), p. 175. 
25 
 
multiplicity of different selves, without the restriction to the Symbolic Order of the 
sameness, which frees consciousness from the fixed habits and utilitarian concerns, 
and from which something new emerges. This would be opening out (going out of 
one self) to the multiplicity of human and non-human durations in time that produce 
difference. Contemplative, neither passive, nor active in the normative sense, but a 
potential to immerse oneself in the image, which exceeds the terms of control either of 
or by the image.
69
 A certain state, we might call love, or a powerful, non-organic 
vitality that is beyond or outside particular bodies, but which allows for the body to be 
affected and to affect. Paraphrasing Bergson, I will call this attentive 
misrecognition.
70
 It hovers outside and within the flesh(y) encounters; hesitantly, 
unknowingly. In imaging this would be a result of both the director's vision and the 
non-human eye of the camera, and in the case of viewing, the viewer's emotion 
(memory' and thinking) which come together as the power of the false.
71
 Thus, the 
'real' perception will be that of pre-personal, non-subjective, and non-human 
(co)creative encounter; an event of time, not representation. And the aesthetic – an 
affective 'offspring' of that encounter, not a judgment. That is why linguistic or 
psychoanalytic approaches are misleading: there is nothing to be looked for on this 
side or the other of the filmic images, no exterior structure that would prescribe their 
forms. With this in mind, cinema is not/ cannot be a language, but an event of affect-
thought, a living concept of the real. Accordingly, aesthetics moves from judgment/ 
theory of beauty towards creative 'framing' of irrational intervals where 
commonsensical and habitual recognition is shattered and the possibility of rational 
synthesis destroyed; an 'intensive construction' that is image's 'soul'. Here the 
emotional rapture puts the viewer in a situation where the liberated from perception 
                                                 
69
 As Maria Walsh writes, in the interrelation between the stilled - yet diegetic - image, and the 
spectator, who is also both still and moving, a disjunctive engagement between the parameters of 
stillness and movement occurs, generating associations and emotions that are not predicated on content. 
Maria Walsh, 'Against Fetishism: The Moving Quiescence of Life 24 Frames a Second', in Film 
Philosophy, 10.2, 2006, p. 6. This is one of the many unforeseen outcomes of the encounters with the 
cinematic. 
70
 As mentioned before, the attentive recognition comes through recollection images. However, when 
attentive recognition fails, when we cannot remember, the present optical perception does not link up 
with either the motor image or a recollection image, but enters into relation with genuinely virtual 
elements, feelings of déjá vu or 'past in general', dream images, fantasies. Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 52. 
71
 For Deleuze, the false is not opposite to truth but it is a different kind of truth, the false which is the 
artistic power that puts the 'philosophical' Truth into question; which replaces and supercedes the form 
of truth. Deleuze Cinema 2, p. 127. 
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senses are confronted with the non-thinking.
72
 As it is not a domain of a subject, but 
pre-personal and pre-linguistic affect, the 'interpretative' objective also deviates from 
the traumatic Real as proposed by Lacan, which is not to say that the concepts of 
unconscious processes and irrational gestures do not come up as necessary 
constituents of the image. In this sense, the real moves away from representation 
altogether, towards what Bracha Ettinger called the encounter-event. For Deleuze 
(and Guattari) this would be a non-Oedipal sense of (un)conscious creating and 
thinking through desire.
73
 An aesthetics of affect-thought. Thus, what will pierce 
through the image is life vibrating with its own rhythms, an abstract yet real 
movement of matter. It will be an image seen as an aesthetic event – an instant of 
rhythmic time shimmering through all. Above all, it is presented as the processual 
creative 'network' that happens between the work of art, the viewer, and the 'outside', 
which is folded in time and 'consists' of (e)motion. Thus sensed, the real falls between 
the categories of oppositional dialectics of inside/outside, subjective/objective, 
reality/memory. It sits in-between and within all sorts of connections and pathways, in 
the maze of interrelations of indexicality and imagination, of reference and art, of 
materiality and illusion. It escapes interpretation, appropriation, and categorisation, 
becoming instead the web of vital cells vibrating in-between the 'object' and 'I' in the 
flesh of the world folded in time; a construction-expression were the meaning is 
emptying itself. As a folding and unfolding process of imaging, it grasp and repels the 
viewer in virtually 'reciprocal' encounters. It would be an image-world, the moving 
force that 'frames sensation', the move towards gesture rather than meaning, and a 
space-time of thinking with affect – mind and body; an immanent life of becoming 
where art, life, and thinking come together as tragic aesthetics. 
74
 This thesis will 
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 Following Artaud and Blanchot’s idea of the ‘impossibility of thinking’, Deleuze argues that real 
thinking starts precisely on its very impossibility: 'The impossibility of thinking that is thought'. 
Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 161.  
73
 Bracha Ettinger developed the concept of the encounter-event as encounter taking place at the 
borderline of 'I' and non-'I', outside the phallic structure, which is an inter-subjective 'engagement' with 
life, not a consequence of non-representable (that which cannot be represented) repressed trauma/ death 
drive. For her, this forms specific aesthetical and ethical accesses to the Other. Bracha L. Ettinger, The 
Matrixial Borderspace, (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2006). I will extend the use of 
the concept to the pre-subjective, non-personal encounter outside the psychoanalytic model, towards 
the Deleuzian (and Guattarian) understanding of the outside and the unconscious as an immanent space 
of desire that is not dependent on the familial structure/ drama; a kind of productive orphaned space. 
Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, 
Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Continuum, London, 2004), and A Thousand Plateaus.  
74
 The idea of a poetic gesture will be explored in following Chapters/ exposures in relation to speech 
(sound), and in relation the characters/ figures. Tragic aesthetics will be discussed in the context of 
Nietzsche's idea of tragedy in Chapter/ exposure 5. 
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speak of the image that is alive, in its embryonic state of 'enormous' life-force, 
bringing out the vital sensation as intensity, an excess rather than lack. The concept of 
aesthetics, on the other hand, will be thought of in its original, pre-Kantian realm of 
the 'creation' of sensations, but with the Deleuzian proposition of its impersonal, pre-
subjective and non-human aspect. As sensations do not correlate of any subject but 
are veritable beings in themselves, endowed with an autonomous existence,
 
they 'live' 
outside the scope of judgment and representation.
75
 Aesthetics not as a theory of 
beauty but intensity, and a rapture between perception and emotion. As Deleuze 
proposed, it is neither a theory nor a reflection exercised on previously given objects 
but a creative activity, and in this activity it finds its own dignity.
76
 The real "is that 





Such is Béla Tarr's real cinema, the main focus of my 'adventure' into the real. 
There are certain elements of its imagery – difficult, often problematic – unfamiliar, 
somewhere on the borderline between the still and moving image, between revealing 
and concealing, absence and presence, memory and forgetting, which do not lend 
themselves to a 'unidimensional' interpretation or analysis, and as such embody what 
this real is. Beautifully filmed, with extremely long takes and very little editing, Tarr’s 
films are like a collection of old, black and white photographs of a forgotten time 
where 'nothing happens'. People walk, dance, get bored, drink, and muse on the 
universal order or disorder of the world. The same scenes are repeated from different 
angles, and action – or rather, the lack of it – co-exists curiously with the monotonous, 
insistent soundtrack. All this appears to be going on for an eternity. This is the cinema 
of time and experience, where the images are dense and "time is out of joint."
78
 
Optical and sound images, infested by the senses. 
The absence of a storyline, non-professional actors, found locations, and long shots 
uninterrupted by editing, all informed by the reality of post-communist Hungary 
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might be pointing towards a realism or naturalism similar to that of Italian 
Neorealism, or John Cassavetes's films. On the other hand, this is a very painstakingly 
choreographed imaging based on the novels of László Krasnahorkai.
79
 However, it is 
neither realistic nor an idealistic/fictional representation but "a sum-total of dealings 
with the world" – which is real – both imagined and very concrete; the "cinema of 
wonder" (John Orr), and the "cinema of damnation" (Tony MacKibbin).
80
 The vision 
Tarr is creating alongside and from/with(in) the world is uniquely its own. Brought 
out by the director, this image-world sees and thinks itself. Not objectively perceived 
reality, nor a metaphysical beyond, it is rather a strange presence, both actual and 
virtual, in the process of creating and re-creating itself.
81
 It is art and life, where the 
director does not give us access to a given reality, but creates a cinema with a sense of 
its own 'radically ambiguous and open' reality where it no longer merely signifies the 
real but becomes real.
82
 It is a thing in itself, a different world and different reality 
that is 'immersed' in the stuff of life, and which restores the link with the world by 
rising above the everyday, the accepted, and the compromised, outside judgment and 
outside commentary. Art, which does not tell us how to live, but might 'force' us to 
think by the power of affect; a non-personal, difficult and 'unknown' space of 
becoming. Here the image does violence to the 'world', and thus thinks. Accordingly, 
by affecting the viewer, it compels him/ her to think. I call it the cinema of the real, or 
real cinema, where the affirmative aesthetics keep the 'reading' outside of positive or 
negative dialectics of oppositions. Following on from this, such provoked 'reading' is 
construed as a 'personal' journey (experiment) into the experience of this image-world, 
as a poetic coming together of a philosophical, performative, and inquiring free 
indirect discourse that would sense and tease out expression-concepts.  
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The analytical (and methodological) approach to those films' reality will function on 
two levels interacting with each other, and operating between creation and perception, 
thinking and experimenting. As presented by the director, it is a world ‘informed’ by 
the post-communist reality of Hungary; a consciously constructed image of 'misery 
and moral decay', a ‘state of amnesia’, where the characters seem to be condemned to 
repeat the past, the life of the tragic or tragicomic, as might be the case; immobility, in 
a hopeless search for something, or somebody, to liberate them. On the other hand, 
there is a "collection of sensations", the indescribable 'something', stored in the 
subconscious of the film, reaching our innermost feelings, bringing up some obscure 
memories and experiences, "stirring our soul like a revelation that is impossible to 
interpret in any particular way."
83
 An experience to which finding a strictly 
appropriate language is not possible, and which constantly undermines any attempt at 
constructing a meaningful whole. The state of amnesia and the virtual becoming will 
intertwine and exchange places, undoing the symbolic as well as the narrative 
structure. 
 
Béla Tarr is making images, and thinking with images, which are difficult and intense. 
They are difficult on two levels: emotional – we do not quite know what to feel, or 
how to react, when put in contact with often morally 'ambiguous' imagery
84
; and 
formal – constant rain, repetitive 'music', hallucinatory, dark, depressive imagery, 
affective rhythm. These cannot be easily defined or 'justified' by either normative 
ethical or aesthetic standards. Neither of Beauty nor the Sublime, the encountered 
(e)motion does not takes us away from a dull and uninteresting life into the realm of a 
'dream', nor does it purify in redemptive self-recognition; not a cathartic relief, nor a 
conventional shock. It sits opposite our transcendental capacity to make sense, in our 
minds-bodies. It drags out of the most 'deeply concealed' feeling the sense of the 
unknown, and the force of thinking. Real, nagging, provoking emotion we do not 
often recognise, it is a 'silent' emotion of creative longing as a potential.
85
 It is the 
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intuitive 'longing' that pulsates behind our own personal story; a certain durée or an 
'aura' of not so much nostalgic reverie but the virtual, pre-personal, non-subjective 
space of imagination and intuition. It is a realm of thinking emotion or feeling thought 
from 'the unthought' outside, which is not the same as a shock of 'the new', but a 
potential for difference, an affect emerging from material, sonorous and visual 
singularities. It also acquires a different sense of beauty:
86
 percepts and affects 
emanating through the image, not necessarily what we normatively (with 'human eye') 
accept as beautiful. An intensely felt physicality of the crumbling and depressive 
world stretched in time and forgotten by history, as will become apparent in the last 
chapter, paradoxically affirms life in the way of the Nietzschean tragic aesthetic. As 
such, images are no longer recognisable in the ordinary/ habitual sense of perception 
but form a space of creative encounters; all sorts of encounters: memory and 
imagination, desire and loss, reality and dreams, all 'entangled' with each other and 
brought onto the surface. The real, embodied material physicality that is 'presented' 
(played with, tried…) by the style of contradicting points of view or non-point of 
view framings (movable frames), is at the same time the realm of the 'imaginary', pre-
symbolic, creative space of invention where art and life can embrace each other in 
non-violent, yet non-compromising, power-less politics of feeling and thinking. It 
dwells in between all of the connections, passageways, in the maze of interrelations of 
indexicality and imagination, of reference and art, of materiality and illusion. 
Ephemeral or elusive in the sense that it escapes interpretation and judgment, 
positioning, meaning and categorisation, it vibrates in the web of vital cells in-
between the objects and the 'I', in the flesh of the world enfolded in time.  
 
Style, on the other hand, enables the film to 'think the unthinkable', and 
philosophically.
87
 As creative construction, a 'happening' through both chance and 
necessity, less involved in making sense of the world and more in opening the senses 
to time as duration, in exploring the possibilities of perception as vision outside the 
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observing 'I' (eye) and outside the symbolic meaning making 'theoria', it is not a 
structure but an event. It belongs to an aesthetics of duration – a style, 'controlled' by 
the rhythm of cerebral and haptic visuality, determined by what Deleuze calls the 
'camera consciousness, and the 'art of description'.
88
 Obsessive framing, low light, and 
stark black and white photography are the means that endow the image with the 
intensity of the real and the space of encounter; the power of the false. Here, the 
poetic meandering in a transsubjective dimension that underlies the individual 
unconscious and impersonal universal outside, puts Truth into crisis, becoming a web 
of multiple possibilities; encounters-events open to chance and the unknown. In a 
momentarily suspended gesture of in-between, the real is hesitant, paused. The 
already and not yet, past and future, coexist in 'time', enfolded in thought, both 
duration and instant. It is a process of a conglomeration of perception, memory, and 
sensation, through particular attention outside recognition. Experiential and 
experimental. Outside structure, symbolism, and appropriation, it is a realm of 
opening up; an ethics of creation. 
  
Thus, my question again is, how is it possible to embark on such a journey without 
falling into generalities? How, to borrow Yve Lomax's words, is it possible to engage 
with "time that brings us the surprise of the unexpected without which life suffocates 
from banality", without becoming too nebulous or too elusive? How "can we enable 
chance and the unforeseen to be given a chance?"
89
 In what way can writing become a 
'theory' without falling to significations and ideologies of representation? How can it 
be experimental and creative, creating new pathways and concepts without falling into 
meaningless idiosyncrasies? How can one write and create within a paradox of non-
sense, without imposing the meaning and yet creating new meanings. How does one 
form thinking as a provocation, a questioning and not a 'critique', resisting the 'master' 
entrapment of judgment? How does one engage with what is critically without 
criticizing? How does one resist 'what is' without a negating or antagonistic dialectic, 
and yet think of new, different modes of being and 'creating'?  
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My writing is 'theory' only in the sense of it being a processual, experimental 
engagement with the (photographic) image in the hope to (re)discover the real as a 
matter from which new concepts might arise. This would be a theory where the form 
becomes the content and the content 'images' itself into the form of alive, dynamic 
exposures. Thinking philosophically in duration, it seeks neither to convince nor to 
'give voice', but to radically open 'what is' by creating a rapture in what might have 
stagnated into familiar/l icons, to become a 'seer' rather than a viewer, a thinker rather 
than a moraliser. To create not a figure of metaphor but the real of becoming (not an 
intellectual but a living/ thinking concept); communication of the image that bypasses 
knowledge. To think and write photographically in instants and pauses; in exposures 
and screens. Capturing expression. The 'argument' of this thesis will take only one 
'assumption' that will resonate throughout: the movement of life that is also thinking, 
is everywhere and constant (the only one that does not change), and that it enfolds all 
life – life, art and thought in time-becoming.90 
 
Indeed, in the face of the injunction to speed there must be a 'revolt' that 
produces an interruption in which thinking can construct a time that is its own. 
It is in this time that thinking obtains the chance to 'throw the dice' against the 




What is an image?
92
 Image as depiction and imagination, construction and intuition. 
An image as art and image of thought, it gives rise to much long-standing disarray. 
Image-world, it's own space-time, vibrant matter of time-space – immanence. How 
many words are needed to describe the non-representational image or the image that 
wants to become non-representational, both art and thinking. In so many words-
sensations it seems to be-coming to 'defend' itself within the familiar/l structures of 
discourse, repositioning the majoritarian narrative of representation. Not patriarchal or 
matriarchal, it desires to prevail, orphaned, parentless and nameless creative space of 
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make-believe, an inhuman and imperceptible plane of composition.
93
 The 
photographic image – time based – thus is nothing stable or defined, an 'expression' in 
passing where space coexists with time, and time is unhinged. Unforeseen and 
'ungrounded', it will remain, with Deleuzian proposition, its own reality and its own 
thinking.
94
 Perhaps 'what is an image?' is the wrong question altogether. The answer, 
or no desire to answer, falls outside the 'desire' to know, and moves into the area of 
hesitating/ hypothesizing without presupposition: linking and unlinking, folding and 
unfolding, in the movement of thinking in/ with time unhinged; a non-linear process 
of creation. It is not within the scope of this project to define the image or position it 
within pre-existent models (psychoanalytical, structural, philosophical) but to open it 
to thinking, to set image-thought in motion through the fragmentary encounters with 
the sensations it produces; to "reweave our fabric of belief and desires."
95
 Not outside 
of Being or Nothingness but in the meanwhile of an "amazing wait", or a 'trace' of a 
rollercoaster that went in the 'wrong' direction into the unknown. Perhaps what I'm 
after, to suggest with Yve Lomax once again, is 
 
something which is better than being or non-being which is being's correlate, 
its other, its twin. I'm not denying the existence of something. To be or not to 
be? – that is not the question.96 
 
Ours is a civilization of image, and a civilisation of cliché, Deleuze asserts: "We are 
besieged by photographs that are illustrations, by newspapers that are narrations, by 
cinema-images, by television images. There are psychic clichés just as there are 
physical clichés – ready-made perceptions, memories, phantasms."97 Throughout 
history, image has been constructed and deconstructed, 'brought' forward' in the 
iconical representation of truth, rejected as an exploitative medium of occulacentric 
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regime, and disappeared under the simulacrum of denigrated vision.
98
 We now find 
ourselves in the dialectical circle of oppositions of what is rejected or accepted, as 
aesthetics or as politics. Is it possible to 'unravel' the conundrum of what something 
called an image is? Of what is art and what is not? Is it possible to recover image 
aesthetically and 'authentically' from the avalanche of so many interpretations, 
appropriations, and judgments (from intellectual critiques to 'popular cultures'), 
without the negative dualisms, and without falling into what Benjamin called the 
'aesthetisation of politics'?
99
 Is it possible to bring together art, life, and thinking in the 
Nietzschean-Deleuzian sense of affirmative ethico-aesthetics? With the visual arts 
moving away from 'image-making' towards more conceptual and research based 
practices – which often comment on, conceptualise or contextualise, rather than create 
– it is perhaps cinema ("when it is good") that takes on the 'notion' of the image in a 
very 'real' sense (of belief). It can, as Deleuze hoped, bring us closer to life by 




In the regime of 'cliché', images are owned, used, narrated, illustrated, de-constructed, 
put into context or out of context, judged, and rejected either in the name of aesthetics 
or politics. What would happen if we think of the image not in terms of 
representation, ideology, or deconstruction, but as a production of affect (a catalyst or 
expression) and thus a space of transformation? 
 
Deleuze began the process by looking at image/ art in terms of its affective and 
thinking power.
101
 If we were capable, as Deleuze suggests, of creating an image, the 
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image alone would be enough to restore the 'thing in itself', in its excess of beauty or 
horror, and it would thus liberate a seeing whose power is still unknown to us.
102
 This 
image, the time-image or thinking image – a 'pure optical and sound situation' – he 
found in modern cinema, such as Italian Neorealism, French New Wave, the films of 
Ozu, or American independent cinema of 1970s. It was not so much a social content, 
or the discovery of an enigmatic, dispersed reality yet to be deciphered (Bazin) that 
was important for Deleuze in this cinema, particularly in Italian Neorealism. Rather, it 
was a new kind of image, that surged up in situations in which perception, instead of 
prolonging itself into action, is absorbed by the object or the situation, no longer 
representation but direct presentation of time.
103
 Such an image, not confined to the 
logic of cause-effect narrative, and never 'frozen in time', 'becomes' rather than is with 
the non-human eye of the camera and the movement of film. Moments of rupture, 
hesitation, or prolonged duration, replace the sensory-motor action, "uniting image, 
thought and camera in a single 'automatic subjectivity'."
104
 It is now the 'any-space-
whatever', linked to other images by the 'irrational cut', which creates the space for 
'seeing' and thinking. The characters that are no longer "actors" but seers, witness a 
world that has become unthinkable because it has become intolerable, as intolerable in 
its tremendous injustices as in its daily banality. Accordingly, the link between 
humans and the world is ruptured. When this happens, the special relation between the 
viewer, the world, and the 'image' opens up, frees vision, and stimulates unpredictable 
responses. Here, seeing could not be confined to the observing/ judging 'I', but 
becomes a 'free-indirect-vision'. What was most important now, is that the image and 
the vision was no longer tied to a transcendental beyond but became immanent this-
world-image, an actual and virtual real. Its reality was now contained in an 
assemblaged machinic body of 'vibrating matter'. Buildings, landscapes, objects, and 
beings, are no longer ‘recognised' but perceived, as it were, for the first time. The 
familiar fades away, and the objects of the world acquire a new face, revealing an 
existence previously unnoticed, that calls for their attention and absorbs them. The 
image and the world becomes one, beginning the process of rendering visible, of 
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imaging "not yet incorporated to a viewpoint or ordered into line of time."
105
 No 
longer perceived, but consisting of sensations, percept and affects, such an image-
world could not be 'interpreted' through known authoritative (molar) discourses. As 
such, as Marrati stated, it opened the path for the future cinema, giving art the task of 
believing and producing belief in this world.
106
 Instead of old hopes for a better world 
still to come, or for another world beyond this one, we need a belief that addresses 
itself to this world, the only one we have, and where the potentiality of what is yet to 
come lies. With no more future to justify the present, Deleuze emphasises, the 
necessity of believing is critical; of a belief more difficult than the old one – without a 
horizon of redemption, purely immanent, with no other object than the possibility of 
creating new forms of life, of re-establishing the conviction that we can inhabit the 
world, which is not the same as owning the world.
107
 Thus, by moving away from the 
dualistic form of transcendence (the belief in some other world to come, be it the 
American new civilisation or the Soviet socialist dream of the proletariat), we (and the 
cinema), Deleuze suggests, can find immanent powers of life, which hold hope and 





[It] is possible that the problem now concerns the one who believes in the 
world, and not event in the existence of the world but in its possibilities of 
movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new modes of 
existence, closer to animals and rocks. It may be that believing in this world, 




The real of this cinema 'reveals itself' not as representation of reality or realism but as 
a style of expression, a style that is also a belief that was so uniquely important to 
such different filmmakers as Rossellini, De Sica, Fellini, and Antonioni. Neither a 
personal nor cultural vision, but an expression of matter, this was not the question of 
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formalism but a way of restoring day-to-day events in their material physicality as the 
way of getting back to the world.
110
 By taking away the familiarity of perception and 
affection, they imagined new worlds; the unknown virtual potentiality not possible to 
conceive from the a priori of judgment. This, however, required a style in order to 
bring the unfamiliar and this belief to the surface. Thus, here aesthetics take on a 
different face – that of the 'bringer'/ creator, not the bearer of 'beauty'.111 For Deleuze, 
art is not a way of representing experiences and memories that we might 'recognise'; it 
does not show us what the world is, but 'imagines' new worlds. What is at stake in art, 
he asserts, is never "reproducing the visible but rendering visible"
112
 By moving away 
from both the abstract universal and the 'flesh of the world', the experience is 
embedded in the time-space which 'forces' us to think.
113
 What is experienced on the 
other hand, Deleuze writes, is not an object of recognition but "a fundamental 
encounter" that "can be grasped in a range of affective tones."
114
 This kind of aesthetic 
requires a different type of politics; what I will explore later as powerless politics and 
"passive vitalism"; no longer aesthetics versus politics, but aesthetico-ethical 
experimentation.
115
 Here morality will be replaced by ethics (Spinoza), and the 
ressentiment of judgment by Amor fati (Nietzsche). Following on from this, creating/ 
thinking/ 'interpreting' is not about re-producing a world we already have but creating 
a new one: an intensive and physical image-world constructed out of encounters and 
assemblages of bodies, buildings, rocks, winds and moods; an indexical convergence 
without referentiality of representation/ copy, a non-signifying sensation of 
photographic sign. 
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According to Deleuze, if movies think, such a power of thought expresses itself 
through the very images themselves: it depends neither on the content of the narrative 
nor on an exterior structure that cinema would then translate. This process is a 
conglomeration of perception, memory, and sensation. This is its own world and its 
own mind, its own imagination, different from human ways of thinking and 
perceiving; a film-mind.
116
 As Daniel Frampton has pointed out, "the filmmind is not 
an 'external' force, nor is it a mystical being or invisible other, it is 'in' the film itself, it 
is the film that is steering its own (dis)course."
117
 Film is a 'vision', a different 
thinking and perceiving, not through its ideologies but through a new (non-human) 
expression. Thus, as Frampton proposes, its 'challenge' moves from the politics of 
establishing a particular historical or social order, to the experiential poetics of the 
event, where thinking and creating happen simultaneously, opening new and 
unforeseeable encounters. This means, rather than thinking in terms of events, making 
thinking its own event by embracing the rich chaos of life with the uniqueness and 
potential of each moment.
118
 Furthermore, as Claire Colebrook has suggested, the 
time-image, which expresses the force of cinema’s potential, might be so rare as to be 
only thinkable in its pure form, but never fully actualisable.
119
 Thus, thinking with 
film-mind, with the photographic, imaging will replace the interpretative discourse 




What can film do? "What is the good of film experience?", Rodowick asks through 
Kracauer.
121
 What does it means to bring ethics and cinema together as a 
philosophical problem? Kracauer does not want to know if a particular film or 
filmmaker is "ethical", nor is the question the basis for making moral judgments of 
artworks and their makers. He asks, rather, how do we evaluate our experience of the 
movies; meaning, in what ways do the movies offer themselves as a medium for an 
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As in philosophy, the question of life (how do I live?) in cinema demands a 
reflexive examination of self, in its possibility of knowing itself and others 
and in its openness to change or not. […] In this way, an ethics is distinct from 
the usual sense of morality. Morals refer ordinarily to a transcendental system 
of values to which we conform, or against which we are found lacking. An 
ethics is an immanent set of reasoned choices. In ethical expression, we 
evaluate our current mode of existence, seeking to expand, change, or 




The ethical question is also inseparable from an aesthetical one. The 'experience' of 
life (philosopein) is, simultaneously, expression and existential choice – "the medium 
and idiom of a life, the mode of existence and its style."
124
 The film style, its image, 
can thus be seen as a link to perceiving and thinking anew (a 'new kind of thinking'), 
and here, in the poetical transformation, may lie the key to change. In Deleuze's 
Nietzschean and Bergsonian perspectives on cinema, the concepts of movement and 





Tarr is making images that are 'unique' in their ability to 'shock' us out of familiarity, 
into a state of thinking where the image is no longer 'recognisable'. His rainy image of 
Hungary is stored in long takes, deep focus photography, "any-spaces-whatever", 
characters’ faces, 'architextures' of settings, and sound.126 The material, earthy 
physicality, intertwined with the careful, precise construction of 'elements', that are a 
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result of director's vision, the way he 'sees' the world,
127
 and with the eye of the 
camera, create a set of multiple machinic assemblages; moments lasting for minutes, 
repeated from different points of view scenes, and monotonous, insistent image-
sounds. Tarr's films think with long takes, wandering movements and 'stills', black 
and white and in-between. A style that produces affect and thinking through creation; 
an aesthetics of duration – a style, 'controlled' by the rhythm of cerebral and haptic 
visuality – works through imaging that enables the actors to live, the landscape to 
'breathe', and the light to 'persevere', rendering the film with a cosmological 
significance and the viewer with a space of affect and thought. Details of everyday, 
mundane chores, enveloped in the process of description and experimentation, 
recording and imagination, refuse to lend themselves to any moralistic or theological 
judgments. In the inevitable 'life' of the process, and of the new, of becoming, of time, 
of the outside, of becoming lost, of uncertainty and paradox, and of (im)possible time 
as everything.  
 
… a cinema of the body, which puts all the weight of the past into the body, 
and cinema of the brain, which reveals the creativity of the world, its colours 




The affirmative, tragic aesthetic of Tarr's Nietzschean project weaves the story of an 
inhuman life asserted through 'amnesiac' virtual becoming. Incredibly intense, 'earthy', 
real and felt, it is the tangible experience of duration, the sense of timeless (en)during, 
as if the process of imaging was a result of an 'artistic' wrestling with the power of a 
vital, formless, and chaotic force, an unknown nomadic becoming. This is the 
language of affect, an affective assemblage of visual 'utterable' tending towards 
indiscernibility; an expression neither subjective nor objective, stored in images' cells 
and brought to the surface. Tarr's images do not lend themselves to 'interpretations', as 
they invite instead to be lived with, in, or through, which is different from that which 
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is proposed by 'spectator theory'.
129
 Uncertain, affective and real; this is where life and 
thinking come together with art: "a pure contemplation without knowledge."
130
 By 
means of these long/still hypnotic images, we can in a sense see what we feel. No 
longer a question of recognition, of 'what is', but of a sensory becoming with 'what 
is'.
131
 It is a time-space in-between: cognition and emotion, the thought and reality, the 
frame and the outside, viewing and creating: "that unforeseeable nothing which is 








The aim of this thesis is not to illustrate Deleuze's ideas with Tarr's images, nor to 
read Tarr's cinema through Deleuze as such, but to think with images philosophically, 
in the hope to open up the area of theory to the 'powers of the false'. On the one hand, 
the project seeks to creatively re-think Deleuzian concepts while thinking 'about' still 
and moving images, photography and cinema, in relation to the real as affect and 
thought. On the other, to 'continue' films’ images by opening their thinking further 
through various encounters between film, philosophy, and my own (e)motion towards 
unexpected and unforeseen outcomes. A number of concepts related to immanence 
and becoming will enable me to set the thought (of) the real in motion, not only to un-
ground the image from its politics of subject and object, form and content, inside and 
outside, but to 'intensify' its virtual power (of the false). They will be weaved in a kind 
of labyrinthine fashion into a tapestry of fragmentary encounters created alongside 
Tarr's imagery, or 'played with' (a Nietzschean proposition) as an aesthetico-ethical 
experiment. 'Positioning' around, or rather, in the middle of the time-image, and 
inseparable from it, the concepts of life, art, thinking and affect will (in)form this 
uncertain film-philosophy project. It is not my intention to theorise or 'explain' 
concepts, but whose sense I hope to evoke creatively through expression, where signs 
as events will flow from the real, not signification, not real as system, but the powers 
of image-world.  
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Stanley Cavell points out in The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, 
that cinematic experience could be said to be comprised of nothing but remembered 
and misremembered moments.
134
 We are always in the process of constructing the 
image projected before us, linking it to other images, whether from the history of film 
or from the films we replay endlessly in the forms of memories and dreams.
135
 It is 
this strange created memory of something we have not seen before that is possible in 
cinema, an encounter-event or event of an encounter. It is a space of thinking with 
(e)motion – mind and body. In linguistic, structural, psychoanalytic and cultural 
frameworks (reception theory), film theory has failed to break away from ideological/ 
meaning based treatment of film as a representative mode of some external reality. 
Film practice and theory predominantly 'oscillate' within the polarising forces of form 
versus content, aesthetics versus politics, outside versus inside; where the film is 
regarded as an object, framed and projected for the subject's/ viewer's reception and 
interpretation. As Vivian Sobchack points out, through many processes of 'coding' and 
'de-coding', film and its viewing became enclosed in the metaphors of the frame – 
formalism, the window, realism, and the mirror – in contemporary critical theory, 
where the binary 'poetics' of the relevant concepts of perception, expression and 
representation were firmly established.
136
 Cinema, with its ideological implications, 
has been seen either as a process of registration or as a language. As a result, political 
cinema distinguished itself from art (as 'purely' aesthetic) cinema, relinquishing the 
importance of aesthetics for reflexive and anti-illusionistic strategies in the form of 
Brechtian critical distanciation. Similarly, the spectator’s engagement with film has 
been seen either as cognitive participation or corporeal reception, holding firmly the 
distinction between mind and body.  
 
On the other hand, the advent of cinema, as Claire Colebrook writes, might give us a 
form of transversal becoming: not a becoming that is grounded in a being and which 
simply unfolds itself through time, but a becoming that changes with each new 
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 Thus, we can transform our whole way of becoming through the 
encounter with what we are not; in this case the camera, and its non-human 
perception. This can happen, however, only if we encounter the cinema not as 
something we already know but as something that challenges us. It is this challenge of 
the 'old' way of perceiving and thinking, the creation or the new, that is the most 
potent and 'inspirational' aspect of both Deleuze's Cinema books, and his philosophy 
itself. With cinema at its greatest moments, the "turn of experience" is capable of 
undoing that which our habits, needs, and laziness have done, in order to make visible 
what the human eye is not made to see. "Only with cinema can we think of a mode of 
'seeing' that is not attached to human eye."
138
 The "inhuman" task of philosophy and 
cinema, as of every art and every science, always consists in the fact of looking 





Cinema sees, not a world of things, not even a distinct world, but the 




If we think of film as an assemblage, as Deleuze does, as a 'collection of images' or a 
"processual state of immanence", then we can discover a different mindset of the 
aesthetics of film through a wider range of vocabularies outside of signification, 
semiotic, or psychoanalytical explanations.
141
 This can happen not only within the 
ontology of film but in recognising the intricate relationships between the viewer, the 
cinema, and the world, as well as their context. As Paul Patton suggests, the 
possibility of cinema lies, for Deleuze, in the shift from the metaphor to the "reflective 
judgment"; where "nothing is given from the standpoint of the active faculties"; where 
there is no pre-existent context but rather "free and indeterminate accord" between all 
the faculties.
142
 What it means, Gregory Flaxman writes, is the end of divine or 
structural mediation; learning to think without Law, without Father, to develop an 
absolute ethics that begins where symbolic-moral mediation leaves off and an 
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aesthetic experience of non-relation begins"
143
. Thus the power of cinema lies in the 
capacity to exile us from familiar conceptual terrain by extracting the dynamic nature 
of life always in the "process" of creating, thinking, like the process we undertake 
each time we return to the cinema. Deleuze's aesthetic theory is not a theory of 
reception, an analysis of the spectator's judgments, but a theory of aesthetics written 
from the point of view of creation. Like the 'truth', which is not something out there to 
be discovered or found, "but something that must be created […] as a processus in 
infinitum", philosophy for Deleuze is the process of constructing, creating, and 
inventing concepts.
144
 Thus, cinema allows us to engage with and to re-think the 
concepts of life, art and thinking, in both aesthetic and ethical terms.
145
 The time-
image, distinguished from cliché, is both art and life that demands a great 
'thinking'/creative effort from art as well as from life. In this sense, it will be possible 
to move from the fixity of meaning towards a movement of possibilities, thus undoing 
the stability of accepted structures, not through ideological underpinnings or 
deconstruction, but through 'affective rapture'. Theory, accordingly, must be thought 
of as a creative 'experiment' (Brian Massumi), a process or activity parallel to the 
work rather than attempting to explain or interpret it. Intuition: intellect and 
imagination, as Massumi remarks: "It is the edge of the virtual, where it leaks into the 




Béla Tarr's films are modernist and the director frames his images in a very distinctive 
way. It is not a question of formalism as it is already known however, but an 
experiment with form; a style, which is more than an exercise in 'style'. It is the way 
for the image to stay outside of clichéd and accepted ways of perceiving and thinking. 
It is 'there' to make the image strange, unfamiliar, and difficult; to allow for new 
possibilities. Despite the accusation of elitist or modernist choices of films he uses in 
the Cinema books, Deleuze’s insistence on the real thinking and experimenting image 
is vital to thinking about the image, and his strong rejection of judgment in a sense 
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overthrows the arguments concerning the oppositions of elitist or populist. In order 
not to be assimilated into the 'cliché', the image has to be intense and difficult. It 
means being impossible to approach with the same, familiar, everyday logic of 
habitual response. The image, which is nagging, intrusive, visceral, disabling, 
ineffable, is enfolded in the time-space of 'untimely meditation'. Here, the lived 
experience, a sensation embodied in space, is 'captured' by a style that is not 
communication but expression, and expression outside of the oppositional dichotomy 
of thinking, both objective and subjective; a ‘shared’ de-subjectified affect. The 
difficult and unfamiliar imagery creates time-space of events and encounters, 
productive interactions between all kinds of forces; a chance of /for change; blocks of 
becoming. Becomings, desires come together by the power of nomadic thinking, 
creating the image that cannot be hijacked – or not so quickly – from itself, in order to 




Tarr’s unique imagery, complex and intensely difficult, fleeting from both intellect 
and sensation as good sense and common sense, resonate with Deleuze’s thought of 
radical immanence, where the ‘singular’ difference rather than a chain of 
contradictions ‘prevails’, and where concepts are not defined within the doxa of 
binary thinking but created from “without”, in the middle. Transcendental empiricism, 
“disjunctive synthesis,” “double becoming” are the expressions that expose the  
paradoxical nature of Deleuzian philosophical concepts. Tarr creates a world 
perversely, so to speak, in-between, out of entropy, pain, endurance and excruciating 
beauty, resisting both judgment and nostalgia for the lost time. The dense, earthy 
materiality of his visionary world, teasingly balancing on the verge of real and 
imaginary, provokes a disorientating response, both haptic/visceral and 
impersonal/asubjective, in the form of hallucinatory becoming with the image. For 
Deleuze cinema is a living brain that works by “irrational connections,” a machinic 
assemblage which is capable of thinking and intuiting new modes of life. It is also a 
cinema of the body, as well as a cinema of the brain, being in becoming where the 
image-world thinks with the brain as well as with the body, and feels with the body as 
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well as with the brain.
148
 Both are aspects of the time-image where the sensory motor 
link of either/or between the world and the image is severed and ‘replaced’ with the 
logic of irrational interval, of both/ and. Here, time  as a plane of immanence in which 
everything happens, affirms all. At the same time there is no longer association of the 
whole but non-commensurable relations and relinkages which put thought into contact 
with the unthought outside. A brain is now only an interval, a void between stimulus 
and response,
149
 a hallucinatory space of undecidability (of the body), between 
perception and action. As Deleuze tells us, “we no longer believe in a whole as 
interiority of thought, even an open one; we believe in a force from the outside which 
hollows itself out, grabs us and attracts the inside.”150 Throughout Cinema 2 we 
encounter moments of indiscernibility – of actual and virtual, real and imaginary, 
subjective and objective, inside and outside, in the ‘structure’ of crystalline narrative 
and irrational cut. The outside of judgment - “any-space-together” and interstice - 
replaces the dialectics of transcendent value. “We no longer believe in an association 
of images – even crossing voids; we believe in breaks which take on an absolute value 
and subordinate all association.”151 The body-brain-thought structure of affect-
thinking fashions belief in this world through contact with the virtual outside. Tarr’s 
ungraspable and unspeakable imagery, unfamiliar and often problematic – on the edge 
and in-between – still and moving, revealing and concealing, absence and presence, 
memory and forgetting, is a polyphonic composition of material, detailed reality and 
the outside, constructed through the style of waiting which shatters the 
commonsensical ability to comprehend, and ‘thinks’ the impossible. The long 
enduring shot where nothing happens, where the imperceptible expression dwells in 
the image and pierces forth, puts truth into crisis. Here, the diagnosis and affirmation 
come together in the persistent sensing of the irresistible power of life as creating. The 
virtual power breaks through the cracks in the peeling walls, derelict buildings, and 
empty spaces. Non-personal (a) life lingers in the exhaustion of bodies and in 
devastated, barren landscapes. The ‘textured’ rhythm of delirious dance ‘envisage’ 
people to come and communities other than (hu)man. The tactile, material quality of 
light, shapes, and the physical intensity of wasteland-scapes, de-frame the image into 
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strangely clairvoyant vision. Everyday domestic chores - insistent, present and 
enduring, intuit both the (un)known and (un)homely. The accumulation of materiality, 
unremarkable quotidian moments, and black and white textures wrest a life more (or 
less) than human, more (or less) than organic, irreducible to either realism or 
representation. They reposition photographic 'indexity' from it's 'status' as a copy to 
the creative coexistence of the image and the world, not as a double of the imaginary, 
but as multilayered facets of incompossible coexistences – multiple becomings.  From 
material to virtual and back, the nonhuman becoming is the overcoming of human 
through embracing the human (condition) where dogs, walls, and weather also have 
their stories, and where stupidity, baseness and malevolence are part of life. The 
‘problem’ is not defined in terms of goals and means but is “dispersed in a ‘plurality 
of ways of being present in the world’, of belonging to sets, all incompatible and yet 
coexistent”.152  An expression of immanence as at once finite and infinite material-
virtual plane on which everything happens. 
 
The tensions within Deleuze’s thought ‘formulated’ around paradoxes and 
oppositions are (non)resolved in the one-multiple sense of imperceptible becoming. 
Tarr’s tragic aesthetics wrest the invisible forces and intuit new worlds. In order to 
enable Tarr-Deleuze encounter, to be faithful to both modes of expression, the two 
contradictory readings of Deleuze’s philosophy – that ‘of the body’ and that ‘of the 
brain’ – have to be maintained throughout the thesis through the ‘understanding’ that 
the seeming contradictions in Deleuze’s philosophy are not contradictory as such.153 
Not resolving Deleuzian paradoxes and embracing Tarr’s hallucinatory vision 
demands embracing both. The strategy of maintaining the contradictory readings 
stems from the way Tarr images (with) the world, where close to earth, material 
physicality creates a unique vision, a kind of hallucinatory ‘sensing’ demanding a 
certain attention to do with delay and uncertainty. Here the non-thinking of the mind 
and undecidability of the body come together in a mind-body-thinking - thinking 
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through the gap - where neither the apriori systems nor decisive conclusions are 
possible; a process of wo(a)ndering desire. Thus, the nature and aim of the project is 
not to resolve, define or arrive at final conclusion but to bring oppositions into 
(irrational) contact in the hope that new concepts can be created and new problems 
opened be up. Here haptic and cerebral, mind and body, outside and inside, being and 
becoming, (non)communicate on the plane of intensity-composition through 
“irrational connections”. To write with Tarr’s imagery is a desire to stay outside 
binaries of either/or and to be ‘faithful’ to the Deleuzian spirit of difference through 
singular encounters. Thus, creative questioning - methodology of intuitive thinking 
with the image, philosophical, performative, and inquiring - come together as free-
indirect-discourse that would sense and tease out expression-concept. 
 
There is something peculiar to the medium of film (and photography), a very special 
relation to the world, its ability to 'capture' expression-matter photographically, while 
simultaneously transcending everyday materiality, to project both the presence and 
absence, as it were, of materiality. Capturing expression dismisses representation, 
identity, definition, and the thing. It restores the link with the world through the 
immanent power of existence, through the real that is virtual (mental, outside) and 
actual (creating its own reality). It restores belief in this world as it is through mental 
construction – creating new 'worlds'.154 Thus, whatever – stillness or space, is 
traditionally opposed to time, in my analysis will leave the opposition of stillness 
(fixidity) and movement (the flow of time). Through thinking with Bergson's duration 
and Deleuzian/Spinozan univocity, it will proceed with this assumption that time is 
all, and therefore stillness and space can be perceived as immanent movement and 
change. Re-thinking stillness and movement through both the time-image and still 
photography, not as opposed but intertwined affectively and conceptually, within the 
time of in-between. Thus, fixity and flow, past and present, are interchangeable 
concepts creating movement and change. 
 
As previously stated, my thesis will not be concerned with specific film or 
photographic theories but will look at the image from the perspective of relations and 
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assemblages; a network of becomings and possibilities. What is seen? Visible and 
invisible. The surface. Concealing and revealing. The screen as photograph. 
Materiality, physicality, embodiment. Expression outside expressionism, like form 
outside formalism, movable frames of theoretical discourse. The work consists of 
three levels running parallel and interacting with each other. One will attempt to 
discuss the (photographic) image in relation to theoretical findings and image 
aesthetics. Another will take up the challenge offered by Deleuze to create new links 
and images as conscious and necessary processes of thinking, where interpreting takes 
the shape of creative and reflective judgments of 'film thinking'; "a more poetic entry 
to the intelligence of films."
155
 The third will enact a Tarr-Deleuze filmic, 
photographic encounter, from film to still photography and back. The main 'objective' 
of my research is to think the concept of the (photographic) image as art, and as an 
image of thought, as image of real or image as real or real as image. What I aim for is 
to reclaim the image from the 'vicious circle' of the aesthetical, as well as political 
two-dimensional oppositionistic thinking, and propose another that is neither and 
both; neither an investigation into nor against representation or realism. Further 
inspired by Deleuze's conception of aesthetics as a "condition of real experience", the 
thesis will take the form of 'individual' encounters with time-space, of image-ing 
understood as transformation in the sense of both creating and viewing. 
 
… an encounter, becoming, or 'nuptials' that fractures the limits of a well-





The writing will 'vibrate' on various levels: as a project outside of dominant 
film/photography theoretical concerns, as 'performative' writing of experimental 
constructing, and as a means of finding a way of moving between categories and 
definitions, in a process of thinking with the image. As a rhizomatic mode of 
thoughts/images (non)related to each other in an independent construction that does 
not develop in terms of a certain point of illumination or external goal. As a work in 
process, it will engage with the philosophical and aesthetical processes in the 
following manner: with time and perception (history and memory) as concepts 
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encompassing movement, narrative and becoming, in Chapter/exposure 2; with a 
paradoxical nature of the photographic in terms of space (any-space-whatever), 
materiality and the outside, in Chapter/exposure 3; with the concepts of sound in 
relation to rhythm, refrain and resonance as territorializing and deterritorializing 
cosmic nomadic forces, in Chapter/exposure 4, and with aesthetics as a mode of life in 
Chapter/exposure 5.  
 
Not adopting any specific philosophical or theoretical 'stance', the project will engage 
the arguments critically, as and when is necessary. By adopting the methodology of 
fragmentary framings and labyrinthine processes, it will proceed without a particular 
goal or end, in the chain of concrete expressions/ encounters offered by attention and 
chance. By interweaving philosophical writings from different texts, the 'text' of the 
films, and my own reflections, the work intends to embark on a poetical journey of 
cinematic experience as affective and thinking. By bringing the form and matter 
together, that a more poetic writing might be able to be produced, rather than by 
attempting to reproduce the experience of the real. W[a]ondering through, the image 
is traversing amongst its elements; touching, sensing, seeing, and imagining, thus 
creating the rhizomatic cartography of the spider’s web. The assemblage of 
'connections' and impossibilities, weaving and severing, advancing, and regressing; in 
other words living with and through the image. Setting out on a journey without an 
end or particular goal; a creative endeavour; an experience.  
 
Experience which is never limited, and it is never complete; […] an immense 
sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web of the finest silken threads suspended in 
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The Moving Image: Tarr's Cinema and Deleuze's Time-Image. 
The Quest(ion) of W(a)onderous Narrative. 
 
 
[C]inema is not a representation; it is an event of intuition which goes 
beyond the actually given to the Idea of the image. Cinema sees, not a world 
of things, not even a distinct world, but the movement of imagining from 
which any perceived world is possible. But it only achieves this in the time-
image. 




The photographic exists somewhere in-between; it is a state of 'in-between-ness.' 






For Béla Tarr, reality and cinema is the combination of faiths, beliefs, interests and 
chance, polyphonic compositions of nature, landscape, faces, and light, in a process of 
creating. For Deleuze these "molecular productions of variations and selection of 
variants" are the indispensable condition of every creation that is real.
160
 The sombre 
image of Hungary (this world) that sets and defines the mood and style of Tarr's films 
is not a realistic representation of the world but an event, a situation 'locked' in a 
wa(o)ndering movement in which anything or nothing can happen. The films refuse to 
tell a story, but their aesthetics move beyond that of social realism into the process of 
imaging from which any world is possible. Each is an event comprised of many 
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events, at times repeated, at times imperceptible, material, and indescribable, folding 
and unfolding according to their own rhythms of life (and art). The movement, 
rhythm, and texture of the films – intensely felt materiality – have the potential to 
restore the link between ourselves and the world by reaching the deepest levels of 
sense and thought. 
 
Leaving aside the theoretical debates about cinema and realism, and drawing on 
Deleuze's proposition of time-image instead, this chapter will engage with the 
imagery of films in terms of the real (rather than realistic) and the creative or 'the 
false' (rather than fictional).
161
 A certain sense of 'realism' (with this world), or what 
Deleuze calls an "image-world", surfacing as photographic intensity, will come to 
view in the discussion of what I called the amnesiac reality – an immanent real of 
creation. This will not mean the depiction of an already existing, nor transcendental 
other reality, but a new image in the movement of becoming in-between memory and 
forgetting, actual and virtual, past and future. This will be 'written' in relation to a 
particular function of time (becoming) and the aberrant movement of what I will call a 
'wa(o)nderous narrative'. 
 
The conception of 'open reality' will be considered in relation to Bazin's vision of a 
'lacunary real' (mimetically grasped by film) and Deleuze's proposition of the real as 
both actual and virtual. It will develop both as a sense of materiality/ physicality and 
of memory with regard to the notion of perception. It will consider materiality of the 
films as a sensation of becoming with the world
162
 and memory as the concept of 
'pure past' (Bergson, Proust). It will also refer to 'amnesiac reality' as forgetting that 
would be a creative construction of the new rather than repetition of the old.
163
 
Consequently, the notion of immanence (Deleuze) and the idea of chance-necessity 
(Nietzsche) will explicate the sense of narrative and time in the construction of the 
moving image. 
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 The two levels (amnesia resulting in entropy) and the director's 'vision' are conflicting and 




Rather than directing the event outwards towards another event moving into the 
future, as Stephen Marchant suggests, the director puts a simple, single event into 
repetition, ensuring that it is grasped in the concrete physicality of its occurrence 
rather than as a step in a chain of consequences.
164
 Multiple points of view, what 
could be called encounter-events within the filmic reality, interact with each other in 
the false 'continuity' of the fragmented open whole. The world seems examined, 
approached and tried indecisively, as if aimlessly, displayed by the disoriented 
movement of the camera. This is no longer the social reality of a particular historical 
time – (post)communist Hungary – but any time of 'this world'; a time where, as John 
Rajchman put it, "the past becomes indeterminate, the present untimely and 




The narrative consists of disconnected and aberrant movements, wanderings through 
what feels like any-spaces and any-times, lost in the potential memory of the future, 
immersed in the rhythms of walks, detours, and returns. Here reality and memory-past 
merge and exchange places in the crystalline narrative not confined to the cause-effect 
demands of action, but enfolded in extremely long, disconnected, and enduring 




The 'story' of the films does not refer to an ideal or a truth but becomes a 'pseudo-
story', a poem, "a story which simulates or rather a simulation of a story"
167
. This 
could also be thought of, following Deleuze's suggestion, as the "perception of an 
independent aesthetic consciousness" and the power of the false.
168
 Both Tarr and 
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Deleuze use the term 'situation' ('floating' for Deleuze) rather than story or narrative 
when talking about film-world. This is the 'story' of non-human becomings in the 
fragmentary 'narrative' of fabulation that is not a subjective or deprived matter, but a 
question of becomings and of visions, where life appears as immanent and released 
from its subjective, or objective (dis)attachments.
169
 Thus, the functioning of the 
narrative will be approached mainly in relation to the idea of (e)motion as proposed 
by Giuliana Bruno in Atlas of Emotion, and Deleuze's concept of 'crystalline regime', 
a narrative of actual-virtual process in a chain of images (de)linked by the "irrational 
cut." This will be folded and unfolded within the idea of wa(o)nder – a certain 
movement, and a nomadic becoming of unknown 'outcome' where both affect and 
thinking are possible. The stylistic (formless as both form and content) 'architexture' – 
black-and-white photography, rain, the treatment of space as a time-space of affect 
dwelling in-between, and 'insistent pauses of framing' – will provide textual analysis 
of cinematic still-movement as wa(o)ndering image-thought. 
 





A herd of cattle drifts out of a barn onto a muddy patch of open ground and wanders 
off to the left; the camera follows, first in a pan, then tracking past the houses of an 
apparently deserted village, before the animals disappear between the buildings. A 
grey, foggy ambiance fills the space. A ghostly, premonitory sound of wind and deep 
tolling bells accompanies the whole scene. 
 
Futaki… it seems… is afraid of something. Early … morning… startled… He 
was looking out … the window. Futaki… is terrified… he's afraid of death. 
They'll kick off anyway. You too, Futaki, you'll kick off.
171
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The almost ten-minute opening shot of Sátántangó (1994) unfolds the time-image, a 
'pure optical and sound situation' where 'nothing happens' takes time. The little time in 
its pure state.
172
 And while the cows continue their monotonous existence, and Futaki 
looks anxiously out of the window, the image-world of a small Hungarian town 
opens. 
 
In the east the sky clears fast like a memory. At dawn, it leaves all red on the 
waving horizon. As the morning beggar trudges up the back steps to the 
church, the sun rises to give life to the shadow and to separate earth from the 





Amnesiac reality verges on the edge of reality and artificiality. 
 
This world, stricken by poverty and corruption, exists on its own, an image where 
history is replaced by time, and the 'story' by the wa(o)ndering movement of 
circuitous narrative. Derelict buildings, dark, empty squares covered by rain, 
swamped by harsh attic lights and muddy streets, rise up to the surface like old black-
and-white photographs, where the utterances of forgotten worlds resonate. Nothing 
happens here. People seem stuck, and drenched under the persistent rain. 
The habitants of Werckmeister Harmonies (2000) seem to have tragically fallen under 
the spell of a mysterious circus visiting the town. The main characters of Damnation 
(1989), longing to escape the mundane and senseless existence, traverse the empty 
streets or pass the time in a local pub. Sátántangó (1994) revolves around the slow 
decay of a small farm collective, where the dreams, weaknesses, and betrayals of its 
people are revealed in the slow rhythm of a tango. As András Bálint Kovác has 
pointed out, these wretched souls seem to have just arrived here somehow and cannot 
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escape. We do not know who they are, what they do, how they got here, and when or 
where the story takes place. The characters "simply move toward their grim fates" as 
if they were no more "audacious than the lumbering cows of Sátántangó"
174
. "They sit 
in the kitchen, shit in the corner and look out the window now and then. They just sit 
on the same dirty stools. Stuff themselves with potatoes and don't know what's 
happened." (Sátántangó) Disaffected black-and-white long takes frame this world, 
keeping the people living in it captive while they desperately try to escape, along with 




The absence of a storyline, the non-professional actors, found locations, and long 
takes uninterrupted by editing, are somewhat reminiscent of the Italian Neorealist 
tradition where ideas or points of view are omitted in favour of being lost in the 
experience of reality (Bazin). As Tarr commented in an interview: "It is not like 
shooting a movie, it is like a part of life."
176
 At the same time, the long takes and 
"painstakingly choreographed shots" based on the novels of László Krasznahorkai, are 
the results of meticulously considered directing.
177
 Tarr weaves a 'tale' of life 
connecting objects, moments, moods, and people in a composition that is both untried 
and never finished. Now and again, he reminds his viewers that he is making the same 
film. One could argue, after Bazin, that reality here is filtered, not analysed or 
interpreted, but contains both a depiction of perceptual reality and more abstract 
qualities associated with time and the flow of life; qualities such as the fortuitous, the 
unexplained, and the ambivalent.
178
 Neither realistic nor non-realistic representation, 
nor a presentation as such, but "a sum-total of dealings with the world around" is real 
– both, imagined and very concrete. The director does not give us access to a given 
reality, but creates a cinema with a sense of its own radically ambiguous and open 
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reality, where it no longer merely signifies the real but becomes real.
179
 The films are 
not of or about 'reality' or a world where the real is represented or reproduced but 
rather where real(ity) is "aimed at."
180
 Theirs is the sentient, bottomless reality which 
transforms the way we see and the way we sense, an attempt to show the "intolerable" 
which resists the ready-made linkages of communication/ information and thus 
restores our connection with the world. Here the unexplained, the fortuitous, and the 




As presented by the director, it is a world 'informed' by the post-communist reality of 
Hungary, not yet 'recovered' from the regime’s consequences, and already 
disillusioned by the new reality of so-called democracy; a state of amnesia, where the 
characters are condemned to repeat the past, the life of tragic immobility, in a 
hopeless search for something, or somebody, to liberate them. It manifests itself in a 
consciously constructed image of misery and destruction. On the other hand there is a 
"collection of sensations", percepts and affects, "an intelligible material" given form 
through a "becoming art"; an "artistic volition." Both aspects are the result of the 
creative exploration of 'reality' (problems of life) and the creative mirroring of artistic 




The already mentioned slow beginning of Sátántangó, the sluggish, automated motion 
of coal dumpsters suspended on cables, creaking around in a circuit above the town 
(Damnation), the semi-paralytic movement of the local drunkards' bodies 
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choreographed into a working model of the universe by the film's hero János Valuska 
(Werckmeister Harmonies). Brilliantly portrayed opening scenes of Béla Tarr's 
cinema announce the wa(o)ndering character of the films. What follows are the 
endless walks and endless camera 'prowls'. They capture the spaces and the characters 
from every possible angle, even from above their heads and under their feet, in the 
narratives of disconnected and directionless events that concern no-one. There are 
figures walking away from the camera – into the far distance, and walking towards it 
in medium-shots and in close-ups for extended periods. The camera wanders 
alongside the characters and amongst them, touches the spaces or objects, and slides 
off the walls. The cameras are on the heels of Irimiás and Petrina, surrounded by rain, 
wind and cascading rubbish, or following the farmers walking down cold, desolate 
roads to their 'promised' town in Sátántangó. Two characters in Werckmeister 
Harmonies are accompanied in almost close-up, walking along for two minutes in 
absolute silence, with little indication of what they are doing or where they are going. 
Furthermore, the movements of isolated individuals are inscribed in the most 
memorable sequences. The mainly solitary manoeuvre of an old doctor in Sátántangó, 
lost in an 'alcoholic haze', lasts a full hour. The doctor staggers out into the field to 
refill his flask; breathing heavily along, he stops to take shelter with two prostitutes in 
a barn, after which nearly reaches the pub during the drunkards' dance. Fading in and 
out of visibility in the rain and darkness, he is at the very last moment led off course 
by a young girl and collapses in the forest.
183
 Following Valuska's "nightly 
perambulations" through the village streets, or Karrer's aimless wanderings around the 
rainy town in search of his lover, the camera moves between spaces and characters, 
stopping for a while to 'think', or returns again and again to the same spaces and 
situations as if in search for some 'truth'. It returns to spaces like a film-loop, "glued 
by ambient tones."
184
 The movement (walking-wandering) is not from one place to 
another, from point to point in a manner of progression, but a movement in itself; an 
'internal' variation, and exhaustion of possibilities towards the unknown, the potential. 
This is the movement of a stroll that modern cinema adopted instead of the narrative. 
It does not forward the narrative causality, does not lead to any destination becoming 
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 (E)motion on the other hand, as Giuliana Bruno proposed, is both a 
moving force ("a moving out, migration") and emotion, but also a memory.
186
 In 
Deleuzian terms, this would be a matter of non-subjective affectivity, or as Blanchot 
put it, "infinite or discontinuous: relation always in displacement."
187
 Furthermore, 
wondering of the wandering, would pertain to a nomadic movement without an end, 
in a whole that is never given, a 'space' where things are always starting again in the 
middle, assembling themselves in yet another way. Rather than an attitude of curiosity 
satisfying the knowledge through perception, wonder would flow with the movement 
of duration.
188
 This is the logic of repetition that prevents any relation to before or 
after, and keeps moving, and thinking, alive – in the sense that it is new every time; a 
movement of becoming. Only when movement becomes automatic, as Deleuze points 
out, the artistic essence of the image (as imaging itself) is 'realised'.
189
 Werckmeister 
Harmonies's mob came out of nowhere and will never arrive, they 'happen' with the 
matter of the world, and the 'spirit' of the vision as 'multiple-one'.
190
 The films' endless 
walking, "plodding along," seem to lead nowhere; the camera hesitates on the space, 
lingering a little longer after the characters have left. Independent, singular sequences 
tend to break free from the overall shape like polyphonic compositions, locked in a 
directionless, rhythmic 'structure' in which anything or nothing can 
happen."[F]ormations of worlds, constellation of universes", landscapes.
191
 These are 
event-facts that cannot be represented or directed in advance. 
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A fragment of concrete reality in itself multiple and full of ambiguity, whose 
meaning emerges only a posteriori, thanks to other imposed facts between 




A tractor pulling a large metal truck passes down the street at night as it is watched by 
János. Eszter looks into the eye of the cardboard whale, turns and walks away. Estike 
and her brother on their way to the wood nearby walk away from the camera until 
they disappear from view. In Werckmeister Harmonies there are thirty-nine shots and 
thirty-nine events. Each takes time. There is never-ending rain, muddy streets, 
cramped houses, wandering stray dogs, and, as Daniel Frampton has observed, half-
empty packs of cigarettes.
193
 At times an inanimate, dehumanised and somnambulistic 
dance sequence breaks the 'narrative', locking the characters and the viewers in a 'mad' 
perpetuation, providing a kind of 'circular dance' in which the walls, the rain and the 
dogs also have their stories. Locations have faces, in a certain kind of space, which 
Deleuze calls "any-spaces-whatever"; irrational, disconnected, aberrant, no longer 
obeying commonsensical causality. The characters, played by non-professional actors, 
do not obey any causal structure of story but become seers. On the other hand, the 
sound, camera, and landscape also become characters. Sometimes the 'autonomous', 
rhythmical, and 'otherworldly' sound endows the image with strangeness and 
reiteration. Outside, it is pouring with rain, and dogs wander by. Spectacular moments 
give way to the most banal ones and vice versa, or tragic to comic ones, without any 
sense of rational logic. In the end, the cinema’s 'trip' into ambiguity is so 
overwhelming that the imaginary and the real become indiscernible.
194
 Fragmentation, 
repetition, and no causal development, construct the "order of non-chronological co-
existences or relations"
195
 which resembles the 'structure' of a dream rather than 
narrative. The narrative of wander becomes a narrative of wonder.
196
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The long, slow, black-and-white time-image of Béla Tarr's world, verging on 
hallucination or déjà-vu, opens by re-evaluating the very category of reality. 
 
What is this reality verging on the hallucinatory? A reality that seems to be positioned 
between and within both amnesia and memory (amnesia as a kind of memory); this 
'state' that is an 'invention', and the question of displacement in time?
197
 As a direct 
time-image it gives us access to that 'Proustian dimension', a (deeper or 'third') 
memory of the world, directly exploring time, reaching in the past that which conceals 
itself from memory.
198
 What conceals itself from memory is the difference, not 
something once present that is stored as such in the past, and then actualised as a 
resemblance, but a pure "essence", that rises up as a haecceity, "untimely thisness." 
The invoked (by involuntary memory) 'thing' is something that is "absolutely new."
199
 
'Unsolicited', independent, and disengaged from immediate action or perception, this 
is memory on a cellular level or even before that – and because it is folded in time, 
cannot stagnate into repetition of the same, into the 'heaviness of subjectivity' or 




The people of this 'film-world' seem to always find something above themselves, 
some greater faith, or promise that would save them from defencelessness and 
despair. As one of the reviewers observed, they form blind and autonomic allegiances 
to seductive false idols, such as the charismatically maniacal Prince in Werckmeister 
Harmonies or the messianic Irimiás in Sátántangó.
201
 This keeps them locked in a 
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grip of repeating the same story, like the self-contained microcosms of 'any-people-
whatever' behaving according to inherent, pre-programmed natures, forever longing 
for a better world. 
 
[H]ere nothing's changed. The schoolmaster's still at home alone. Mrs. 
Schmidt with Futaki… You know, with the cripple. My sister's nuts, she spies 
on everybody… Mum beats her, but they still say she'll be nuts all her life. 
The doctor broods at home… Schmidt and Kráner are bringing the money for 
the cattle today… Everyone's been doing that since February.202 
 
The 'unreal' statuses of petty criminals like Irimiás (to whom the story of the 
unchanged town is reported), and the endless destruction and misery, is etched in the 
hallucinatory mise-en-scene of blurred, and in places, what seem like out of focus 
long camera takes. In Werckmeister Harmonies, the camera's tenacious movements 
between the faces gathered in the Square give an impression of being lost in a 
nightmarish labyrinth. Does the visually stunning, apocalyptic walk in Sátántangó, 
with leaves, rubbish, and endless pieces of paper circling in the wind, conjuring up an 
"unforgettable sense of space and apocalyptic mood," only prolong the never-ending 
hopelessness?
203
 And does the incredibly beautiful pan against the dark silhouetted 
trees on the isolated, nightly landscape, seem to uphold the doctor's painful stagger 
stretching out through/into the night? The sense of unreality, strangeness, and 
reiteration endows the image with an illusion of slow motion or a dream. Like a 
strange repeated ritual, or implied dream that envelops the delirious dance and walks 





The direct presentation of the stifling, useless, and insurmountable time which haunts 
the characters, accompanied by a vast wasteland stretching in all directions, confers a 
feeling that the universe itself is out of joint. The distinctive, black-and-white 
photography is purposely leaden and, at times, oppressive. Enhanced by low lighting 
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and high contrast, it creates the feeling of blurry half tones or 'half-rememberings'. In 
the long extended take, the circus caravan's headlights project a slow, sweeping swath 
of light onto the facades of the town's unilluminated and seemingly depopulated 
buildings, creating the sense of a shadow play mimicking the sinister 'premonition' of 
the circus poster. In one of the most 'hypnotic' scenes of Sátántangó, as Donato Totaro 
observed, the camera performs a 360-degree tracking movement across the sleeping 
people, returning again to the first sleeper, then continuing again in the same arc, 
again and again. The movement and the space covered create the impression of a 




Although the films do not deal directly with memory, the past, or dream-states, they 
are created in such a way as to mimic the process of memory or dream. The reality 
settings, the hallucinatory world of the towns' lives, without beginning and without 
end, instead of providing a space for action, open out into thought and non-subjective, 
impersonal memory. Perception becomes overwhelming, hallucinatory, unbearably 
intense. Simultaneously, the screen itself becomes "the cerebral membrane where 
immediate and direct confrontation take place between the past and the future, real 
and imaginary, the inside and the outside, at a distance impossible to determine, and 
independent of any fixed point."
206
 The entropic mise-en-scene unfolds a style of 
repetitious, hallucinatory narrative. For Deleuze, this 'intolerable' landscape of modern 
cinema that sprang out of both an impossibility to connect with the world and the 
necessity to believe in it, endows the image with the potential for new ways of 'seeing' 
and thinking. No longer the recollection-image or 'attentive recognition', as he writes 
after Bergson, which gives us the proper equivalent of the optical-sound image, but 
the disturbance of memory and the failures of recognition.
207
 Is the visually 'dazzling 
marvel' and intensity of feeling only formal mastery of the long-lasting, perfectly 
executed shot? The aesthetics of artistic sensitivity or a matter of "lacunar reality"? 
The 'attentive misrecognition', where the displaced perception dwells in what seems 
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like timeless enduring, demands the impossible. The time-image of long disconnected 
moments of intensive 'immotion' starts to think. 
 




The long, exhaustively endless shots of spaces, or haunting repetitive sounds, create a 
sense of remembrance or déjà-vu, where the image is actualised from a virtual plane 
at the point when images become ambiguous – when we cannot tell what is real and 
what is imagined, what has happened in the past and what is happening in the 
present.
209
 As the cause-effect of 'action' gives way to the fragmentary "false 
continuity", the succession of chronological order no longer defines time.
210
 Memory 
of films and the memory of the viewer interact with each other becoming something 
else, a set of 'mis'-represented 'moments', an assemblage of thoughts, feelings, and 
senses vibrating in the net of non-realised connections. For Deleuze, this kind of 
strategy endows the image with a creative, productive potential, inherent in the 
operation of memory, rather than linking it to the past. The past can never be just 
remembering or simple recollection because it is filtered through other recollections 
and experiences. Memories, Deleuze argues, are not old perceptions. Remembered 
things cannot be represented or 're-organised' as the same ones which were 
experienced in the past, because today's recollection is quite a different experience 
temporally and contextually from either the original experience or previous 
recollections. Thus conceived, memory is a creative power for producing the new 
rather than a mechanism for reproducing the same. The virtual is not imaginary but 
real in the sense that it is the reservoir from which thought draws in order to bring 
about the actual. Bergson believed that pure memory stores every conscious event in 
its particularity and detail. The perceptions of actual existence are duplicated in a 
virtual existence as images with the potential for becoming conscious, actual ones. As 
Deleuze writes: 
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"between the past as pre-existence in general and the present as infinitely contracted 
past there are, therefore, all the circles of the past constituting so many stretched or 
shrunk regions, strata, and sheets: each region with its own characteristics, its 'tones', 
its 'aspects', its 'singularities', its shining points' and its 'dominant' themes. Depending 





Thus, what we see on screen is already a memory in the way that the image that gives 
way to new images in the present is reflected and preserved in memory – a vast virtual 
reservoir of images, the recollection of which produces countless circuits: links 
between past and present. As Anna Powell puts it, the virtual image is not actualised 
directly, but appears in the form of another, different image, which "plays the role of 
virtual image being actualised in a third, and so on to infinity."
212
 How does this 
actualised image look? The actualised image cannot be confused with the represented 
'real' of what is. Rather it is the creatively 're-remembered' past as a new image. Thus, 
the actualised is real not in the sense of a 'copy' of reality but as a plane of composed 
elements, here photographically, which are capable of rendering visible. It might be 
possible to say that photographically, actual images are, in a sense, becoming facts. 
Following from Bazin's discussion this would be "a fact in the order of reality" 
redeemed from the "spiritual dust and grime" of ordinary perception and human 
sensory experience.
213
 Accordingly, the image, and its reality as 'fact', is endowed 
with the potential of 'all that might have been' and might be, the potential of 
transformative becoming of being.
214
 Reality, writes Bergson, is a "global and 
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undivided growth, …invention, duration: it resembles a gradually expanding balloon 
assuming at each moment unexpected forms."
215
 Thus is the image-world. Therefore, 
remembering suspends sensory-motor extension and links actual image to virtual 
affective elements that include déjà-vu, dream images, fantasies, theatre scenes or 'the 
past' in general. What in classical cinema was always demarcated as past (through 
flashbacks), in modern cinema would overtake the present, or the present would 
almost lapse into the past. Different sheets of (real) past and past-present coexist in a 
non-chronological order. "From this point of view," Deleuze writes, "the present itself 
exists only as an infinitely contracted past which is constituted at the extreme point of 
the already-there."
216
 This would 'create' the aberrant movement of discontinuity (no 
longer rational or sensory motor) where the past, present, and future merge in a 
(virtual) assemblage of 'incompossible' attentive mis-recognition.
217
 When Valuska 
reads a diary account of events at the end of the hospital massacre, there is a sense of 
confusion in relation to time, and to the way the events develop. Is the diary his own, 
or has it been found in the looted department store he finds himself in? And if the 
events have already been written down, what is it that we are watching now? In his 
analysis of the film, Jonathan Romney suggests the possibility of Valuska authoring 
the events (in a more oblique way), by a passive collusion with Tünde, not only 
reading the account of his own involvement.
218
 The narrative of Sátántangó is 
constantly 'retold' by the doctor in fragments of information he scribbles in the 
notebooks, of details he chooses to focus on while observing the farm through 
binoculars, in repeating, moving-back-and-forth shots. This is 'repeated' once more 
towards the end of the film in the rather comical transcription of Irimiás's and 
Petrina's pseudo-poetical report of the farm's undertakings. The 'remembering' of the 
repeated instants happens simultaneously in a sense (we rarely know in advance in 
which time the events are unfolding). The temporal 'confusion' of the events and their 
're-telling' put into question both the normative perception-cognition process, and the 
moral-political expectations. What happens next or before does not concern the 
'narrative' any more. The past is neither remembered nor forgotten. It is suspended in 
a form of mis-represented 'moments' without before or after; the space of 'other' 
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thinking. As Deleuze noted, the cinema of time-image is not a case of psychological 
memory made up of recollection-images (flashbacks), but a case of purely ontological 
'past in general' that is preserved neither in time nor in space. It has no psychological 
existence nor is it a case of successions of presents passing according to chronological 
time; rather, it is a collection of purely virtual images where the two modes of 
existence, 'actual present' and a 'sheet of past', are "combined in a circuit where the 
real and the imaginary, the actual and the virtual, chase after each other, exchange 
their roles and become indiscernible."
219
 This ontological 'past in general' outside 
psychology, chronology, and representation is the photo(graphic) in becoming, the 




There is not present which is not haunted by past and a future, by a past which is not 





"The little crystalline seed and the vast crystallisable universe: everything is included 
in the capacity for expansion of the collection constituted by the seed and the 
universe."
222
 Above and beyond various actualities (memories, 'perceptions'), Claire 
Colebrook notes, there is a virtual whole composed of multiplicity of duration.
223
 
"Memories, dreams, even worlds are only apparent relative circuits which depend on 
the variations of this Whole."
224
 That is where private memories and unofficial 
histories become 'universal', constituting a "universe of prehistory, not that of our 
ancestors, but a prehistory of consciousness at the birth of time and sin, when sky and 
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The past/presentness of the cinematic image functions as a kind of two-way mirror. 
Non-linear relations, fragmentariness implied by the crystalline, the past/presentness 
of the cinematic image of a two-way mirror, splitting the screen into two 
heterogeneous directions – launching into the future and falling into the past. Such 




The richly orchestrated mise-en-scene functioning independently of narrative and 
subjected to long and detailed 'descriptions', provokes such involuntary memories. 
Microscopic details, like remnants of some cosmic memory of everyday gestures, 
insistent, intense, physically present, touching the deepest levels of existence from 
before all existence, in an image that has no point of reference. "Fragmented nomadic 
essences to each of which corresponds a viewpoint." The 'memory' of the image-
world interacts with the cosmic 'anti-memory' of the universe becoming one of many, 
an infinite number of varieties, never stable, never presupposed. Memory and anti-
memory, presence and absence, visible and invisible lose their attributed definitions 
and enter into new relations of unknown potentiality. 
 
 
How do we make sense of this cacophony of different voices and visions? Is it the 
half-cynical confession of Karrer's monologue renouncing the story? The unstoppable 
entropy of alienated human condition? Or another dream? A map perhaps with 
different zones of speeds and slownesses, landmarks and roads, of curves and dead-
ends, or a collection of nomadic singularities vibrating in the web of (dis)connections 
leading nowhere. 
 
While real-time blends with 'Tarr-time', the minutes on-screen encapsulate something 
both intimately specific and profoundly universal, Cullen Gallagher suggested.
227
 Or 
it might be simply "time that film frees itself from the shackles of linearity."
228
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And the living time in the time-image? 
 
Time present and time past 
[…] both perhaps present in time future, 
And time future contained in time past.  
If all time is eternally present 




In the hallucinatory world of the towns' lives, without a beginning and without an end, 
time has no 'meaning' – it is 'out of joint'. "The two clocks show different times. Both 
wrong of course. This one here is too slow. Instead of telling the time, the other one 
seems to point out at our hopeless condition," observes Irimiás while waiting outside 
the government office.
230
 In long, monotonous, and repetitive shots, past, present and 
future seem to merge or exchange, generating a sense of vertigo, or a dream. The 
somnambulistic group line dance recalls the image of the sluggish, automated motion 
of cable cars (Damnation), the long robotic march of workers on their way to the 
hospital (Werckmeister Harmonies) and the inanimate and dehumanised dance 
sequences echo the directionless, the seemingly never-ending nightmare. It brings to 
mind the automatic movement of Kantor's Dead Class' characters dragging along their 
childhood puppets/ selves.
231
 The unredeemable time 'pointing to the hopeless 
condition' lasts forever, indifferently, 'inhumanly'. 
 
Becoming…(is) its own time, the real time in which changes occur, becoming 
unknown to historical time. This time, which does not change but in which all 
changes unfold, is not a Kantian a priori form depending upon attributes of a 
particular kind of consciousness, but the time of production, founded in difference and 
becoming, and consequent to relations between internal and external differences. For 
Deleuze, the present is merely the productive moment of becoming. Rather than a 
product, final or interim, becoming is the very dynamism of change, situated between 
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heterogeneous terms and tending towards no particular goal or end-state.
232
 Becoming 
'moves through' every event, such that each is simultaneously the start-point, end-
point and mid-point of an ongoing cycle of production. That is where the films stop 
being 'hopeless' and become 'real', with all the uncertainties and ambiguities, all that is 
life, the experimental and the spontaneous, an open process of transformation, 
"dispersive and lacunar reality" of aesthetic becoming. Reality in becoming, 
"meaningful, rich, beautiful and filthy."
233
 Sentient, bottomless. Time and memory is 
also forgetting, repetitions of labyrinthian paths. It is the condition of impossibility, 
the intolerable from which thinking arises. Deleuze theorises this productive cycle 
using Nietzsche's concept of 'eternal return', pointing out the potentiality and 
importance of difference, where what returns is never the same. In this way the 
amnesia of repetitious moral degradation becomes a repetition with the possibility of 
change. What returns with each repetition is difference. Thus the eternal return is not 
a repetition of a universal sameness but the movement that produces difference, 
inscribing change and becoming at the very heart of being.  
 
We misinterpret the expression "eternal return", Deleuze writes, if we 
understand it as "return of the same." It is not being that returns but rather 
returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and 
of that which passes. It is not some one thing which returns, but rather 
returning itself is the one thing which is affirmed of diversity or multiplicity. 
In other words, identity in the eternal return does not describe the nature of 
that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of returning for that which 
differs. This is why the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis; a 
synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity and its 
reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and of the being which is affirmed in 




Thus conceived, amnesiac memory is a creative power for producing the new rather 
than a mechanism for reproducing the same. 
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The images are always surfacing from the past because, as Deleuze pointed out, 
quoting Federico Fellini: "We are constructed in memory; we are simultaneously 
childhood, adolescence, old age and maturity."
235
 Thus memory must be perceived not 
as something fixed that has been but as what Deleuze called an "anti-memory" or 
becoming, which is the result of duration, durée or Aion time: "at once an always-
already and an always-about to be."
236
 It is not narrative that unfolds the space of 
memory but a style of 'inaction' that produces a collection of sensations, memories 
stored in images and, as such, perhaps paradoxically, opens up the space for active 
participation and change. 
 
Reality and memory become one as virtual and actual in what Deleuze calls the 
'crystal image'. The crystal image is a merged form of virtual and actual in its various 
points towards infinity. The self-reflexive crystal image involves a multilayered and 
infinite register of 'montaged' realities, where there is change, passage, becoming. But 
the form of what changes does not itself change or pass on. This is time in its pure 
state: a direct time-image, which grants what changes the unchanging form in which 
the change is produced.
237
 Crystal images are the pure and direct images of time, 
external representations of an image of/as thought. In Sátántangó, several of the film’s 
inter-titles make reference to the spider, and the spider makes a physical appearance at 
the end of the long pub dance scene. In a long, lateral tracking shot of the drunken 
carousers, a spider can be seen briefly in the foreground, spinning a web between two 
glasses. The voice-over tells us that the spider will be spinning its web around the 
objects, and around the people in the pub … The 'labyrinthian' shape of the spider web 
acts "the spider's function", linking the cosmic to the everyday, the durable to the 
changing, "one single and identical time as the unchanging form of that which 
changes."
238
 One can think of Velasquez’s painting The Spinners: 'pure' time, real and 
virtual, all 'levels' of time reflected in crystal. The contest between a goddess and a 
mortal on one level and the works of spinning women on the other, folding and 
unfolding into each other opening the present to 'timelessness'. 
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And for the tender sound of accordion the spiders in the pub sewed loose webs 
on top of the glasses, the cups, the ashtrays, around the legs of the tables and 
the chairs. […] They sewed a web on the sleepers' faces, their feet, their 
hands. They hurried back to their hiding-place, waiting for an eternal thread to 




This is no longer the social reality of a particular historical time – post communist 
Hungary – but any time of 'this world'; not reality objectively perceived and 
independently existing, nor a metaphysical beyond, but rather a strange presence-
sensation, both actual and virtual, in the process of becoming. In the interview, Tarr 
says that it is not his objective to tell a story but to get closer, "to understand everyday 
life."
240
 This 'understanding' takes the form of experimentation, a kind of "visionary 
aestheticism" where both the form and the content are indeterminate.
241
 And it is 'a 
life' itself bubbling underneath the surface of the mundane and the everyday, which 
has been each time 'incarnated' into the image.
242
 The director works closely with 
'what is' in the locations, allowing the actors, the composer, the editor, and the non-
human eye of the camera to 'live in the situation' while playing with variations of 
'what is' and the singularities (modes) of encounters, at the same time resisting 'what 
is' through a very persistent 'vision-force'. Touching the deepest levels of existence 
from before all existence; image without any point of reference. Here the 'director's 
vision' intertwines with encountered objects, spaces, and situations in a composition 
of a labyrinth without the (Ariadne's) thread, in a series without common borders, in 
which all roads lead to the same point, and where every point finds itself on all 
roads,
243
 where 'politics'/ life means to endure entanglements (to follow through the 
thought of immanence immanent only to itself), to feel and to think according to 
'demands' of singular encounters without compliance to a priori norms. 
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It is also a 'mode of living, a style in the sense of Spinoza ("affective realism") which 
is a question of immanence and experimentation (a belief in this world as it is); 
"empiricist conversion," rather than judgment.
244
 It is life as it is felt, imagined, seen, 
encountered; an affirmation of all paths. An aesthetics of "(e)motion", and the ethics 
of encounter-event through affecting and affected bodies; a result of becoming with 
life, like a body thrown into the world which is un/known, un/tried, alien sometimes 
or stupid, 'ugly' or excruciatingly beautiful. Tarr's camera is in the world, immersed 
and distant, felt and invisible, seeing with its body. The images are earthy, real, non-
nostalgic, bare in their material physicality, and familiar in their worldly strangeness. 
Empty spaces, bleak industrial landscapes, the oppressive and alienating environment, 
might reflect the desolation and spiritual lethargy of morally bankrupt protagonists. In 
Tarr's world, everything seems to take place in a crumbling, depressive world of mud, 
alcohol, and betrayal. Here, 
 
[m]atter accumulate[s] and become[s] blocked, a geology of elements, filth and 




Serge Daney, as Deleuze noted, saw the washed, sodden, heavy, translucent images 
characteristic (according to him) of certain Eastern European filmmakers (like 
Zanussi) as "a taste for heavy materials and dense still lifes."
246
 It might be the 
question of existential sensitivity brought out by the necessary 'clandestine aesthetics', 
but it might also be the case of the poet who "with the dredging net must haul up 
difficult things"
247
 pushing resistance and the intolerable even further. 
 
It might be that beneath this film runs another film, a film whose character, as 
Pasolini would have it, is completely and freely expressive, independent of the 
director's intention.
248
 This is no longer the expression of subjective interpretation or 
representation, nor a question of an authorial 'voice'. What we have here perhaps is a 
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director's vision which no longer belongs to the director, which flees from personal 
matters and universal (utilitarian) concerns, and which has been hijacked by the 
camera consciousness, unknown intensities, affects and percepts. The director no 
longer directs but creates the time-space where the intensities are brought out in a 
poetic framing imposed on sensation to give it a life (in form-force of image) neither 
objective nor subjective but both. In this sense the director is a visionary, and his/ hers 




Thus, despite the seemingly realistic portrayal of the world stricken by poverty and 
corruption, the reality constructed in the films is not that of social realism, nor is it the 
representation of historical events, but a creative exploration in the form of a thinking 
image, where the real is not a representation of reality and virtual is not a negation of 
the real. It is art and philosophy. In this sense the 'reality' pervades as past, present and 
future at the same time, not something that has happened but something that is 
'happening' all the time. This is particularly prevalent in the films' aesthetics of long 
repetitive shots where the camera loops back to 'look' at some sequences each time 
from a different point of view. The fact that the clocks have stopped or show the 
wrong time in those films is no longer of any relevance. As such, the 'authentic' 
world-portrayal acquires its right to exist while standing on the border between reality 
and artificiality, in the hesitant movement towards the False. Reality is memory, film 
is memory. Reality in the film is fiction, however real-istic. And the amnesiac reality? 
It arises as an inscription of memory – one that remains open, one which changes in 
every moment, an inscription that depends, in order to be registered at all, on its 




Moreover, the deglamourising, disaffected style, rather than being perceived as 
nihilistic or decadent appears to be the effect of "the powerful, non-organic Life that 
grips the world" and which, according to Deleuze, provides "a new kind of health, that 
the cinema is forced to discover in the nauseating, devastated, death-strewn 
landscape."
251
 Here, the oppressive and alienating environment – landscapes of 
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identities – is dissolved in the any-spaces-whatever and brought back in the event of 
becoming something else, something that is at the edge of language as it is on the 
edge of the 'narrative'. The events and characters, somehow not quite 'real', existing in 
a non-hierarchical monotony of time, are not concerned with 'action', interpreting, or 
communicating, but weave instead the narrative of disconnected moments that may or 
may not exist. The two levels – amnesia resulting in entropy – and the director's 
'vision' are conflicting and interacting, constructing (new) order out of 'forgotten' 
strata, a new kind of (real)ism impossible to prevail from the standpoint of what we 
already know. 
 
This way is a nice family story. But it finishes like any other story. Because 
stories end badly. Stories are all stories of disintegration. The heroes always 
disintegrate, and they disintegrate the same way. If they didn't, it wouldn't be 
disintegration but revival. And I'm not talking about revival but disintegration. 
Irrevocable disintegration. So what's about to happen here, is just one form of 




This kind of 'realism' requires a different form of (wa(o)nderous) narrative. A 
narrative of disconnected and aberrant movements, wanderings through spaces and 
times, lost in the potential memory of the future. Narrative immersed in the rhythms 
of walks and returns. Narrative working according to the process of 'memory', and as 
remembering and forgetting at the same time. The narrative departing from the story 
(disintegration), and from the logical consensus of cause-effect. Out of anomalies, 
irregularities, and false continuity the crystalline regime develops narration. The 
elements of this (non)narrative – objects, character, sound – do not carry the story, or 
a discourse, but exist in their own right, and as parts of the image, intertwined with 
each other as fragments in 'sensational' composition of affect. The slow 'empty' 
tracking of beer glasses, the texture of the net curtain closely examined by the camera, 
or Estike's gesture of straightening her skirt (Sátántangó) as she lies down after taking 
the rat poison and the wandering dogs soaked by rain, "shade into each other"
253
 as a 
kind of reciprocal immanent engagement in the cosmic memory of the world. 
Everyday 'tidbits' and profound events, equally important moments, break the 
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continuity into imperceptible expressions. All are enfolded in the black-and-white 
'reality' of the photographic time, challenging our perception and our cognition.
254
 
When the camera stops or zooms on a detail, there is a sense of wanting to go beyond 
the frame, 'inside' the thing, but which is at the same time shattered by the surface so 
populated with opaque and mute expressions that the gaze somehow slips off into 
optical disarray. Relatively autonomous, image-expressions, while referring to each 
other, they nonetheless resist being reconciled into a whole. As a result, there is no 
totalisation of space in an organic image of the whole and no subordination of time to 
movement. Inside and outside, mind and body, mental and physical, imaginary and 
real, are no longer decidable qualities.
255
 The ordinary detailed bits become percepts 
and affects of those relations, an ensemble or set of relations that are in a state of 
continual transformation, without end and without message. Rain, peeling walls, 
wandering dogs, people sitting, drinking, walking or dancing. Specific and singular 
expressions/ events with no other purpose than occurrence; unique, unrepeatable 
instants, these elements enter into relations of unknown, chance encounters made 
possible by the style of multiple views. 'Restricted' neither by the logic of narrative 
continuity, nor by the norms of perception, they enter instead into the mad, 
'schizophrenic' rhythm of potentialities, composed in incompossible variations 
(composed and decomposed in an endless process of creation), tamed only by the 
style. The style frames, providing a kind of order (a "vision"); the order not so much 
of order versus chaos, 'sane' versus 'mad', but one on the verge, in-between, where the 
intensity of desire is able to sustain itself without breaking down.
256
 The order of the 
margins or the cracks in the surface.
257
 As such, the image, disconnected, aberrant, 
schizophrenic, does not point to anything in terms of actual 'change' or action. It has 
however more profound and important 'value' – that of realisation of intensity; 
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intensity as a much more radical 'concept'; intensity, as a quality of life. The creative 
force of affect and 'pathological clinging to life' fold into each other in a moment of 
poetical co-poiesis. 
 
Life for Deleuze, as Daniel W. Smith pointed out, is a power of abstraction capable of 
producing elements that are in themselves asignifying, acosmic, asubjective, 
anorganic, agrammatical, and asyntactic (singularities and events, affects and 
percepts, intensities and becomings) and placing them in a state of continuous 
variation. On the other hand, it is a power of invention capable of creating ever new 
relations between these differential elements (syntheses of singularities, blocks of 
becomings, continuums of intensities)
258
. Béla Tarr speaks of making the same film 
but always a little better.
259
 For him it is the combination of singular encounters where 
the new real will come forth within the actual and the virtual, in-between. The powers 
of the False. 
 
In place of an argument or story we are presented with a series of events, which 
instead of creating an illusionistic space of judgment/ identification, offers a different 
space – that of encounter – where the film, the viewer, the world, and the outside are 
interconnected in the process of creative transformation. 
 
Deleuze called this kind of (false) narrative, or rather the lack of it, the 'crystalline 
narrative'. Unlike the 'continuity editing' of classical cinema, continuity here is 
achieved by relinkages of independent images that are not extendable to each other. 
"Instead of one image after the other, there is one image plus another; and each shot is 
deframed in relation to the framing of the following shot …"260 Images are delinked 
and deframed which severs the flow from any sense of predictability. This creates a 
new 'linkage' of dependency and unpredictability, what Flaxman referred to through 
Deleuze as a Markoff chain which introduces chance into the stream of images.
261
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What links the seemingly disconnected images is a gap, an in-between space in which 
thought experiences its own duration. Here, "the outside or obverse of the images has 
replaced the whole, at the same time as the interval [ interstice ] or the cut has 
replaced association."
262
 The way images are linked exceeds Eisenstein's dialectical 
synthesis of the shock as inducing thought. The shock is now produced by an 
encounter with the image that is unrecognisable and unknown, in a sort of 
directionless regime which fashions a kind of meandering that refuses resolution, and 
creates an enhanced sensitivity to time. The narrative becomes a form of the ballade 
where the film is "wedded to a wandering movement", a journey, the stroll, the ballad, 
or (e)motion of the events which concern no one.
263
 The spaces are disconnected, 
characters are no longer defined by their actions but by their visions and narration 
becomes, essentially, falsifying. Both the 'real-ism' and the 'story' are disposed of in 
favour of the false and its artistic, creative power, a 'pseudo-story', or a poem.
264
 The 




Linear actions dissolve into the form of aleatory strolls. Events occur where it is no 
longer possible to act or react: situations of pain or beauty that are intolerable or 
insupportable; occurrences that are incomprehensible or undecidable. Since the 
linking of images is no longer motivated by action, space changes in nature, becoming 
disconnected or emptied. Acts of seeing and hearing replace the linking of images 
through motor actions. Fragmented narrative structure, false continuity, and irrational 
cuts are the strategies making time-image possible. 
 
Tarr's characters, all with distinctive faces and 'personalities', seem to be matched by 
the scenery, weather, and time, creating the necessary tension with their faces, voices, 
and movements. Performing 'themselves', they become with the situation. There is 
neither eagerness nor resistance in a way the characters' bodies give themselves to the 
'action'. (János in his kitchen preparing the meal, dance sequences). Just ordinary, 
concrete, attending to their chores – a sort of Bruegelian attention to gestures, faces, 
and movements of bodies – carries expression of 'a life'; intense looks and absent 
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emotion. In the faces of actors – independent, alienated, subjected to the slow, 
penetrating 'scans' of the camera – madness and helplessness show the 'real'. 
The characters of the (e)motion are 'weaved' in a wa(o)ndering movement of the 
ballade, taking on the movement of thinking. Assisted by the camera, they move 
within and between locations. They 'observe' closely, or from the distance, assisting in 
return the 'spectacle' of non-human perception; becoming 'seers' rather than 'actors'. 
Intertwined with textures, mud, dogs, rain … "This is a cinema of the seer, no longer 




Here the wandering of the narrative becomes the wonder(ing) of the false. 
 
The camera is always moving among the characters but does not identify with any of 
them: their 'identities' are substituted with the director's aesthetic vision. In this way 
the character losing his identity "enters into a 'free indirect' relationship with the 
"poetic vision of the director" who affirms himself through him while at the same 
time distinguishing himself from him", allowing for objective and subjective to 
become 'one'.
267
 This is a "new race of characters", of a time-image cinema; 
characters who see rather than act, characters who are compelled to witness the world, 
yet who are entirely unsure of what they witness. These characters do not 'change' 
anything, do not forward the narrative; they 'flow' with time, registering, seeing, 
recording rather than acting or reacting. These characters of the trip/ ballad are 
unconcerned even by what happens to them. Their wa(o)ndering movement, on the 
other hand, not quite like the lumbering cows of the opening scene (Sátántangó), 
becomes the movement of thinking; not resignation but the ultimate affirmation of 
life. Not human but over-human. 
 
Structured in twelve normatively overlapping, discontinuous chapters, Sátántangó 
replicates the visual rhythm, the six-steps-forward six-steps-back pattern of the tango. 
The rhythm of the film's forward and backward episodic movements, particularly 
evident in the circular, repeated narration of Futaki's perceived detection of the tolling 
of nonexistent bells at the beginning and end of the film, underscores the banality and 
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empty, ritualistic existence of the communal farmers resigned to a life of aimlessness, 
despair and passivity. The film's compositional principle is to present not facts, nor a 






As Steven Merchant observes, the director often puts a simple, single event into 
repetition, ensuring that it is grasped in the concrete physicality of its occurrence 
rather than as a step in a chain of consequences.
269
 Scenes which we have already 
witnessed repeat, but from different spatial and narrative points of view. At the 
beginning of Sátántangó several scenes are repeated later from the observing 'camera-
eye's' point of view. The narrative voice is that of the doctor, and the film returns to 
him at the end as the narrative begins again.
270
 At the "most remarkable narrative 
crossover point", a girl stops by a window to watch the dance taking place within. The 
event is later witnessed from inside in its entirety in one long, slow-moving shot, 
interrupted only by a cutaway of the girl looking in from outside.
271
 In Werckmeister 
Harmonies, the image of János walking away from his dwelling, watched by the 
shoemaker's wife, is repeated in exactly the same way as in the earlier scene when it 
was the shoemaker who watched him disappearing into the 'horizon'. In Damnation, 
the couple circle endlessly around in frustration and recrimination. The camera returns 
to the spaces outside the police station, the pub or between the blocks of flats to wait 
with Karrer. Fragmentary spaces come together in the last image, which is the mirror 
image of the first. The story ends at the beginning, with a vast any-space-whatever of 
Hungarian puszta. And, "as the film ends," Jonathan Romney wrote, "we are waking 
from a bad dream that is about to start again."
272
 The films' wanderings, 'plodding 
along' lead to nowhere. There is only the framed 'image', and torturous emotion 
arrested in time.
273
 Neither spaces nor characters reveal anything, or point to anything 
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outside the situation itself. Instead the viewer is left to 'endure' the ambiguity of an 
open image. At every turn the hope for resolution is frustrated."
274
 The wandering of 
the characters becomes the wondering of the camera. Tarr’s camera scrupulously 
follows the visual micro-dimension of characters' everyday routines ('describing' 
rather than directing), as the reality of social order and disorder is confusedly left 
behind and 'mixed up' with its own entropic and chaotic excess. However, the 
'expressive' here is, not of the 'expressionistic' kind, of an individual/subjective self, 
but it 'creates' a kind of conduit through which 'life' and its force express itself. "It 
creates the real through the force of visual description," where the "knowing 
subjectivism is utterly objective," and "description tends towards a point of 
indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary."
275
 The camera tracks not through the 
windows /doors but alongside them, 'communicating' with the spaces beside. At a 
slow pace it curiously 'observes' through the doctor's binoculars, the old water tap, the 
wandering dog, or the prowling boar, returning to the same places again and again 
(Sátántangó). In one of Damnation's long tracking shots the camera moves along the 
pub's exteriors alternating between the groups of people at the open doors and the 
sections of textured wall. It glides now carefully like a 'typologist', examining, now 
like an absent-minded passer-by glued to the scene without particular interest. 
Accompanied by a pan, the concrete walls, drenched by rain, interchange 
rhythmically with 'group portraits' of what could be a kind of human 'cross-section' 
reminiscent of Bruegel, to the repetitive sound of the harmonica. What are we seeing? 
The camera wanders, framing the space and the characters in a complex web of 
movement. While the characters sit, drink, or walk, the camera is scanning: the space, 
the faces, the objects as well as the relationships between characters, spacing them 
apart, putting them 'on the edge'. The characters are etched into their spatial settings 
and the external spaces are the inner mental spaces of the characters. Man and space 
become one. At times, there is an 'insistent' or 'obsessive' framing, which makes the 
camera await the entry of a character into the frame. It waits for him/ her to do, or say 
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something, and then exit, while it continues to frame the space which has once again 
become empty, leaving the 'scene' to its pure and absolute signification as scene once 
more. It moves between spaces and characters, stopping for a while, hesitating on the 
space, lingering a little longer after the characters have left, or returns again and again 
to the same spaces, each time from a different point of view; as if searching for some 
truth. It never rushes into the depicted space, inviting the eye to linger on the surface 
and the viewer to remain on the edge. 
 
Between one image and another, a gap opens, in which thought experiences its own 
duration. A new kind of montage that derails perception from its stable centre, a series 
in which each image is de-framed in relation to the image that follows it, producing a 
kind of space between images wherein thought lingers, oscillates, hallucinates …276 
While, as Deleuze proposes, the crystalline regime produces an increased sensitivity 
to time, the interval suspends the spectator in a state of uncertainty. Every interval 
becomes a "bifurcation point," where it is impossible to know or predict in advance 
which direction change will take. 
 
Gaps, fissures, nothings: "on the one hand there is no longer a whole thinkable 
through montage, on the other there is no internal monologue utterable through 
image."
277
 There will always be in-betweens. The relation between images, no longer 
linked by the sensory-motor schema, becomes non-commensurable; a system of false 
continuity, an "irrational cut." What occupies the interval is an affect. This is a very 
special kind of cinema, Deleuze tells us, which has acquired a taste for "making the 
camera felt'."
278
 The alternation of different lenses on the same image and the 




The waltz in Damnation – partially sentimental, partially 'longing', the voice of 
faraway void lost in the half shadows of the rainy afternoons, enters the space of 
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remembrance. The rhythmical pattern of a ticking clock, a whirring fan, the drone of a 
refrigerator motor, or the constant patter of rain, 'physicalise' time. The off-screen 
sound of balls on a pool table and the sound of an accordion accompaniment by the 
player at the bar, shift and confuse further the sense of foreground and background. 
Background is being rescued from the fate of uninteresting and unimportant. Silent 
whispers and background 'noise', usually pushed away into the unheard by the central 
action are brought forward by the stillness of attention.
280
 In the long opening shot of 
Damnation the black coal buckets move towards us, and we hear nothing but the 
running of the wire. The most 'deafening sound' of the massacre in the hospital scene 
is the silence that contains all the violence and unspeakable terror. Absurdity, 
polyphony, contrapuntal structure? 
 
… it affects the visible with the fundamental disturbance, and the world with a 
suspension, which contradicts all natural perception. What it produces in this 




The viewer becomes lost in the fog of twilights, in the streets drenched by the rain, 
exhausted by the long and enduring 'non/adventure' in the history of the universe and 
the memory of existence. From scene to scene, from perspective to perspective, 
neither encouraging understanding nor providing emotional security. As one of the 
critics observed, comfort is one sensation never allowed us. And as we are waking 
from a bad dream that is about to start again, something happens, something that puts 
us on edge, throws in the gap of uncertain 'logic', outside perceptive and cognitive 
certainties. The point of view is not one of the 'knowing' observer, but hesitant, 
uncertain. Why? What does it mean? What does it say? This usual set of questions 
brings confusion and frustration if not irritation. These questions have no value here. 
We are left with the time and space of wa(o)ndering thought. 
 
As multiple points of view inside the filmic reality interact, the same scenes being 
viewed form multiple perspectives, as the world is examined, approached, tried, 
indecisively, helplessly, it is our own position as a viewer that is at stake here. 
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According to Claire Colebrook this liberation of the sequencing of images from any 
single observer, so that the affect of cinema is the presentation of an 'any point 
whatever', is what makes cinema cinematic. "By maximising its own internal power, 
she writes, cinema frees images from the organising structure of everyday perception 
and thus chooses to follow life."
282
 Things become pure sensations, composed of the 
"disjunctive synthesis of incompossible points of view."
283
 In 'forgetting' the 
established perspective, amnesia does not repeat the past. We are not just given 
connecting points of view of different mobile sections, we are freed from viewpoint 
altogether.
284
 Béla Tarr's films are assemblages of images in the 'narrative' of time and 
aesthetic in a total reversal of values, a complete disruption of optics, perspective, and 
logic."
285
 In the rhythms of the camera's movements, in its circling, bending and 
turning, crossing and surrounding movements, in its slower or faster pace, there lies a 




The sense of an unreal, hallucinatory dream-like world is at the same time very real. 
 
While the sleeping bodies (Sátántangó) are 'watched' by the camera 'gliding' above 
them again and again, the voice-over 'relates' everyone's dream. As the dreams are 
being told, the camera movement becomes the incredibly touching 'eye' revealing 
slowly and repetitively, the sleeping, vulnerable bodies, and their 'disembodied' 
dreams The sense of surrealistic, dreamy imagery is the result of an arrangement of 
real elements, a kind of creative constructing, rather than what we accept as 
'surrealistic imaging'. Nothing is 'artificial' in the way these images are constructed. At 
times, the viewer feels that something is 'wrong' with the way things appear on the 
screen, but is incapable of detecting sufficient proof to discredit the presented events 
on the basis of everyday logic. For Vlada Petric, this would be image "estranged" 
poetically in the tradition of the Russian Formalist poets and Constructivist artists, 
rendered obliquely in order to suppress the 'dramatic' meaning of the event, while 
encouraging the viewer to search for something beyond the image as an analogue of 
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 Or, as Erica Balsom wrote, it is the case where the spectator is left only with 
the interstices of events, engaged in probing the last tremors that emanate from 




The beyond, shining through the surface that is both inside and outside, is not an 
existential, human redemptive void and neither is it nihilism. In Tarr's world objects 
and things, to paraphrase Pasolini, appear charged with multitude meaning and thus 
"speak" brutally with their very presence. Physical, practical reality, "getting close to 
life", the mundane, everyday, boring chores evoke almost ritualistic presence of 
existence (different places are sometimes filmed to construct the scenes of what looks 
like the same place) which somehow intensify their experience, turning emotion to 
affect. An image "aimed at reality." "[And] there is more", as Pasolini continues: 
"there is an entire world in man which expresses itself primarily through signifying 
images: this is the world of memory and of dreams."
289
 For Deleuze, this is the 
moment of a virtual sign that makes 'actual' experience possible, the result of intensity 
and physicality of elements that have been given to time rather than perception. A 
'world' of the virtual sign is not a transcendental 'other' reality but an immanent 
outside, a plane which is both inside and outside. It is an intuition that restores ‘faith 
in the world’ precisely by tapping into the intensity that creates it. Béla Tarr's 
response to the question of metaphysical dimension of his work is that of "always 
listening to life."
290
 Listening to life and the 'belief in this world' takes the form of a 
photographic 'index' devoid of referentiality and free from analogy.
291
 In this sense, 
the image/ work of art is a 'vision', a real, an expression that not so much actualises 
these virtual affects but gives them "a body, a life, a universe."
292
 It does not represent 
or interpret reality but is a 'catalyst' through which the expression becomes visible but 
not seen. The image as real is both actual and virtual (not as virtual reality but the 
soul, the spirit, time itself); not transcendental Ideal but an immanent plane of 
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creation. Steven Marchant, finds a metaphysical dimension in Tarr's "richly 
happening sequence shot" which gives form to the nothing.
293
 However, this might be 
a question of the open whole which brings out the real, the thing in itself, as Deleuze 
writes, literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its radical or unjustifiable 
character, because it no longer has to be "justified", for better or for worse.
294
 Here, 
the nothing 'happens', taking away the negation and the lack from the productive 
'uncertainty' of what becomes. Image as real is both actual and virtual. It might be also 
the question of what Deleuze calls spiritual determination, which is not the 
transcendental system of values to which we conform, but the potential in the 
choosing the mode of life alongside thinking.
295
 The extremely long, disconnected, 
and enduring moments, no longer images but thoughts, put us in contact with the real 
– the unclear and dispersive nature of the outside. It is this "hypnosis that reveals 
thought to itself", which requires a new thinking.
296
 By giving us enough time, films 
intensify our interaction with the world and thought by allowing us to relate to it 
intuitively and affectively, through both the movements of film and our memory. 
 
It could be said that the films consist of long gliding thoughts that travel the length of 
streets or caress the interiors, becoming "questioning, responding, objecting, 
provoking, theorematising, hypothesising, experimenting, in accordance with the open 
list of logical conjunctions ('or', 'therefore', 'if', 'because', 'actually', 'although'…')."297 
For Deleuze, this interpreting, hypothesising camera is 'a sort of third eye, the mind's 
eye", which "frames the 'action' in a whole network of relation. Restoring the 
connection with the world as belief. Wandering, as Giuliana Bruno found out could be 
also understood as 'error' (etymologically) implying rumbling, roaming, or even going 
astray.
298
 Such narrative thus invites a wandering 'response' with the movement of/in 
the image, a different kind of attention. Cosmic rather than universal, and machinic 
rather than human. It requires a shift in perspective – from transcendence to 
immanence, from reaction to intuitive co-creation – that is at the same time an 
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affirmed 'resignation' to the new, imperceptible yet to come. A passive resistance and 
a choice. In this way the reality of the trilogy can be perceived as a process of creative 
transformation of becoming, and not representation. 
 
Film is a construction, a world of its own, and an art. 
 
As a work of art, it departs from the domain of representation in order to become an 
experience, "the science of the sensible" Realism is disposed of in favour of the false 
and its artistic, creative power. Lived experience, also the result of imagination, 
hesitation or chance, stored in long takes, deep focus photography, "any-spaces-
whatever", characters’ faces or sound is also the experience of universal and cultural 
memory as timelessness, both actual and virtual, real and imaginary. The world, as 
Deleuze puts it, is neither true nor real but 'living', because, 'a Life' is a force that 
persists over time as an experimental, spontaneous and open process of 
transformation. Artistic here takes on the power of life, the time and rhythm of 
becoming as co-poiesis of art and life. 
 




The rhythm in Béla Tarr's films creates the 'narrative' and dictates the movement. It 
could be argued that it is time itself which directs the image. Distinctive, ongoing and 
resonant,
300
 the rhythm seems to be of different movements and different times. The 
fugal repetitions, the tango rhythm, the rhythms of the everyday chores and of cosmic 
forces.
301
 "There is repetition in a way with this fugue structure. Something similar is 
coming back, albeit with a totally changed substance, so the meaning is quite 
different… This kind of monotony is very close to me" he comments in an 
interview.
302
 There are varying rhythmical patterns that establish a constancy which 
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envelops us and heightens our sensitivity to change: a ticking clock, a whirring fan, 
the drone of a refrigerator motor, the patter of rain.
303
 The monotonous 'patterns' of 
existence, hesitance, waits and returns unfold the time in-between vision and hearing. 
 
The rhythm 'experiments' with time and discloses new temporal relations. It is as 
though the viewer, as Ronald Bogue wrote, "was going for a walk through different 
points of time, as though he was amassing the future by turning to the past, in the 
process of which, the memory of the past becomes transformed into the memory of 
the future."
304
 This is the power of rhythm, which is more 'profound' than a vision, or 
hearing itself, Deleuze writes. Rhythm appears as music when it invests the auditory 
level, and as imaging when it invests the visual level. This is a "logic of the senses", 
which is neither rational nor cerebral. "It is diastole-systole: the world that seizes me 
by closing in around me, the self that opens to the world and opens the world 
itself."
305
 As dance which carries life, preventing the return of the same in each of the 
films, the rhythm is also a force that keeps real from realising. This lacunary reality of 
the world is also the lacunar of the mind.
306
 The rhythm of thinking is enfolded in 
vision, folded in the "pleats of matter,"
307
 and unfolding in sound (and silence). 
Connected to the outside in a web of encounters-events, image-sound is used in a way 
of moving beyond communicative 'language', and into affect. This is the language of 
amnesia, the background sound the mainstream cinema discards, which, according to 
Deleuze, puts "in continual variation all components", "that enters the service of a 
virtual cosmic continuum, in which even the holes, silences, ruptures, and cuts have a 
part."
308
 For this 'continuum' is neither structural, nor formed logically according to 
the common sense of progression, but that of forking, diversions, repetitions, and 
waitings. 
 
All three of Tarr's subsequent features are the result of his collaboration with the 
writer, László Krasznahorkai. The Melancholy of Resistance (2002) is the origin for 
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Werckmeister Harmonies; Sátántangó is also based on a novel by Krasznahorkai of 
the same title, while Damnation was developed from a short story. The films abandon 
the language of 'continuity', in the fashion of the Resnais and Robbe-Grillet 
collaboration in French cinema, in favour of the "crystalline narrative."
309
 The 
language of Krasznahorkai's novels is already 'deterritorialised' – nonsensical, 
fragmentary, and full of "boring holes." In films the language of speech and the 
'language' of images are intertwined in the 'non-sensical' assemblage that is the result 
of an immediate life which has no need of language in order to create a style.
310
 What 
Deleuze calls collective utterances: a-signifying voice/ gesture/ of subjectless affects, 
neither an impersonal myth, nor a personal fiction, but an utterance expressing the 
impossibility of living under domination. It is an affective becoming passing between 
"people who are missing" and the "I" of the author who is now absent, releasing "a 
pure speech act." An autonomous, impersonal form setting itself up in "the midst of 
unliveable or intolerable situation."
311
 "There I was, plodding, plodding, plodding, and 
plodding along!" the conductor Kelemen repeats abstract Beckettian 'recitations' in his 
endless pub monologue in Sátántangó. 
Language as a collection of signifiers is bypassed in favour of the 'logic' of utterance. 
The structure of narrative, by enacting what Daniel Frampton described as a trans-
subjective film thinking, is tending away from the causal linear progressions of 
communicative speech/thought towards the extremity of a dream.
312
 Neither 
structured, nor deconstructed, dream is functioning here as 'chaotic', directionless, and 
immanent time-space. Imaginary, timeless floating of images: "a dispersive and 
lacunary reality … a series of fragmentary, chopped up encounters."313 Many of the 
trilogies' sequences are silent or without words. Silent scenes are the most powerful 
images in Tarr's 'story'.
314
 And with the words, the most important are those that speak 
poetically through the images themselves, in disconnected monologues, fragmentary 
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dialogues, and 'visionary' speeches. This brings us to the second way in which the 
language of structure is given to the 'logic' of utterance. The monologue explaining 
the eclipse of the sun by János in Werckmeister Harmonies, the neurotic, 'inner' 
speech of the girl in Sátántangó, the cloakroom attendant's hollow recitation of 
religious scripture to Karrer in Damnation, all have an autonomous, fragmentary 
character, and tend towards silence (invisibility). Nobody is given a voice, and 
nobody speaks in the name of the other. There is no more "I" or "We" or "You", 
subject and object intertwine, dissolving in the matter of image-world.
315
 Personal and 
collective merge. Language here seems like a resemblance of "inner speech", the adult 
survival of what Jean Piaget calls the 'egocentric speech' of the small child, preferring 
images to words, and treating words as images. Disconnected and incomplete, the 
mental image – an internal, drunken monologue, works through figures, metonyms, 
synecdoches, metaphors, inversions and attractions."
316
 For Giorgio Agamben, this is 
a primary experience, before human becomes subject, an infancy – a 'wordless' 
experience in the literal sense of the term.
317
 It is the free-indirect discourse of 
Pasolini and Bresson's models, a poetic language as experimentation, which Kristeva 
saw in gestural, disjunctive rhythmic of asemiotic elements; an internal vision, or 
language of sensation.
318
 This is imagining and imaging the world of the 'whole' that 
consists of Visions and Auditions that no longer belong to any language. As Deleuze 
asserts, these visions are not fantasies, but veritable Ideas that the artist sees and hears 
in the interstices of language, in its intervals.
319
 The child in Sátántangó is the 
character, which 'acts' most 'creatively', uncompromisingly, imaginatively (even if in 
the most tragic way), 'choosing to choose', as children often do. Beyond or outside 
reality/ fantasy negative structure 'imaginary' here is not a 'fantasy' (opposed to 
reality) but imaging which is experimental: creative exploration of reality and the 
creative mirroring of artistic process. Expression and Construction. What this 
'infantile' broken 'language' seems to be doing is resisting further the "majoritarian" 
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(Deleuze) discourse of art and politics, moving outside the Oedipal structures of 
familiarity.
320
 What is more, the child and the idiot, the 'seer' of wa(o)nderous 




Blurry in its meaning, loose in its movement, the image-narrative becomes in a sense 
pre-verbal content, like 'day's residues' – remnants of remembering, mental images, 
not necessarily visual but auditory, tactile, olfactory or kinaesthetic. Fragmentary 
sequences, often circular and repetitive, are formed from the elements real and 
imaginary no longer discernible or distinguishable. As Deleuze notes, Antonin Artaud 
suggested that the cinema resembles automatic writing, simultaneously conscious and 
unconscious in thought, a "spiritual automaton."
322
 He attributed this kind of 
thinking/time-image with the character of memory, dream, or subjective 'vision' which 
puts us in contact with the unknown. The language of wa(o)nderous narrative is the 
language of affect-thought, a wordless potential for sense and sensation. This is the 
cinema, which resembles no language, but consists of "pre-linguistic images" and 
"pre-signifying signs."
323
 The language of cinema, as Pasolini states, is fundamentally 




Regardless of symbolic potency of the whale, the prince, and the repeated biblical 
references, Tarr's images resist interpretation because of a kind of poetic short-
circuiting that eradicates any conventional symbolic reading. The big, 'mysterious 
creature' in the centre of the town's square is not a representation or metaphor but 
literal cardboard animal left decaying at the empty town square. It is a silent witness, 
as is János in the hospital of events that reveal nothing, that only, as Andrew Schenker 
pointed out, "tantalise us with the prospect of a higher meaning only to deny that 
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 The sense of enclosedness, mystery has been enveloped not 
in meaning but in paradox, a reverse of 'universal' myth in the semi-ironic 
disappearance of a story of which there is no more to tell. The move from metaphor is 
a move away from a representational concept of language, towards a concept of 
language immersed in the world of things – a vision, intervening among them, 
forming new bodies with them, capturing and distributing intensities. The meaning of 
the film is incorporated into its rhythm just as the meaning of a gesture may 
immediately be read in that gesture: the film does not mean anything but itself.
326
 Tarr 
denies that his films convey any allegorical meaning – "film is always something 
definite – it can only record real things."327 His poetic vocabulary belongs to 'the art 
of description', which attempting the pre-symbolic grasp of agile reality leads not to 
the illusionistic depth, but to the "untimely meditation" of shape, light and texture, 
that begins again in order to obliterate its object, like the body in the world, neither 
fully conscious nor unconscious, erasing the opposition between subject and object. 
Ambivalence in which the same procedure creates and withdraws meaning, the 
wordless immediacy of the visible, it is the language of affect, a sensible or 




Film of the time-image is neither a language system nor a language, Deleuze writes, 
"it is a plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-syntaxic material, a material not formed 
linguistically, even thought it is not amorphous and is formed semiotically, 
aesthetically and pragmatically…. It is an utterable."329 The director does not take his 
'signs' "from a shrine, a protective sheath, or from some baggage, but from chaos, 





They constantly intertwine with each other, becoming one with another, one through 
the other, dissolving the subjective/objective division. Hallucinatory imagery (slow 
'motion', rain, ambient light) and concrete physical reality (texture, embodied 
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presences) coalesce and interact in a chain of production (outside judgment and 
outside meaning), caught in the perpetual motion of the crystalline narrative. 
 
This is he image that we cannot 'say', it is beyond words. We can go around it, with it, 
into it, we can sense, feel, perceive but cannot say what is. We can utter sounds but 
have no access linguistically to it as a symbolic structure. There is no signifier but 
encounter-event. The real of poetic (non)communication. 
 
Can one 'progress' from symbolic to imaginary? 
 
Poetic 'communication' is different from instrumental communication, it is non-
communication, an expressive event. It can be 'sensed' as kind of muteness, the 
silence of speech between language and expression, language and experience. 
Gestures and 'brute reality', as well as dreams and the processes of our memories are 
almost prehuman events, or on the border of what is human. People, dogs, rain, 
moods, textures… neither particular nor universal but both (cosmic, entering into 
'larger vision'). Forming molecular coupling they enter into a 'mad' dance of 
becoming.
331
 They are pre-grammatical and even premorphological (dreams take 
place on the level of the unconscious, as do the mnemonic processes; gestures are an 
indication of an extremely elementary stage of civilization, etc.). The linguistic 
instrument on which film is found is, therefore, of an irrational type. Absurdity of 
situations and tragicomical gestures, at times diabolical and sarcastic. The messianic 
status of Irimiás (including his biblical name) and parodic role of Petrina as his 
confidant, accomplice, and kind of Cervantian squire. At the end of Sátántangó, the 
doctor comes to a church ruin at the top of a hill, climbs a set of stairs, and finally 
walks into the centre of the church trying to find the source of what seems like the 
church bells. The camera continues forward to an extreme close-up of this source: an 
old man rhythmically clanging a steel rod in lieu of the missing church bell, while 
repeatedly yelling “The Turks are coming, the Turks are coming.” Who is this old 
man? Where are the Turks? The moment makes no sense but somehow, as Donato 
                                                 
331
 For Deleuze and Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus and Anti-Oedipus), the molar and molecular are 
two different (not opposed) modes of becoming or perception. Molar is the level of the organised and 
static i.e. the state, while molecular is the realm of singular desires (flux and flows) i.e. the multiplicity 
of the pack. In terms of perception 'molecular' refers to differences contracted by our perception. 
"Becoming-imperceptible is a molecular style of perception which transforms our notion of freedom." 
(Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, p.129). 
94 
 
Totaro points out, "it evokes an ominous and portentous atmosphere which is a perfect 
culmination of seven plus hours of similar tension-filled 'senseless' moments."
332
 The 
verbal torrents of Werckmeister Harmonies, reduced to a chill autism might be closer, 
as W.G. Sebald has suggested, to Gogol.
333
 In fact the whole atmosphere of absurd 
'situations' of corruptible worlds are like the characters of Gogol's Dead Souls. The 
profound and comical, this utterances are weaved in the fabric of life. The three men 
are looking upwards intently at whatever is in front of them. Irimiás looks especially 
moved by what he sees, and drops to his knees. Tarr underscores what seems like this 
religious vision with appropriate music. We finally cut to a point of view shot of what 
they have been gazing at: a gorgeous ruin encircled by slowly lifting fog. The shot 
cuts to the three men with their backs to the camera as they walk away. We hear one 
of the companions coolly ask Irimiás: "Haven’t you ever seen fog before?" Here the 
intensity of paradox of humour (joy), horror or pathos produces a strange sense of 
play, a hide and seek almost-meanings which chase each other in the rhythm of a 
never-ending waltz. And, 
 
the relentless rain merged Schmidt's swearing and Futaki's cheery, 
encouraging words as he repeated: "Never mind old man, you'll see we'll have 




There is more than the portrayal of human misery. 
 
For Deleuze this has great potential in terms of the deterritorialisation of meaning and 
judgment as cinema's goal is to produce images (imaging) which bring forth 
expression: percept and affect in a language of sensations. Even with its verbal 
elements, this is neither a language system nor a language. It understands signification 
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And whenever a language is submitted to such creative treatments, it is language in its 




This is a space of haptic visuality, which sees the world as though it were touching it: 
close, unknowable. Outside of image's visibility, in the sounds and tastes, on the skin 
and inside, amnesia as past and memory of the senses persists. Intuited and sensed. 
The formal and textual qualities: grainy, unclear images; the depiction of characters in 
acute states of sensory activity, close-to-the-body camera positions and panning 
across the surface of objects; changes in focus, under- and over-exposure, decaying 
images are the formal strategies that evoke the memory of the senses. The rain, mud, 
and vast landscapes, decrepit interiors of post-communist facilities (a hospital, a 
government office), black-and-white photography that might recall communism's 
grey, the play of light off bodies in bed, a drunken revelry of a dance fog ridden, 
unflattering greys of blocks of flats and desolate roads, empty streets with dogs 
wandering in the rain and a melancholic waltz running through the images. Intensity 
in excess of details, repetition, light and shadows, dark and earthy images of 
heightened sensation. The peeling walls, or the cardboard whale do not take us 
beyond the 'surface' to the other world (as in Tarkovsky for example), but bring us 
right back to the earth, mud, rain of this world, to feel it again closely, physically, and 
affectively. 
 
Intensities skew or scramble the faculties. 
 
Percepts as "independent of the state of those who undergo them", and affects not 
arising from but instead passing through subjects, "produce a shock to thought, 
communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system 
direct."
337
 Therefore, the percept is the images before us, and the affect is the 
"becoming other." Thus, images are always both multi-sensory and embodied. Pure 
memory does not exist in the body, but it is in the body that memory is activated, 
calling up sensations associated with the forgotten/ remembered event.
338
 Hence, 
every lived moment is both actual and virtual, with perception on one side and 
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memory on the other – an ever-growing mass of recollections. But this operation is 
possible only if the sensation of a particular domain (here, the visual sensation) is in 
direct contact with a vital power that exceeds every domain and traverses them all. 
This is remembering without 'knowing' what we are remembering, connecting to the 
'universal', a collective experience of life, from before collectivisms. Amnesiac 
remembrance. We do not edit experience, Frampton reminds us, and the film shows 
this when we follow the lead character of Werckmeister Harmonies, János, as he 
surveys the whale, or when we keep endless pace with Mr Eszter and János as they 
walk side by side, their faces "bobbing in front of us for a relative eternity;"
339
 when 
we 'endure' the long walk of people on their way to the 'promised' town, tired and 
drenched by the rain in Sátántangó, or wait for the protagonist of Damnation, Karrer, 
to finish shaving. It is not so much a matter of technique, real time or depth of field, 
but a function of remembering, a figure of temporalisation, which "gives rise to all 
kinds of adventures of the memory."
340
 All of us hold knowledge in our bodies and 
memories in our senses. As such, the 'Image' is not simply the visual image, but the 
complex of all sense impressions that a perceived object conveys to a person at a 
given moment. For Deleuze, art is not a way of representing experiences and 
memories that we might 'recognise'. Rather, the image as a collection of sensations – a 
"sensible aggregate", or what Deleuze will call a "sign" that we cannot simply 
recognise and that we encounter, as such, at the very limit of the sensible. Percepts 
and affects born on the edge, in the cracks of the surface, pre-personal, non-
representable, unnamed intensities. Emotion, on the other hand, does not render a 
'space' to empathise or identify, but to 'feel' in a subjectless way, uncompromisingly, 
unredemptively. Affective interiority beyond (outside) subjectivity. Like a body-
without-organs vibrating with intensities. The utterance of poet's creation moving 
along in 'majestic' cadence is the utterance of empty streets, the rain, the silences of 
half-shadowed textures. Dithyrambic rapture and rhapsody with the mystic dance 




Thus, what might be perceived as prolonging the never-ending hopelessness, and 
deterioration, is in fact a strategy that endows the image with a creative, productive 
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potential, which 'transcends' the language as a system of signs, beyond syntax or 
signification. Hence, taking it beyond narration and symbolism. These are the signs 
that we cannot simply recognise but encounter, as such, at the very limit of the 
sensible. The sudden encounter of a man in a bath at the end of the muted and 
ritualised violence of the hospital massacre in Werckmeister Harmonies for instance, 
or the silent look of a girl in the pub's window in Sátántangó – the 'irrational cuts', 
beyond language of representation or communicative speech, are not merely a sign of 
alienation or impossibility of communication. Here, the film-thinking enacts a kind of 
non-rational, figural non-communication, communication without communication as 
Lyotard would put it, communication of vision and experience, embodiment of 
tensions, complexities and ambiguities.
342
 The sensations 'stored' in the image, which 
do not refer to anything outside themselves, pure 'mechanical' intensities before or 
outside of any meaning have a capacity to derange the everyday, to short-circuit the 
mechanism of common sense and to bring a different kind of thinking at the threshold 
of "the thinkable." Here at the threshold/ interval, both the reality of the film and the 
reality of the 'outside' coincide and interact. It is as if the past surfaces in itself but in 
the shape of spaces and personalities, which are off-balance, in some sense embryonic 




This is something one can only sense, ambiguous, singular beyond individual 
experience; physical, concrete, and virtually present, real in a non-realistic sense; a 
space of 'unfixed' identity. Here the outside, the virtual nothing, opens into other 
outsides to infinity; embracing all: the 'negative', the pessimistic, the sad, the 
melancholy, the real, and death, in the eternal return of no longer recollected amnesiac 
repetition of the same but that of amnesiac difference; a creative process of eventing/ 
'imaging', where one and the same event is played out in these different worlds, in 
incompatible versions.
344
 Ultimately, such a universe goes beyond any lived 
experience; it exists only in thought and has no other result than the work of art. But it 
is also, writes Deleuze, "that by which thought and art are real, and disturb the reality, 
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morality, and economy of the world."
345
 With the cinema, "it is the world which 




Thus the thinking image seems to be a question of style. 
 
Tarr's style – a collaboration of sound and image in the variable compositions of a 
fugue – functions on two interacting realms. That of music: as an imitative, 
polyphonic composition in which a theme or themes are stated successively in all the 
voices of the contrapuntal structure, and that of 'psychology': an amnesiac condition 
during which one is apparently conscious of one's actions but has no recollection of 




Style creates the space of different 'becomings' in an assemblage of signs and images. 
It frames the living image in tiny fragments – microcosmic details – carved out of 
chaos or imposed on it, or both as a process of negotiations, details vibrating in a web 
of relations where "everything is connecting to everything else."
348
 Out of this 
labyrinth of encounters the new 'happens' in the nothingness of happening, in a 
creative process of imaging. Here the 'perception in becoming' enables the 
'appearance' of the unforeseen and the unexpected that is an expression in itself; 
becoming visible without being seen. In this becoming one does not become another 
as such (identification), rather each encounters the other and becoming is something 
(this something) between the two or outside the two, irreducible to the affections or 
perceptions of a subject. Time itself, and the constant change it implies, carries the 
relentless motion that transforms all Beings into Becoming, instead of letting it be 
…349 Cinema short-circuits the sensory-motor schema that governs our perception. 
Encountering the productive power of affect therefore permits us to confront what 
Deleuze refers to as "the 'microperceptions' that make up who we are – not just the 
perceptions of the eye that sees and judges, but also the disorganised perceptions of 
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the life that pulses through our bodies."
350
 Style allows for the creative forces of life, 
subject-less expression outside of interpretation or judgment. It is a real protagonist. 
 
Choreography, immanent to the physicality in front of the camera, and following its 
own rhythm in a striking symbiosis, rather than imposing itself finds the order 
“inside” the chaotic physical world. The order lies inside entropy, inside the liquid 
and dispersive deployment of time, instead of simply being opposed to it: that is 
Tarr’s style. It could be argued that like the whale, Tarr’s style is the static image of 
time, i.e. the destructive force par excellence, shown and cinematically 'frozen' at the 
microscopic level of its everyday action, circulating from point of view to point of 
view. It seems that this is the style of living and creating as one, an aesthetic of 
immanence that dislodge the 'politics' from the dialectics of negation (Utopia). It is a 
manner of thinking 'towards the world' or with it, a belief in this world, not another, 
transformed one.
351
 Style is creating an order which is then dis-ordered through the 
movement of camera and narration in a rhythmic repetition. The style in the most 
threatening one could say, radical. There is no value superior to life, Deleuze writes: 
Life is not to be judged or justified, it is innocent, it has 'the innocence of becoming', 
beyond good and evil …352 and the cinema: 
 
carries the experiment further and offers us not only certain rhythms of 
habitual life as the eye or ear recognises them, but those darker, slow-motion 
encounters with all that is concealed beneath things, the images – crushed, 





The characters, like the camera's different points of view, enable the multiplicity or 
'muteness' of perception. They point to nothing but themselves and the situation they 
are in, and at the same time bring forward the expression of becoming. As such he or 
she refuses identification and by depriving the viewer of a position from which to 
act/judge, renders the viewer 'knowledge-less' and 'direction-less', that is, in the 
standards of commonsensical rationale, powerless. There are no carefully placed signs 
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or symbols to decode, no frames designed to send a message, only an Image in itself 
and our inability to do anything but 'watch'. Repetition, description, and point of view 
are intertwined, entangled in a framed space with no position from which to 'enter' the 
image. "To open up to the inhuman and overhuman … to go beyond the human 
condition is the meaning of philosophy …"354 
 
To sum up, amnesiac reality functions as 'unreal', hallucinatory or a sleepwalking state 
of eternal return, a process of destruction, entropy. "Those who cannot remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it."
355
 It is also the state of 'forgetting' that might by-pass 
the accepted, established perceptions and thus create a potentiality for the new: now 
an eternal return of difference. Amnesia does not allow for a transcendental image. 
Being outside subjective remembering, it enters remembering in general as in the case 
of Werner Herzog's Kaspar Hauser who, not having any experiences to remember, 
while acquiring new 'memories' is able to 'see'/ dream the images he never 
encountered in reality.
356
 The regions of the past will keep their secret, and the call to 
recollection remains empty. He can no longer recall anything about it, but the whole 
of it is hallucinatory. The present is no more than an empty door from where the past 




It is as if the past surfaces in itself but in the shape of personalities which are 
independent, alienated, off-balance, in some sense embryonic, strangely active fossils, 
radioactive, inexplicable in the present where they surface, and all the more harmful 
and autonomous. Not recollections but hallucinations. Madness, the split personality, 




The eternal return, memory repeating itself but differently each time, is a circle in the 
spiral of infinite possibilities. The repetition acquires a different dimension. In this 
sense, Tarr makes the same film again and again where what repeats is difference, in 
the return of new. Evolution/ history is construed as a process of repetition that is 
inherently creative: it is productive of difference. All life is a "rhizomatic mode of 
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change", without firm and fixed boundaries, which proceeds "from the middle, 




Memory is 'stored' in the senses, and sense is this repetition that never returns to the 
same. In this way, amnesiac reality – because it is amnesiac it is new – creates the 
space for non-preconceived affects and percepts making seeing anew possible. Not 
from the perspective of the voyeuristic gaze but through sightless 'e/motion'. 
Amnesiac memory can also be a question of choice, as opposed to being traumatically 
imprisoned. Valuska tending to his daily routines, moving from one to another, 'sees' 
nothing. Sátántangó's different points of view culminate in doctor 'barricading' his 
window … What are we seeing exactly? And how is the I-eye (of the viewer) to enter 
the becoming of world-image of these films? 
 
Emotion is a subjectless affect. As such, perhaps, amnesia is no longer an opposition 
of remembering but is a different kind of remembering – the memory of the senses, or 
'mute' remembrance. Amnesia in Tarr's films is a potentiality, as it is an entropy. 
Forgetting and remembering embraced by the rhythm of polyphonic fugue, the to-ing 
and fro-ing of untimely meditation. A kind of amnesiac memory that plays on the idea 
of repetition. Two kind of repetition: repetition of the same (when history repeats 
itself) and repetition of the new (a-historical creation), based on experimentation and 
experience. The whole work revolves around questions of life and creativity, 
challenging pre-conceptions and perspectives. "The proliferation of intensities in art 
also destroys the image of a unified viewing subject who recognises a meaningful 




This kind of cinema implies a kinaesthetic way of experiencing space, and images 
stored in our memory, which are embodied and haptic as much as retinal pictures.
361
 
In a work of art we encounter ourselves and our own being-in-the-world in an 
intensified, non-personal manner. 
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There is always a temptation to put one's faith in God, a better world, Humanity. In 
Tarr's world there is no God, no morals, and no Humanity. In this sense his films are 
truly nihilistic. The nothing however happens here out of the affect/ desire and 
thinking matter. Belief in this world without a priori 'knowledge', without God, State, 
and heaven turns the world from something given into something to be explored and 
created, not according to measure of 'what is' but according to 'what this world is 
capable of'; an active and affirmative attitude towards the world.
362
 In existential 
terms this means attention to life 'as it is' (which is not the same as resignation but as 
what Tarr calls a 'pathological clinging to life', a kind of Beckettian 'plodding along'), 
whereas in philosophical terms it is a choice to think with the movement of life. In 
view of this the 'pathological clinging to life' becomes an active affirmation, a 
wa(o)nder. 
 
This is cinema that is not philosophical but which does philosophy. It does philosophy 
through life in a Deleuzian-Nietzscheian-Spinozan fashion through the excess of 
material detail and time of wa(o)ndering narrative. Cinema of wa(o)nder might thus 
'function' here as a method and philosophical concept (of 'seeing' the world without 
judgment), an ultimate affirmation of life. Furthermore, the crystalline narration, by 
creating a vision that is no longer a presupposition to action, but takes its place, will 
stop the 'movement' altogether. The character, or the shot remaining immobile, will 
discover the "power of the fixed shot"
363
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Photography is not a return to the things,  
but a return to the body as undivided vision-force. 





In obsessive framing, empty or disconnected spaces, 
the filmmaker, in a certain sense, stops movement  
and rediscovers the power of the fixed shot. 





What is a photograph? 
'Nothing but relation, nothing but affect', we may reply'. 







As it has already become apparent in the previous chapter, we no longer have an 
indirect image of time which derives from movement, but a direct time-image from 
which movement derives. This would be the fixed shot of the photographic, which by 
indexing its specific reality through the world immanently, erases the opposition 
between actual and virtual, form and content, past and present, and creates a special 
affective space of singular 'identity' – the real. Moreover, as reality is not constituted 
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by borderlines and functions, and identity is not a matter of limits but capacities, the 
relationship between time and space, between stillness and movement also changes. 
 
With the time-image of cinema risen out of the ruins of post-war Europe where time 
as well as space was fractured and fragmented, the photographic 'fixed shot' stood out 
as an 'any-space-whatever', without identity and without name. Out of the 'grand-
narratives' ruins, like a pagan Phoenix, orphaned and forgotten, the new and 
'homeless' potentiality of image 'arisen'. Schizophrenic, multiple-personal, 
'undeveloped', and affirming. It became, as John Rajchman observed, a "laboratory to 
make sensible the existence of time (as distinct from movement)" and to intensify the 
experience beyond the empty "banality" of the familiar …367 This kind of image, 
brought to life by Italian Neorealism has been strengthened by East European 
cinema's aesthetics of resistance through the construction of camouflaged, ambiguous, 
and unspoken imagery requiring an aptitude of (de)ciphering rather than critique. This 
new, clandestine, and unfamiliar imaging enabled by the 'style' of encounter rather 
than judgment became for Deleuze, and others the way out of a suffocating regime of 
information or cliché.
368
 Such molecular politics of resisting enabled photography – 
despite the claims of realism – and despite the later digital artificiality, to free itself 
from the constraints of mimetic representation, keeping at the same time the sense of 
the real merging aesthetics and politics together: 'expression and reality'.
369
 Not in the 
image, but neither absent, perhaps 'this' (photographic time-image) occurs as 
something – 'abstract-real' – that vibrates in the space of intense folding (of time and 
space, subject and object, past and present), or "shines through" its aesthetic, 
rendering visible the event that is no longer and not yet, becoming 'future' for ever. A 
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forgotten instant released from the world, fleeting from definitions, ungraspable by 
knowledge, unpredictable. 'Waiting' to be(come). 
 
Thus, it can be suggested that what the concept of the time-image involuntarily 
discovered, was the potential of photography or the photographic, both making and 
viewing, paradoxically perhaps, that keeps fleeing from the information/ 
communication regime of meaning-making and yet remains real.
370
 The impossible 
image of affect-thought. 
 
Still in the still/moving convolution of relations, a number of questions arise. How 
can we critically and conceptually 'approach' such an image? To suggest photographic 
indexing, and particularly in relation to the virtual, is almost unthinkable within the 
established dialectics of a discourse.
371
 Thus, in what way is it possible to 'argue' the 
impossible? What does it mean to encounter an image that is 'fixed', and yet from 
which movement derives? Why might it be important to look at the still photograph 
from the point of the cinematic, or perceive the moving image of the cinema through 
the photographic still? Most importantly, what can such image/s or 'relation' do, or 
what is it capable of? 
 
When thinking about the film image, the tendency is, understandably, to acknowledge 
the multiplicity of different 'expressions'/ arts, not only that of the visual, involved in 
the creation of what is known as film image.
372
 With photography there tends to be a 
more monolithic view of the image confined to vision (bound to the mimetic – a copy 
or death mask), and predominantly belonging to representation. Yet, if we move away 
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from perception/ representation to affect/vision, other possibilities might arise on the 
horizon of 'love' rather than death. The blind vision? Seeing with the eyes closed? 
 
The time-image – a sound and optic situation is framed and deframed by the 
aesthetics of durée, in the narrative of w(a)onderous imaging 'strung together' or 
sculpted by the logic of poetic thought. Without a before or after, in the meanwhile of 
time, this image exists as its own reality and its own thinking; neither realistic 
representation, nor symbolic structure of communication it stands alone and present: 
objective and subjective, actual and virtual, ephemeral and embodied. It is a thing in 
itself, a different world and a different reality that is immersed in the 'stuff' of life, and 
which restores the link with the world by rising above the everyday, both transcription 
and construction (art).
373
 As 'a life', it transgresses the meaning of life (cliché). As art, 
it 'forces' to think by the power of affect, a non-personal, difficult, and 'unknown' 
space of transformation (an affect-thought), and thus might, as Deleuze hoped, 
liberate a seeing whose power is still unknown to us. 
 
The silent, flat space of its 'secret' – the real that is located nowhere but 'pierces 
through' (Barthes) – that seems to hover, ungraspable on the surface "at once lived 
and imperceptible"
374
 is what makes the photograph(ic) 'most compelling'. It may, 
arguably be one of the most interesting in affirming life, thought, and creation as a 
(non)philosophy of "this world." This expression of the 'still image' as neither realistic 
nor idealistic, yet both actual and virtual is perhaps possible only through cinema or 




Could a photograph be thought of as 'real', outside realism and representation? As 
both an impression and an expression
376
, a gesture pointing to 'nothing', a shape 
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carved out of chaos, or pause, a non-place of an encounter-event that destabilizes 
perception and implies multiplicity of relations recovering at the same time the link 
with the world? The link with this world does not close the relation with the world to 
referential or judgmental models, neither to realism or idealism as it is known, but 
opens up the experimental and experiential virtual space (not to be confused with 
virtual reality) for the possibility of becoming (vision). 
 
In what sense – visually and conceptually might we perceive photography through the 
lens of cinema, and in what way might such perception be necessary? Cinema as a 
certain number of photographic stills put together in motion? Or is it more to do with 
the way the camera 'sees'? More to do with framing? On the one hand, it could be the 
many points of view/ framings of the camera, on the other, its ability to frame 
intensities, sensations, or affects. Perhaps it is the question of a particular framing of 
space-time, the relationship between stillness and movement in a complex 
entanglement, interchangeable and interconnected in the material and abstract sense; 




Thinking with and against Deleuze's ideas concerning time and space, stillness and 
movement, materiality and abstraction, the aim of this chapter is to (re)negotiate the 
photographic (image) as real, taking its 'inherited' dispositions outside of realism and 
representation.
378
 Situating it within the concepts of multiplicity, creation and 
immanence, I propose an 'image' – a plane of composition, a map – where the 'trace' 
and the 'false' do not exclude each other, and where time and space are not opposed.
379
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This would allow me to think of the concept of space-time, or haptic spatiality 
(defined by the flow of forces), which has to do with affect as different from affection 
(and yet not completely detached from 'bodily' desires). Not the same as 
phenomenological 'being-in-the-world', this is rather a question of 'becoming with the 
world' or alongside it.
380
 Rather than thinking of the photographic as a paradigm of 
either physical or virtual reality, the discussion will adopt the idea of the image as a 
plane of forces where the real is incarnated (repeated as difference) in the becoming-
photographic; a vision which is also a matter of (photographic) thinking rather than 
'philosophy'
381
. This will be the realm of both actual and virtual, still and moving, 
objective and subjective, and the relations within and between, in the open 
experimental space of singular encounters; the question of affect and intuition. This 
chapter's aim is to move away from oppositional thinking and to propose a different 
way of looking at both the 'still' and the 'moving' photographic image, where the 
coming together of opposites is not a question of relation or hybridity as such but of a 
radical immanence. This will be possible by moving away from theoretical, critical 
discourses and meaning-making strategies around photography, and instead by 
exploring the potential of the photographic through the (non)philosophical and 
creative investigation into the cinematic 'time-image' where movement is 'stopped' 
becoming vision.
382
 The emphasis will be on the idea of vision (rather than act of 
looking) as realised in the long, hallucinatory shots of Béla Tarr's imagery.
383
 This 
will give an opportunity to rethink space and image and their relation to one another, a 
way of returning to the photographic still, via film, as an image (and art), and as its 
                                                 
380
 Being in the world in Deleuzian sense is different from its phenomenological understanding. This 
would be "an existential communication that would constitute the "pathic" (non-representative) 
moment of the sensation." "The world that seizes me by closing in around me, the self that opens to the 
world and opens the world itself." Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. 
Smith (Continuum, London and New York, 2002), pp. 30-31. 
381
 Fragmentary, fractured/ fractal and flat according to Laruelle; 'punctured', mad and uncertain when 
attempted through Camera Lucida (Barthes); as creating concepts through opening up new 'problems' 
(Deleuze). 
382
 Stopped or paused or stilled movement is thought of as an optical and sound image of its own 
vision, where time is 'given' to attention (not perception but intuition) and to contemplation (thinking 
from a non-habitual position, outside of sensory-motor re/actions); also not only in relation to stopped 
movement but in relation to the world/ outside. 
383
 The photographed has for some time now been perceived as a particularly dangerous form of short-
circuited thinking and representation, since its chemically based realism confers it with an air of 
authenticity, of innocent directness, that supports all its stereotyping. This point, central to Roland 
Barthes' and other structuralist thought, has created a particular critical discourse positioning still 
photography within a fixidity of meaning. and the defining power of the gaze. This monolithic view of 
the image, confined to the act of looking, bound to representation, has been criticised for some time 
now. See Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes, pp. 435-493. 
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own reality (experiential and experimental space). It will be thought of as real which 
connects with the world but is 'rescued' from the burden of truth (of) either 
documenting or representation. Following the conceptual 'ethos' of the theses as 
'photographic thinking' the writing will flow in the fragmentary, discontinued fashion 
opening up problems rather than looking for the solutions. Using expressions (photo, 
photographic, image), and concepts (still, moving, fixed) interchangeably it will aim 
at a materiality of 'what is' sensing the image-photo-world and thus 'teasing out' the 
real. 
 
Disconnected by the irrational cut, fixed by aberrant movement of non-narrative, and 
'banished' from the rationale of symbolic order to the 'madness' of any-space-
whatever, the time-image brings the photographic image to the surface, and as a 
surface, allows it to live in a space of movement and change. In this sense the 
photographic 'still' could be perceived as a space-time (in its embryonic state of 
potentiality), which, growing in dimensions, "never stops reconstructing the identity 
of image and object."
384
 The 'time-image' on the other hand can become a 'moving 
photograph' that fills the image with a temporal flow of 'pure contemplation': "the 
mental and physical, the real and imaginary, the subject and object, the world and 
I"
385
. The photograph thus is also a plane of different relations where 'everything is 
connected to everything else' (Sátántangó) in a cosmic web of 'world-memory' which 
is also a multiplicity of 'unlimited finity', and a plane of composition that is also an 
abstract "plane of consistency" (or immanence).
386
 As such, a photographic image 
moves away from fixing the meaning and opens up the space of infinite becomings. 
 
A photograph – the sense of space and vision, and a plane of (non)relations. 
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Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 27. 
385
 Ibid., p.15. 
386
 'Unlimited finity' refers here to different finitudes and distinct combinations "not unified by a single 
vital current." Colebrook, 'Deleuze and the Meaning of Life', in Constantin V. Boundas (ed.), Deleuze 
And Philosophy, Edinburgh University Press, 2006, p. 122. 
The plane of consistency is also the plane of immanence, the virtual dimension of reality. Sometimes 
also referred to as A Body Without Organs of "the earth." "The Earth, is a body without organs. This 
body without organs is permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free 
intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles." Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, p. 40.  
Also in terms of time, this is the time of Aion; an 'idea of time' rather than Chronos, which would be a 
concept of the plane of organisation: "The plane of consistency consists of the ‘chains’ of co-emplaced 
modes or ‘stages’ of abstract machines and of assemblages, and overall of the field of co-emplaced 




The photograph is always a way of seeing different from perception, a 'viewpoint' 
among and within many, "not truth according to the subject, but the condition in 
which truth of a variation appears to the subject."
387
 A fleeting moment amongst many 
other moments vibrating in-between. 
 
If a photograph is a hybrid, it is in a sense of a labyrinth 'ordered' into a web (variety) 
of all the (non)connections (the photograph, the image, the photographer, the viewer, 
the world and the outside – the indefinable process of becoming), different points of 
view that in their most radical form free our perception from any viewpoint. The 
"incompossible" frames/ worlds folded in the potential of the false, this is where time 




A photograph is also a paradox – both any-instant-whatever and durée at the same 
time, a trace and a map.
389
 Both absent and present, it is never 'what is'. Time here 
exists not as the chronological ordering of a 'narrative's' progression, but as going in 
two directions at once, where the perception is already a memory, "the pure present 
being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future."
390
 Already and not 
yet. Here, the past coexists with the present, objective with subjective, inside with 
outside, actual with virtual within the plane of immanence. This is the nonorganic life 
that is retained in the photograph in a strange contradiction: life within death as a 
potential of multiplicity, of what might come (next), or of what might have been. The 
living present of Chronos expressed in the wonderment of the photographic instant 
(Sutton), and the empty time of Aion as the meanwhile's interval (Yve Lomax). 
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 Deleuze, The Fold, p. 22. Each point in the world is a monad, a perception that unfolds the world 
from itself without the requirement of a shared and anticipated space that is synthesised into the future. 
To say that 'monads have no windows' is to say that a world is perceived and unfolded without the 
assumption or presupposition of perception in general. As discussed by Claire Colebrook in 'The Space 
of Man: On The Specificity of Affect in Deleuze and Guattari', in Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert 
(ed.), Deleuze and Space( Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 189-207. 
388
 Deleuze, Cinema 2. Incompossible refers to Deleuze’s concept of an open and divergent - but not 
antagonistic or contradictory - series belonging to one and the same; the only world, our world. 
389
 The paradox is understood here not in the contradictory sense of opposition. Rather, as Deleuze 
suggests, paradoxes allow us to be present at the genesis of the contradiction: "The principle of 
contradiction is applicable to the real and the possible, but not to the impossible from which it derives, 
that is, to paradoxes or rather to what paradoxes represent." Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. by 
Constantin V. Boundas (Athlone Press, London 1990), pp. 74-5. 
390
 Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 150.  
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Reality (the link to the world)
391
 and fiction (the power of the false) are bound by the 
chance of a meanwhile. Both a revelation and concealment; an infinite web of 
(in)finite connections in the cosmic world of memory, and an embryonic state of 
potentiality. An empty meanwhile that is also a pure reserve. A photo – radical 
immanence. 
 
How thus can the fixed shot Deleuze speaks of, exist as a thinking image that is never 
stable, defined, or captured, but in constant motion of inventing and reinventing 
itself? 
 
Beautifully filmed, with extreme long takes and very little editing, Tarr's images are 
like a collection of old black and white photographs of a forgotten time. People walk, 
dance, get bored, drink, and muse on the universal order or disorder of the world. It is 
as if the world has been confined to the 'number' of still, and what feels like timeless, 
moments of 'nothing happens': mating animals, moving round empty coal carts, foul-
smelling kitchens and smoke-filled pubs. Independent, singular sequences are folded 
into a textural dance of fugal repetitions as if time has been paused or suspended 
momentarily dwelling in the timeless now. Derelict buildings, dark, empty squares 
covered by rain, swamped by harsh light attics and muddy streets, rise up to the 
surface like old photographs, where the utterances of half-remembered worlds still 
resonate. Movement, space and time lose their respective positions, becoming 
imperceptible. The past is carried by the surfaces of buildings reduced to their own 
descriptions, the space reinvented outside of either control or recognition. The film's 
and the viewer's memories meet and interact in the 'any-pace-whatever' – an empty 
space of Aion. The sense of endless decay and suffocating intensity of style 
'deceptively' point to unstoppable, degrading hopelessness.
392
 Here the image in time 
becomes 'pure expression', no longer image of something but an image-affect-thought. 
Tarr's hallucinatory image, enfolded in the long, wandering shot, not only destabilises 
the still/ moving opposition but throws in motion of experiments and experiences the 
established notions of image, photography, perception, and time. The relation between 
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 Again, this not phenomenological being in the world (perception) but intuitive misrecognition; 
percepts and affects, rather like Camera Lucida's punctum cut off from its psychological and 
phenomenological attachments. 
392
 Tarr's films have often been interpreted in terms of being bleak, dark, and even nihilistic. See 




the film, the viewer, the world, and the outside are interconnected in the process of 
creative transformation brought forth by the director.
393
 The rainy image of Hungary 
is a powerful and unique "vision" stored in long takes, deep focus photography, "any-
spaces-whatever," characters' faces, "architextures" of settings, vision and sound. The 
image that becomes rendered (sensed/ felt) in moments of percepts and affects, 
through the photographic, neither 'art' nor information. Difficult, intense, disquieting 
in its seeming bleakness and its absurd tragicomedy, it is an image in the process of 
what Claire Colebrook calls, rendering visible imaging itself "not yet incorporated to 




Instead of concentrating exclusively on Deleuze's linking of the fixed shot to 
'crystalline regime' (Damian Sutton's reinterpreting of still photography
395
), the 
concept of the photographic will attempt to unpack or decipher the still photographic 
image by looking at the concepts of stillness and movement in relation to space as a 
plane, both virtual and actual, of composition (art), of immanence (philosophy), and 
of the outside (ethics). The deciphering, as mentioned already earlier, will take a form 
of 'sensing' (rather than defining or synthesising) with Tarr's imagery and the 
photographic concepts involved. 
 
"Photography affects us like a phenomenon in nature," wrote Bazin, "like a flower or 
a snowflake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of their 
beauty."
396
 Photography's affect 'identical' to that of a 'phenomenon in nature', is more 
than simple objectivity or the 'naïve realism' Bazin is often 'accused' of. As both, the 
'camera consciousness', which combines human and non-human 'seeing' into not so 
much a way of seeing but a new vision, a seeing (an eye-camera-world process of 
rendering visible each time of encounter, never a priori or given), and the material 
existence of all life, photography becomes a plane of consistency/ composition where 
every element (sign) is the enlargement or extension of material intensity.
397
 
                                                 
393
 This could be thought of with Laruelle's concept of a photographer who "ceases interminably to 
verify the supposed identity of things, escapes the obsessive-compulsive interpretation of philosophies 
and their sub-systems. Instead, he 'gives' to things – manifesting as it is, without producing or 
transforming it – their real identity." Laruelle, The Concept of Photography, p. 56. 
394
 Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, p. 53. 
395
 Sutton, Photography Cinema Memory. 
396
 Bazin, 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image', p. 13. 
397
 As Pasolini suggested, the objects of reality have become units of image, at the same time the 
movement-image has become a reality which 'speaks' through objects. Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 27. 
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Moreover, the 'beauty' read here with Peirce's (and, by extension Deleuze's) 
'semantics' can not be perceived as a form imposed upon matter, or a thought-mass of 
linguistics, but as direct experience which is also a thought (a matter/ brain 
coupling).
398
 We could extend this to include the photographic index as material-
abstract sign of a particular mode of expression as this-world-image coupling, outside 
signification and outside reference.
399
 This would be an experience that can never be 
known but only 'captured' as potential, where the relation of the real world and affect-
thought is immanently 'unrecognisable', neither through aesthetic judgment nor 
through dialectics of political re-action. The material world extended to the 
materiality of the photograph via photographer-camera-eye is experienced through the 
immaterial sign enabled by the style/ framing. It might also be the camera/ optical 
unconscious – a time as 'infinite opening',400 and space for something unknown or 
unexpected about to happen. This has a potential for restoring the direct link to the 
world not through its reproduction but through the belief in this world as "unlimited 
finity." This is not so much a question of perception held within the frame of another 
perception (Sutton),
401
 but the complex relationship of indexicality and the 
unconscious in a multiple framing of immanent becomings (between the world and 
                                                 
398
 Matter is not just the material element of the subject's thought but is the material element of all life, 
of which the subject is only one mode of expression. This material existence is necessary for thought, 
and is actualised in thought and the sign. The sign does not result from the imposition of form, but 
instead, the sign teases out of matter what is already real, yet abstract. See Roger Dawkins, 'The 
Problem of a Material Element in the Cinematic Sign. Deleuze, Metz and Peirce', in Angelaki, vol.8, 
no.3, 2003, pp. 155-66. This is not the question of a referent or analogy, but what Pasolini called 'Ur-
code' which, "independently of any language system, makes the phoneme of the image from real 
objects and the moneme of reality from the image." Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 276. 
399
 Index is thought of here in the context of Peirce's theory of signs, as outside referentiality and 
symbolism. As also outside transcendence, it becomes, on the other hand, the link to this world, As a 
sign of in-between (Deleuze excludes index from his discussion of non-referential, non-signifying 
signs) it is the domain of both actual and virtual. This is not a question of contrasting analogue to 
digital but more importantly of remaining within the immanence of actual and virtual (not reality and 
virtual reality which points to transcendence), and within the Deleuzian emphasis of 'this world' (not 
any other or better world). The index is folded within the world and the outside immanently. 
400
 …there must be "a birth of the world that is not completely restricted to the experience of our 
motivity” and “the most distant recollection of image must be separated from all movement of bodies" 
writes Deleuze with Jean-Louis Schefer, Cinema 2, p. 36. 
The unconscious is understood here after Deleuze, as a constructive opening to the outside rather than 
the psychoanalytical negative space of repression as in Krauss's 'optical unconscious', or Foster's The 
Return of the Real. Rosalind E. Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (MIT Press, 1994); Hall Foster, The 
Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1996). 
401
 As cinema's rediscovery of the photograph's free-indirect proposition, Sutton, Photography, 
Cinema, Memory, p.104. 
According to Laruelle, for instance, photography is not a model of perception, it supposes (not pre-
supposes) perception, requires it, refers to it. Laruelle, The Concept of Non-Photography, p. 7. Vertov's 
Man with a Movie Camera (1929) might be considered as a practical exploration of this proposition. 
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(non)human/ camera framings). It is an affect of the instant in a moment of a 
spontaneous 'optical situation' that is real, not a copy of the real; the momentary 
(be)coming together of the inside and the outside, the form and the content in the 
image-world by the way of re-thinking/ redefining perception altogether. It is the way 
a photograph grasps this world, the image and the outside, in the "image that is a 
reality of nature, namely an hallucination that is also a fact."
402
 A mad image chafed 
by reality.
403
 Cinema (photography) represents reality through reality.
404
 This is not 
the question of analogue versus digital, aesthetics versus politics, but of the image that 
is 'impossible': capable of bringing forth the forces of life as becoming, and as such, 
becoming itself with the world and the viewer. Perhaps, the question would be as 
Deleuze 'stated'," … not to achieve a real as it would exist independently of the image, 
but to achieve a before and an after as they coexist with the image, as they are 
inseparable from the image."
405
 Such an image shatters our expectations – the shared 
'knowledge' (of image and of reality) giving us instead the direct experience of 'reality' 
– an intensity of affect, as a singular becoming, and the 'beauty' not of the beautiful 
but of the 'sublime'.
406
 This paradoxical 'indexicality' of the photographic within 'this 
world', between the thing and representation, is what Tarr's 'unrecognisable' imagery 
sense imperceptibly and intensely. Against 'natural perception' and 'unnatural cliché', 
it resists appropriation.
407
 A strange kind of 'realism' where the world/ life thinks itself 
through the image immanently. 
 
When Tarr speaks about "developing emotions" which is something "physical, 
concrete and clear", about "just some lenses that are objective", and "the real thing", 
                                                 
402
 Bazin, 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image', p.16. 
This is not the result of the exposure to the unmediated real world (Lacan) that in the dissolution of the 
ego would lead to the implosion of all meaning. For Deleuze and Guattari, he dissolution of the "I" is a 
moment of encounter and becoming which is thought in positive terms (outside subjectivity). Deleuze, 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.143 
403
 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 119 
404
 This is not the question of a referent or analogy, but what Pasolini called 'Ur-code' which, 
"independently of any language system, makes the phoneme of the image from real objects and the 
moneme of reality from the image." Deleuze, Cinema 2, p.276. 
405
 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p.36. 
406
 The sublime is referred here to the Deleuzian reformulation of Kant's idea of the sublime. For 
Deleuze, upon encountering something too terrible or too beautiful, the synthesising power of the 
faculties are shattered, and are replaced by difference in itself; the pre-subjective, impersonal 
"sensation-event." See Stephen Zepke, ‘Contemporary Art – Beautiful or Sublime? Kant in Ranciére, 
Lyotard and Deleuze’, in Avello Publishing Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1. 2011, p. 4. 
407
 'Unnatural cliché' refers to the shock factor employed by many mainstream cinemas of 'action'.  
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he gestures towards his complex and uncompromisingly 'difficult' imagery, "closer to 




It is a plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-syntaxic material even though it is 




Film and photography, writes Lisabeth During, are not "modelled" "but moulded in 
the crucible of real things."
410
 Similarly for Deleuze, the image is not analogical in a 
sense of resemblance, neither a codification; "the image is the object." It is "the 
modulation of the object itself" which re-positions the 'analogical' from resemblance 
to a process of a transformation (of the mould), and a sign from linguistic to 
'material.
411
 This is the photography's resistance to language. Neither language nor a 
language system, but "[d]escriptive science of reality", the photographic sits in-
between what could be called an 'estranged' resemblance, and "signaletic material"; 
"the thing itself caught in movement" – a modulation. As such, it is the operation of 
the real, "in so far as it constitutes and never stops reconstituting the identity of image 
and object.
412
 Such index as a conduit to affect, an in-between sign, a gap of non-
resemblance unhinged from designation, lacking a referent is "unmooring the 
conditions of truth."
413
 By the way of [this] 'factuation', it would be the utterable of 
poetic experimentation with the world, grounded in the image but never given; an 
index as 'nothing to say'. The process of indexing the real world 'happens' in Tarr's 
                                                 
408"I’m able to develop emotions from you, but it’s always physical, concrete, and clear. I cannot use 
any metaphors. I cannot use any symbols. What I have are just some lenses, which are objective. I tell 
you and show you real things" Béla Tarr, Interview with Fiona Meade, 
http://bombsite.com/issues/100/articles/2909. 
The "reality more real than reality" was Alfred Steiglitz's 'aim' in photography.  
409
 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 28 
410
 Lisabeth During, 'Innocence and Ontology', in Temenuga Trifonova (ed), European Film Theory 
(Routledge, New York and London), p. 262. 
411
 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 26-27 
412
 Ibid, p. 27. The 'thing caught in movement' here, or a pause (used throughout the project) is not the 
same as a photogram  - a single unit of film strip, and a film still – the term used in film-theory in 
discussions between cinema and photography. See Garrett Stewart, Between Film and Screen-
Modernism and Photo Synthesis ( Chicago:T he University of ChicagoP ress,1 999). Neiter is it the 
movement registered in the series of still photograph like those of Edweard Muybridge. It is rather a 
singular sense of a moment lacking nothing, a 'thisness' as a individuality different from that of a thing 
or a subject. 
Signaletic material, which includes all kinds of modulation features, sensory (visual and sound), 
kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal, and even verbal, which Deleuze speaks of in relation to 
movement, could be also extended to the still photographic in terms of index as non-linguistic, material 
sign, similar to those (opsigns, sonsigns) he employs for the cinema. Ibid., 28 
413
 Massumi, 'Introduction', Shock to Thought, p. xv. 
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imaging a posteriori in a sense that it envisions the world but never follows any 
scripted pattern of narration, or linear logic of progression.
414
 The filming occurs 
through the detailed attention to the world, and the letting go of any clear or hidden 
agenda, or judgment, which gives an impression that things are indeed being caught in 
the in-between, in becoming without before or after. 
 
Thus, we could think about the world photographically as a starting point, or a middle 
without a centre; not as being in the world (phenomenologically) but becoming with 
the world affectively.
415
 The 'had been' of Barthes's punctum as one of many potential 
'beings' in the immanence of the photo-world, might be thought of as be-ing of, or 
with, 'this world', intuitively (Bergson). Indexicality thus, as 'ur-code' and haecceity, 
moves from referentiality/ commentary and signification to the 'believe in this world 
as it is'.
416
 Similarly perhaps to Neorealist imagery, which, by "severing the link 
between the man and the world", has already moved from realism/ representation to 
'belief''. With later modernist cinema, the belief was 'replaced' with a totally different 
and radical sense of belief as difference. Would it be possible to say that the link with 
the world (as it is), outside World, and outside Man, can be restored via the index as 
"an index sui prior to any indication,"
417
 as a material empty sign, not linguistic but 
'worldly', of the reserve. Index as haecceity, thisness, sunya, the void, or sovereign 
contingency.
418
 Presence (only) of affect through co-existence with the world, a pure 
potentiality in a real sense of immanent becoming. 
 
Laruelle's photographic apparatus "negotiates the re-entry of the World in the abstract 
photographic stance … And this synthesis – where the claim of the World over 
                                                 
414
 Tarr often talks about having everything in his mind before starting the filming. At the same time he 
refuses to work according to script. Moreover, he sees the process of filming as a collaboration with 
those involved, including the places (and people) where the filming occurs. 
415
 Becoming affectively refers here to the Spinozan and Deleuzian becoming through the encounter 
with the world (through empowering or disempowering, affecting and being affected). 
416
 Believing in this world, as will be discussed later, acquires a different understanding when thought 
of outside transcendence and teleological 'narratives'. In this way it does not mean accepting the status 
quo but 'repositioning' the belief within the 'materiality' of thinking/ creating rather than the 
transcendentality of ideas. 
Deleuze, Cinema 2. 
417
 Francois Laruelle, 'The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems of The Secret and Communication', 
in Parrhesia, Number 9, 2010, p. 18. 
418
 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 5. 
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abstract vision-force is at once satisfied and postponed, where its resistance is 
admitted and displaced" – "is perhaps nothing other than art."419 
 
How can we think, or act/ experience, this relation to the world which is real? 
Could indexicality (as non-referential) be thought of as the world that is 'incarnated' in 
the image, that is a result of the in-between actual and virtual "of an impassive 
mechanical process" (Bazin), and of 'passive vitalism' (Colebrook); the relation 
between this world and photography, and the question of presence? As de-centred 
'perception' setting time/ vision-force free from any linkage (Deleuze)? An index-
gesture pointing to itself? Or a metamorphic eye, neither objective nor subjective, a 
new vision each time? 
 
The photographic thinking of the real does not know the world, it cannot delineate or 





Could it be the point of 'emanation' as a trace of space-time (as affect), not a copy but 
a quasi-automatic transfer, the question of a different 'direct' link to the experience of 
the world (neither subjective nor objective but pre-personal in a sense)? Without the 
presence of Man and World (representation), photography opens the space for an 
'instance of wonder' and thus potentiality (not will), for not-yet-human chance 
encounter with the world, which would then change the subject/ object position form 
fixed to one of many, an encounter that is empty of perception. As such, the 'photo', 
Francois Laruelle writes, "[may] not show the invisible that haunts the world, its 
folds, hinges and furrows, its hidden face, its internal horizon, its unconscious… It 
does not make the repressed return. It manifests the real, "the Identity which is its 
invisible object." This is paradoxically perhaps the link to this world and its 'index', as 
it – the invisible – is in this world. At the end (or the beginning) it is the world that is 
'in photo', an event of 'real(ist) aesthetics'. 
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 Catherine Kron, 'The Concept of Non-Photography: Review', 
http://dismagazine.com/blog/20047/the-concept-of-non-photography/. 
420
 Cavell, 'What Photography Calls Thinking', p. 117. 
118 
 
The impassive lens, stripping its object of all those ways of seeing it, those 
piled-up preconceptions, that spiritual dust and grime with which my eyes 
have covered it, is able to present it in all its […] purity to my attention and 




What is the love Bazin speaks of? Could that something be in-between (through the 
camera-photographer) the world and the photo, in a gap, or 'contingent' interval, a 
'truth' in itself but outside knowledge, and outside transcendence? The index as the 
secret prior to any indication, and outside (human) reason? Here the index and the 
punctum might come together in "this silence or this darkness – when they are 
absolutely deprived of transcendence, but not of positivity."
422
 Perhaps in a complex 
entanglement of experience and experiment, in a radical rejection of the Self and the 





Thinking through Blanchot, this might be the a singularity of an encounter as a vision 
without 'seeing' that allows the 'unknowable secret' to be discovered, to resonate/ 
affect without ever being exposed, and thus can only work as real through non-
communication, and not-knowing, radically and rigorously. Here the secret (not 
mystery) of the flat silence, or what McMahon calls the 'flattening out of moments'
424
, 
the affirmed darkness flickers on the surface of the photograph, never what it is. 
These are the "clandestine encounters" with the world, radically unknown, and outside 
nostalgia, or 'mysticism'.
425
 Time is no longer a progression to and from privileged 
points, "that gives a priori order and depth of personal or historical meaning to the 
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 Bazin, 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image', p. 15. 
422
 "The secret", Laruelle writes, "contains in it no fragment of the World, of History, of Meaning, etc.: 
it is radically finite and for this reason inalienable." Bazin, 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image', 
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course of things." One moment is like any other. "All are moments without qualities, 





The photographic image does not look like the real, it is real. The camera's physical 
intimacy, engaging with 'nature' at a different angle from that of copyist, breaks down 
the distance between perception and the perceived, attention and memory, objective 
and subjective in/ as an instant. This is a matter of 'truth', divorced from 'metaphysical' 
absolute truth, that of art/ photo as appearance, as surface, as life; as the 'power of the 
false', an Idea-in-image.
427
 The thing itself caught in movement. What we see is not 
ghostly residue of a departed reality, but the "material passing into sensation" 
(Deleuze). Henceforth there will be, as Bazin suggested, a living-on, a continued 
presence, or virtual plane of consistency, of the real in the photographic image.
428
  
A photograph is a fiction: "wholly real but in its own mode" – the fictional realm429 
 
What the camera sees is the "being in time" experience itself, the sensation of being 
'in the moment', which is "done by fidelity to what is passing", by making concrete 
the sense of evanescence in ordinary things.
430
 It is itself the Uninterpretable from 




Time and space become tangible in what is felt, experienced, and even thought 
through the camera not as a mediator, but as a machine in Deleuzian sense of 
(re)assemblages, entering into relations with other 'machines', bodies, movements. 
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Tarr's films seem to be thinking these conditions, the spatial and temporal conditions 
of experience, seeing the 'world' through the world. "The camera is an observer that 
captures the atmosphere of a moment, and reacts to life", he states in the interview. 
The man waiting at the corner can be a story, a story is not only human actions, 
everything can be a story.
432
 The uncertain moments in fragmented composition, 
where every-thing is an "utterance" (a singular 'story' taken out of 'context'), 'evolve' 
in 'unlimited finity' of folded expression. In this sense, the nonhuman eye of the 
camera might be a more "natural" or "material" form of perception than human 
perception.
433
 What the camera does is free the image from its human perception. 
 
The faces in the photograph could look at us, writes Mary Price, which is not merely 
the effect of true-to-nature-ness of the photography but perhaps the first self-
consciousness of the camera.
434
 Not only as an independent view from a human way 
of seeing, but in a reverse sense of making the viewer self-conscious.
435
 The camera-
eye is also part of the framing (as art), which enables 'vision', a sensation that 
illuminates for an instant, an impression and machinic assemblage. Perhaps it has 
something to do with a new kind of 'lyrosophicall' thinking that Epstein saw in 
cinema, one that could sense 'the unconscious mysteries of nature, including human, 
through its epistemological exploration of time as well as space'.
436
 Here the film, 
freed from human perception becomes an omniscient eye seeing both objectively and 




Thinking photographically would then be freeing thinking from its natural/ human 
perception, and allowing for the 'seeing' to happen to us. And as perception is in 
matter (Bergson) and in movement, becoming photographic would be a-centred, 
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nonhuman experimentation with the world – fragmented, spatially intense, and 
instantaneously paused.  
 
Thus, what might be referred to as the aesthetics of becoming-photographic, similarly 
to modernist art and neorealist cinema, perhaps, defy every Kantian separation of art 
and nature, ideality and materiality. Autonomous images in which the conditions of 
nature appear, intimating the existence of a world of their own, a deeper and 
phenomenally invisible nature.
438
 The becoming photographic of the image and the 
viewer, in-between imagination and perception.  
 
It could be suggested with Elizabeth Grosz, that the long shot of the time-image and 
the still photograph can think about 'perception', of "seeing reflecting to us the process 









Rain washes over the world 
Steadily Rhythmically 
Embracing all 
It rains onto the slopes, the sounds, and the gestures 
Opening silence to thought 
Speechless 
 
The relationship between the world and image is immanent, outside or between 
realism and representation. The locations of Hungarian towns provide not so much a 
realistic credibility but a sense of material earthy physicality of any-space-whatever, 
and the richly orchestrated mise-en-scene seem to function independently as tableau 
or even 'still-lifes'. The Doctor’s exercise books and overflowing ashtray; the wilted 
plants in dark rooms; rain-soaked external walls; peeling plaster; the spray of 
rainwater; damp, sagging net curtains; the condensation gathered on windows; the 
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sodden leaves in woods; the clods of earth on well-worn boots; the paper engulfing 
two figures in a windswept street, locking the gaze for a time longer than necessary, 
all seem to rupture the perceptual surface of narration.
441
 The long, tracking shot of 
the night owl, the close-up of beer mugs in the pub, or the wall of a decaying house, 
as if digressing from the main 'story' are not just stylistic excess, as David Bordwell 
might have had it. They are, Tarr tells us, "the everyday tidbits that are very 
important."
442
 Partly the result of camera framing and partly the result of a necessity 
on the part of the director to resist the familiarity of mainstream cinema's quick 
gratification, the detailed physicality of the 'tidbits', also provides the link to this 
world, the landscape, animals, buildings, objects, and weather. Their material earthy 
physicality and detailed texture intensified by the light, reposition the photographic 
'indexity' from its 'status' as a copy to the creative (inter-subjective, and experimental) 
coexistence of the image and the world, not as a double of imaginary, but as a 
multilayered facets of incompossible coexistences. At the same time, indexicality, by 
refusing the mode of representation, becomes pre-reflective, a kind of 'automatic' 
being in the world, a gesture pointing to itself.
443
 Idle periods, 'Stilled lifes' of 
ordinary objects, and abortive empty spaces, 'trapped' in what feels like endless, 
staring shots, impose their 'presence' as a felt time of living photographic thinking.
444
 
People attending to their most 'ordinary' daily activities in scenes often lasting for a 
great deal of time is what 'happens' in Béla Tarr's films. At the beginning of 
Sátántangó, the endurance of the hallucinatory, long, 'painful', slow movements of the 
doctor while he staggers to bed, his immobility and frustration, become almost 
fascinating. The step-by-step, detailed and immaculate procedure of opening the can 
of soup by Valuska before pouring the contents into a pan mesmerises by its sheer 
ordinariness. As we watch characters repeatedly move from one place to another, our 
attention is drawn to the 'excessive' elements: the mud underfoot, the gravel on the 
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road, the visible force of the rain, the contrast of greyscale photography. All seems to 
be equally important: a piece of furniture, the naked man discovered behind the 
shower curtain during hospital massacre, the faces illuminated by the fire. The 
abundance of material detail goes beyond what might be described as normal 
observational necessity, adds nothing except as perceptual material.  Suspended in-
between still and moving, actual and imagined, these 'remarkable events' throw into 
question our accustomed ways of seeing. It is never clear why things in the films are 
shown, what we are seeing and why. As such, these images bring emancipated senses 
into direct contact with both life and thought. The uncanny 'scenario', where the 
human sensus communis is banished and the new sense of the world starts to feel 
itself from with(in)out of 'what is', unknowingly, imperceptibly.  
 
The photo renders indiscernible ground and form, the universal and the 
singular, the past, and the future etc. And photography, far from being an aid 




This 'quality' of a still(ed) photograph frames the perception out of perception. Non-
expressive, everyday, neither strictly objective nor subjective 'bits', none of them more 
privileged than another, including people and animals, creates a sense of material in 
their actual intensity and their virtual expression. Here it is the 'logic' of the events 
that determine what we see. It is not so much the distanciation strategy of cinematic 
'dead time' but the experience/ sensation. According to Deleuze, the most banal or 
everyday situation releases accumulated 'dead force' equal to the life force of a limit-
situation. They are the effect of a remarkable event which is reported only through 
itself without being explained'.
446
 Sometimes, Deleuze writes, it is necessary to restore 
the mundane parts, to rediscover everything that cannot be seen in the image, 
everything that has been removed to make it 'interesting'.
447
  In everyday banality, the 
action and even the movement tend to disappear in favour of pure optical situation, 
which "bring the emancipated senses into direct relation with thought."
448
 Framed in 
black-and-white photography, the mundane, everyday, boring chores are slown down 
and intensified in an almost ritualistic presence of existence. Like remnants of a 
                                                 
445
 Laruelle, The Concept of Non-Photography,  op.cit., p. 51. 
446
 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op.cit., p.7 
447
 Ibid, p. 235. 
448
 Ibid, p.28 
124 
 
cosmic memory of everyday gestures, insistent, intense, and physically present,  
pointing to something outside. Purely playful, pictorial or experiential, those elements 
that resist or exhaust connotative “meaning,” that remain ever elusive, ever opaque. 
As Maurice Blanchot wrote: 
 
[t]he everyday is platitude […] but this banality is also what is most important, if it 
brings us back to existence in its very spontaneity and as it is lived-in the moment 





Again, Tarr is not reluctant to point to the great influence of Bruegel on his image 
making, not only pictorially but also philosophically. In terms of the films' 
'composition', it is the cosmic dimension he is interested in, where the opposition of 
the particular and universal collapses into immanence. When the doctor 'observes' the 
farm through his binoculars, the 'gaze' is slowly passing by the buildings, by Futaki 
urinating outside, remaining – for a while – on the dog wandering nearby or on the 
dripping tap, 'taking in' the rain and muddy texture of the place. In another scene, the 
camera remains on the faces of people gathered next to each other in the cart on their 
way to the new place, while the faces drenched by the rain blend into the black and 
white surroundings. One of many possible arrangements in the multiplicity of 
available framings, in a process that is never finished.
450
 The human condition, and 
indifference of nature, like the 'flatness' of the image, resist commentary and 
judgment. Here our gaze wanders, almost vaguely, as if gliding over the figures, and 
objects, only to lose itself in the emptiness irresistibly drawn towards 'nothingness'. 
Yet the perspective is not one beyond the horizon, but within it. The detailed, 
textured, and slow moving view of the windows tracks the worn net curtains with 
their holes and creases and the wilted plants, remaining on the surface, while Futaki 
'recalls' his future plans. It is as if the 'story' is being weaved into the textures and 
'colours' of the surface, disappearing in-between the light and shadow of another 
morning awakened by the bells. Enfolded into the composition, the 'direct 
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presentation of time', with its own rhythms, 'forces' us to feel and to think from the 
outside, yet still within the frame, inducing non-sensicality into common sense, 'alien' 
into recognisability, abstraction into figuration. Windows are not views in to the 
world, just surfaces where thought lingers. 'Boredom', nothing happens, passive 
endurance, useless time 'compose' unnatural relations. Not an excess (Bordwell) but 
exhaustion. The 'commentary' is 'rejected' in favour of 'description', where waiting and 
the exhaustion of space obliterate their 'objects', discovering instead a force (of life, 
and thought) which paradoxically, by "irregularizing the given immediately", prevents 
the crystalline narrative from exhausting itself.
451
 The plane of composition 'resolves' 
into the plane of immanence. This kind of metamorphic (nonhuman) creativity would 
be the case of passive vitalism as nonhuman becoming, and of intuition/ imagination 
as subjectless subjectivity (Bergson). 
 
The 'hopelessness' of a commonsensical 'progress' appears to be rather a 'tragic of a 
surface', a force that manifests through still 'passivity' and the 'uninteresting', long 
(en)during moments between perception and action. This is different from what is 
known as the psychological depth of repression or trauma, rather like a mad zone of 
indetermination and experimentation from which new connections may emerge.
452
 
Pathological clinging to life dissolves into affirmation, a 'leap of faith', a kind of 
perverse vitalism that is 'required' in order to resist the 'cliché' of the image as well as 
of thinking. 
 
The photographic process of composition is also an event and an encounter-event in 
the way that it does not make sense of the world but opens the senses to its 'earthly' 
intensities and ambiguities. It is saying yes to all experience. Tarr often speaks of his 
practice of living in the place of filming for a while, getting to 'know' it, 'getting close 
to life'. What 'comes after' in a sense is not the description of reality but the 'identity' 
of the real manifested through the director's vision, immanently. One "does not 
photograph the object or the 'subject' that one sees – but rather, on condition of 
suspending […] the intentionality of photography, one photographs Identity – which 
                                                 
451
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one does not see – through the medium of the 'subject'", writes Laruelle.453 The 
mundane, everyday, boring chores evoke an almost ritualistic presence of existence. 
In his world, objects and things, to paraphrase Pasolini, appear charged with a 
multitude of meanings and thus "speak" brutally with their very presence. At the same 
time their existence is 'determined' by what the photographer/ director 'sees', by "the 
affect of the reality that he alone feels."
454
 This immanent process, the affect-thought 
of multiple meanings, render the image pensive, ambiguous, difficult; somewhere on 
the border in-between still and moving, revealing and concealing, absence and 
presence, memory and forgetting. A kind of art brute, not in the sense of the 'poor 
image' in art, but perhaps as "outsiders art", with its "own raw materials that permit it 
to enter into external relations …"455 This, working against the already thought and 
perceived, does not lend itself to a particular interpretation or analysis and, as such, 
embodies what real is. 
 
This world-image, a physical space of attention, allows one to become fragmented, 
multiplied, disconnected and 'immature', with and out of 'I'-myself-self-me. It 'pricks', 
it touches (my) self, outside and despite myself. It is an encounter, not with the 
traumatic Real of the Symbolic order, but with life itself. The self here is this 
singularity which resonates most with the Deleuze and Guattarian concept of 
'becoming-child',
456
 a 'plastic subject'; an artist-child-philosopher. In this sense the 
punctum which Barthes speaks of cannot be an 'emanation' of the mother or the 
confirmation of the son. The umbilical cord of familiarity has been cut rather than 
restored. It is the breath of Life, the tragic affirmation of love, where death of the 
photographic is not opposite or other to life but, to draw on Claire Colebrook's 
observation, "that which, from within "life itself", allows for the thought of life."
457
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The movement in the still takes a virtual form of existing as intensity and thought, in-
between the stillness of the fixed shot (space) and the movement of time. 
 
The time-image is not only an event of photography (Sutton) but a still photograph is 
an event of the time-image because of its potential as a 'fixed shot' beyond movement 
itself (Deleuze). As a space-time event, a plane of relations and possibilities, where 
the space is not subordinated to time and time is not subordinated to space, it is a still 
movement of difference. Here time and space coexist in a multiplicity of becomings.  
The photograph has been arranged and anticipated, performed and posed. It has been 
judged, put on trials, celebrated and discarded. It has been negotiated to become 
expression, intensity, an (in)decisive moment. What moves in the photograph and 
moves the photograph is sensation. The photograph moves (double meaning) in 
reciprocal encounters of immanence. We wait with Estike who, being ordered by her 
mother to sit outside, remains on the chair, staring ahead, motionless. The wind on her 
face, what seems like a resigned tension in her expressionless look …; two long 
minutes of motionless (e)motion where nothing, and so much, happens. 
 
 Perhaps the time-image is 'still', in a sort of waiting attention and indecisiveness 
where the sensory motor response is suspended. The movement that consists of 'pure', 
empty time, where movement and stillness interact and exchange places in a relation 
of becoming, and without end. It might be the opening to time, in its direct 
presentation, from in-betweenness: between what had been and what is not yet, where 
the past folds onto the future and the present acquires the status of a meanwhile; an 
indecisive moment. Tarr's image-world-photo is suspended in-between categories, and 
folded into unhinged time that we will be never able to grasp definitely. Here the 
insane trust, and knowing 'idiocy' of belief in creating where nothing makes sense, 
opens the space of affirmation, and yields a strange sense of freedom. 
 
Thus, if we were looking for the essence of the photographic, we might find it in its 
paradoxical character of this world. In the multiplicity and the relational 
intertwinement of all the factors involved in taking and looking at the photograph, it is 
a moment of the real beyond or outside all that is known. Thus the objective and 
subjective, the illusion and the document, the actual and the virtual disappear in the 
'nothingness' of in-betweens; or become a pause (hesitating) in the meanwhile, 
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exchanging their momentary positions and moving on, traversing the space, 'affecting' 
the image, the viewer, the world, and the outside.  
 
If duration is defined less by succession than by coexistence (Bergson), can a 
photographic image (as affective) be perceived as freed from succession of the cause-
effect linearity, becoming a plane of a particular intensity, amongst other planes 
where each corresponds to a different intensity of memory, a different hold on the 
past? The past that undergoes transformation and fragmentation, between different 
planes? If so, would it be a 'new thing', detached from World, Image, and Idea, the 
object itself; the object, as Bazin suggested, "freed from the conditions of time"?
458
 Or 
perhaps as a body, the photographic is of all times (Lomax).
459
 Each a memory, 
expressing a different 'tone' or style or rhythm of becoming, a distant voice, it speaks, 




Thus, perhaps instead of asking what a photograph is, we can ask with Spinoza: What 
is it capable of? What can it do?  
 
Depth of field would be the photographic play, and plane, of 'reality-memory'. This 
will not be the lost memory of a nostalgic past 'attached' to photography, and neither 
an archive of stored memorandums. Not so much a function of reality or memory but 
an image that absorbs the real, which exists as much in virtual as in actual. The 
alternation of different lenses on the same image and the excessive use of the zoom, 
"doubles the perception",
461
 enabling the depth to remain on the surface. It becomes 
the non-perception of the photographic vision-force. 
In the Deleuzian sense, this would be an 'invocation' of memory (virtual). As 
immanent past-future, where the present is only an encounter; "not exactly a 
recollection but invitation to recollect."
462
 Tarr's deep-focus imagery is of a kind that 
invites 'recollection' without conscious remembering. It is a play, and a kind of 
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memory that is also forgetting, thinking through attention, through the world to the 
unconscious/ outside and back. In the image it would be a question of trajectories and 
paths, forkings and rhizomes. The straight line as a force of time, as the labyrinth of 
time is also the line which forks and keeps on forking, passing through incompossible 





As already mentioned, in Bergson and then Deleuze's view of time, the past coexists 
with the present: the sheets of past and peaks of presents.
464
 Here memory also 
functions as forgetting, as going into other planes of past, or in the sense of forgetting 
ones own preconception based identity in order to 'enter' another. This is the paradox 
of 'it has been' and 'not yet'; photography's madness that Barthes speaks of in Camera 
Lucida
465
, which overcomes the dialectics of memory and forgetting, absence and 
presence. 
 





Might it be the forgetting that enables repetition of the new? A 'living' memory rather 
than a dead memorandum, the memory of variable (in)tensions rather than as 
nostalgia of the same? 
 
There is forgetting which is different from the remembered or the forgotten of 
historical past. On the one hand we can think of events that did not leave a trace, that 
have passed unnoticed; those unrepresentable, non-subjective sensations of the 
imperceptible virtual. On the other hand there are those 'extra' moments not yet 
actualised or those "exceeding actualization"
467
; the "pure past" of virtual non-
memory of the immanent real. An "infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, 
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 Those neither forgotten nor remembered 'left-overs', rather 
than mourning, require the opposite – "unmourning" as Deleuze proposes. 
Unmourning, according to Deleuze requires "more work but promises more joy", and 
is the process not of re-memorisation or identification, but an "active forgetting and 
affirmative experimentation with what is yet to come."
469
 In this way, the 
photographic 'had been' can become the open space of potentiality. Outside 
knowledge, structure, and signification, at its loss of memory, the photographic 
'waiting' moment creates the space for 'orphaned', nomadic encounters that are 
indescribable and often imperceptible; no longer lost memories but 'returns' created 
anew. Eventually, those 'new returns', as manifested in Belá Tarr's aesthetics, would 
become the unforeseeable future. 
 
Tarr's enduring 'contemplative' images of 'nothing happens' – deep focus and stretched 
time of the shots – function, in a sense, as acts of "active forgetting"; memory open to 
other (than mine) "affective tonalities, intensities or rhythms of duration that continue 
to be implied within it."
470
 It is what Deleuze calls the description and exhaustion of 
space, which is photographic and still. The photographic future-past shifts from 
historical or identifiable towards the memory of the present as a world memory that is 
always a potential in becoming, and invention. It can then think in terms of 
"potentials" and "inventions", not absence and loss, in terms of life and not the 
retrieval of lost memories.
471
 That is perhaps why the depth has to stop at the surface, 
where the 'instants' of the other pasts can be felt through the cracks, and where the 
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… forgetfulness would be not emptiness, but neither negative nor positive: the 
passive demand that neither welcomes nor withdraws the past, but, 
designating there what has never taken place (just as it indicates in the yet to 
come, that which will never be able to find its place in any present), refers us 
to non-historical forms of time, to the other of all tenses, to their eternal or 




Thus in the stories/ histories/ memories (Hungarian any-towns, any time) the films 
take a form of sentient gestures pointing to nothing but themselves; bits of 
unimportant, concerning no-one moments, suspended from action and forgotten by 
History. Actualised namelessly, again and again in the 'performance' of becoming. 
Those who forget repeat the past. According to Deleuze, we repeat not because we 
forget (repress), but we forget (repress) in order to repeat.  
 
Béla Tarr's black and white imagery is a stylistic choice, moving away from 
naturalistic representation towards creation, and a vision.
474
 Describing and 'erasing', 
it forgets the World, History, Image. Creating the false – true real – process of 
becoming; imperceptible, nebulous and 'uncertain' but felt, lived and experienced on a 
pre-personal or even pre-humanistic level. Its aesthetic figures are not metaphors but 




It ushers in a thought, a future, a community without any guarantees. Not 
future as all future. Not past as much as all past. A return to tradition, break 




The poetic vocabulary endows the image with the intensity of the real and the space of 
encounter. The feeling of two-dimensionality, the equal treatment of visual elements 
brought to the surface of a screen and 'subjected' to long, tracking, scanning camera 
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movements, lead not to illusionistic depth, but to the "untimely meditation"
477
 of 
shape, light and texture; like the body in the world, neither fully conscious nor 
unconscious, erasing the opposition between subject and object, real and imagined, 
memory and forgetting. Here, the description erases or destroys its reality which 
passes into the imaginary, and at the same time brings out all the reality which the 
imaginary or the mental create through vision. In this process – the drawn out stillness 
of the moment, and the silence of attention – perception, instead of prolonging into 
action, is absorbed into objects and situations, in a continuum of intensity whose 
effect is to erase all identity. No longer objects but percepts and affects 'materialise' at 
the points of indiscernibility of imaginary and real, physical and mental, remembered 
and forgotten becoming photographic (of) real. 
 
In Werckmeister Harmonies, the townsmen (seemingly 'all' the men of the town) stand 
around in loose groups, possibly waiting for work, or simply to keep warm by the 
fires, as Daniel Frampton has suggested. At this point, the film begins to move around 
the faces of the men, tenaciously, almost impertinently
478
, as if puzzled, uncertain. 
The everyday description accentuated in black and white contrast dissolves at times in 
the mid-tones of "empty frosted grays."
479
 People, faces, fires are blurred into the 
surrounding space. The actual mutates to the virtual; the light, tone, and sound 
intertwine and mingle with the objects and each other. Anonymous faces, 'obliterated' 
identities, 'abstract' figures gathered in the crowd of any town, any square. The 
stationary, staring shot depicting a de-dramatised action, generates a dreamlike mood, 
as if the action was floating in the situation rather than bringing it to conclusion or 
strengthening it.
480
 The boundary between the dream states and conscious states are 
erased, the two modes are 'combined' in an open circuit where the actual and virtual 
exchange their roles. 'Natural' locations metamorphose into any-spaces-whatever, 
faces into landscapes, visions into becomings. Figures become abstractions and 
abstracts re-emerge into shadows. A hallucinatory, hypnotic image/ thought arises 
from the blurry figures diminished by the burning fires – as the force of visual 
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 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p.4 
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description tends towards a point of indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary.
481
 
The image-space opens inviting all sorts of 'adventures of memory': tactile, kinetic, 
aural, aleatory, and becoming-reserve suggests pure potential. The "art of description" 
passes into the plane of immanence, becoming thinking. Man and space become one. 
Blank, shrouded in fog looks, and non-expressive, alienated faces coexist and 
intermingle with the light, the textures of crumbling buildings, the 'schizophrenic' 
landscape, and stray animals: not a different perception but no perception at all. 
The earthy materiality of minute detail is caught in the duration, becoming duration 
itself; a wa(o)ndering thought, an empty time. Particular and universal merge as 
photograph(ic) thought is enfolded in the molecular becomings. And if there are 




This is not only the result of undermined perception, but also a question of the meta-
communication which Tarr speaks of.
483
 This is also the absurdity of otherworldly 
hope. It resonates with the 'methodology' of the absurd employed by Kafka or 
Beckett; one of the ways to resist the oppressive language of narratives' discourse. 
The world cannot be explained, only evented (Colebrook), and 'described' in a 
language that has no language; that is, intuited rather than recognised (Bergson). The 
'play' with the metaphysical and the symbolic is not a cynical rejection of all 
spirituality but the critique of a same-image symbolic and the pointing toward 
potentiality of another 'worldly' vision, both material and abstract, vision and thought. 
 
Light is 'everything' in Tarr's films, and like other elements, it is also a character. 
Black and white, grainy and high-contrast, greys and dark-light modulation, 
depending on the situation, reverberate with "intensely celluloid textures"
484
 
functioning/ performing as a matter of expression or abstraction. The light here is not, 
as in the manner of the Expressionists, the result of a struggle between light and 
darkness, nor of an embrace of light and dark, nor dialectical opposition. Rather, as an 
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alternating movement of grey, "not so much black and white but lightgray and 
darkgray."
485
 It is an alteration in extension, and not conflict and, as such, not a 
subject of judgment. Here light – "sunlight and moonlight, sunlit landscape and 
moonlit landscape – communicate in grey and pass through all its nuances."486 It 
becomes an extension of (to?) thought, not in terms of judgment but as style of 
immanence, a way of not so much illuminating or revealing but, we could suggest 
after Heraclitus, of 'intimating'.
487
 Not "yet bodies or rigid lines but only figures of 
light, blocks of space-time", they are images in themselves – of potentiality.488 Here 
white does not stand for purity, and black can be a 'colour' of passion.
489
 As Yve 
Lomax writes, 
 
"pure potentiality is non-exclusively both black and white: it goes in both 
directions at once and, with this movement making a sparkling alternation, 
produces a shimmering zone of indetermination between the blackness and the 
whiteness …"490  
 
Light is, of course, the figure of the photographic, turning it into image, so to speak, 
and the film can only 'live', as Stanley Cavell reminds us, as light projected on screen. 
Furthermore, as Deleuze suggests, the plane of immanence is entirely made up of 
light; light which diffuses, which is propagated "without resistance and without loss." 
In this sense, just as matter is light, the image is a movement of empty potentiality.
491
 
Therefore, as the distinction between light and darkness not longer holds, things are 
luminous by themselves, and need anything to illuminate them. They shimmer 
imperceptibly on the surface of the image, shattering the perception and cognition into 
incompossible bits of imaging. All consciousness is something (rather than of 
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 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 62. 
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something), not our consciousness but consciousness by right, which, Deleuze writes, 
is diffused everywhere and yet does not reveal its source… :  
 
… it is indeed a photo which has already been taken and shot in all things and 




Light, consciousness, matter … plane of immanence. Light is valid for itself, in a 
sense of 'privileged' singular intensities that populate the plane of consistency. 
Valuska walking away into the darkness of immense possibility is no longer bound to 
the human laws. The momentarily illuminated, empty rooms at the house where the 
group is about to stop for the night, Estike's face outside the pub's window, or the 
neon "Titanic" sign over the bar door in Damnation – these are 'inhuman' sublime 
moments of the unknown becoming, connect thought to the outside. Not symbols or 
signifiers but forces and expressions. The way light, dark and shadow play on the 
surface, teasing the expectations, whatever it seems to otherwise suggest. By the 
means of light and shadow, infinite non-organic forces are at play, turning space into 
an indeterminate and 'spiritual' intensive surface of pure powers, qualities, and 
affects.
493
 The light's modulation creates both the sense of materiality and the sense of 
outside, visible and invisible, folded (photographically) into each other within(out) the 
fabric of the world. We are no longer caught by the absolute values of darkness and 
light, but are invited into the space of an authentic choice, able to "start again at each 




We have reached a philosophical space… [T]he white that imprisons light 
alternates with the black that stops it, and then white is liberated in an 
alternative, which restores to us the white and the black. We have travelled 
without moving, from one space to another, from a physical to a philosophical 




                                                 
492
 Ibid., p. 63. 
493
 Nilsson, 'A Crystal Matter'.  
"Intensive surfaces" is an expression which Deleuze adopted from Lewis Carroll. Deleuze, Pure 
immanence, p. 11. 
494
 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p. 115 -162. 
495
 Ibid, p. 117, p. 165, Deleuze cited by Rodowick, 'The World, Time', in Afterimages of Gilles 
Deleuze's Film Philosophy, p. 106. 
136 
 
Be it decay, entropy or repetition of the new, the circular rhythm of 'endless' 
variations – actual and virtual, real and imaginary, particular and universal – prevents 
the photographic image from fixing either past or memory. In this way the past can be 
both, present and absent. Its 'existence' depends not on historical data but on a chance 
to become-new-photographic. If we think of a photographic still as one of many 
moving images in time, not ordered into chronological narrative linearity, not frozen 
into past archives, but as image in becoming, we encounter memory/ image that is 
non-representational (not an afterimage of a present perception), but the real of 'any-
image-whatever'. 
 
What I'm seeing anyway is the formula of the unendurable. It expresses a new 
relation between thought and seeing, or between thought and the light source, 





The amnesiac remembering of this world 'enables' by the potential of inventing the 
'false', forging new 'worlds' and new connections forever incomplete. Like the circular 
and repetitive dance sequences present in all of Tarr's films embracing time and space 
in a rhythmic, open polyphony of the senses, it unsettles the accepted modes, taking 
expectation outside the given. Again, like the time of photography, all the time and 
none at all, not dead or frozen but 'suspended' temporarily in a fleeting (fugitive) 
moment of intensity where the 'trueness' of the past is brought to life not by conscious 
perception or conscious recollection but by creative 'forgetfulness'. The truth of the 
past 'moves' towards the false, and its artistic, creative power. In forgetting and 
forging, fragmentary finitudes and distinct combinations, it 'implies' a multiplicity of 
worlds and perspectives, keeping creating and thinking alive. Thus, how does the 
forging and forgetting keep the thinking alive? Perhaps the perception must become 
seeing, and the consciousness must "slip through the interval",
497
 and fall into the 
outside.  
  
Imagine, what you hear is what you see, and what you see is what you remember, and 
what you remember is what you dream, and what you dream is what you are.  
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Now imagine, what you are is what you dream, and what you dream is what you 
remember, and what you remember is what you see, and what you see is what you 
hear. 
Or … 
The extremely long, disconnected, and enduring moments, no longer images but 
thoughts, put in contact with the real – the unclear and dispersive nature of the 




By means of the long/ 'still' images we can remember something that we have never 
seen before, sense the 'unknown' in the anticipation withdrawn from habitual 
perception, recollection, thinking, and suspended on the edge of the familiar, and of 
destination. Looking at the rain embracing meaningless 'wanderings' of men brings up 
the sensation of 'aimless' thinking, the quiet anxiety of lost time, echoed in the 
opening shot which presents itself as an image that embodies the 'situation'. It is the 
situation that lasts, presenting itself to the viewer: framed 24 times a second. Time 
flows 'through' the photograph, and around it, intensifying the details and 
interconnecting with the senses. It flows in-between stillness and movement, 
imaginary and material, expanding and contracting in the hallucinatory space of 
becomings; in a mad dance of rhythmical movements, wanderings and waitings. Not 
arrested but paused, waiting… Tangible in their elusive gesturing. This is the middle, 
the affective space between the world and the outside, where relations start to form.
499
 
Here description stops presupposing a reality, as every perception is hallucinatory. It 
could be that, by giving us enough time, films intensify our interaction with the world 
by allowing us to relate to it intuitively and affectively, through both the movements 
of film and our memory in a space of creative imaging/thinking. By staring at the 
long, immaculate, step-by-step process of tin opening by Valuska preparing his 
dinner, or the endless waits and wanderings, we are 'invited' to unpack the secrets 
encoded in images and objects and find the memory of the senses. We are hypnotised 
by the sheer ordinariness of life. In the slow-moving, somnambulistic shots, time 
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renders the image inexplicable. These are no longer 'long takes', but thinking of the 
human 'gaplessness' of experience.
500
 What happens is imaging itself. We experience 
this when we follow János, as he surveys the whale, or when we keep endless pace 
with Mr Eszter and János as they walk side by side, when we 'endure' the long walk of 
people on their way to the 'promised' town, tired and drenched by the rain in 
Sátántangó, or wait for the protagonist of Damnation, Karrer, to finish shaving. It is 
not so much a matter of technique – real time, but like deep focus, a function of 
'remembrance' uncertain, hesitating, and as affect, when 'nothing happens' between 
perception and action. According to Bergson, when affect arises in a body, the future 
action is interrupted or delayed. The body waits before acting; it has time to 
remember. The delay enables access to memory and the openness of its future. Thus, 
to feel is to no longer play out the past automatically, but to imagine and remember it 
intuitively.
501
 Affectivity opens for my body a particular intensity of remembering, 
replacing perception with intuition. When nothing happens, the virtual is trying to 
keep itself from realisation, sometimes returning as actualisation, half-way in-
between. 
 
The long shots of stilled images are important on different levels: as questioning/ 
thinking but also as a chance of unexpected and unintentional. Remembering, 
forgetting, 'seeing' and hallucinating, weave the pattern of imaging – "an unlimited 
opening into the world occasioned by lights and shadows in time."
502
 
Thus, photography can (in an affective, or disorienting way) provide a vision that can 
'hear' the multiplicity of figure/s and ground/s at once, from elsewhere, a no-place. In 
an affective way, it can be a 'truly democratic' vision where everything is equally 
important or unimportant, and the 'response' of the viewer depends on the "degrees of 
tensions and relaxations."
503
 What we 'see' in the imaging force of Tarr's films' 
photography effected through the combination of careful arrangements, and of 
chance, is the array of connected to but not dependent on, or resulting from, each 
other's intensities. The face of Estike in the window, as she looks in at the pub's 
dancing from the night outside, or the 360 degree shot of people sleeping in the barn 
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with the night owl perched on the window sill (Sátántangó), the slow, painstaking, 
almost unbearable 'loveless' love scene, or the faces in the bar 'traversing' silently 
amongst the interiors' furnishings 'according to' the monotonous harmonica's sound 
(Damnation), are different moments of 'the same' image: a world in becoming. The 
"different levels of tensions and relaxations" are derived from the highly exceptional/ 
remarkable sense of the difficult and 'original' vision. In this sense, the aesthetic 
complexity and sophisticated employment of the camera movement is a visually (and 
conceptually) demanding image, and in this sense by no means democratic. Rather 
than the 'equal distribution of the sensible' (Ranciere), it seems to be the matter of a 
rapture in common sense and shared experience, where the viewer is 'forced' to feel 
and think difference, from a non-position of an individual 'crack', outside the 




Here the 'blackness' of visceral force resonates with the earth and rain refracting into 
greys of vastness interlocked with landscapes and faces, becoming a space of timeless 
rhythms of difference. The sombre ambience dwells in raininess and shadowiness, in 
repetitions of fugal sounds and whispers in an endless litany of hopeless hope.  
 
The wild dogs, the rain, and the any-space-whatever are the zones of forces outside 
the worlds of loops, of marching, of things oscillating on hinges. 
 
It is always autumn. "And have been cold a long time  
… and not to think 
Of any misery in the sound of the wind, 
In the sound of a few leaves, 
 
Which is the sound of the land  
Full of the same wind 
That is blowing in the same bare place 
For the listener, who listens in the [rain], 
And, nothing himself, beholds 
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This is a complexity of (non)perception enfolded in the rhythms of an open whole (a 
vision), yet equally important is the time given to behold. Just enough time to grasp 
the vibrating moment of becoming. A moment that resists or exhausts connotative 
meaning, that remains ever elusive, ever opaque; pointing to the outside. 
 
As the inside resists meaning, the outside is not a metaphysical beyond, or the "fixed 
limit." It is "a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings 
that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but 
precisely the inside of the outside."
506
 Tarr refuses to "cross to the other side" 
(Tarkovsky) remaining instead on the surface. Despite many gestures that might 
suggest otherwise, the outside is inside and in-between. Immanence is immanent only 
to itself. The 'nothing' happens in the crack of the surface. The unforeseeable nothing, 
which takes time, which is everything in a work of art (Bergson) and which the 
director makes into the form of the event,
507
 which has just happened and is about to 
happen again. The endings of Tarr's films verge on 'going over the edge' only to return 
to this world again, making the same film. 
 
The surface of the photographic is a depth, an immanent, pre-personal, non-subjective 
virtual space of relations, which establishes temporality, rather than a set of outcomes. 
Beyond Chronos is the multiplicity, the inter-fused world of virtual and actual 
emergences of all kinds. Tarr's far-reaching, suggestive but only teasingly so, 
"dizzying" power brings about a very different kind of depth. It is existential in that it 
creates a magical concreteness, such a tangible precision in which "no traces of 
mysticism can be found."
508
 At the same time, questioning neither the absolute nor the 
finite value of human knowledge, it restores the link with this world through the belief 
sensed imperceptibly. Here the expression of immanence as at once infinite and finite 
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A photo is infinite, Laruelle argues, having just one surface which extends forever, in 
the sense that it is impossible to catch or qualify all the information in the sheen of 
emulsion on its surface. But like a fractal, any part of this one photograph contains the 




In Damnation the scene of the pub dance is interrupted by a strange surrealistic shot of 
a man dancing manically outside in the rain, splashing in puddles, stepping 
rhythmically, the sound of his shoes slapping on the watery ground. The framing of 
the shot gives emphasis to textures, and as the image 'unfolds', everything persists in 
movement to the point of stillness, the body and the space merge into one another. 
The dance becomes strange, 'unreal' in a kind of 'mystical' ritual of embodiment, and 
delirious assertion of peculiar joy-trance. This 'static' image, completely unrelated to 
the narrative, and filmed from a disinterested distance, opens the space for a surprised 
'attention', where the viewer has been caught unawares. One does not quite know what 
to think and how to 'take' this almost absurd image. Dancing in the rain? The 
indescribable mixture of joy and piercing 'unexpression' of the face obsessively 
engaged in the movement, a kind of autistic repetitive pleasure of the 'now'; life "tears 
itself free from the organic by a permutating, stationary whirlwind."
511
 Outside and 
inside of the 'narrative', it is a brilliant example of a situation where the power of 
visual impression forces us to forget our own logic and retinal habitus, and to think 
(affectively).
512
 Who is the man? What dance? The image 'pops out', shattering the 
logic of good and common-sense. 'I' cannot think. The machinic force of animalistic 
body unleashes the power of repetition, loses its substance, becoming a "spiritual 
automaton" in the affirmation of the inorganic (or supraorganic) singular power of 
life. The unknown outside, "farther from us than any external space and, as such, 
closer than any inner world", suddenly becomes the space of a creative force 
dissolving the repressed impossible desire or trauma. What happened before has no 
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bearing on what will or might happen next. No longer an interiority of thought, not 
even an open one, but "a force from the outside which hollows itself out, grabs us and 
attracts the inside", we can say with Deleuze,  
 
We no longer believe in association of images – even crossing voids; we 







This is a radical feeling, insofar as it makes us suspect that the cinematographic 





"A photo", writes Laruelle, "does not let us see the invisible that haunts the world, its 
folds, hinges and furrows, its hidden face, its internal horizon, its unconscious… Nor 
does it make the repressed return." It manifests the Identity which is its invisible 
object.
515
 Thus the photographic 'space' between perception and action, where "the 
material passes into sensation" (Deleuze), remains a singular, flat surface at once lived 
and imperceptible. A moment suspended in time and posed in space, it manifests the 
difference (not of something or from something but as itself). The inside of an 
outside, it produces a field of infinite, singular materialities immanently.  
 
The outside is also an interval. 
 
It is the meanwhile, Yve Lomax writes, that holds in reserve an incalculable and 
irreducible 'not yet'. It doesn't hold in reserve a historical future, a prefiguration of 
what is to come; rather, it "holds in reserve what can only be called an oceanic 
future",
516
 the horizon that can never be reached. This paradoxically restores the 
intensity of a temporal moment, of past as not yet, a passing present that is already a 
memory, creating a moment in becoming. The in-between space when something is 
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ending and something else is about to begin. A state of suspension or emptiness where 
things are churning before they begin to 'appear', the world/ life in becoming.  
 
When the intelligence encounters a problem, a gap opens up, a void appears in the 
middle of the unthinkable. The gap between cinematic images brings us to an 
encounter with the limits of the thinkable where the thought appears to itself. 
Somnambulistic consciousness therefore is not just produced by traumatic events, but 
also asserts itself by exploiting the 'problematic holes' in intelligence responding 
creatively through the productive imagination. In order to 'provide' the condition for 
such a gap a particular style is required; the style of construction and creation, of open 
framing, and of hallucinatory space of amnesiac, de-focused imaging. 
 
Neither the depth of individualistic dreams (Surrealist and Modernist conceptions of 
liberation) nor the limited sense of collective consciousness (ideology), this is a plane 
to which other planes relate, a surface of relations, and the Other which is the 
expression of possible worlds. As virtual, it is also pre-personal and pre-individual 
space, the memory of other pasts, which have never been present for me, of other 
lives that I have not lived – 'a virtual nebulosity accompanying my own life or past.'517 
It is the reservoir from which thought draws in order to bring about the actual. It 
opens onto incompossible memories, different 'histories', and other perspectives and 
planes, which then become 're-created' into something else. It is recounted in multiple 
'voices'. Those voices do not necessarily form a harmony, nor are they organised 
according to any overriding logic or order. Indeed, more often than not, the polyphony 
of memory records dissonant and dissenting voices and inscribed discordant 
histories.
518
 This is the space of becoming where actualisation takes place through 
creation, a constant process of self-alteration through fragmentation, discontinuity, 
and death. Thus, it is not just a realisation of what is possible, but an actualisation of 
something entirely new, unexpected, unrecognised.  
To think of image as actual and virtual in the state of becoming is to move away from 
both material reality as traditionally defined – static, visible, and definite – and from 
transcendence by bringing it back to materiality. To think of image as world and 
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world as image – difficult and uncertain, yet real in its effectual and thinking qualities, 
makes it possible to move away from the corrupted ideologies/ theologies of other 
worlds and turn the focus on this world as it is, its human and in-human nature. 
Deleuze insists that the 'structure' of the unconscious is not conflictual or oppositional 
(another I or another world) but rather questioning and problematising, it is 
productive. Unconscious questions inside and outside, the centre and the periphery, 
the near and the far. The Gaze turns towards a Vision; not a fantasy, but veritable 
Ideas that the artist sees or hears in the intervals.
519
 They 'cannot be reduced to the 
psychological fantasies of the author, nor to 'ideologemes' of a collective unconscious, 
since they take place, as Kafka said, "in the full light of day" and not "down in the 
cellar of structure."
520
 Yet, the multiple processes of self-alteration are often hidden 
and imperceptible, and are without the unity of an ancestry, without filiation or 
hereditary production.
521
 Epidemic and contagion, rather than reproduction, seem for 
Deleuze to 'drive' multiple becomings of creation, and the plane of unconscious 
desires, rather than repressed traumatic dramas, shifts radically the relation between 
memory and forgetting, nostalgia and orphaned future as affirmation; this "another 





Muted and ritualised, the climax of Werckmeister Harmonies is one of the most 
nightmarish eruptions of violence in recent cinema, suggests Jonathan Romney. A 
mob marches in hypnotic rhythm, the camera hovering in front of them, rising, 
falling, drifting from left to right "before this inexorable river of hostility"
523
. A 
single, eight minute shot then accompanies the crowd through a run-down hospital, 
where they smash up the fittings and attack its inmates; throughout, we hear not a 
single threat or scream of pain. It feels like a long, still, mute and impossible 
enduring. The discrepancy between sound and image is not merely a sign of alienation 
or impossibility of communication, but a power of the irrational interval, a gap in-
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between. Here the discordant voices and different memories interact with each other. 
We are, in a sense, 'forced' to feel much more than we see or hear, and the feeling is 
outside the familiarity of knowing or certainty of recognition. We do not know why 
this event takes place, who the people are, and will not find out what happens to the 
crowd at the end. Again, a singular, out-of-context image, carved out of chaos, picked 
up and abandoned by wa(o)ndering camera-thought, wants something from us, 
demands our attention. The image 'enfolds' a kind of ungraspable meaning, enigmatic 
and unnameable, lurking in the details, the textures and the sound, beyond conscious 
control, a kind of intuitive anticipation of something to come; an affect, the real, in 
between construction and description. Nothing but an intensive labyrinth of 
suspended truth brought out by a total lack of knowledge or information. 
 
What happens seizes us, writes Blanchot, as the image would seize us; that is, it 
deprives us of it and of ourselves, keeps us outside, makes this outside a presence 




Thus, the Outside might be thought of as a non-place from which all forces emerge, 
not a specific context, "out of field", or the third meaning (Barthes). It is a demeanour 
of cosmic indeterminants beyond the personal – individual or collective, particular 
and universal. In Tarr's films it is the feeling of immanence, where the duration of the 
image and the time duration of its beholding create an important space for 'something 
to happen', something unexpected, uncanny or unusual but also something new, like a 
thought provoked by memory of events one has not experienced. Accordingly, what 
might be called communicating with the outside is the moment's 'seeing' of 
unanticipated experience provoked by the an amnesiac kind of memory; the power of 
visual impression causing us to doubt the reality and existence of our normative self. 
Stylistically, this is a question of a particular framing, a question of movable 
(dynamic and ambiguous) frames of in-between, not quite inside or outside, or where 
inside and outside merge. Here the frame articulates distinction without ever fixing its 
relationship with the work, as with Derrida's Parergon.
525
 On the other hand, the 
obsessive framings of description – slow, insistent, repetitive – allow the image to 
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free itself from the logic of narration and to exist as a singular moment/ frame, 
relating 'openly' to other moments/ frames, becoming photographic.  
 
The time-image, that is duration-image, change-image, relation-image, volume-image, 
which is beyond movement itself … Any-instant whatever, remarkable and singular. 
A stilled photograph in its embryonic state of potentiality, a direct image of time: non-
dialectical, paradoxical time – all presents are simultaneous and all pasts co-existent.  
 
At the still point of the turning world, neither flesh nor fleshless; 
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, 
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity, 
Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards …526 
 
The image of the dead girl lying on the table surrounded by village people in 
Sátántangó, is a minute and a half long. The camera-eye is fixed on the scene. The 
only way we can detect that the image is moving is by noticing the blinking of 
somebody's eye from time to time, or from the slight turning of a head. The moving 
image becomes 'still' through the withdrawal of 'action', not necessarily of movement. 
As such, it is a moment of a still, not an illusion of stillness. Time is not immobilised 
but momentarily spatialised; not frozen but temporarily locked in space, moving 
inwards and filling it with 'depth'. Depth, on the other hand, becomes a surface of non-
geometrical time and space of "thinking otherwise."
527
 It is like the experience of 
looking at a still photograph: silent, mute, without before or after; quiet intensity. The 
time-image is moving but 'still' in terms not of action but of space-time; a moving 
'photograph' that fills the image with a temporal flow, allowing it to exist in the act of 
becoming. Space here is the one that allows for the uniqueness of this becoming, and 
for the link to the outside. The speech, the motionless bodies, the table around which 
'image' unfolds, as if all and nothing were related; 'things' thrown together in an empty 
space of potentiality which can be sensed between, alongside, outside and around of 
the impossible – a "plane of composition" opening sense and thought. "The plane of 
composition in art", Claire Colebrook writes, "is more than a spatial metaphor, for any 
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work of art is a struggle with those perceptions, affects and sensed encounters that are 
'lived'": 
 
Art does not express the 'lived' but releases from the lived the impersonal 
power form which any oriented and located life emerges. The plane of 
composition comprises the potentials of sensibility that an artist must 
somehow locate in a material (in this time and space), while producing a 





The movement that surfaces indefinitely depthwise, enables a particular connection 
with the outside and in-between. The spaces are not only actualised planes of 
relations, but are also openings to new/ other relations. The long takes of empty 
spaces, crowded interiors or stilled paused 'actions' think the outside. The 'artist' teases 
the affect/thought from in-between the surface and depth, form and content. This is 
the thinking otherwise, 'a shock to thought', "a camera consciousness no longer 
defined by the movement it is able to follow or create, but by the mental connections 
it is able to enter into."
529
 Here the time-image becomes a moving 'photograph', a map 
that carries us towards experimentation in contact with the real.  
 
Looking at this 'still' image, we are 'jumping' to other images, trying to put together 
the moments that brought it to 'this' moment, searching for 'signs' of the whole. At the 
same time, we are exposed to the singular expression within a tableau in front of us, 
connected to the stretched body. The nature of this experience is neither past nor 
present. This is perhaps the death that is only the stage or a state to some new sense of 
life. Life goes on 'indifferently' but in death it affects for a moment, changes its 
intensity. "We are with, in death already, to live is to die, for death does not take 
place."
530
 This is also the power of amnesiac memory, which dissolves into the 
boundless oceanic space, conjuring up the nothing that matters. Such an image, never 
stable, never frozen in time, connects with the real. While the camera pauses, 
observing the situation with a meticulously steady eye, provoking the search for 
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reasons "to fill the gaps in the void of explanation",
531
 the scene 'feels' again like a 
still, silent photograph affirming the thought of no answers. 
 
The spider in Tarr's films does not carry a symbolic meaning but is a figure of 
thought, a style of connections in a space of becoming. It parallels the process of 
making and unmaking, framing and deframing, in an infinite creation of imperceptible 
and impersonal life as a work of art. It is the web of vital cells vibrating in between 
the object and 'I' in the flesh of the world enfolded in time. The style that enables the 
image to 'think the unthinkable'. What is it to think the unthinkable? Is it a creative 
construction, less involved in making sense of the world and more in opening the 
senses, where neither the mind nor senses alone, but the whole of existence, is 
addressed? The perception of an "independent aesthetic consciousness"?
532
  
Subjective and objective coexist folded in a nomadic viewpoint of bifurcation, 
"waiting for an eternal thread to move to start it all again."
533
 It resonates with a 
particular kind of thinking as traversing which starts from the centre, and has no 
beginning and no end. Every image, Deleuze writes, is "merely a road by which pass, 
in every direction, the modifications propagated throughout the immensity of the 
universe."
534
 The endurance of the hallucinatory, long, 'painful', slow movements; 
buildings, landscapes, objects, and beings are not longer "recognised" but perceived, 
as it were, for the first time. The 'spider function' envelops life and opens it poetically 
to the non-human outside. This requires a style of 'wonder' in order to bring such 
unfamiliarity to the surface. The suspension of normal motor activity, and slowing 
down of the senses. 
 
It could be argued that in Tarr's films, the camera movements mirrors the description 
of the image and an act of looking, in the complex web of relations, framing and de-
framing, remembering and forgetting, waiting and transforming, in becoming 
'wondrous thinking'. Indecisive and questioning, they move in elaborated stylistic 
choices dictated by time and 'vision', not presenting but anticipating the word. The 
camera sometimes slides along the images of interiors, moving from one to the other 
not by a cut but by a 'blank screen', as when it pans across a blank exterior wall that is, 
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every so often, interrupted by a door. Inside, crowds of people, their hard faces as 
expressionless as the wall, stare disinterestedly out at the pouring rain. They do not 
stare back at the viewer but passed past him/ her. Their sombre gazes disappear in the 
rain, and we are at a loss, comprehending at close range, haptically, the breathtaking 
crumbling beauty of the repetitive motion of space-time, disappearing and reappearing 
each time slightly differently. The difference itself is carried on by the monotonous 
sound of the accordion. There is nothing socially determined in this strange 
metamorphic fluctuation of 'the same' image. These relations are not a matter of a 
context or environment which surrounds them and remains exterior to an interior 
(Lomax); "infinite or discontinuous", they are "always in displacement." 
(Blanchot)
535
. The context disappears in the walls' rainy texture, the exterior of the 
interior. This is a staggering towards the unknown, and waiting indecisively
536
. A 
long, staring shot of the photographic surface that is also a communication of vision 
and experience, embodiment of tensions, complexities and ambiguities. 
 
Communication of the world and the I in a fragmented world and in a 




To think is to question everything, including thought, question, and the 





Béla Tarr is making images and thinking in images. Breathing, lurking through, 
permeating the material, earthy physicality entwined with the precise construction of 
'elements' that are the result of the director's vision, they persevere. After the young 
girl Estike (Sátántangó) has tortured her pet cat she forces its face into a bowl of 
poisoned milk. She then leaves it alone and backs up a few yards behind the it until 
her back rests against a wall. The camera remains static, with little action, looking at 
the little girl flat up against the wall. The girl does not move, the cat is barely able to 
move its maimed body. Unable to move, it attempts to lift its head to and from the 
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bowl. The image 'expands' in this transitory state of a 'present moment' seized in its 
association with past affects and 'meanings'. On the one hand, there is the remembered 
'speech' of a the girl echoing the parental indifference and verbal abuse she suffered; 
on the other, the dying cat, the only thing she had ever felt close to. At the same time, 
the disinterested camera, a presence, of which, oddly, only the cat seems to be aware, 
refuses any rationally expected point of entry into this naked and nameless any-
image-whatever. Frozen, immobile, imprinted by time already forgotten and 
remembered at the same time. Spaces of memories not exactly of what is remembered 
but what is seen. I'm grabbed by the throat. Forcing the way between impossibilities. 
Choking on the excess of flooding affect. Gasping for air between breaths.  On the 
other 'side of the screen', the viewer is not given any direction; is left to his/ her own 
devices. He/ she finds himself/ herself in the labyrinth without the thread of escape, 
confronted with the 'unknown', witnessing this strange ritual or sacrifice, impossible 
to perceive from any commonsensical point, or judged by moral standards. The 
unknown is not the Other of a different culture or different space; it is of a more basic, 
affective level of responding to that for which there is no language. Restored to us 
with its direct matter, there is only the framed "Image," and the torturous emotion 
arrested in time.
539
 We could think of the Real that Lacan speaks of, the trauma, that 
cannot be named or represented, or of Barthes's photographic punctum of 'ordinary' 
images met by chance,
540
 the leftover, the throwaway of symbolic order; an image 
without metaphor. Instead, the imaging, to paraphrase Deleuze, creates the 'whole' 
which "brings out the thing in itself, literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its 
radical or unjustifiable character, because it no longer has to be "justified", for better 
or worse …"541 No longer a family drama played out by repressed desires, but a 
desire/ drive of poetic (non)language/ affect-thought outside judgment and 
morality.
542
 Scrambled emotions (with)draw the viewer into different/ other spaces (of 
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attention), not 'interpreting' but experiencing, 'living' in and with/ through the image. 
A long intensity of almost unbearable physicality of space, bodily entrapment 
(entanglement) in the textures of place and time, of enclosed fragmentations… a 
labyrinth with no Ariadne. The slow, mundane, cruel, and painful situation unhinges 
the logical time not only by violence to the senses, as in the case of the sublime, but 
also by a strange, powerless resignation; "formless, 'mute, unsignifying region where 
language finds its freedom' even from whatever it has to say …"543 This is the most 
remarkable example of the confrontation with ourselves that is truly 'other' than our 
(hu)man other. Similarly to the moment in Damnation where Karrer barks with the 
dogs, rolling in the mud outside the town, or the de-humanised love making scene 
earlier in the film, this is a moment of rupture, perceptually and cognitively. Perhaps, 
what we encounter are not repressed traumas, but "the demons, the sign-bearers: 
powers of the leap, the interval, the intensive and the instant."
544
 The time-image acts 
as "the utterable itself" – pure automatic or psycho mechanical utterance, emitting 
from itself, a no-place.
545
 Time exhausts the image, which becomes its own 'matter', 
description without before or after like a 'whisper' of eternity, of the meanwhile. The 
only truth that exists is the search itself, an awareness of the being of becoming.
546
 
Where thinking the unthinkable begins. 
 
It is like being at the edge of a terrifyingly ancient void. It is like hearing the 





If we fold still into the adjective still, Lomax writes, we enter into another relation 
(dimension) with movement and time. That which has been in not yet (still to come) 
and present (still here). The trajectory of an arrow, which bends, reverses and comes 
back, only to miss the point, and a throw of the dice, which will never abolish 
chance.
548
 This can also mean 'even', 'then', or 'nevertheless', which always remains 
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open and uncertain. It could fold into an adverb – continuing now or in the future as in 
the past, or up to this or that time; yet, in movement of unlimited relations. A space-
time that carries in itself the affirmation of immanence. 
 
Is the image paused also, in a sense, posed?  
 
David Campany suggests that the pose of a still photograph is a theatrical 
convention.
549
 He argues with Baudrillard that photography cannot but transform the 
world into a world performed or posed.
550
 However, to think of the momentary 
'arrestness' of the image as pausing the 'world' rather than imposing a pose on it, 
seems more adequate. The pose of the paused moment is like stillness, polyphonic 
and unstable in its meaning: as a pose, a gesture but also a pausing, slowing down, 
bringing to attention. Moreover, to think of pose as gesture does not necessarily imply 
theatricality or performing out the world. The gesture of uncertainty, not a monument, 
but a momentarily fleeting expression, like the image which is not or about, but a new 
thing, itself performing only itself. It is rather a result of encounter, of 'dealings with 
the world', whose outcome is not known a priori. Any-instant-whatever instead of an 
'ideal pose'. What would be next becomes a pause, a gap, an "amazing wait of an 
event." A slowed-down image-world. Stopping the movement in order to discover the 
power of image. In Béla Tarr's images everything is 'paused', slowed down, but not 
arrested and not imposed. The 'blankness' of the faces, intertwined with the material 
physicality of space and textures of light, 'combine' the life and gesture in the process 
carrying becoming. Texture, light, and physicality of the photograph, its affective 
intensity (real), brings out all sorts of actual and virtual movements and relations 
'probed' by chance (not known to cliché). It brings importance to space as a plane of 
composition/ becoming and of style as a mode of living.  
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Since thought is inseparable from motion, Yve Lomax suggests, one is obliged to 
'keep the thought moving'.
551
 Perhaps the 'waiting' stillness of a non-representable 
silent 'voice' also provides the space for thought. "It is in stillness that one may be said 
to find true speed", asserts Trinh T. Minh-Ha.
552
 The meanwhile, in-between time (no 
longer and not yet at the same time) but also between before and after, might be the 
constant process of questioning without end. A perpetual moment of thought. An 
interval that goes on for aeons and is profoundly immeasurable.
553
 Here anything can 
happen. The 'taken out' of time still image, an 'amazing wait of an event' where the 





Tarr's films are incredibly intense, 'earthy', real and felt, as if the process of imaging 
was the result of a kind of 'artistic' wrestling with the power of vital, formless, and 
chaotic force. One could argue that his images have almost the sense (the rawness and 
the magic) of 'mythical' cosmic stories from before they were written down. Here time 
flows 'through' the photograph, around it, intensifying the details and interconnecting 
with the senses. It flows in-between stillness and movement, the imaginary and 
material, expanding and connecting, bifurcating in different directions. In a 
hallucinatory space of becoming. In a mad dance of rhythmical movements, 
wanderings and waiting. In the space not arrested but paused. Tangible in the elusive 
gestures of unprivileged instant. 
 
Static views, ordinary scenery, blank faces. Tarr uses the 'documentary' style, yet 
there is no desire there to document. Imagery 'ingrained' in reality – found locations, 
non-actors, no editing – and yet so 'unreal' in terms of realism or representation. 
Nomadic, individual singularities brought out by the materiality of existence. 
 
Robert Bresson, as Paul Schrader points out, defines reality by what Aristotle called 
"privation" by the qualities that the object lacks, yet has potential for.
555
 Tarr, like 
Bresson, documents the surfaces of reality. Nothing is resolved psychologically, 
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rationally, even conceptually. Nothing is deconstructed in terms of narrative. Things 
are here as they are, in this world's one of many existences. Yet, the link to the world 
(and the belief in it) is different from cause-effect commonsensical thinking and 
perception. There is a sense as if things were unfolding on their own, in fragments, 
unrelated viewpoints, fleeting momentarily and taking time according to their own 
rhythms rather than dependent on some already determined outcome. It is as much an 
act of living in the world as in the image and if a performance, it is performing with 
and not (of) the world.
556
 In this sense the truth and the image are being unsettled/ 
destabilising both the mimetic 'evidence' and auratic transcendence. The virtual, as the 
multiple potentiality of emergence from a situation, comes into view imperceptibly. 
We could think of these images as photographic impressions, an "existence placed 
half-way between the thing and the representation" (Bergson). In this way, the posed 
moment of a photograph may be 'embraced' as a positive 'state' of potentiality, not 
necessarily 'dead' past (Benjamin, Barthes). "Lives freed from their destiny" 
(Benjamin) can be seen as perhaps an escape from too much control, or as an 
embryonic power of returning of the new, where what is dead (if it is dead) passes 
through into another state of living, not nostalgically suggesting 'non-human' 
becoming. And more, closing of the horizonality of the outcome (in whatever form it 
might be) of the World, Idea, Self, is pointing to the unknown future. Like a 
photograph no longer 'remembering' the identity of a 'subject', becoming any-instant-
whatever or any-body-whatever, an 'identity' of the real, freed not only from destiny 
but from definition.  
 
Is a photograph an acting-out of the world? Or is it the unstable, or fragile 'impossible' 
connection (link) with the world; the desire to dwell and to escape (wander), to grasp 
and to retreat? In the meanwhile, between 'whisper and eternity', the empty time of 




Stillness becoming alive, yet still …558 
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In the Evolution of Film, Janet Harbord discusses the predominant tendency in film 
thinking towards regarding time as somewhat superior to space. In the 
conceptualisation of cinema and time, she writes, time becomes the indefatigable 
discovery that revitalises thought. Space, in turn, is the conservative force, singularly 
appearing as the measurement of time; "its empirical plodding order."
559
 The space, 
and spacialisation of time in particular, has also been attributed to still photography.  
How can we think of image and space outside of Cartesian measured space, Euclidian 
geometry, the rules of perspective, where the space is not reconstituting time and time 
is not homogenised by space? Is it possible to think of space-time as time-space, as 
relational strata of possibilities of becomings?  
 
Could the space of still photography, based on the 'fixed shot', be rethought of as a 
space of unrecognisable, and non-definable 'interval': any-space-whatever, as 
aesthetics of the 'meanwhile'? For Deleuze, space could only be explained in non-
spatial terms. Perhaps to reclaim space is to reclaim the image and the photograph. 
The power of the fixed shot of the time-image is both space and time that co-exist in 
formation of the image.
560
 Thought of, as Rajchman proposes, as an intensive 
complexity, it is a "groundless depth from which erupts something that creates its own 
space and time."
561
 Such space exists in becoming, blurring inside and outside, figure 
and ground, space and thresholds. Perhaps we could start with the photograph as both 
time and space. Not something organised into a chronology of privileged instants but 
as any-instants-whatever existing in time, unborn, unnamed, and undecided. At the 
same time, as 'actualised' virtuality in the form of percepts, affects, intensities, the 
photographic space, heterogeneous and as a 'play of forces', would distance itself from 
sensus communis of the beautiful becoming the rapture of the 'sublime' singularity of 
difference.
562
 If we think of a photograph as a paradox, an event somewhere, 
sometime, that has been and will be but with the indefinite 'outcome' of 'could have 
been', or of 'not yet', perhaps there is a way of thinking of (photographic) space as 
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constituted through the sense we make of it, as a space-time image where movement 
is not 'arrested' but exists as imperceptible but felt. This, to draw on Colebrook's 
discussion, may not be a constituted sense, or term within a structure but "sense as 
such, a surface that is liberated from any denoted being."
563
 It is not space to which 
time is added but space-time of 'attention' and thinking. Affective, singular, and 
haptic, as well as sensed; a field of singularities embodied as well as conceptual.
564
 
Through the time of waiting, an image reinforces the sense of space as haptic. As it is 
defined by the flow of virtual forces, it is perceived haptically as much as optically. It 
is the 'intensive', where striated space is 'extensive'. It is "occupied by events or 
haecceities more than by formed and perceived things", and it is more a space of 
affects or sensations than properties.
565
 At the same time this plane or field of 
singularities cannot be separated from the material power of immanent differentiation. 
Again, in Tarr's aesthetic this is the question of intensity where the sense of 
confinement defines both the ephemeral and physical, the inside and the outside, the 
oppression and 'freedom'. In his vision, smooth and striated spaces meet, interact and 
exchange places. They multiply, destroying the sense of both uniformity and contrast 
(as opposition). The material modes of expression become abstract lines, and abstract 
lines overtake the material in the infinite pulsation of life, carrying it towards the 
unexpected. It is the space of enduring, an affect-thought where the world thinks us, 
and where the fleeting instant, as if hidden in its dark intensity, was affirming 
something new and unforeseen. The haptic space where every encounter creates 
another space, another sensation, another instant that is also duration. 
Space is also produced through rhythm and repetition, through an exercise of 
energy that is manifested as intensity … In an excavation of filmic space, its 
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Space is what a photograph is in time. The space-time of a photograph is a pause, an 
instant and still, where time has been momentarily suspended at the edges of this 
moment. The posed movement gestures to the outside that remains out of sight; 
unknowable, unreadable. Rather, like Jean Epstein's notion of photogénie,
567
 it is a 
fleeting moment of experience or emotional intensity – a sensation – that the viewer 
cannot describe verbally or rationalise cognitively. Paradoxically, this fleeting 
intensity can only be experienced in a space of 'stillness' within its singularity of no 
before or after, in the space of an irrational cut. If we look at a still photograph in light 
of the time-image, it will suspend the narrative of before and after, thus becoming a 
memory of the present, leaving the image outside of time and yet forever in it. In this 
sense, it can be viewed as an image outside representation, history, chronology, and 
definition; as life's gesture of becoming, paused in-between, in the meanwhile of 
waiting potentiality.
568
 The seeming apathy and the dragging movement of 'fate', 
where gestures are charged with an extremely solid 'reality', not only destroy the 
form/content solidity of aesthetical judgment but shift the active/ passive dynamic. It 
becomes a matter of an event that folds and unfolds within and between.  
 
As a photograph unfolds a content, we also find it folding into a future that is 
without content. Unfolding and enfolding – both continuous and 
discontinuous. As Yve Lomax reminds us, being "between these two folds is 




Photography could be thought of as framing space but also as space re-framing the 
world. Deleuze speaks of obsessive framings… Framing is also 'carving space' out of 
chaos or 'curving around', which produce a style of movable borders that 'shade' into 
each other thinking not just "the space of man" but the sense of space as such.
570
 Art 
struggles with chaos but it also illuminates it for an instant as a sens(ation). A 
photograph becomes a creative and creating space, no longer belonging to anyone or 
anywhere. Now, it becomes the 'place of composition', the space of fleeting 
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encounters of nomadic movements of solitude and anonymity, of (dis)connections 
with the potential of opening up new planes. "The elaborately choreographed mise en 
scène is consistently inventive and unpredictable, making use of highly unorthodox 
angles,"
571
 and unorthodox 'suggestions'. Here, in addition to the space produced out 
of encounters of individual forces, there is also "the metaphysical surface, which is 




The space of no-place (of Tarr's films) is neither that of belonging, nor identifiable. 
Always heavy, peopled with only very few but repetitively appearing 'miserable' 
objects, it seems overwhelmingly confined and borderless at the same time. The harsh 
chiaroscuro light and the camera movements create a forever shifting space: closed to 
the outside world, the small town where the action takes place contains endlessly 
explorable interiors, such as the expanses of Karrer's house in Damnation, unfolded 
by a wandering camera. The apartment is austere and sparsely furnished, like the 
lethargic electric powered conveyances endlessly traversing along the overcast, 
desolate landscape, obscured by the density of the fog. As Yvette Biró points out, they 
all radiate the same feeling: being on a desolate wasteland, imprisoned by Time. 
Paradoxically, however, one cannot see where the walls or bars are found, the space 
seems borderless, infinite. Dense, thick "comprising of so many layers in the slow 
motion", time brings out the sensation of the any-space.
573
 The confined space of the 
photographic frame incites forces and puts us in contact with the outside. Here the 
sense of 'homelessness' conditions thinking. 
 
For Harbord, this space (film space) is a complex production defining an originary 
cultural space ('here' and 'elsewhere') mediated through a range of cultural references; 
being composed of images and media forms as much as built environment. Tarr's 
spaces are more 'unbounded'. They are outside recognition, orphaned, both timeless 
and outside time. In these spatial 'explorations', there are no cultural references. The 
'places' in Tarr's films, although filmed in real locations, do not allude specifically to a 
particular time or space. The sets and related landscapes were often constructed from 
different parts of different locations. As the set designer, Gyula Pauer explained, 
                                                 
571
 Rosenbaum, Almanac of Fall, http://www.jonathanrosenbaum.com/?p=6266. 
572
 Colebrook, 'On the Specificity of Affect', p.192. 
573
 Biró, 'Confined Space'. 
159 
 
sometimes only a street scene was recorded, sometimes a house wall outside 
Budapest, an inside in Ajka, and a next-door shop in Pécs; "so the film's world 
consists of real elements, which, however do not create a real place."
574
 Tarr's streets 
and landscapes are not identifiable as particular places, towns, or villages. They could 
be any-street or any-town somewhere in the past or future, any-spaces-whatever that 
existed or are imagined. Anytime, anywhere. This forking of "delirious pasts" and 
"delirious futures" creates a sense of hallucinatory uneasiness, as if the vision was 
somehow strangely clairvoyant
575
; the sense that there is more to what we see, and not 
beyond but in the world. This is not the relation to the world phenomenologically but 
opening relations as such. The tactile material quality of light, shapes, and the 
physical intensity of wasteland-scapes, deframe the image from its 'culturally' bound 
convention of rectangular geometry. Tarr's towns are where any street, any house, any 
field is every house, every street and every field. The 'beyond' surface in his films is 
not the metaphysical in usual sense but timeless and cosmic (if not universal). There 
are no stabilizing shots of towns, or overviews to reassure that vision is knowledge, 
neither the flaneuristic sense of exploring –as what cinematic theory would call the 
'active viewing'. Rather, we move blindly, from frame to frame, from sequence to 
sequence, in a searching attempt to locate the sense of 'place', public and private 
space.
576
 This visual (and sound) ballade takes us nowhere in terms of either common 
sense or communis sensus. This is also a liberating force. A force of imagining/ 
thinking different places – different world. If time is really an unchanging motion, 
space can be thought of as the 'composition' of change, as creation, again, a becoming 
or as vessel of abandoned memories in a labyrinth of passing through. Time as an 
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The land one possesses is always a sign of barbarism and blood, while the 




A-cultural and a-historical, they are often claustrophobic close-spaced intensities of 
entrapment or vast, open landscapes of Hungarian "puszta." Disconnected, 
autonomous, mute any-spaces-whatever dimmed by the high contrast and black and 
white photography, the interiors emptied of their occupants, deserted exteriors, or 
landscapes in nature. And the endless stretches of rural wasteland. Not quite in the 
same way as the alienating anonymous spaces of airports and waiting rooms Marc 
Augé writes about.
579
 The spaces are any spaces that could be anywhere in any time, 
they are familiar and foreign, close and far, heimlich and unheimlich, reinvention of 
space as any-space-whatever, outside control, knowledge, and recognition. It is a no-
place of the overlapping of perspectives, description, repetition, a crisis of action, in a 
direct presentation of time. For Janet Harbord, referring to Deleuze's reading of 
spaciality, this is space as an affectual register in its own right, not simply as nature 
mirroring the emotional or psychological state of characters but a landscape which 
decentres the human.
580
 In the last shot of Damnation, Karrer literally descends to the 
level of dogs, getting down on fours, barking and snapping at them. The dark, muddy 
landscape recedes behind while the camera 'walks' through it. This is one of those 
puzzling, unsettling images reminiscent of some seen in Tarkovsky's Stalker (1979). 
Edward Howard perceives Karrer's choice to abandon the town as an act 'less than 
human, an animal fighting only for itself'.
581
 Yet, the isolation of man outside the 
social 'condition', pointing towards 'indifferent' nature, rather that seen as degradation, 
might create a possible connection between the human and non-human world, where 
spaces, animals, corners and walls also have their stories. Here, film space produces 
an affectual register that is not simply human projection: filmic space may be 
claustrophobic, agoraphobic, neurotic, eroticised. It is not simply location, a container 
or backdrop for action, but a creation of the mobile forces at work between the human 
and the non-human; a space of potential 'beyond' the human condition. Empty spaces, 
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bleak industrial landscapes, and the oppressive and alienating environment might 
reflect the desolation and spiritual lethargy of morally bankrupt protagonists. In Tarr's 
world, everything seems to take place in a crumbling world of mud, alcohol and 
betrayal. There is no psychology, and no morality here. In the spirit of Italian 
neorealism perhaps, "the world is, quite simply, before it is something to be 
condemned."
582
 Things and people are encountered in a web of relations outside the 
personal and the social in the process of becoming, where the question of how to co-
exist is one without signposts or 'commandments'. This is not the question of 
existential decadence or nihilism. It is "the powerful, non-organic Life that grips the 
world."
583
 Deleuze calls this 'pre-hodological' space, the space of indecision (not an 
indecision of the spirit but an undecidability of the body) where "disparate sets 
overlap and rival each other, without being able to organize themselves according to 
sensory-motor schemata." The space of 'passive vitalism' "which reveals a non-choice 




This might be the result of the clandestine aesthetic mentioned earlier, aesthetic that 
probes the thought itself. Yet, unlike Tarkovsky, for instance, Tarr doesn't search for a 
truth in the realm beyond the senses, but in material physicality (actual and virtual) of 
this world. Could it also be that description exhausts the meaning through the 
apprehension of space? The slow, difficult, and unrecognisable image replaces 
perception with intuition. When the action is suspended between fiction and truth the 




The seemingly naturalistic sets feel more like variations on the same atmosphere, 
'unrealistically hopeless, and claustrophobically depressing' (according to Kovács). 
The sense of space as place is not the one of belonging or actual dwelling. It's 
'orphaned' particularity 'arises' from the specificity of a (waste)land free from the 
certainty of 'identity'. And yet somehow it perversely 'emanates' life –an impersonal 
vitality – not through the realistic 'preference'/ of misery or poverty but through 
art(ifice) that is also real. As such, the space, rather than formed into nostalgic 
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resignation or 'contented' by judgment, is open to experimentation. The aesthetics of 
movable frames where new encounters can open new relations.  
 
In the images of this cinema, we are unsure of the status of what we are seeing and 
hearing: despite the apparently 'real' locations, there is no containing schema or 
guarantor that these situations have an existence outside of the image.
586
 The 
disclosed space is minutely defined in the placement of objects, in the lighting, and 
the length of the shot enveloping them. Excess of intensity – space as zone of 
intensity, an embryonic sense of potentiality. 
 
But there is also the notion of space-time, which is 'operating' in the realm of the real: 
abstract and concrete, virtual and actual. Here the space loses its two-dimensional 
recognition of stability and is re-imagined as a multidimensional 'set' of transitions. 
Attics, cellars, unused sheds – places abandoned by domestication and 'stable', safe, 
recognizable attributes of belonging are often 'charged' with those 'forbidden' forces of 
desire for adventure, for the new, for the unknown. When the doctor in Sátántangó 
stops to rest with the prostitutes in the attic of what might be an unused barn, the 
sense of hopelessness or repression is offset somehow by the material intensity and 
wonder of hardly recognizable space. Another attic where Estike has created her own 
'world', or even the elaborately 'described' pub interiors, in all their stagnating 
eradication, seem to evoke some sense of transition. This is also a childhood's space 
of 'freedom' from family and domesticated constraints, and a space of 'magic'. These 
kind of spaces (any-spaces-whatever) provoke, by their 'unfamiliarity', a sensation 
which enables intuitive 'connection' with the time as 'pure' cosmic memory of 'life'. 
Not only in a sense of involuntary memory of individual sensation, but of a more 
'basic' opening to the outside – a sensation that becomes a seed, a creative longing of 
potentiality rather than traumatic or nostalgic sense of loss.
587
 A new sense of being-
in-the-world, re-making and re-creating the world, even if it seems devoid of 
meaning, even if it is destined to extinction. This is what space-time in photography 
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is. It does not represent time but 'gives' time literally to contemplation.
588
 The thought 
as movement is operating in two directions: a non-linear associative process (create 
associations and connections), and a movement of integration and differentiation 
(distinguishes and arranges thought into sets of ensembles). The whole of relations – 
the consciousness of a qualitative change. The concrete set changes qualitatively in an 
abstract/ virtual dimension of thought. Any-time-space-whatever of waiting, 
hesitation and anticipation becomes the zone of intensity, a time which endures the 
'still', and space (both physical and sensed) which acts as a catalyst of affect/thought. 
 
Without boundaries or measure, the space frequently affiliated with the unconscious – 
has no depth – it is a surface, the mirror unreflexive, opaque. There is nothing beyond 
what we see. It is a surface of visual and aural interconnecting/ intertwining 
becomings, forming and deforming, framings and de-framings. What connects with 
the virtual outside is a crack, a crack as some intensive pull (as if losing it, or losing 
the ground) between virtual and actual.
589
 It might happen on the same plane or 
between different planes but it exists now and always in the immanent infinity of 
chaosmos, always pregnant with potentials of different instances, singularities, bodies. 
These are the 'instances' formed out of matter with the force of spirit; "minute 
perceptions," according to Leibniz.
590
 The virtual that awaits its actualisations is a 
non-spatial 'outside'. There is nothing more than can be seen in the image, one does 
not quite know what to look at, and yet, as Laleen Jayamanne
591
 has suggested, there 
is so much to see and to hear… Yet, what is seen is so ambiguous that perception is 
impossible. Senses are scrambled in the mute whisper of meaning-less (not 
meaningless) signs: the world and world as an image. The 'fixed' shot is a surface, a 
plane upon which images of thought arise and where percepts and affects are born. 
The surface here is not the opposite of depth or a base upon which everything is 
arranged. It is not an interpretation nor it is a disclosure but a space-time (zone) of 
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affects and intensities. It acts as a mirror, deprived of its reflective and reflexive 
certainties. It becomes a plane where different worlds, times and identities meet 
together with the plane of transition, where personal and real time, knowing 
subjectivism and objective description as well as image and spectator, blend together 
again and again without resolution, in a domain on this-other side, within the mirror. 
Perceptions are no longer linked or linkable and the "spaces are neither coordinated 
nor filled."
592
 It is a plane, a virtual plane, a transcendental, preindividual, and even 
prephilosophical field of infinite variation which, as Gregory Flaxman writes, 
"superseding the limits of normal perception, deterritorialises the classical coordinates 
of thought" and opens the space for creative experimentation.
593
. Not returning to any 
prior or 'primitive' modes, it is a plane of composition (art) and production of 
sensation that takes us beyond the lived experience of phenomenological flesh, and 




In this sense, a surface can be perceived as a space of 'absolute potentiality', where 
faces and objects, people and landscape, touch and coalesce in poetical 
transformations, in a trans-subjective dimension that becomes a web of multiple 
possibilities, encounters-events open to chance and the unknown. In Tarr's films, this 
is the non-metaphysical/physical beyond, as "that flat and death thinking, strictly 




Suddenly I am astonished. I see a photograph stretching (and folding) to 
infinity. Suddenly I see the infamous window on the world not shattering but 
gently, gently folding. Suddenly I see the frost on the window pane of the 




The photograph might be an instant, and the slice, but by bringing this instance to the 
surface, it demands attention. The fleeting moment does not flee but is imprinted in 
time. What time-image in cinema created, photography was doing all the time. Instead 
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of spacialising time, it enfolded it in space of embryonic potential. It could not be 
fixed as then and there, because it exists as a separate reality, a space-time always 
growing in dimension. Whenever we think, we produce memory, we are engaged in 
becoming, a kind of amnesiac memory of potentiality. We write not with childhood 
memories but through blocks of childhood that are the becoming-child of the 
present."
597
 Space does not need to be confined to fixed determinations. It does not 
have to hold time in its chronological calendar. It can be folded in time (Chronos) 
outside of time (Aion), and outside of place as any-space-whatever. A plateau. Self-
vibrating region of intensities. 
 
Time-space – 'the empty space' that resembles the Tao – empty and formless yet with 
the potential to contain an infinity of things. A winter landscape with its isolated 
vastness. Endless stretches of rural wasteland. Deserted interiors. Creaking coal 
dumpsters. Wandering stray dogs. Muddy streets. Half-empty packet of cigarettes and 
half-forgotten dreams. The void is not merely opposite to fullness or objecthood but is 
the very site that makes forms and contents possible – that is also inseparable. 
 
Changing emphasis from time to space-time and from movement to 'stillness' might 
provide the opportunity to 'slow down' the senses, to 'observe' the relationship 
(affectual encounters) between the spaces and objects and bodies within space. This 
might, instead of freezing time into the chronological definition of a 'place', free 
space, allowing it to grow in dimensions, to 'capture' attention, to invite sensual and 
affective thinking and rethinking of our relationship to time (speed or slowness), to 
purpose and to 'productivity' in a context of nomadic 'displacement', where space does 
not belong, or is own or recognisable but open to a intuitive and imaginary wonder of 
a vital life that is more than possession, including that of knowledge. 
 
Although, as Victor Burgin pointed out, a photographic exposure may be made "in the 
blink of an eye", the experience of looking at the resulting image belongs to the 
register of durée rather than to the mechanical abstraction of the "instant."
598
 The 
'fixed shot' of modern cinema, which has a particular resonance as 'instant', becomes a 
'durée'. Time is 'confined' in the image by the length of 'recording', and the stillness of 
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a camera. In a sense, the image is cut out from the world by 'attentive misrecognition', 
becoming a thinking image. Every single shot is self-contained, "each image being on 
its own, just a fragment of reality existing before any meaning";
599
 a singular image in 
a collection of 'stills' weaved together by the logic of 'irrational cut'. Time, however, 
lingers somehow in the direction of depth or 'breadth' rather then linearity, growing in 
dimensions, but like a ripple. Depth, on the other hand retains its importance not as an 
illusionistic window to the other world, but the dimension of time outside 
chronological time. The image "does not extend to new spaces but 'intends', 
involuting into the mind, opening up a whole new sense of mental duration."
600
 
Exhausting the space, the thought turns inwards towards memories, memories as 
becomings. Space-time becomes a qualitative combination of sensation and 
'(e)motion' where perception becomes hallucination, and memory becomes déjà-vu. 
The movement 'stops' in the image 'growing in dimensions'. Long shots, mimicking 
the still image, multiply the dimension of space-time 'outside the time' of a 
photograph and enable the viewer to make 'connections', becoming-other. Film is 
thinking within the shot as description, and between as (non)relation. The slow and 
prolonged camera movements never rush into the depicted space, inviting the eye to 
linger on the surface, and the viewer to remain on the edge. It evokes the thinking 
process, yet a process that is hesitant, experimenting, questioning, rather than 
interpreting or defining. The camera, sometimes still, sometimes scanning or 
recording, echoes the experience of looking at the still photograph. The movement of 
the eye constructs a recognizable space, and "it is only through the suspension of 
movement … that the essential heterogeneity of the visual field can be approached. … 




Something happens in the process between the photographer/ filmmaker, the camera 
and the world that is outside intentionality. Photographic image (the photographic) is 
not only the question of "camera consciousness" but the "camera unconscious", 
something which is outside the natural or 'implied' perception, outside intentionality. 
It is in Bazin's statement about the snowflake and in Deleuze's 'fixed shot'. 'I' who 
perceives, cannot experience nonchronological time, but the eye which get rids of the 
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'I' could become the catalyst of the image-world happening through it. The time-
image severs the link between mind and matter temporarily, throwing the knowing "I" 
into the gap of the nothing matter. We forget who we are for an instant, and by the 
failure of attentive recognition, discover seeing (perceive for its own sake). We gain 
new subjectivity in a sense: "subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or 
the spirit, the virtual."
602
 No longer the objective camera or subjective eye but vision 
which is immanent to itself (self-referential). Falsifying, virtual 'pure expression' that 
is real. When the subject's ability to act has been suppressed, Temenuga Trifonova 
writes, the subject's attention to images is intensified, and now all it can do is perceive 





The first unrealised beauty of the photographed image was the 'defocused', wrote 
Stanley Cavell.
604
 This is not, however, the 'nostalgic and romantic' beauty associated 
with soft-focus photography, but rather a high-contrast 'out-of-focus' linked to the 
uncertainty of perception. Tarr's distinctive, black and white photography, intensified 
by the greys of the surroundings and blurred by rain, question the 'reality' of 
perception. As such, these images are no longer recognisable in an ordinary/ habitual 
sense of perception or cognition. They form a space of creative encounters. All sorts 
of encounters: memory and imagination, desire and loss, reality and dreams, the 
neglected, the unarticulated, the unrepresentable, the actual and the virtual all 
'entangled' with each other and brought onto the surface of an image. Thus, 'suddenly' 
the de-focused beauty acquires the radical space of nomadic thinking, where the 
familiar viewing codes and the confidence of judgment are refused. The image is by 
definition a moving image insofar as it does not "resemble an object that would 
represent", writes Deleuze.
605
 The still image offers a space of 'seeing' rather than 
perceiving representationally, in waiting frustrated by the absence of a before or after. 
The visual and sound elements enter into internal relations, deleting and displacing 
the predictable.  
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And the perplexing perception becomes questioning, responding, objecting, 
provoking, theorematizing, hypothesizing, experimenting, in accordance with 
the open list of logical conjunctions ('or', 'therefore', 'if', 'because', 'actually',  
'although' …).606 
 
'Contemplation' of these 'fragments of existence withdrawn form Time', although 
fugitive, renders the (cinematic) pleasures of affect-thought far 'superior' to social or 
sexual pleasures of 'action' narrative. Here immobilised time, or liberated from their 
implication in a ceaseless flow of fragments of time, allows for sensing the 'eternity' 
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The visual image and the sound image are in a special relationship, a free 
indirect relationship. 




"I have to make it clear that not even for a moment is there a doubt that it is not 
a technical but a philosophical question that … The tonal system in question, … 
through research, has led us inevitably to a test of faith, in which we ask: On 
what do we base our believe that this harmony, the core of every masterpiece, 
referring to its own irrevocability actually exists or not?" 
 




Can you hear that? 
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A ticking clock, a whirring fan, the whirr of the refrigerator's motor, the slow, 
scraping sound of the shaving razor, the constant patter of rain. The recurring distant 
drone of church bells, a gong, the crack and rumble of pool balls, the howling of the 
wind, and the music, abstract and autonomous, like a speck of dust in the eye, or a 
"true foreign body" in the visual image.
613
 Belá Tarr's films' sounds are a collection of 
vibrations and frequencies, both intensely material and ineffable, sultrily entwined in 
the construction of what Gregg Render calls a "musico-emotional sensation."
614
 
Physicality and temporal denseness, which intensify the moment and enhance the 
sense of an unseen, otherworldly presence, bring together inside and outside, close 
and distant, particular and universal, weaving a polyvocal 'sound-visionscape' that 
brings forth the outside of affect-thought. Intensely material and 'otherworldly', like 
the visual, the sounds of time-image resist.
615
 Everyday, mundane sounds, 
monotonous tonality of music, and detached speech-acts unfold; fabricating a 
polymorphous unconventional tale, undoing plots and rupturing linearity, rendering it 
visible and audible. Forming disjunctive compositions with images – both an 
organizing and disintegrating process – they frame audio-visual encounters of non-





Therefore, and following on from the previous chapters, what is particularly relevant 
to my analysis here is the role sound can play in dislodging habitual recognition, and 
in opening up space and time for creative participations, in both the films and the 
viewings. Rather than addressing the theoretical and/ or historical discussions around 
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film sound, I will engage directly (experimentally and creatively) with ideas coming 
forth from the inventive use of sound in Belá Tarr's films, and in dialogue with the 
more creative or philosophical writings about sound.
617
 Thus, sound will be 
considered here as carrying the 'nomadic force' of the creative process (of being in 
becoming), emerging through the concepts of rhythm, resonance, and refrain. 
 
The thinking about and with sound is based on the understanding of film as 
construction, and the artificial creation of image/sound in a complex set of relations, 
and resonates with the concepts of space, time, and movement. It derives from 
adopting the concept of the 'time-image' as primarily an audio-visual, or optical and 
sound situation, where sound is not in service of the visual narrative but (co)exists 
with(in) the image as a process/formation in time. It is thought of, after Deleuze, as a 
"living concept, which goes beyond the visual image, without being able to do 
without it."
618
 The analysis will be constructed mainly against Deleuze and Guattari's 
writings on sound in A Thousand Plateaus, and Michel Chion's theoretical work on 
film sound. The writing will evolve around the ideas of rhythm, resonance, and 
refrain, as formulated by Deleuze and Guattari, and will follow the conceptual crux of 
the analysis as a whole in expanding the idea of the (cinematic) image beyond its 
representational and communicative stipulations.  
 
Throughout the chapter, thinking about sound will be constructed around two ways 
that sound can be 'perceived'. First, as embracing the physicality of the familiar 
(creating space), and second, as the unfamiliar, distant, and 'otherworldly' resonating 
with the outside. Both are interlinked by presupposition of rhythm/time as 'flux, 
multiple speeds, and reversible relations' (eternity) which bypass the binary 
opposition of transcendence to take the form(less) of the immanent set of 
becomings.
619
 The question therefore will shift from the relationship of sound to 
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image to audio-visual assemblages, and from harmony/ disorder to a plane of 
sonorous composition. 
 
Despite many writers' efforts to identify sound solely with image, sound does not have 
a precise and fixed relationship to it. In sound film, the film is more or less 
everywhere, writes Michel Chion, but we can't say exactly where between the sound 
and the images.
620
 As Deleuze suggested, there is no movement common to the visual 
and to sound; sound acting as a "stimulant to movement without being its double."
621 
One cannot separate images from sounds, seeing from hearing. In seeing there is 
always hearing, and in hearing there will always be seeing. Even in silent cinema a 
film was not really silent. The relation of sound to image cannot, according to 
Deleuze, be a question of correspondence, either external or internal: "it is a reaction 
between the musical foreign body and the completely different visual images", an 
interaction independent of any common structure.
622
 Moreover, silent or talkie, 
cinema constitutes an immense internal monologue that is not a language but visual 
material which is the utterable of language."
623
 In the cinema of the time-image, the 
sound-image relation is that of the irrational cut. 
 
As Chion pointed out, sounds are neither experienced objectively nor named, and 
therefore might attract various degrees of vagueness and uncertainty.
624
 The difficulty 
in discussing/ thinking about sound from the standpoint of definitions stems from its 
characteristic as sensation (intangible despite the sense of materiality). Sounds take on 
and render sensations that, in lived experience, are combined, or ‘agglomerated’ 
together, thus creating what Chion describes as 'the rush of composite sensations not 
just the auditory reality of the event'.
625
 In this sense one can think of sound as a kind 
of paradoxical entity, combining seemingly separate sensations (sound, vision and 
even touch) in a sense of their materiality, in a way that is living; in a complex web of 
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elements which are interconnected almost like living tissues, which despite their 
complexity, work together.  
 
Music, dialogue, and sound effects can each suggest a mood, evoke a feeling, set a 
pace, connect otherwise unconnected ideas, characters, places, images, or moments, 
heighten realism or diminish it, heighten ambiguity or diminish it, draw attention to a 
detail, or away from it, indicate changes in time, describe an acoustic space, startle or 
soothe, exaggerate action or mediate it.
626
 Sound can also be thought of in terms of 
proximity: what's near and what's far, ideology and pragmatics, immanence and 
transcendence, inside and outside, and the number of relations these concepts can 
enter with and out of each other. As will become apparent later in this chapter, sound 
is in 'dialogue' with vision as "free indirect relation", which is a question of 
style/aesthetics. 
 
When we accept the cinematic image as an optical and sound 'situation', sound and 
image need to be 'perceived' as simultaneous and as coexistent, rather than in 
historically motivated chronological order (sound added to the image)
627
. Sound and 
image invade each other, feed off each other; sound and silence playing off each 
other, neither communicating nor signifying, becoming open to the outside. When 
sound coexists with image in its own right, it is 'rendering audible',
628
 thus together 
with the image (rendering visible) becomes any-image-whatever, a fleeting 'moment' 
of the visionary 'gesture' open to the future of unlimited possibilities. Here, in the 
strange un/familiarity of rhythmic tonalities, one is able to hear, losing oneself in a 
world of sound, where hearing breaks down the defences of the harmonic and melodic 
ear, and becomes aware of TIMBRE alone.
629
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In Tarr's films, all sounds – ambient and composed – are distinctly present, and they 
often occur one at a time, either as music, ambient 'noise', or speech. In most 
situations, they do not recede or fade, but remain in focus. The acuity of each sound, 
and their relation to what is the background noise/sound, at times reduced and at times 
intensified, becoming over-present, allows the voices or sound effects to be more 
highly individualised, and to be heard both more finely and more clearly in the 
context of a more 'profound' silence.
630
 The rhythmical pattern of a clock, a whirring 
fan, the hum of a refrigerator motor, or the constant tapping of rain, the repetitive 
intensified ambient sounds 'physicalise' time, simulating movement without imitating 
it. Footfalls and footsteps, from the urgent approach to the shuffling feet of drunks 
attempting some kind of coordinated dance, the plodding of a long trek, 'blocks of 
sound' relate to time that is not linear measurable progression, and make the image 
even more physical, earthier, and more tangible. The clocks that are silent, on the 
other hand, point to "the perpetuity of defenselessness."
631
 The unchanging intensity 
of sound, and its rhythmical polyphonic materiality encroaching on space, frames it 
within the immediate response, a kind of 'touching' quality. It is as if the director 
'forced' our attention on the details of a sometimes mundane (this) world that seems so 
evident, or uninteresting, in order perhaps to discover the potential (new) unthought of 
relations – the virtual time of un-heard, non-articulated, 'foreign' and forgotten 
'(e)motion'. As with the almost over-present sound of the coal buckets in Damnation 
which, in its quiet insistence, forces itself onto the body/mind of the viewer, pulling 
him/her into the monotonous whirl of transient sentience – the unknown. It is as if the 
director, like Klee's artist, adopted first an "earthbound position", turning his attention 
to the microscopic in order to then open up to the Cosmos to "harness forces at 
work".
632
 Crinkling, crackling, rattling, and thumps deliver a high degree of 
concreteness to the rendering. Rendering audible. These "sonorised moments", as 
Chion calls them, with added as well as ambient sounds, do not offer "slices of 
reality" but "observe the real through a prism that separates and recomposes, without 
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necessarily making the dislocated elements coincide perfectly."
633
 They wring the 
photographic image from representation, rendering it real. For example, people walk 
into the distance and, due to the wireless microphones strapped to their legs, the 
'gravelly crunch of the footfalls' remains present, and with their changing distance, 
sound remains the same, just as loud, just as near.
634
 This confuses the (aural and 
visual) sensibility, heightens the senses, and enables the sound to be present rather 
than disappearing into the habitual 'non/hearing' (background sound) of narrative 
'reality', allowing it instead to coexist with image as affective intensity, a rhizome of 
sensation, an interaction without any common structure, and is in line with Tarr's 
treatment of sound as a character.
635
 Unequal and yet not hierarchical sounds become 
a (de)territorialising refrain in a rhythmical composition of audio-visual renderings. 
Not dramatising or psychologising, Tarr (similarly to Robert Bresson) allows the 
sounds to have their own value, exerting them according to their own resonance and 
not as a background soundtrack. Different sounds connect but do not communicate 
with one another. The sound of church bells in Sátántangó, for instance, resonates 
with the silence of the vast nightly landscape, which is at the same time 'approached' 
distantly by the melodic iteration of music. Each, however, has its own distinct and 
apposite place in the assemblage of the vision-sound fabric. The 'aesthetic' emotion 
arises from the intensified material detail of the everyday mundane rustle or murmur. 
The sounds' repetitive insistence that 'take time', invade us, impel us, drag us, 
transpierce us. The recurring distant drone comprised of drums, a gong, a train 
whistle, and natural sounds, accompany the otherworldly music, suggesting the 
outside. The 'otherworldly music'
636
, composed by Michály Vig, circular, repetitive, 
often monotonous, and excruciatingly insistent, creates an impression of 'being stuck' 
and 'taking off' at the same time, leaving the characters and the 'story' behind. Partially 
sentimental, partially 'longing', it attains the strange, hypnotic and hallucinatory 
quality of a 'drunken' image, where the 'voice' of a faraway void half lost in the 
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shadows of the rainy afternoons, enters the space of remembrance which is also the 




Circular and repetitive, reinforcing the awareness of space, and of self, it locks the 
attention in the intensity of melodic reiteration. Here the senses are not heightened but 
dimmed, quietened, withdrawing the habitual perception, and opening the space for 
what can be called, paraphrasing Bergson, an attentive non-recognition. Together with 





Persistent presence (real), neither signifying nor communicating, not inside or outside 
(in or out of frame), sounds open the image with(in) the world to the 'cosmic' forces of 
the unknown (not the same as transcending). 
 
Sound owes this power not to signifying or "communicational" values (which, 
on the contrary, presuppose that power), nor to physical properties (which 
would privilege light over sound), but to a phylogenetic line, a machinic 
phylum that operates in sound and makes it a cutting edge of 
deterritorialization. But this does not happen without great ambiguity […]. It 
takes leave of the earth, as much in order to drop us into a black hole as to 
open us up to a cosmos. […] Ecstasy and hypnosis.639 
 
The sounds of the physicality of time, the everyday sounds (proximity), and the 
sounds of the outside (distance) interact, becoming together, without merging, in the 
'confused' perception of what is near and what is far, what is outside and what is 
inside. Hallucinatory 'playing', teasing, on the verge of reality and dream, in between 
sense and sensation. They are given the time and space to (co)exist with each other 
and with the images in the process of contrapuntal renderings, when the sound might 
become the image. The 'banging' noise the Police Chief's children make in 




 For Deleuze, 'out of field' was the situation characteristic of the movement-image, and editing, 
where the frame was open to other frames, and which implied the existence of the whole. In the 
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Werckmeister Harmonies, or the rhythmical tapping of a dancing man's steps in 
Damnation, the accordion's melancholic and almost 'oppressively' monotonous waltz, 
the 'detailed' sounds of everyday chores, or the otherworldly sound of the bells in 
Sátántangó. The quiet voice of the opening scene of Werckmeister Harmonies, or the 
screaming silence of the hospital massacre. The forlorn song of a bar singer, the music 
of harmony and discord. The polyphonic multiplicity of sounds and gestures. The 
fugal repetition. All in 'harmony' with life, and 'chaosmos' of this world, a rhizomatic 
multiplicity. 
 
Sound in Tarr's films is a character, with different interacting roles in a rhythmic 
composition of the sound-image plane. The tangible, felt rain brings forth a sense of 
space; the detailed repetitive sounds, such as the pool balls, create their own intense 
presence, away from the main story. Sound is a paradoxically silent 'witness' to, or 
accomplice in, the process of destruction/entropy. In Werckmeister Harmonies, it 
could be argued, the sounds are trapped, confined to immediate space; an impotent, 
overbearing presence. The dance, where Tunde and the police officer 'march' around 
each other to the rhythm of Strauss's Radetzky March, for instance, or Prince's eerie 
voice inside the whale, even the helicopter circulating over the train tracks at the end 
of the film; the repetitive scramble, effacing all sounds, culminates in the 'silent' 
massacre where no scream was uttered. They circulate the town in a mute/gagged 
'gesture', while the film's music embraces the movement in gentle wondering-
questioning, assembling an open structure "freeing matter and tapping forces."
640
 
Not leading, interpreting, or communicating, sound wanders among the spaces of 
images, the memories of viewers, the 'emotions' of films (narratives), constellating 
new encounters, creating nomadic intensity of becoming and 'viewing'.
641
 It carries 
the image of gesture in suspended reaction. Rhythm, refrain, and resonance enter the 
unlimited number of variations on a theme (that is, life); a polyphonic, contrapuntal 
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Sound has also a 'happening', performative character, as an immanent coexistence 
with other elements in a process of creating that is never finished, outside realism and 
signification, in the teasing quality of not quite what it seems: the conversation 
overheard by Valuska hiding inside the whale's body in Werckmeister Harmonies, for 
instance, where the whispers and shouts of the non-visible 'prince', deceptively 
'revealing', lead further and further away from any logical conclusions. While in 
Damnation, the repetitive, elliptic movement of melody assisting the camera enters 
into a rhythmic dance with its opening framing, where the sound of the coal 
dumpsters connects the outside with the inside through the frame of the window, their 
'humming' lingers on the empty space long after Karrer has left his apartment. Even as 
films' music, sound exists as 'sound' rather than melody or a soundtrack.  
 
Damnation (as film and as 'concept') appears to be porous. "There are cracks in the 
surface of things," the cloakroom attendant warns Karrer.
643
 The more attention the 
director gives to the textures of objects and sounds, the more surfaces seem to be 
'cracked'. The image-sound becomes porous, where 'things' escape through the cracks. 
The rainy 'constitution' of the wall – 'moved' by the faces and sounds – leaks, allowing 
for something to enter (or escape). It keeps itself and the film from concretisation into 
a story/narrative, becoming instead sensory surfaces and walls of resonance where the 
intensity of perception bounces off. While 'the fog gets into the corners and into the 
lungs, and settles in your soul',
644
 and the rain envelops the world in its rhythmic 
murmur, words, sounds, and sensations leak out of the walls, the rain, and the 
mundane, monotonous barrier of uneventful, slow images. Through screen-skin pores, 
'things' escape and form new assemblages, new bodies, sometimes 'bodies without 
organs'; they enter 'matters of expression' and, as Deleuze and Guattari suggested, 
when liberated from all 'connections' might produce an opening to the Cosmos. 
Rendering visible and sonorous. Thus entering a different 'plane' of aesthetic 'value' of 
the film's 'form' and its title's 'content', where, as Deleuze and Guattari write, "the 
assemblages placed matter and form in a new relation: matter ceased to be a matter of 
content, becoming instead a matter of expression, and form ceased to be a code 
subduing the forces of chaos, becoming a force itself."
645
 The effects of such 
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'operations', as Deleuze reminds us, "can be very diverse but are never symbolic or 




The sound takes the form of a 'sign',
647
 different from that which mainstream cinema 
reserves for signification, and employs it to sustain emotion, to enhance the mood, or 
to guide the viewer's response. The sign here is a non-structural entity, always in 
becoming, always in transition, on the move … non-symbolic, plastic, and unruly. It 
exists independently, entering at the same time into relations with other sounds, 
images, and the outside. It is a sound/sign, which puts in continual variation all 
components; a sound that, as Deleuze put it, "enters the service of a virtual cosmic 
continuum, in which even the holes, silences, ruptures and cuts have a part,"
648
 like a 
vibrating note in conversation with other signs, details, shapes, tonalities, dwelling 
beside and always on the move. Fleshy and earthy, the sign is a 'matter of expression' 




Sátántangó's sounds dwell in its 'bodies', people, cows, and ruins. They stand still and 
reside in a place until trance 'comes', and then they suddenly change, pulling bodies 
with them, interlinking surfaces, walls, and faces; the becoming 'spider' of the dancing 
body cutting across all fixed positions, harnessing unthinkable, invisible, non-
sonorous forces. As such, they take a form of signs that are 'real' vital affects 
resonating with life and its cosmic force, "an enormous force operating in 
infinitesimal space." The "invocation of the Cosmos", Deleuze and Guattari tell us, 
does not operate as a metaphor; it is, on the contrary, an "effective operation", 
artistic/poetic renderings: connecting matter with forces.
650
 And the new is possible 
by introducing 'affective ruptures' no longer concerned with the content ('the drama of 
miserabilism') or meaning (symbolic message), but which enter into 'dialogical 
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conversation' with the memory-forgetting of the cosmic 'now' consolidating the 
material, making it consistent. 
 
Rain-ness and shadow-ness, … repetitions of fugal noises and whispers, an endless 
litany of 'hopeless' hope. The slow movement of the buckets of coal in Damnation, or 
an empty 'drone' of a refrigerator, evoking the monotony of labour is, Adrian Chan 
observed, "time without agency, time without a thought, contemplative subjectivity 
beholding the repetition of a life,"
651
 the repetitiveness of movement/sound 
'transgresses' into the realm of eternity. But perhaps this is also, like a visual image, a 
space-time of heightened attention. Its rhythmical replay, even if mundane and 
monotonous (or perhaps because of it) creates the space that is not opposite to time 
but with/in. The space that is much closer, and proximate to the ground, is in our 
heads, pulling us along with movement, as if we were tracking the shot.
652
 It is the 
refrain of territorialisation, which is repeated and repeats, but each time differently, 
the "refrain which is a prism, a crystal of space-time." It acts upon that which 
surrounds it, sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, 
projections, or transformations.
653
 The 'earthy' sounds of domestic spaces resonate 
with rain, wind, the rustle of leaves, calling the invisible forces of the 'desert'. The 
intensity of rain and the force of wind detach themselves from the world, becoming 
the forces of duration. This refrain fabricates time; it is the 'implied tense' that carries 
over the space, running in many directions.
654
 As such, the repetition/ refrain 
constructs the space of opening(s). It carries within the virtual force that envelops the 
actual matter rendering sonorous what is not yet, the unknown, the 'secret', a gap in 
the form 'to come' – "certain that something is to come."655 
 
The refrain also has a catalytic function: not only to increase the speed of the 
exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to assure indirect 
interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity, and thereby 
to form organized masses.
656
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All is overarched by the rhythm, in its labyrinthine pattern of unlimited number of 
connections (as becoming). In the use of sound, the style is also extreme. The 
conductor in the dance scene in Sátántangó repeats over and over in every possible 
variation that Irimiás and Petrina are returning to the town to collect the money from 
the farm collective. The overbearing, and at times repetitive, music seems to be doing 
the same. As if something intensely and persistently tried to 'be heard'. The 
'phlegmatic' sound of the accordion seems somehow to 'perfectly' envelop the 
haunting, longing atmosphere of the rainy, wondrous space. Space-time that despite, 
or maybe because of, the characters' 'immobility' (to progress), is being transformed. 
Music offers it a different, intensive quality each time we go back to the same place. 
In this way, it creates the space-time (moved through style) that carries on, somehow 
paradoxically, the energy of life – the desire to 'dance'.  
 
If, as Nietzsche suggests in The Birth of Tragedy, the visual image comes from 
Apollo, who causes it to move according to a measure, and makes it represent the 
whole indirectly, "it will be music, which will […] add the immediate image" (direct 
representation), the "Dionysian closer to an inexhaustible Will than to a 
movement."
657
 The music will take the role of a chorus which, as in the case of Greek 
Tragedy, is the one communicating with the outside, the chaos, the inexhaustible 
Will.
658
 It will be the chorus not of the redemptive reassurance of Oedipal fate, where 
ones expectations are confirmed by the dialectic structure, but different from the 
identifying conception of empathy. Creating language without language, 
communication without communication; this is a different kind of empathy, empathy 
that does not involve moral judgment of obligation, but 'consists' of affect, the pre-
moral, pre-religious, and even pre-human(istic) force that disturbs the social 
equilibrium.
659
 It is a question of 'responsibility' to life, or even to death.
660
 Where 
"the human is not the centre of the world", writes Rosi Braidotti, "and neither is God, 
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who put him there," there is a space for an "emphatic proximity", an intensive 
interconnectedness with the world.
661
 Beyond human identification and beyond 
cultural resemblance or imitation, the becoming-intense of the transforming body lies 
in itself, allowing for uncontrollable rhythmic contaminations among people, objects, 
sounds, and impressions. Provoking a relay between the corporeal and incorporeal 
dimension, (de)touching blindly, insecurely, unknowingly; an attitude that requires 
total trust (even if unconscious) in a process of what becomes(now), of "unheard-of 
potentialities", the 'mystery' of the everyday and the 'beauty' of creating. This kind of 
'Spinozan' empathy is possible through the dignity Tarr offers life and its characters, 
through weaving the audio-visual 'matter' of encounters without 'solution', "setting 
love adrift in the direction of other [than familial] assemblages."
662
 The distant bells in 
the empty ruin of the church at the end of Sátántangó announce nothing. 
 
Similarly, the 'yearning', a longing so strong in films' sorrowful (as Biró calls it) and 
'freeing' music prevents it from the 'emotional' sentimentality of empathising as 
identifying, becoming instead a yearning which cuts across the barriers of good and 
bad, objective and subjective, inside and outside, across gender, class and race, which 
is more than empathy/identification as we know, it is empathy without empathy.
663
 
This might be a question of proximity (and praxis), and unconscious affect rather than 
the reason of consciousness, a realm of poetic immanence inherent in the process of 
creation through encounter, including the spectator. This kind of music (which also 
enters into relations with other 'otherworldly' sounds within the films, including rain 
and wind) keeps one on the edge of objective/subjective, body/mind, in a kind of 
(non)involvement, of feeling-thinking from the outside; neither feeling nor thinking, a 
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gape of indecisive emotion, a constructive inability to act. Could this be called a 




The 'longing' aspect of the music, and the ambiguous tonality of the sound overall, 
(which ranges from silence to almost irritating, or at times uncomfortable, 
repetitiveness) shifts its effect from sentimentality to 'awakened sensation', where 
according to Valuska in Werckmeister Harmonies, 'deep emotion pierces everyone'.
665
 
Gentle music carrying over the 'drunken' composition in the pub into the "infinite 
sonorous silence" of the night is but one example of an amazing sensibility of audio-
vision in Tarr's films, where the border between sentimentality and profoundness, 
cynicism and 'empathy', is undone, leaving the viewer to work out his/her own 
feelings. The scene where two small boys act out a parody of military authority, 
bashing on drums and screeching combative rhetoric into an electric fan, is a truly 
affective image. But the longer we are locked in the grip of this repetitive image, the 
more disquieting our sense of reality becomes. The scene falls outside its enacting, 
and becomes the 'terrifying rumble' of order, the uncanny undoing of the norm. In the 
long opening shot of Damnation the black coal buckets move toward us, and we hear 
nothing but the runner of the wire. The most 'deafening' sound of the massacre in the 
hospital scene of Werckmeister Harmonies is the silence containing all the violence 
and unspeakable terror. Even the monotonous, rhythmical creaking of the bed, which 
disappears into the sound of the coal buckets, overtaking everything and everyone in 
the intensely unemotional love-making in Damnation, has its degree of emotion 
measured by rhythm (poetic discourse) against the meaning of symbolic structure. 
Here, the sounds of life, real and 'indifferent', scramble fixed ideas and expectations. 
 
This is the Dionysian aspect of the image often forgotten in the Apollonian 
'harmonious' form or the negative dialectics of oppositional thinking. In fact, the 
whole 'composition' of Werckmeister Harmonies might be 'seen' as a reflection on the 
structure – or the lack of it – in music, which not only does not find an answer, but 
renders the question of order/disorder redundant altogether. At the end of 
Werckmeister Harmonies, Mr. Eszter informs Valuska that he 'retuned the piano': 
                                                 
664
 'Poethics' is an expression coined by Patricia McCormack to describe cinematic images as form-less 
events of memory, that are the realm of poetics and ethics rather than of symbolic structure, in Patricia 
McCormack, 'Julia Kristeva', Felicity Colman (ed.), Film, Theory and Philosophy: The Key Thinkers. 
665
 Werckmeister Harmonies (2000) 
184 
 
"Now, once again is like any other. Once again you can play anything on it."
666
 What 
Mr. Eszter seeks in the Apollonian harmony of the spheres is 'seemingly' contrasted 
with the entropy and distraction, but which 'disappears' in the particular assemblage 
where the cosmic harmony of creation lies outside the opposition. Here there is no 
judgment opposing noise to melody, as they cannot function in isolation. The sounds 
'need' to find their own harmony through co-existence in the chaosmic polyphony, in 
poetical meandering, pondering, relating without interpreting or explaining. While 
Valuska walks the city in rhythmical steps of everyday chores, his uncle enquires into 
the depth of musical spheres through theory. The two are then reconciled in a brilliant 
'silent' shot of both walking side by side to the rhythm of the blowing wind; evoking 
the rustle of old leaves, the cracking sound of rain drops, the silence of the forlorn 
look in the window. It is no longer a question of imposing form upon matter, or 
driving off the chaos as in territorial refrains, but elaborating material in order to "tap 
intense forces."
667
 The 'heavenly music' of Werckmeister Harmonies enters into 
contact with the 'noise' made by the children, the singer's performance in the bar 
(Damnation) and the nonsensical, repetitive verbiage ("I was plodding, plodding 
along …") of Sátántangó, which 'disturbs', disrupts, or, to use Deleuze-Guattari’s 
expression, deterritorialises its harmony. They are then re-composed in the prevailing 
sound of the accordion, only to be overtaken by the heavy materiality of silence. The 
"sensually heightened realism" – as much a product of a dense soundtrack as of the 
consistent gaze of the long take – becomes the real of image-sound, assembling in the 
style of becoming-affect. There is no outcome or resolution. Harmony and 
disharmony no longer exist on opposite sides of image-sound. The dialectic structure 
disappears in the crack of in-between. 
 
This is a question of style as nomadic aesthetics
668
; homeless, genderless, subjectless 
thinking with affect, outside of judgment; the nomadic thinking "despises mainstream 
communication." It longs instead, as Braidotti puts it, "for the desert: areas of silence, 
in between the official cacophonies, in a flirt with radical nonbelonging and 
outsidedness."
669
 Sound makes aesthetics of affect possible. Through vibrating, 
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resonating that opens up the space of becoming, fleeting encounters, nomadic 
wanderings, and becoming that cannot end up in being, it is forever bound to 
'creation', even if it takes the form of destruction. The point is not the predictable 
outcome but the eternal unknown that is always a step ahead: "[t]he danger of 
rhythm's enigma."
670
 There is no more a question of harmony or disorder, but duration 
which is inseparable from entropy or degradation.
671
 Drenched in atmosphere, sound 
envelops the senses, and links to the outside that is also the silent stilled image of 
thought and unthinking. The chorus is the refrain – the unspeakable affect where 
rhythm inserts time into ethics.
672
 "Why does the grass dry and yet grow again?" Tarr 
poses the question after the Hungarian poet Endre Ady, while elaborating on the films' 




Refrain is something that carries both the (un)known and (un)homely. It is that which 
reassures through its repetitive 'familiarity', bringing us 'home', but it is also that 
which carries us away into the unknown, beyond the borders of familiar(l). And as the 
sentimental tune of repetitive composition embraces a child's fear, it opens the 
body/spirit to the longing of else(where). "The song is like a rough sketch of a 
calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, centre in the heart of chaos," write Deleuze 
and Guattari.
674
 However, the song in the Titanic Bar (Damnation) is more like a 
destabilising force of yearning for the outside, deterritorialising the 'norm', be it 
disintegration through social impotence, or security of the order. "You lose your 
words, and yet you cannot go …" the words of the song reverberate, while the sleepy 
jazz of the band carries off the movement. Abstract shapes, carved in black, 
silhouetted 'against' the music, gesture silently towards 'outside'. It is the song sung by 
the woman in Damnation's pub, the repetitive 'plodding along' heard over and over in 
Sátántangó's 'affairs', the sounds of insistent steps covering the ground everywhere; 
the song of the man and his life is of no place and every place. One might hear it 
anywhere at any time. Outside good or evil, neither distressing nor soothing, a 'song' 
carries life and inexhaustible will, a "pathological clinging to life, pathological 
insistence" could also be the "continual self-overcoming of man," 
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"that longing for an ever-increasing, widening of distance with the soul itself, 





This might be what Deleuze and Guattari called the ‘natal refrain’, different from 
native or innate as it is always in 'communication' with nomadic forces: 
 
Natal refrains, refrains of the territory (the lullaby, the drinking song, hunting 
song, work song, military song); folk and popular refrains tied to an immense 
song of the people, bring to play affects and nations, and molecularized 
refrains (the sea and the wind) tied to cosmic forces, the Cosmos refrain. For 
the Cosmos itself is a refrain, and the ear also (everything that has been taken 




Becoming-child (of music). 
 
Rain, raining, running, in rivers and in thick sheets, or in hushed continuity … An 
almost ceaseless rain, whose stubborn consistency seems to offer no hope of respite, 
makes the motionless, decelerated quality of time apparent. Time itself, merciless, 
unstoppable, repetitive. Yet, rain is not 'sad'. Its indifferent, rhythmical quality of a 
'whisper' has an almost meditative rhythm, which resists expectations of 
predetermined outcome. Is the rain more of a sound than vision? Or is it somehow a 
sound-image, a 'sheet wrapping the scene in textured translucency',
677
 falling in a 
variety of sounds: into puddles, on roofs, dripping from window sills. Rain is time, 
rain is the reign of time, and in rain, it is time that rains. Indifferent yet intensive. 
Tarkovsky's rain, as Adrian Chan observes, is a rain-event, rain falling, in light and 
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shadow, rain as sculpture, as a column of rain falling through a hole in the ceiling of a 
room: "Rain in Tarr is a sentimental field, a wash of mood, used to wipe the lens and 
the eye and to perpetuate a sentiment even and in spite of action developing within it. 
Rain is sublime, it arouses thought, and yet in many ways it suggests nothing, nothing 
at all."
678
 The expected meaning fleets through the cracks of old walls in a crystalline 
gesture of endless returns, or seeps away with the ceaseless motion. "I'm not attached 
to anything anymore" confesses Karrer's lover (Damnation) when talking about the 
rain's calming effect. Matter loses its static appearance and becomes an ensemble of 
dancing molecules. 
 
Tarr's black-and-white films boldly apply the consistency of stylistic and total unity, 
thus the worlds they present seem whole and even homogenous. It is however, a 
deceptive homogeneity as the consistency here lies in the intensity, which is never a 
function of quantity. The heterogeneity of the films comes from labyrinthine and non-
exhaustive potentialities of sound-images, even if the actual events often have the feel 
of total exhaustion.
679
 Stylistic and temporal consistency ('monotony') imply the 
heterogeneous unity, a 'whole' (without resolution), as if to pacify or hypnotise the 
senses. Intensified monotony creates the 'paralysing self-consciousness' – perhaps a 
sonic equivalent of Barthes’s punctum. It also pays attention to everyday, familiar 
sounds de-familiarising the expectations. Here, the 'pain' of enduring moves, however, 
from the subjective, personal loss/lack towards the 'abundance' of creation.  
   
Paradoxically, in the monotony of this world's sounds lies the possibility of another 
life, life as yet to come, one outside the pre-designated image (a destination), one of 
nomadic vision of being in becoming. This vision is present at the core of the films' 
wandering structure. It is their 'soul', and their ethics. It requires different 




A brilliantly evoked sense of entrapment, intercomposed with the theme of perpetual 
repetition, circling, 'going nowhere'; rain, repetitive music, and endless walks, create 
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at times a kind of vertigo. As if the music with its sentimental tones, as well as 
'otherworldly' sounds, was set to frustrate and provoke. The only way out of 
entrapment seems to be the 'rule' of tango: six steps forward, six steps back, and yet it 
is this that paradoxically captures the forces of "immaterial nonformal and energetic 
Cosmos."
681
 While the people of the farm might be locked in mute 
'reterritorialisations', which according to Deleuze and Guattari is "the most numbing, 
the most redundant" force or repetition,
682
 the persistent movement of the dance itself 
dislodges the numbing resignation. Relations take on a life of their own, forming 
rhythmic characters and melodic landscapes whose interrelations constantly shift and 
change. This is the movement of refrain that has been 'there' always as an active 
shaping including chaos's disorder force (the Natal), even in child's song which in the 
first instance is a point of order. The refrain of Estike's mute wonderings becomes the 
voiceover of her uncompromising deed as she lies down in the ruins' courtyard to 
become "all things" herself: "she knew she wasn't alone for all things and people, her 
father upstairs, her mother, her brothers, the doctor, the cat, these acacias, this muddy 
road, this sky, this night down here depend on her, just as she herself depends on 
everything" (Sátántangó). As if all movements and sounds co/existed, to paraphrase 
Yvette Biró, in the madness of poetic co-creation,
683
 "in the advent of a new form, 




Thus, the 'foolish' hope remains within the physical intensity of the world, in the 
ambient sounds intensified and foregrounded by their distinctive singularity of 
presence, and the 'heavenly harmonies' of the outside.
685
 This is in 'tune' with the 
ethics of creation and experimentation, always on the lookout for the way forward, 
different from the idea of progress, that allows, and indeed requires, backward 
movements, ellipses, waverings … As Ian Buchanan writes: "this is not an ethics that 
decides in advance how one ought to proceed, nor does it exercise either a power of 
judgment or selection; it is, rather, a creative, or experimental ethics, which is always 
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on the look-out for the way forward."
686
 It is thus becoming expressive of rhythm. It is 
a pattern of refrain as both repetition and stepping back, of hesitation. These are the 
forces of the mud and the rain, the sound of cowbells in the distance and the silence of 
the march, the forces of cosmic becoming that do not proceed towards the organising 
goal of harmony. It is a process of encounters, touching and separating, forming 
connections and disconnecting, resonating and 'dissonating', composing and 
decomposing; a countless, limitless state of potential movements/ compositions. It is a 
refrain that carries on the process of affirmative creation, and transgresses the 
hopelessness. Whenever bodies stagnate into static, formed, and domesticated 
'subjects', they break into dance.  
 
Dance in Tarr's films is everywhere, it never stops; folk dance, ritual dance, the manic 
dance of automatic movement, drunken dance, 'always on the move'. It has an 
ongoing formative activity, detaching or unfixing, reorganising the elements into new 
assemblages. 
 
Dance is Dionysian. It is life. 
 
In the Tango steps, what we hear is the litany of hope. The space is traversed, 
territorialised, and deterritorialised, constantly on the move. While the spider weaves 
the net around the space, the dancers' bodies break into fleeing lines, circling and 
rotating, chasing each other in the 'joyous' madness of momentarily becoming, even if 
it might be in the first instance perceived as a vicious Satan's Tango. These intensely 
present musical performances interrupt the narrative. Unaccounted for the 'real world' 
of the narrative, they enter into different 'unnatural' participations of metamorphosis, 
and provide the rhythmical sense of transformation and creativity. For a moment, in a 
dance, through an affective intensity, one that belongs to bodies as vectors of 




Becoming does not involve the imitation – an action that would merely reinforce 
social codes – but, as Amy Herzog put it, an unspecifiable, unpredictable disruption of 
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codes that takes place alongside, in a metamorphic zone between fixed identities.
688
 
The becoming-movement of dance dislodges the accepted norms and identities; 
becoming genderless, nomadic, and imperceptible … In the 'madness' of dance, all is 
unfixed: moral codes and aesthetic values. The bodies of dancers move by a desire to 
live, unconcerned with the consequences. Gestural, disjunctive, rhythmic movements 
happen in a series of involuntary jerks, variable speed relations and incorporeal lines – 
"Lilliputian hallucinations" as Deleuze and Guattari called them. Not representation 
but a movement of (inter)encounter, a fleeting moment of vibrating composition of 
shapes, gestures, volumes, and tonalities. This is a theatre that exceeds representation 
through vibrations, rotations, turnings, gravitations, dances of leaps that directly touch 
the body and the mind.
689
 As Herzog observes, becomings reassemble molar 
identities, the very specificity of the bodies, forming 'unnatural' unions that rupture, 
transect, and take flight from those stable positions. These combinations are neither 
genetic nor structural; 'they are interkingdoms, unnatural participations'.
690
 The 
woman is being pulled around in a dragging-like movement around the room, while 
her husband dances with a cheese bun on his forehead. Men waltzing with men, 
women with women, forming a line that moves in labyrinthine patterns and, breaking 
it up, a mass of bodies interacting with each other, with furniture, and with walls. The 
man outside a pub dances as if in a trance, stepping rhythmically in a puddle of rain. 
Exaggerated movements, re-intensified out of the monotone enveloping dancing 
bodies … chairs, objects, faces. "We know nothing about a body", Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, 
how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of 
another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange 
actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body."
691
 
And this is evident in both the hospital massacre in Werckmeister Harmonies and the 
pub dance in Sátántangó. The body in music, as Herzog proposes, posits another type 
of becoming, one that explores the limitations of corporeality, dissolves distinctions 
between interior and exterior, and forges new alliances between the bodies of living 
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beings, objects, and environments.
692
 The movement of bodies as if trying out, testing 
in different rhythms and intensities the neighbouring surfaces. In this sense, bodies of 
dancers operate as "privileged acualising machine" that allows a passage to the 
virtual. As such, their flight into dance provides a potentially disruptive force, a point 
of 'indiscernability', an ‘unhooking', a ‘discrepancy' of the action693, not as actual 
(opposition/reaction) but virtual creative transformation. Such is Tarr's films' 
transforming potential, the power of which lies not in the actual outcome, but in the 
sense of the 'imperceptible' real embedded in the aesthetics of life.  
 
What a lovely, colourful crowd. A party. 
Dance! 
Arms and legs, waists and shoulders working in harmony! 
The way they speak. Movements, glances that raise the dancer over earthly 
troubles. 
The young are so lovely! 
Believe me, there is nothing like finding one another, when there is music that 
warms the heart.  
Two hands clasped together, one foot senses where the other will step.  
And follows, not matter where the other steps.  
Because it believes they'll be flying from now on. From every swing and turn. 
Who knows? Perhaps … it is flying.694 
 
Every dance in Tarr's films is the result of the director's vision and actor's 
'spontaneous/chance interacting'. Two simultaneous movements, one towards 
dissolution, entropy, and death, and the other towards music and pleasure 'interfused' 




A circuit of embodiments and disembodiments, a passage of sensations 
through bodies – first extracted from bodily perceptions and affections, then 
rendered perceptible in the expressive matter of the artwork, then engaged by 
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embodied audiences swept up into the image, and then extended into an 




According to Deleuze and Guattari, it is in order to join with the forces of the future 
that one launches forth, hazards an improvisation. But to improvise is to join with the 
World, or meld with it.
697
 This is Nietzsche's 'tragic' dance, a "perpetually repeated 
series of dice throws."
698
 Becoming with the world, whatever form it takes, without a 
known outcome, is the characters' 'ethic' picked up and 'respected' by the films' 
aesthetic, a parable of grace, "that like the wind, blows where it will." The seeming 
nothingness as void in this context can be read not as a lack, but as a site of exchange 
where the encounters are not governed by a moral mandate, but by chance and 




It is this nomadic line that is mechanical, but in free action and swirling; it is 
inorganic, yet alive, and all the more alive for being inorganic. It raises 
"mechanical" relations to the level of intuition, Heads […] unravel and coil 
into ribbons in a continuous process; mouths curl in spirals. Hair, clothes … 
This straming, spiraling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish line of variation 
liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had 





Dance is a collective expression but one that 'forms' assemblages of singular bodies/ 
movements, together with textures, and ambience. A group dance in the pub, and the 
joyful performance of a man alone outside it; this kind of Bruegelian collectivity, 
quite different from the forced togetherness of the collectives, like those of the 
socialist regime's, is present throughout Tarr's films. This is the togetherness of 
everyday moments, of solitudes, hopes and deceits assembled together without a 
specific cause/goal. It is nearest to Deleuze's and Guattari's conception of collectivity 
as that which is not a given but something that must be produced, and that such a 
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functioning entity does not yet exist. It might be shaped through virtual force 'in 
spirit', in a 'respected' dignity of those who 'assemble' together, even if only to dance, 
dwelling momentarily alongside each other. The assemblages formed on the ruins of 
the fallen farm collectives, with all their deceit and moral void, are neither the 
condemned (post-communist) reality nor nostalgically mourned past, but perhaps the 
opportunity to begin anew. There is almost a feeling of gracefulness in the physicality 
of people's ragged appearance, in their awkward, somewhat out of place poses. 
Perhaps collectivity will never exist as a form of 'being', but always will in becoming, 
transforming, transgressing, experimenting. Not as collectivism but a unity of 
multiplicity as being in becoming.
701
 Such collectivity, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, is "Dividual"
702
, a phenomenon where multiple entities come into being and 
acquire a certain degree of cohesion and group identity, yet do so without dissolving 
and merging with one another: 'The people must be individuated, not according to the 





The power of transforming (metamorphosis) lies here not in a literal (actual) 
representation of a state of reality or in metaphysical transcendence, but in real/affect, 
actual and virtual. It would be a multiplicity of subjects who have a different 
sensibility, and experience life differently, 'genderless subjects of metamorphosis, a 
creative coupling of 'song' (of Dionysus/Ariadne), as Tasmin E. Lorraine calls it, 
outside of confinements of identity and gender.
704
 The metamorphosis of the unity of 
both, open to the multiplicity of becomings, has to create a genderless subject – the 
beyond-human life-form that is the overman. As such, the Dionysus-Ariadne subject 
can at each moment affirm the being of becoming as the unity of multiplicity with 
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nothing lacking. It is through nomadic movement that one can retain one's 
individuality; it is by leaving the molar identities of one's self and others behind that 
one can preserve one's own creative power. This model of subjectivity emerges 
through an encounter with the others transformed, a becoming in which a subject not 
only pursues her/his own line of flight, but also attends to how her/his line of flight 
implicates and forms a web with the lines of flights of others.'
705
 The 
Dionysus/Ariadne subject of becoming defies the Oedipal law of symbolic structure 
(of being), and 'creates' a different non-structure of encounter-event, or ethics of 
encounter. 
 
… the other rhythmic, evoking the deep, eternal breathing of the earth.706 
 
The earth in Tarr is 'over-humanised' somehow in a non-human sort of way, gathered 
together in a dance of bodies assembled with different movements and becomings – 
earthy and otherworldly, intense and imperceptible. Anamorphic rather than 
anthropocentric. 
 
The people will always be missing, Deleuze and Guattari (after Paul Klee) tell us – 
this is the nature of becoming, which is always in the process of being produced. Or it 
can only exist as a virtual (vision) that drives life, an immanence as process, outside 
ideology: realism or idealism, of the people as a nomadic assemblage of modes of 
lives, becomings (not identities) dwelling beside, transforming, transgressing, and 
transversing selves. There is a dispensation with the hero in place of 'unnamed', 
anonymous, imperceptible wanderer, the idiot-child, passive and visionary, that can 
accept and produce difference.  
 
Instead of the people and the earth being bombarded everywhere in a cosmos 
that limits them, the people and the earth must be like vectors of a cosmos that 
carries them away; then the cosmos itself will be art.
707
   
 
                                                 
705
 Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze, pp. 163-4. 
706
 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 339. 
707
 Ibid., p.346 
195 
 
Dance/Sound could also be the form of refrain that is linked to territory. The territory, 
which after being 'signed', proceeds towards deterritorialisation by a rhythmical 
crystality of refrain.
708
 Through rhythm's movement, the territory is never owned or 
identified, it is always re-created anew, outside structures of domesticity (homeland) 
in the domain of borderless milieu. In the way sound and vision interact, there is 
always a sense of space being shifted, (un)grounded, unstable, the any-space-whatever 
defined by the moving frame/border of the inside-outside embrace.  
 
The earth is this close embrace. This intense centre is simultaneously inside 
the territory, and outside several territories that converge on it at the end of an 
immense pilgrimage (hence the ambiguities of the "natal"). Inside or out, the 
territory is linked to this intense centre, which is like the unknown homeland, 





As bodies break into dance, language brakes into nonsensical musings. 
 
Dear Capitan, 
Eternity lasts forever because it doesn't compare to the ephemeral, the 
changeable, the temporary. The intensity of light penetrating darkness seems 
weakened. There is discontinuance … interruptions, holes, then finally the 
black nothing. There are myriads of stars in an unreachable distance … with a 
tiny spark in the middle …710 
 
The voiceover, heard in this particular example during the almost static shot of the 
pub entrance covered by night and rain – of the 'spider function' (vibrating with 
actual, resonating with virtual) – weaves in and out of situations, landscape, and 
characters. Sound and image come together in a hesitant (pondering) harmony of 
suggestion, or diverge into opposite directions, stretching to the past/future infinity of 
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time. Monotonous, and forever the eternal 'now'. This is the 'momentum' of the 
missing present enclosed momentarily in the voice of speech sound. 
 
Speech sound, or as Deleuze refers to it while discussing modern cinema, speech-act, 
is a concrete physical operation. A voice is the mother of all special effects, Chion 
writes, one that requires the least technology and expense.
711
 Not so much a special 
effect in a conventional sense, speech takes a special place in Béla Tarr films, as a 
character's speech/dialogue, or rather monologue, and as voice-over. Like other 
elements of his film-world, it does not communicate or symbolise, but rather 
participates in the weaving of the visionary/ distinct/unparalleled 'living-filmic' 
cosmic tapestry, which is never completed. It undoubtedly belongs to the category of 
the speech-act that Deleuze speaks about in Cinema 2. At times there is quite a lot of 
talking in Tarr's films, but it is in a very different voice to the mainstream narrative's 
dialogue or monologue. Unlike the 'talk' which carries the narrative, clarifies 
uncertain situations or reveals characters' psychology, the conversations of Tarr's 
characters are mostly singular and detached from, or only loosely attached to, the 
'progression' of the scenes or the demands of narration. Constellations of sayings, 
inexhaustible verbiage, multiple registers, even dialogues take on an independent, 
microscopic/molecular worlds of their own, disconnected from their communicative 
function, and unmoored from the visual image. Literal, indifferent, automatic, echoing 
Bresson's use of a character's voice, free-indirect speech (Deleuze, Pasolini), objective 
and subjective, not directed at anyone in particular, half narrating half 'philosophising' 
is also an important part of, as discussed earlier, free indirect style – discourse.712 A 
meandering exercise in voicing or wording, human speech here is 'a closed setting', 
and it resonates with the space. The doctor's dispassionate narration, the endless 
speechmaking exercises of Irimiás's false prophecies, the nonsensical verbiage of the 
drunken, repetitive soliloquy in Sátántangó, the cloakroom attendant's musings in 
Damnation, the recordings of Mr Eszter's theory of music. The literalness is 
'combined' with the poetic/philosophical content of the speech, having sometimes 
comic, sometimes 'rhetorical' effect, both creating a non-communicative, non-linear 
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and fragmentary/disjunctive 'performance' of its own. The dialogue situations also feel 
like exchange of monologues addressed to anyone or to no one, a "to-ing and fro-ing 
between speech and image', which has to invent their new relationship."
713
 As the 
camera remains inside the truck with the body of the whale, Valuska, who has just 
emerged from it, relates to the curious and anxious passer by: "A giant whale has 
arrived. This mysterious creature from the sea has come from far-off oceans. Most 
definitely you have to see it too. Nothing wrong with it. Just what a gigantic animal 
the Lord can create! How mysterious is the Lord … that He amuses Himself with 
such strange creatures" (Werckmeister Harmonies). In the background the crowd is 
awaiting – the mysterious Prince? The orders for upheaval? The ethereal speech-act 
creates the event, "but always placed crosswise over tectonic visual layers: there are 
two trajectories crossing each other."
714
 It creates the event, but in a space empty of 
events.' The 'nothing happens' of the audio (speech-act) and visual (empty space) non-
correspondence, reposition the sight/sound relationship in a way that "what speech 
utters is also the invisible that sight sees only through clairvoyance; and what sight 
sees is also the utterable uttered by speech." 
715
 The strange sense of a voice in 
Estike's mute 'ponderings' through the empty landscape while holding her dead cat, or 
through the woods at night, looking briefly in the pub's window where the dance 
breaks, evokes the solitary, heartless daze. But it also resonates with the muteness 
inherent in humankind’s capacity for language, its speechless dwelling in language, a 
poetic, pre-subjective state of potentiality – its infancy. 716 The speech-act and the 
empty space enter into non-rational relations – a 'rhythmic rapture' – not in the sense 
of juxtaposition but as 'aimless', non-decisive, wondrous movement that resists all 
forms of causal logic (narrative or montage).
717
 The speech act detaches itself from 
both the speaker and the receiver and passes into the rain, the peeling walls, the empty 
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[t]wo trajectories (the speech-act and the act of faith) are combined to make 
'struggle' comprehensible as emergence of the new: not a struggle between 
two trajectories, but a struggle which can only be revealed through the two, 




The speech is also a gesture, a figure of language, of change and of style that lodges 
itself between the still and movement, vision and sound, as well as between words. As 
Giorgio Agamben observed in Potentialities, the sense of these gestures is not 
exhausted in communication.
720
 It does not take place through language as medium, 
but in it. It is the musical, affective, non-signifying side of language.
721
 Gesture is 
always a gesture of being at a loss in language, a 'gag' logged in the muteness inherent 
in humankind's very capacity for language (speechless dwelling in language).
722
 The 
Bressonian voice of the model in modern cinema, where the character speaks as if he 
were listening to his own words reported by someone else, might be comparable to 
the figures of Commedia dell'arte who, as Agamben reminds us, "emancipated from 
written texts and fully defined roles, oscillate forever between reality and virtuality, 
life and art, the singular and the generic."
723
 The speech in Tarr's films is not one that 
has 'lost its gesture'. Partly poetical, partly philosophical musings, often comic and 
tragic at the same time, this is not the overwording that would either reject or mourn 
the gesture (silent film). It is rather, as Kristeva would have it, a poetic distortion, 
gestural, disjunctive and rhythmic immanence of asemiotic elements that "calls into 
question all that is central to representation", and thus creates new possibilities for the 
future of language and image.
724
 In its subjectless indirectness it becomes an 'image' 
of potentiality, where the mystery of gesture is initiated into life itself (through the 
'comical' speeches of the false prophets or the nonsensical verbiage of drunken 
monologues), 'life purely worldly, purely earthly, purely contingent' where the sacred 
and profane loose their linguistic power: 
 
Now life is a sacred domain, the only one that remains. And into what does it 
initiate? Not into its meaning, only into itself. Into something that, in its 
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incarnation in beauty, pain, and enigmas, constantly borders on meaning 
without ever uttering it and while remaining unnameable. […] the fact that life 
is assigned this force of initiation gives rise to something new, a mystery of 




In the nearly torturous waiting for 'something to happened', the becoming expressive 





… the difficult birth of a new world, under the double forceps of words and 
things, speech-act and stratified space. It is a conception of history which 
simultaneously calls up the comic and the dramatic, the extraordinary and the 




Furthermore, the speech-act of this (modern) cinema, as Deleuze argues in Cinema 2, 
is no longer inserted in the linkage of actions and reactions, but turns on itself; it is no 
longer a dependent on, or a part of the visual image. The 'speech-act becomes an act 
of story-telling, the political of story-telling', "neither an impersonal myth nor a 
personal fiction but a collective utterance" where becoming passes between "the 
people" who are missing and the "I" of the author who is now absent, releasing an 
utterance that expresses the impossibility of living under domination.
728
 Similarly to 
Kafka's use of language, it could be the act of resistance in overcoming the resistance 
of the dominant text: 'the pre-established laws and the already decided verdicts'.
729
 "I 
cling to nothing but everything clings to me … They want me to look at them. To 
look at the hopelessness of things … And they want this irreversibility of things to 
drive me mad but the next second they want me not to go mad … I wanted to know if 
it made sense to speak at all," pronounces Karrer in the indifferent, unchanging 
voice.
730
 Or is Beckettian: the comic dialogue in Sátántangó, when Petrina tells his 
crooked companion Irimiás that he is a poet: "We relate to it as twigs to the rain: we 
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cannot defend ourselves" (Irimiás), "Twigs … and rain? You are a great poet, I tell 
you" (Petrina); or the bombastic speech Irimiás gives over Estike's body. The tragi-
comic tone of Sátántangó lies in the nearly absurd disjointment of the speech-acts 
with the 'narrative', which confuses and reverses the intentions and the expectations. 
As Deleuze observed in Cinema 2: 
 
 'it is no longer enough to say that the speech-act must be torn from what is 
resisting it: it is the speech-act which is resisting, it is the act of resistance. 
[…] The act of speech and music is a struggle: it must be economical and 
sparse, infinitely patient, in order to impose itself on what resists it, but 




The free-indirect discourse breaks off from visual logic of the image becoming-event 
of audio-visual resistance. The voice/speech of such autonomous character is no 
longer part of a whole (as in an out-of-field situation); it has broken free from its 
mooring with the visual images, has lost its omnipotence, it has become questionable, 
uncertain, ambiguous.
732
 The relation between the disarray of entropic, or mundane 
everydayness, and the 'eloquence' of speech, as if in need to "say itself." 
 
The [sound-image] event is always resistance, between what the speech-act 
seizes and what the earth buries. It is a cycle of sky and earth, of external light 
and underground fire, and even more of the sound and the visual, which never 
re-forms into a whole, but each time constitutes the disjunction of the two 
images, at the same time as their new type of relation, a relation of very 




Sometimes voices are at a crossroads: between diegetic and non-diegetic, between 
dialogue and narration, habitually adopting the position of the powerless – but not 
'passive – observers of the characters and events.734 There are a lot of moments in 
Tarr's films where it is not clear who the 'voice' belongs to, the character of the 
'narrator', either through the camera focusing on the space where the voice is heard 
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but not seen (as in the shot of beer glasses in Damnation), or by the foreground and 
background voices being confused. This is another kind of refrain-chorus, or what 
Deleuze and Guattari call "destratifying transversality", in tune with Tarr's use of non-
actors and characters that are visionaries, perhaps storytellers, but not heroes or 
commentators. 
 
The voice comes from the other side of the image. One resists the other, but it 
is in this always re-created disjunction that the history under the ground takes 
on an emotional aesthetic value, and that the speech-act towards the sun 




What links sound and image is the aesthetic resistance. 
 
In the same way the monotonous, feeling/freeing music composed by Vig shifts from 
sentimentality to open form of affective transformation, capable of 'provoking' new 
assemblages and new modes of 'existence'. A repeated tune is heard, composed with 
few 'notes' and instruments, intense and somehow stretched over a vast array of 
responses, from reassuring, lullaby-like, to a more disquieting form.  
 
In classical antiquity and through the Renaissance, as Edward Lipman explains, music 
was closely allied with the disciplines of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, and 
the concept of the 'harmony of the spheres', which links music to cosmology. For 
Pythagoreans, the kosmos was a word, which 'united the notion of order, arrangement 
or structural perfection with that of beauty'. In the Pythagorean cosmology, the 
unlimited, formless, boundless, and chaotic flux, which precedes the cosmos, was 
transformed into the universe of form, order, proportion, and wholeness. The 
macroscopic whole and time is made regular through its subjugation to the periodic 
repetition of the same. … Order requires a subjection of the many to the one, and the 
other to the same. As Lippman observes, the entire Platonic enterprise may finally be 
conceived of as a form of music. "The musician creates harmony in the pitch and 
duration of tone and in gesture; man creates harmony in the conduct of his life, the 
statesman creates harmony in society; the Demiurge creates harmony in the cosmos; 
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the philosopher creates the harmony of dialectic and the music of discourse."
736
 In the 
Platonic sense, music is a mere sensual echo of the more significant music of 
mathematics. The 'establishment' of high (order) and low (disorder) forms of music 
developed accordingly. Following this, it could be argued that the whole 'structure' of 
Werckmeister Harmonies, and the 'logic' of a single theme in Tarr's other films, is 





What Michály Vig does with his compositions is something 'equally' outside the 
harmony Eszter looks for, and of the chaos encroaching the town. His 'cosmic' 
harmony of 'earthy' compositions, resonating with Tarr's material vision, closes the 
gap between heavenly and earthly, high and low, as 'actualised' in the breathtaking 
opening scene of Werckmeister Harmonies, when the music joins Valuska (and the 
film) walking away into the night; or in the 'composition' of the slow, searching 
camera movement over the 'inexpressive' faces in the pub's doorways, and the rainy 
textures of the walls, replaying them over and over again to the 'rhythm' of intensely 
'moving' music.
738
 Becoming expressive of rhythm … 
 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that music is an open structure that permeates and is 
permeated by the world, and the relationship between the cosmos and music is not 
mechanical and mathematical, but is machinic and rhythmical.
739
 When music 
deterritorialises the refrain and becomes cosmic,  
 
Vig's music does not represent or illustrate the 'harmony' or 'disharmony of cosmos'. It 
is intertwined with the cosmos, which is a 'living thing', not a circumscribed totality, 
but an open whole (whose dimensions can never be given as such). It is far from the 
abstract mathematical forms of classical music, leaning instead towards the popular, 
almost verging on the sentimentality of an easy, catching, melodic tune. Neither 
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perfectly ordered nor completely popularised, his melodic sounding weaves the 
(re)dissonant thread of expression in between harmony and disorder, inside and 
outside. The music and the refrain in the crystal serialization of oppositions of 
interchanging roles, monotonous heaviness already seeded with the desire to fly, Vig's 
musical complexity is to be found in the molecular domain of transverse becomings, 
what Bogue described as the "ametrical rhythms of the incommensurable and the 
unequal"
740
 (of music and the world). Both 'timeless' and intensely rhythmical, it is 
music that carries the expression of the eternal return of difference, the floating time 
of haecceities and becomings. His music has no melodic or harmonic arc that would 
allow the listener to anticipate the moment of coming to cadence.
741
 The monotonous 
repetitiveness seems 'constant', without beginning and without end, and yet endowed 
with what Yvette Biró described as intensely "palpable sense of musical freeness."
742
 
It is the rhythm that creates a sense of 'up and down' but in an open structure. Here the 
sound offers no temporal vectors (it does not vary over time), and as such can 
contribute to a feeling of fixity, stagnation, or destruction.
743
 This particular condition 
of music, comparable to the repetitive, hypnotic state of 'dreaming', is the opening to 
the outside – to unconscious, 'unbinding', becoming porous that is a condition for a 
more intensive feeling, affect beneath the hallucination of senses. This evokes a kind 
of schizophrenic experience of becoming-transition: 'For schizophrenics experience 
these naked intensities in a pure and almost unendurable state: beneath the 
hallucinations of the senses ("I see", "I hear") and the delirium of thought ("I think"), 
there is something more profound, a feeling of intensity, that is, a becoming or a 
transition ("I feel")'.
744
 This politics of life/poetry is exactly in tune with Tarr's artistic 
sensibility and his 'earthly' philosophy. The sound-image of music draws out the 
"polyphonic" nature of contingency, while the strategies of repetition (thriving on 
their own repetitions) form "ritornello," what Félix Guattari noted as the immanent 
musical metaphor par excellence, and which as he observes, "escapes beyond the 
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strictly defined limits of space-time. With it time cases to be external so that it can 




'Cosmic music' is not the harmonious, heavenly ideal but the polyphonic assemblage 
of becoming (life's expressions). Immanent variations on a theme … The music acts 
as a kind of 'amnesiac' catalyst, which allows for forgetting/remembering, creating 
difference. This references the anti-Oedipal, non-familial remembering (remembering 
that is forgetting). No longer my childhood, my home, my past, but any childhood, 
home, past, life, whatever; an orphaned un/consciousness, which enables us to create 
anew instead of repeating the same (acting from the individual, historical 'past's' point 
of view), any image-whatever, enfolded in fugal 'insignificance'.
746
 There is a kind of 
(dis)familiarity of music in all Tarr's films that seems to be playing on the sense of it 
being heard elsewhere, in another film. Each of his films has its own 'soundtrack', and 
yet one cannot help but feel that the same tune has been used again. Here, the very 
fine line between the rhythms of each film carries on the gap, the opening to, what can 
be called, the 'forgetting-now'. This is a stylistic and ethical choice: a poetic 





The music has the structure of a refrain, although there is no direct 'representation' of 
it. It acts as a carrying a force of becoming rather than interpolating any specific 
meaning or message. According to Deleuze and Guattari, music takes up the refrain as 
'content' in a form of expression, "forms a block within it, and takes it somewhere."
748
 
Refrain as repetition, forming connections and assemblages, becomes a catalyst to 
new, unfamiliar, unpredictable 'melodies'; it is not the repetition of the same. As an 
'element' in becoming, it is the repetition produced as a consequence of 'passing' time, 
even in its eternal stillness. Freed from its structural and symbolic impediment, it is 
always a repetition of the new. Because of the time unhinged from 'temporality', 
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nothing can ever be repeated as the same. Whatever comes back is never the same. 
This is strongly sensed throughout the many repetitions of the films' choreography, 
particularly in the emotional 'newness' of repeating scenes. In Werckmeister 
Harmonies, when Valuska leaves his place, first 'followed' by the gaze of Lajos, and 
then again by the gaze of his wife who does not know that her husband is dead, or in 
Sátántangó where we see Estike's face in the pub's window during the dance, when 
the encounter between her and the doctor is repeated again. The refrain's 'newness' 
depends on the contacts and connections it enters, or rejects to enter, on its process of 
pulsating, and vibrating resonances. In Tarr, the repetitive 'melody' exists in relation 
to the spaces, characters, moods, and weather, as an active and creative operation. It 
enters into various 'tones', and intensities of encounters creating rhythms of life open 
to the earthy existences and the cosmic forces.  
 
Rhythm and refrain are in a perpetual chase – creation of the new, nomadic 'escape' – 
a fleeting moment of an unattainable 'goal', a progression towards no result, the joy of 




The seeming entropic disarray of Tarr's films is only a hopeless 'disorder' when 
viewed against the 'macrocosmic' order of celestial cycles (a periodic repetition of the 
same). Underneath that, however, on the surface of 'time' the molecular becomings 
and haecceties are pulsating in a-metrical rhythms of life. Melodies, counterpoints, 
harmonies, refrains … Monotonous, repetitive, and hypnotic quality of music, 
avoiding any reference to subjects, consciousness, or cognition, suggests that the 
cosmic refrain produces itself and is its own explanation.
750
 It has a power to escape 
or resist the confinements (order or disorder) of definition. However unpredictable 
and elusive music – and films – are, they are nevertheless powerful forces that, when 
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actively engaged with, can provoke transformation, disrupting and destabilizing 
unified models of time, space and identity. 
  
While the image 'tends' to everyday chores, the thickness of the 'atmosphere', and 
changes in the weather, the 'soundtrack' music carries on the role of the voice-over. 
Banal and hopeless, in it's monotonous consistency, the music seems to be stripped of 
its taste, colour, and impulse – this is far from the opposite of heavenly. It lacks, as 
Biró reminds us, even the majesty of pain and suffering. It is merely a vegetative state 
where living forms take in and unload, empty and decrease, only to slowly fade into 
this life-forsaken void.
751
 The 'obvious' level of films' reality' might invite such 
interpretations. The stylistic power of ('eternally repeated') expression, however, 
endows the films with something much more unsettling than the opposition of hell 
and heaven, order and disorder. It demands the ethical revaluation, forgetting … 
Creative blindness. Unremembering. Severalty (Margherite Duras). It is not the 
'reality' of the image that is there to be re-evaluated but the already a priori perception 
of the viewer. 
 
Vig's 'soundtrack' music is indifferent to the situation/ image, but not in the same way 
as the didactic counterpoint or dispassionate understanding of an idea. It is 
intentionally emotional (affective) but not emphatic, its 'power' coming from engaging 
the immediate, profound, and archaic impetus bypassing reading or interpretation. It 
comes and disappears in the rhythm of audio-visual 'demand'. Michel Chion calls this 
kind of music 'anempathetic', and suggests, referring to the sense of loss, that its 
indifference is 'always the mother's indifference.'
752
 However, if we look at it from 
'films-life's' point of view, a life that is outside familia(l)r constrains, a life of desire 
'haunted' not by a lack, but by what Virginia Woolf called a 'lust of creation'
753
, 
'indifference' takes on a different 'meaning': that of affective tension beyond the 
mirror reflecting our own (subject's, or viewer's) solitude. The end of Damnation, 
when Karrer 'dances' with dogs or Estike's (Sátántangó) 'escape' by poisoning her cat 
and then herself, for example, are filmed without music. The 'indifference' here might 
be that of art which makes us un-human, where the tragic or comic, good or evil no 
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longer 'obeys' the rules of redemptive self-identification but asks, "what am I capable 
of?", "what is my body capable of?"
754
 The indifference of this music is the base or 
plane from which all emotions derive: a kind of affective chorus that intensifies rather 
than clarifies. Thus, anempathetic music, in a way, consists in a reframing: instead of 
occupying the whole field with the individual fate of the character, this music allows 
us to 'see' in the background the 'indifferent' world of potentiality. In a number of 
interviews Tarr very strongly emphasised his desire not to suggest or elucidate 
anything, but to leave the work of 'listening' to the viewer.
755
 The carefully 
anonymous sentimentality of the music's cues that seem at first to clothe the 
individuals' stories in emotion progressively peel off from the characters and pursue 
its own path, indifferent to the characters' fates.
756
 The mesmerising reticence
757
 
wanders between the spaces, characters, and situations, then breaks off from specific 
characters or events, becoming the music of everyone, which is to say the music of no 
one in particular. This is achieved through the use of music cues without cultural 
pretensions or complicated orchestration.
758
 Here Vig's compositions, often created 
before filming, are in tune with the director's ethos of transgressing the boundaries of 
art/ film beyond the national or (one)cultural scope. Echoing Béla Bartók's 
Mikrokosms and Hungarian poet's Endre Ady compositions that embrace both the 
local and universal, it can be argued that the films' rhythm and their music take on the 
form of a deterritorialising refrain.  
 
We are the men who are always late, 
we are the men who come from far away. 
… 
We are the men who are always late. 
We are never on time with our success, 
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our dreams, our heaven, or our embrace. 




Deleuze and Guattari write that the refrain as differential, an incommensurable 
rhythm passing between milieus and territories, has a life of its own; "a nonorganic 
life that functions only as a creative line of flight; an autonomous, deterritorializing 
transverse vector of invention."
760
 It is the becoming-expressive of rhythm or melody 
as its own explanation, which resonating with the vital forces of life, dislodges the 
sound/image harmony/wholeness of viewing. The soundtrack music in Werckmeister 
Harmonies accompanies the 'emptiness', the 'nothing happens'; carrying the rhythm of 
the nonfamiliar/l refrain. This 'nomadic' refrain enclosed in the 'palpable sense of 
music freeness',
761
 different form 'heavenly' music of Eszter's theoretical convictions, 
incarnates a different belief based on the cosmic harmony of (dis)order. Similarly 
perhaps to Deleuze and Guattari's proposition of the nonOedipal 'structure' of 
'unfamiliar/l' becomings – of the 'self-other'.  
 
"When music cries, […] it is the whole of nature which cries with it. Truly speaking, 
it does not introduce these feelings in us; it introduces us rather into them, like the 
passers-by that might be nudged in a dance."
762
 It is somewhere between the crying 
out and the song that we can hope to find the movement of becoming that will carry 
us beyond ourselves. 
 
Before providing emotional resonance for a film, music is first and foremost a 
machine for manipulating space and time, which it helps to expand, contract, freeze, 
and thaw at will. The music embraces the spectator, envelopes him/her within its 
rhythms and tones; physical, tangible, 'heavy’. Like the visual depth of field (as 
discussed in previous chapter) which is an immanent space of memory, musical depth 
of sound is the space-time of affect. Writing on Tarr's imagery in 'Confined Space', 
Yvette Biró points out that the large, vacant places and overcrowded backgrounds, 
underlined with the almost monophonic music from a sorrowful harmonica, lay 
emphasis upon the similar state of mind: loneliness, abandonment, and despairing 
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solitude. This sporadic but obstinately returning music, writes Biró, becomes part of 
the space; it fills it up, makes it more saturated, adding weight to it. One could say 
that it works as a third dimension, suggesting volume as well as surface, or 'depth of 
field', as if it were an architectural substance and tension. Quoting Oliver Sacks, she 
argues that music can appear as a ‘three-dimensional container, a vessel … a 
subdivided internal space … therefore it can exert such an emotional hold over 
people."
763
 It does more: it provides a 'space' for what Deleuze called 'the weak 
connections and floating events'
764
; an open, 'raw' (affective) space of everlasting 
rhythm, which by its repetitive sameness (actual) allows for the shaping/ moulding of 
difference (the virtual). Form and content is entwined to the point of imperceptible 




The space that sound defines is not the same as the one constructed by the image. 
Even though it is so full of detail, and even though it is polyphonic, the sound is not 
'contained' in the space.
766
 In Damnation, the sound of moving coal buckets stretch 
time and space, or slow time and stretch space. The sound helps to restore the 
impression of 'vastness', going beyond the confinement of the town. It becomes a 
nomadic landscape, a desert that frees the space from its circumscription – it takes on 
the role of 'time', which forms space, which is style.  
  
The melodic landscape is no longer a melody associated with a landscape; the 
melody itself is a sonorous landscape in counterpoint to a virtual landscape. 
Expressive qualities entertain variable or constant relations with one another. 




Off-screen sound points to an elsewhere. According to Chion, the rarity of active off-
screen sound (peripheral ambience, birds, crowd noise, etc.) gives sound a doubly 
centripetal function: in space, by posing questions whose answers lie within the 
image, and in time; because no sounds function as anticipation or prolongation.
768
 In 
Tarr’s work the off-screen sound has a kind of teasing force of ambiguity. While the 
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lack of active off-screen sounds keeps attention within the image (here the moving 
bodies of sound in space transform the temporal flow into spatial blocks, planes, and 
volumes
769
), the use of discrepancy between sound and image – where we hear the 
conversation but do not see its source, for instance – points to elsewhere. The clean, 
crisp quality of pool balls that 'de-emphasise' the conversations in the bar 
(Damnation), or the voice of the Prince we never see in Werckmeister Harmonies, the 
muted ringing of the bells in Sátátangó … are only few examples. Sometimes the 
camera proceeds so slowly that we can almost 'hear' its movement. The way in which 
the sound is 'famed' in relation to the image creates the sense of displacement: a slight 
disorientation. 
 
Michel Chion defines the visual shot as a container, or frame (a container of time and 
space with definite spatial and temporal borders), and sound as first of all content or 
"containable," with no actual frame.
770
 Within the frame, the flow of images is 
punctuated by breaks that allow us to segment the film into "shots," while the film's 
sound is not framed. Independent of the image, the sound feels like a formless audio 
layer.
771
 This absence of a frame for sound creates a dissymmetry between what we 
see and what we hear; forming an irrational cut. In Tarr's films, the long shots and the 
movable frames within them create a sense of formlessness within the relationship 
between sound and image, which puts them in a different (to editing) relation, 
bringing about rhythmical themes of process within and between the actual frames. In 
this way, sound and image have to be de-framed against each other. As Deleuze 
writes: 
 
"a sound framing will be defined by the invention of a pure act of speech, of 
music, or even of silence, which must be extracted from the audible given 
continuum in noises, sounds, words and pieces of music. […] the sound image 
has shaken off its own dependency [like in the image it is dependency on the 
world]; it has become autonomous, has mastered its own faming. The 
externality of the visual image as uniquely framed (out-of-field) has been 
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replaced by the interstice between two framings, the visual and the sound, the 




Thus the sound, although non-containable within the frame, has a specific function (a 
style) in constructing, together with image, the space-time of attention (thinking). The 
long shots of people walking with the sounds of footsteps, floating leaves, circling 
rubbish, and rain, envelope the sensuality of the viewing body, no longer certain what 
is vision and what is sound. It is not so much the 'content' of the off-screen sound 
(conversation, distant voice) that is important but the rhythm and the passing of time. 
Simple sounds such as the striking of a clock bell create "temporal vectors"
773
 
(oriented in the direction from present to future). They might seem outside of time but 
they are each a tiny story that indicates the irreversible direction in which time is 
flowing. At the same time, these periodic sounds mark time itself; time that takes on a 
life of its own, independent of the story or the characters, 'progressing' towards de-
psychologising and de-rhetorisation. In addition to sounding, the clocks in 
Sátántangó, by showing different times (at the same time), exaggerate the timeless 
time, and point to its 'non-one-directional' flow. An ametrical, staggered time of 
variable intensities; an active, germinal time of flux, a circular and reversible time in 
which beginning and end are confused; the elusive, fluctuating time of becoming. It 
thus shifts the narrative from historical to any-time-whatever, and the story to any-
story-whatever; a tale celebrating the time of becoming, the hope that is no longer 
personal, or even human, but living. Sounds embody the non-psychological temporal 
continuum in which the characters exist. They demarcate the temporal "container" of 
the characters' actions, but do not become personalized or an agent of action.
774
 They 
are neither symbolic nor anthropomorphic. 
 
Through its musicality, the spectacle keys into the durations of the everyday, 
transforming them into suspended refrains. These refrains, like a cracked 
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crystal, lay bare the strata of the past contained in the present, while rending 




The woman singing in a bar in Damnation fills the whole space of the screen with the 
voice of the song. Approaching the magic of vocality, the voice of the singer has the 
power of inhabiting an entire given space, where the verbal structure of the song is 
broken down, acquiring the flow of an unrelenting sense of exodus. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, 'the sentimental or subjective element of the voice internally 





Music here not only fills the need to subjectively enlarge the cinematography's narrow 
frame and provide a wider mental space for the experience,
777
 but opens the space to 
cosmic, depersonalised forces of affect. The velvety, longing voice of the singer, 
caressing the space, prolongs the 'desire' to escape, while the saxophone's husky 
tonality encloses the space. The image and sound enter into the repetitive crystalline 
coexistence of the refrain; exchanging places, resonating with and away from each 
other and the outside. It leaves the image unresolved, suspended somehow; not 
allowing itself to be understood, positioned or explained. Only filled by the vague 
certainty of freedom resonating with the singer's/ lover's earlier pronouncement of 
'escape'. Like the song that is "like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm 








The absence of sound plays equally fundamental role in Tarr's films, in the 
construction and intensification of visual images and as an independent element of the 
composition. Sometimes the sound and image exchange their places so to speak, 
moving in the direction of the imperceptibility (or 'inaurality') of silence. The silence, 
as Chion points out, can take on different meanings. In most of the films, the silence 
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surrounding whispering or restrained voices leads us to sense the presence of a space 
that's listening; on the alert.
780
 In Tarr's films, the impermeability between one sound 
and another seems to affirm the opposite idea that the world is not listening to 
humanity. Here, to draw on Chion's examples, the emptiness around sound is not 
enchanted with supernatural ears, as with Lynch, nor is it metaphysical as with 
Kieslowski.
781
 It is just emptiness, which is not that of existential void but that which 
accepts/ affirms a cosmic space of 'indifference'. The nothing waiting to happen. 
Silence offers neither psychical nor transcendental relief – it can be thought of as 
sound. 
Stripping down a soundtrack is just as important as making it dense and sonically 
rich. A key sequence in Werckmeister Harmonies, in which the hospital is ransacked 
and its patients dragged out of beds, the shot proceeds without sound. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the random muffled sounds of overturning beds creates a scream; the 
scream of 'suppressed' vulnerability that is so hard to bear and has nothing to do with 
psychological 'wounding' or emphatic identification. Creating a 'doubly ambiguous 
paradox', the scream becomes silence. As the random muffled sounds 'gag' the scream 
along with the movement, there is a much confusing sense that the whole scene 
progresses in complete 'silent stillness'. It is a 'pure' affect, a gap(e) that lingers on the 
verge of endurance, an 'unexplained' absence of sound, neither leading towards, nor 
resolving. The image screams without a voice, a step further from Tarkovsky's 
stammering at the beginning of the Mirror (1975). Like the receding colour of 
Munch's painting, there is an aural 'zone of indetermination'. 
 
Image's physicality – earthy, material, gravitational weight, and music's physicality – 
cosmic, virtual, floating … resonance. Sound is not closed off to the service of the 
narrative or meaning; it further opens up the space into the cosmic, eternal becoming, 
into nomadic w(a)onderings. Rather than sensation being projected onto a calm, 
material surface, the material rises up into a 'metaphoric' (virtual) plane of forces,
782
 
rendering audible the inaudible forces imperceptibly. And affects silently. These 
'forces' are not heard in the sound itself, but through it, as the sound enters into a 
disjunctive non-relation with vision and text/ word. This is different from the 'vague', 
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embracing emotion of identification or 'dreaming fantasy permitted for such occasion 
(film viewing). It demands a particular attention and engagement without easy clues 
or familiar signposts. The work that foregrounds or abounds with excess invites us to 




Rhythm overarches the seemingly chaotic nature of the world/ image, in the 
consistent, unchanging flow of time (Aion), the order without ordering.
784
 This is not 
the already ordered harmony of the heavens but the pulsating force of the earth – the 
surface of the world open to cosmic space in immanent co-existence. Speech, dance, 
and silence, interpenetrate (with) the world; "whimsically mnemonic," poetic 
composition. Hanging over the earth, "speaking through intersecting frowns and 
furrows and falls, the earth's expression, […] the mysteriously unruly return of 
rhythms that allow the human subject to seek out his identity with this world … "785  
   
Between improvising and composing, materiality and immateriality, body and mind, 
the rhythm is not a question of measure, which implies a repetition of the same: a pre-
existing, self-identical pattern that is reproduced over and over again. As Deleuze and 
Guattari point out, it is "the Unequal or Incommensurable, always in a process of 
transcoding," operating "not in a homogeneous space-time, but with heterogeneous 
blocks."
786
 Thus, rhythm is difference, or relation – the in-between. It is an ametrical 
ordering, an overarching style – a form of life. It does not define or represent life but 
creates from in-between – when the coded milieu is threatened by exhaustion. This is 
what is: a becoming, a process, a constant change, and dance … A state of being in 
becoming. Therefore, it is impossible to predict from a standpoint of the familiar/l 
milieu. The future is in-becoming, in a state of could have been and yet to come. A 
simultaneous too-late and too-soon, the rhythm/ time.  
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Rhythm is a creation of life and art – it is also a creation of style. This is the rhythm of 
films: the rhythm of footsteps, of the length of shots, of falling rain, the slow tempo of 
the 'drowned out' waltz. Rhythmic wa(o)nderings: territorialized and deterritorialized 
'reality' to the 'sound' of tango steps in the process of "productive repetition that has 
nothing to do with reproductive measure."
787
 That is why it is impossible to accept the 
'concept' of negative dialectics of oppositions where the rhythm is concerned. There 
has always been, and always will be, a crack: an in-between from where the new and 
unfamiliar, the anarchic other will be smuggled in. In Tarr's films, the rhythm goes 
against the 'eternal return' feeling of characters hopelessness, it seem to suggest the 
return of the new in the creative construction of the any-image-whatever, open to the 
future. 
 
What chaos and rhythm have in common, Deleuze writes, is the in-between – between 
two milieus, rhythm-chaos or chaosmos: "Between night and day, between that which 
is constructed and that which grows naturally, between mutations from the inorganic 
to the organic, from plant to animal, from animal to humankind, yet without this 
series constituting a progression …"788 In this in-between, chaos becomes rhythm. In 
the same way the style, and rhythm sustain 'hope' in Tarr's films, with(in) and out of 
chaos. It is the belief of life as continuously changing process in itself, entirely 
different from the belief in external causes based on theological doxa. 
 
Rhythm is the Unequal or the Incommensurable that is always undergoing 
transcoding.
789
 Being opposite to dogmatic, it is critical; it ties together critical 
moments, it changes direction.  
 
Tarr's films require attention, patience, and a 'simplicity' of willingness to let go of the 
learned, accepted formulae, in order to 'understand/feel/get' their complex visuality 
and 'theme'. As he points out in the interview: " … don't think too much, just listen. … 
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Just listen for the details."
790
 It is the faith in the viewer's sensibility and intelligence 
that also resonates with Béla Bartók's hope for the responsiveness of listener.
791
  
For Tarr, filmmaking is the process, and a large part of it is 'listening' for the 
atmosphere, the personalities of the actors, the personalities of the locations, and the 
actual, real people living there. It is more about creating the situation, with all 
elements. 
 
The sounds in his films allow for that space of 'listening to film', just as their long 
takes allow for 'being in film'. There is no longer a need to differentiate between 
sound and vision. Sensations, as Gregg Redner observed through Deleuze, "are 
coupled together like "wrestlers" and form a "combat of energies" from which is 
extracted an ineffable, essence, a resonance, an epiphany erected within the 
closeworld."
792
 Through an incredible physicality (visual and audible) of their worlds, 
the films envelop the viewer into an enhanced state of sensual reception into, to 
borrow Angelopolous's expression, listening to their hearts beating.
793
 Tarr's cinema is 
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 Fleeing Poetics or Ontology of Becoming: an Aesthetico-Ethical 
 Experiment in Thought. Becoming Artist-Child of Philosophy. 
 
 
To live in the world but outside of existing conception of it. 




The cinema must film, not the world but belief in this world, 
our only link … 




Creating isn’t communicating but resisting … 
Creation takes place in choked passages. 






Belá Tarr's "pure optical and sound situation", 'scrambles' emotions, defies the logic 
of habitual seeing, and thus thinks. Difficult, not in terms of what it shows but how it 
intuits, and unique in the stubborn resistance of 'what is', it forges the 'true' image-
world.
797
 Tragedy mingles with comedy, pathos with humour, the material with the 
ephemeral, in a teasing quality of the 'nothing happens' – the real. Neither the question 
of politics nor morality, the image-world becomes; never the same with each viewing. 
No hidden meanings, no answers or messages; what is seen is what it is, and nothing 
more than that – a vision. A vision, on the other hand, as it will become apparent later 
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in the discussion, is not of 'what is' – a perception – but a complex inter-relation of 
attention and intuition; networks of perception and imagination that create points of 
view, and that can produce different relations and configurations, that is, an affect-
thought. Difficult image: A "fact image"? An aesthetic mode of existence perhaps. 
'Pathological clinging to life'? 
 
The question is no longer what we see behind an image but rather, how we 




How thus can we engage with, or endure, the long staring shots of peeling walls, the 
endless walks leading nowhere, with everyday quotidian 'sameness' stretched to 
impossibility, with the outbursts of insane dances breaking out of 'the narrative'. 
Outside the logic of common sense, and outside the habit of expectations. How is it 
possible to find a language for the images – impossible to analyse or interpret – which 
can only be sensed and felt: lived with intensely and unknowingly? Furthermore, how 
can we engage with such an image by having to renounce the a priori of thinking, the 
mode of a discourse, and a desire to make sense? How is it possible to write this 
enduring encounter, so 'familiar' and yet so unknown? How is this impossibly 
reciprocal 'encounter/ event' possible? 
 
"Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears", writes 
Deleuze. The belief in this world, on the other hand, can only be discovered and 
restored by certain imagery whose power, like that of modern cinema - "when it stops 
being bad" -  "lies in the affective and conceptual expressing without the need for 
language, before and beyond words."
799
  According to Deleuze, 
 
[w]e do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We 
lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in 
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This would be a question of an aesthetics of affect-thought. 
 
Starting with the proposition that belief in this world is an aesthetic phenomenon, it 
might be possible to think about life, art/ image, and thinking not in terms of a 
discourse but in relation to the ethics of immanence, where not the search for truth but 
"an affirmation of a world in process" would provide the model. As Deleuze writes: 
 
It is first of all, an affirmation of a world in process, an archipelago. Not even 
a puzzle, whose pieces when fitted together would constitute a whole, but 
rather a wall of loose, uncemented stones, where every element has a value in 
itself but also in relation to others: isolated and floating relations, islands and 





Tarr's 'difficult' imaging is an ethico-aesthetical 'experiment', where aesthetic 
experience - rather than setting up hidden moral and ideological foundations of 
judgment - forms a new image of "an absolute ethics that begins where symbolic-
moral mediation leaves off and an aesthetic experience of nonrelation begins"; where 
it is possible to "affirm a landscape where lying and trickery mingle with "grace and 
chance", for these are the elements of a world devoid of Truth."
802
 As a "creative act", 
cinema/ art has a potential not only to dislodge us from familiar modes of thinking, 
but to become philosophy.
803
 In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze argues that the plane of 
composition of art and the plane of immanence of philosophy "slip into each other to 
the degree that parts of one may be occupied by entities of the other."
804
 Thus cinema, 
as an artistic medium, can produce - or even better, create - its own thinking. The 
viewer's/ thinker's mind would be intertwined with the formally constructed 'concepts' 
put forward by the film director and the unexpected relations that film itself 'provokes' 
through its own thinking. As such, cinema can restore belief in this world by reuniting 
viewer and viewed in the 'flesh' of the world affectively, "before or beyond words." 
Such an encounter would push the viewer off the edge of familiar doxa that tolerate or 
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put up with almost anything, and become "a cinema of at once fantasy and report, 
criticism and compassion."
805
 In this strange 'archipelago' of unnatural connections, 
the viewing can take the form of 'love'/ creation, and the viewer can become the 
philosopher. 
 
This would be an experience at the limit, an affect-thought which is also the move (of 
cinematic aesthetics) from seeing behind to enduring what is there already, and the 
move from 'reading' an image to experiencing it. This is not sensory experience in 
opposition to the extra-sensory but an experience in 'contact' with the outside, with the 
"delirious dimension," with "the unbearable."
806
 As both an aesthetic and ethical 
'experiment', the difficult image persists, enduring in-between affect and thought. 
 
The chapter will also attempt an aesthetico-ethical experiment with the image, re-
thinking the concepts of life, art and thinking. Re-thinking will take the form of 
poetical rather than dialectical discourse, where the 'action' of what is accepted as 
thinking will be replaced by 'belief' in opening new problems. The question of 
aesthetics will be addressed through the Deleuzian concept of immanence, where art 
and life are neither opposed nor one, but where new ways in which art and life can 
affect one another in a continual process of becoming something else. This will 
reposition the concept of aesthetics from transcendence (individual judgment or 
sublimated idea) to non-subjective pre-personal sensation (or sign). The aesthetico-
ethical experiment, where the annihilation of transcendental underpinnings, of any 
sense of pre-existent structure, imagines a world where "force no longer refers to a 
centre, any more that it confronts a setting of obstacles. It only confronts other forces, 
it refers to other forces, that it affects or that affect it."
807
 
Accordingly, there will be a 'justification' of the image as affect-thought, which will 
carry further the sense of belief (in this world) and thus ethics as radical immanence, 
where the politics of humanistic dialectics is replaced with the non-humanistic ethics 
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of "a life."Thus, the concepts of life, art and thinking will be re-examined in the 
context of the aesthetico-ethical imperative of immanence, in which art and life affect 
each other in a continual process of becoming. The writing will continue to ask 
questions and open up problems rather than seek answers or provide solutions. 
 
Stilled, suspended in-between stillness and movement, in the meanwhile of the 
wo(a)nderous narrative, the difficult image of time hurts, repulses, bores, amazes, 
astounds, perplexes, and more … but never leaves one indifferent. It provokes an 
uneasiness, a not quite known or 'pleasant' emotion, while at the same time eliciting 
something that persistently demands attention; a strange kind of excitation that 
creating or experimentation might arouse from an encounter with the unknown. A 
kind of Spinozan productive 'joyful' encounter comes to mind, which does not 
necessarily exclude difficulty or pain, but equally does not position the subject within 
the distanciating [I/eye] or 'fix' the self in the identity of a traumatic Real. Instead, it 
throws the viewing body into the abyss/ boundlessness of, to call on Spinoza again, 
"all the subtle sympathizings of the incalculable soul, from the bitterest hate to 
passionate love."
808
 This physical and mental intensity of an encounter – thinking 
through affect – brings elements of non-thought into thought, or shows 'the possibility 
of the impossible'.
809
 Thus both joyful and productive might be thought of here in the 
sense of provoking new ways of thinking, of seeing the world anew, which is also an 
ongoing struggle. It is not through an intensified 'experience' of cathartic redemption 
or an aesthetic appreciation of Beauty that 'seeing' and thinking are restored, but 
through the 'shock' of  the encounter with becoming itself – a difference – that enables 
the overcoming of the present/ 'what is', producing “strange new becomings, new 
polyvocalities”.810 This would be a question of the singular thought-event, a throw of 
the dice; "the thought-phantasm", as Foucault called it, which 'happens' between the 
director/ camera, the world, the viewer, and the 'outside', and "which does not search 
for truth, but repeats thought."
811
 
                                                 
808
 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, p. 87. 
809
 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy, p. 60. 
810
 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 190-1. 
811
 Michel Foucault, ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault5.htm. 
222 
 
This moment of the encounter-event, delinked from action and charged by the senses, 
is like when one's mouth opens in a silent scream or cry of wonder; "when everything 




Reality, life, image, immanence … Life, art and thinking folded in(to) the aesthetics 
of immanence/ affect? "We are returned to a kind of perception purged of any 
sensory-motor necessity."
813
 In order to write such an ethico-aesthetic encounter-event 




The doctor slowly gets up, locks the door, walks to the toilet, urinates, flushes the 
toilet with water from a bucket, returns to his desk, takes out one of his many 
notebooks, starts writing, stops, and finally stares blankly ahead. In another scene 
(Werckmeister Harmonies), Valuska opens the food bar's door, puts his thermos on 
the counter and, after exchanging a few words with the kitchen attendant, waits while 
she puts the food in each compartment, closes the flask, and handles it back. After 
János leaves, the camera remains for some time in the same position, witnessing a 
couple engaged in a strange sort of kissing affectation seen now in the corner of the 
bar's window. At the beginning of Sátántangó, while Mrs Schmidt goes about her 
morning chores, with her husband asleep at the table, Futaki indifferently envisions 
his future. 
 
"I'm going south, winters are shorter there. I'll rent a farm. Close to a 
prosperous town. Soak my feet all day, in a bowl of hot water. Or … I'll be a 
watchman in a chocolate factory. Or a porter in a girls' dorm. And try to forget 
everything. A washbowl of hot water and nothing to do. Only watch how this 
fuckin' life goes." (Sátántangó) 
 
'Meanwhile', in a single take within Damnation, the singer munches on bits of food at 
the table while listening to Karrer as he slowly, almost indulgently, in a matter-of-fact 
way, describes at length and in detail a previous love affair, where he tormented and 
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ridiculed his lover until she committed suicide. And as the night draws in, the cart 
carrying bodies soaked by the incessant rain moves slowly to the distant sound of an 
uncertain destination. 
 
Here is Tarr’s "logic of life," a collection of events that are 'worth' attending to, 
irrespective of their value to the understanding of any "story." It is a way of getting 
closer to people, "so that we can understand everyday life, and so that we can 
understand human nature, why we are like we are", he comments in an interview
814
. 
An assemblage of singular instants in a collection of other instants, is a question of 
rejecting what Tarr calls "the logic of the story" – editing one piece of information 
against another – in favour of "the logic of life."815 The images are 'justified' by the 
rhythm of time and the composition of the shots, as much as by the aim of bringing us 
close to experiencing the life of this or that character. The shabby, slow-motioned 
movements of the doctor, the detailed textures of interiors, or the strange kissing 
behind the bar's window … From the accumulation of materiality (the excess of 
physical details) Tarr extracts life, and it is life that 'pierces' though his images. Seen 
and heard but also acutely sensed; complex and intense potentiality, immanently real 
and "in-human" – "a life."816 Thus, above all perhaps, these everyday, unremarkable, 
quotidian moments are radically vital because they "wrest" or intuit life more (or less) 
than human, more (or less) than organic, and irreducible to either realism or 
representation. The intensity of material detail, indifferent nature, and black-and-
white photography, are forms of expressions that are neither social/ historical nor 
political, but cosmic; where the 'understanding of the human condition' does not refer 
to a value of , or a value superior to, it but asks "how is this possible?" And where the 
question is not that of good or evil, but of "what am I, or better still what is my body, 
capable of?"
817
 The 'distant', static, and dispassionate 'recording' of life, which allows/ 
renders every unfolding image the time and density to see and hear, is at the same 
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time an expression of infinite variations, encounters, and relations. Life is enfolded in 
the style where the "I" point of view and the free-indirect composition intertwine in 
the movement of wo(a)nderous narrative. The image and the word come together in 
the web of paradoxical relations outside of subjective/ objective, I/ other distinctions. 
Merging content and form, Tarr films the world as it is, and also the belief in it. This 
indecisive relation between form and content might be called a new kind of 
'humanism' (metamorphic rather than anthropomorphic or anthropocentric) of "a 
people that are missing." Here every man and woman remains a "subject-in-
becoming", whose "undecided fate" is the affirmation of both what is yet to come 
with this world, and beyond the human condition.
818
 As Deleuze writes, 
 
[t]here is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that 
produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. 
Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, 
all of life's species: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer 




In this sense, life 'expressed' in Tarr films is neither biological nor humanist, but what 
Deleuze called "a Life" – subjectless, "impersonal and yet singular", an inexhaustible 
virtual force which merely passes through (human) life. Imaged as a material plane of 
encounters – it manifests itself through this world composed of actual bodies and 
relations – that is also a plane of pre-subjective "delirium."820 It is a force that exists in 
each body as its potential for variation that is actualised not by the decisions that body 
makes but by the encounters it undergoes.
821
 In this sense, life in Tarr's films is both 
imaged – an actual plane of encounters and relations, and 'expressed' – a virtual, pre-
subjective and impersonal force of variation/ transformation.  
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It could be said that underneath, or rather within, this world and this life, 'bubbles' an 
inexact and indeterminate virtual power; a vague but real power which is beyond our 
capacity to measure it.
822
 This is not only a force of self-creation but creation that is 
also destruction; it is not opposite to death, as death is also a part of a becoming. As 
Colebrook suggests, it is a potential that always threatens to destabilise or de-actualise 
individual being.
823
 It is prior to, and irreducible to, identification that attaches us to 
familial, social, national, or sexual territories, and thus enables potential for new 
forms of existence. Subjectless and neutral, it is present in all things, and thus always 
immanent to itself. Deleuze writes: "[a] life is everywhere: an immanent life carrying 
with it the events and singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and 
objects."
824
 Such 'a life', as he proclaimed with Nietzsche, has no value; it is radically 
'innocent' and just and, as such, cannot be judged according to the laws of 
ressentiment or bad conscience.
825
 It can only be affirmed. Beyond good and evil, it is 
the multiple truth found by Dionysus: "the innocence of plurality, the innocence of 




Opening into new creations and inventions.  
 
Contradicting all natural perception – distorting the visible and suspending the 
invisible, Tarr's 'logic of life' affirms all that appears; even the most devastating, bitter 
suffering; even death. His tactics of resistance, of moving away from 'what is' by 
affirming it, are enfolded play-fully and intensely in the aesthetics/ style of the 'tragic' 
vision.
827
 The pathological clinging to life Tarr speaks of could be a question of 
resistance in a sense of both 'diagnosing' and affirming, with no clear cut distinction 
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 Recognition of oppression in the figure of amnesiac reality is both a 
'subjective' creating of forgetting and an objective 'image-fact' creating from within 
the world. Here, the diagnosis and affirmation come together in the persistent sensing 
of the irresistible power of life as creating. Not only in terms of actual events 
(Valuska's 'creation' of the universe, or Estike 'arranging' her own death) but most 
importantly in a form of virtual 'lines'; an imperceptible yet real force of potentiality 
that repeats itself in difference. A manifestation of an open, ungraspable Whole in a 
concrete instant.
829
 Thus, getting closer to people or understanding life remains a 
question not of psychology or metaphysics, but rather of a virtual force of becoming 
which could be thought of as a strange kind of inhuman humanism. And when it 
comes to this inhuman life, Tarr, to borrow Deleuze's expression, 'does away' with the  
system of judgment in the Nietzschean fashion: "there is no value superior to life, life 
is not to be judged or justified, it is innocent, it has 'the innocence of becoming', 
beyond good and evil …"830 Such is the Dionysian, tragic vision of resisting by 
affirming. Saying "yes" to life in all its forms (even in death) as a choice. 
 
In terms of 'difficult image', we could talk about an intense and experimental 
spatiality, an "intensive space" that takes us beyond the forms of the "lived body" as 
described by phenomenology, and leads to what Rajchman calls a "mad zone of 
indetermination and experimentation."
831
 The heaviness of human existence is 
momentarily lifted by the aesthetics of affirmation, saying yes to life; by dance. 
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As mentioned in an earlier chapter, under this film runs another film, no longer the 
director's but its own image-world (life and art). It is something that has not yet 
actualised, something unknown and unpredictable, something that can only be sensed, 
'inter-imagined' with film, something intimated in the material intensity; "a 
Chaosmos, a composed chaos – neither foreseen nor preconceived."833 Because, as 
Deleuze asserts,  
 
The true world does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible 
to describe, and, if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous …834 
 
The new modes of existence are intuited in the suspension of 'not yet'. The virtual 
force breaks through the cracks in the false of artistic construction, "irreducible to any 
of the decided forms that we know in actual existence."
835
 Nameless, undetermined, 
impersonal percepts and affects in-between. Thus, what 'actualises' in the materiality 
of the image-world is only one of many moments, a moment which may or may not 
become visible/ audible, and which depends on life's non-organic and impersonal 
power of expression, the 'logic of art'. Thus, 
 
… on the one hand, it is a power of abstraction capable of producing elements 
that are in themselves asignifying, acosmic, asubjective, anorganic, 
agrammatical, and asyntactic (singularities and events, affects and percepts, 
intensities and becomings) and placing them in a state of continuous variation; 
on the other hand, it is a power of invention capable of creating ever new 
relations between these differential or genetic elements (syntheses of 
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A "crumbling, depressive world of mud, alcohol and betrayal"
838
, the wasteland – 
dead matter is the potential in which the virtual matter of radically and unknowingly 
affirming becoming is folded: 
 
… the world as a 'monster of energy' without beginning and without end, a 
Dionysian world of 'eternal' self-creation and 'eternal' self-destruction, moving 
from the simple to the complex and then back again to the simple out of 
abundance: cold/hot/hot/cold, beyond satiety, disgust, and weariness, a world 




This is the tragic vision which is also what Nietzsche called an "exceptional kind of 
health", and which post-war cinema was forced to discover, as Gregory Flaxman 
observes, "in the nauseating, devastated death-strewn landscape."
840
 Moreover, as 
Colebrook suggests, waste, debris, and refuse can be seen as "an intimation of 
unactualised potential" precisely because they cannot be synthesised or recognised 
according to either 'higher' or 'popular' values.
841
 This is not a question of high or low, 
content versus form, but a transformative power of the false; an artistic becoming. 
 
Here it is the tragic aesthetic that brings life and art together, outside the 
transcendental conception of the world, including its phenomenological "life-world" 
condition of perception. 
 
For Nietzsche, the tragic is not the pessimistic turning away from, or reacting to, life – 
even in its most devastating, cruel moments – but affirming its multiplicity. It is a 
"plural joy" of the diversity of affirmation which merges the Dionysian ekstasis and 
Apollonian image, chaos with order, one with many, the singular and the universal, 
chance and necessity. As tragic, this joy is not the result of "a sublimation, a purging, 
a compensation, a resignation or a reconciliation" but of an aesthetic encounter with 
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the unknown. This tragic, as Deleuze writes, is not to be found in the anguish and 
disgust, nor in a nostalgia for lost unity. It is the complex philosophical 'vision' of life 
as aesthetic rather than moral or theological phenomenon.
842
 Not a medical phrase or 
a moral solution to pain, fear, or pity, but affirmation. For there is no cure for the 
'human condition'. It is a choice to choose with this world, "a joyful refusal of 
anything other than radical contingency and a force without promise."
843
 Perhaps that 
of Ariadne who embraces multiplicity and affirms life, rather than that of Antigone 
who seeks revenge out of duty, or of Bartleby, who would rather not. 
 
Tarr's depiction of disintegration, the displacement of humankind as the centre of the 
universe, and "exhausted vitality"
844
, affirmed in the photographic of cinema, outside 
of moral and Biblical narratives, is a choice of a tragic aesthetic – saying "yes" to the 
game of becoming, with no 'going back' and no a priori determined future. A case of 
radically passive vitalism, to draw on Colebrook's reading of Deleuze and Guattari's 





The world is not determined by some final cause or meaning that serves as its goal, 
but a play of chance and necessity, a ceaseless, goalless becoming. Becoming, not as 
'should be' or will be (predetermined fate), but as 'it happens', is the 'authority' beyond 
the limits of the world. For Nietzsche, chance and necessity come together as the 
undecided fate of the dice throw. In the language of Zarathustra, the gods are dice 
players and the earth is their table. The natural world and everything in it, ourselves 
included, are combinations that have turned up in this game of chance. But this 
chance is not opposed to necessity. While the throw of the dice is an act of freedom, it 
is powerless to determine the resulting combination. Once the dice leave the hand, the 
rest is left to necessity. It is this sort of nonrational, nonpurposive "necessity" that 
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Nietzsche wants to ascribe to becoming. Becoming is seen as a series of dice throws, 
each of which is complete in itself ("justified at every moment") and have no further 
end beyond sparking an interest in new throws and different combinations. Whether 
called an "innocent becoming" or "chaos", such a world is without origin, purpose, 
aim, unity, or total character. "And it is precisely this that makes it a world of play, for 
there is nothing to halt this becoming and differing, no transcendent principle to direct 
or constrain it, or calculation that could totalize it once and for all."
846
 Therefore, 
becoming (with the world) is the Amor fati, the love of life as it is –  free from blame 
and guilt, which unites freedom and necessity. Neither some 'universal love' for all, 
nor fate as deterministic opposition to freedom. 
 
What Nietzsche calls the glad tidings is, as Deleuze argues, that existence is no longer 
treated as blameworthy, nor does the will feel guilty for existing.
847
 Tarr's image-
world is 'innocent', and his aesthetics carry the belief in it, not by (re)acting to the 
intolerable but by thinking differently, allowing the difference to differentiate. There 
is 'negativity' that is profoundly productive: the materiality that resists us is also the 
protean source of being, the essentially vague matrix of things.
848
 The glad tidings are 
tragic thoughts, for tragedy is not found in the recriminations of ressentiment, the 
conflicts of bad conscience or the contradictions of a will which feels guilty and 
responsible. The tragic, as Deleuze writes, does not even fight against ressentiment, 
bad conscience or nihilism. According to Nietzsche, the tragic = joyful; therefore, to 
will  is to create and, by extension, it could be suggested that to create  is to live. The 
tragic is pure and multiple positivity. Affirmation is tragic because it affirms chance 
and the necessity of chance, because it affirms multiplicity and the unity of 
multiplicity. "The dice-throw is tragic. All the rest is nihilism".
849
 The tragic is where 
art and life merge and where the choice to choose is possible. In this sense, life 
becomes an aesthetical phenomenon; an inhuman humanism – an aesthetic-tragic 
mode. Through the tragic, the aesthetic thinks the belief in this world beyond words. 
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Therefore, accepting life as an aesthetic phenomenon (an instinct of play) rather than a 
moral or religious one, might open up the 'chance' of finding existence blameless, and 
thus inventing a new (non)humanity; one liberated from not just human centrality and 
agency, but from the future of man. Because, as Deleuze aptly put it, "it is in man 





Thus, Tarr's tragic 'logic of life', blameless and "irresponsible", offers a different way 
of thinking about and 'interpreting' existence.
851
 Immanently and aesthetically. What it 
means is "saying Yes to life", even in its strangest and most painful episodes; to 
accept the will to life and "its own inexhaustible vitality" even when it witnesses 
destruction, or even when it anticipates the extinction of its (human) heroes.
852
 Would 
it be too much to suggest that against the "nihilism" judging existence blameworthy, 
faulty and responsible, Tarr gives us the empty space of experimentation, "to make us 




Once the normalising notions of existence are reconsidered, a new sense of possibility 
within the impossible might open, a new way of thinking and living based not on 
judgment but on 'play' (an encounter).
854
 It might be possible to see language, culture, 
and history as "possessing a force beyond purpose" and, therefore, considered beyond 
normalising notions of organism, as an opening and joyful, rather than closing or 
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 Amor fati is also linked to the poetic, to the playfulness 
embracing the undecided fate beyond truth, and beyond (meaning of) 'words'. This 
would be the "instinct of the game which calls forth new worlds;"
856
 the aesthetic of 
creation. Life as art. It would be the ethics of becoming, of singular encounters within 
the multiplicity of human and non-human durations, of opening to 'a life' as the 
operative cosmic force of self-differentiated difference.
857
 The player/ -artist- child, as 
Deleuze suggests with Nietzsche, "temporarily abandons himself to life and 
temporarily fixes the gaze upon it; the artist places himself provisionally in his work 
and provisionally above it; the child plays, withdraws from the game and returns to it. 
In this game of becoming, the being of becoming also plays the game with itself; the 






The universe has no purpose, and the dice will never abolish chance.
859
 Affirming 
chance rather than counting on probability, to affirm necessity rather than anticipating 
a result, is the belief in this world as it is and its creative power of transformation. The 
Dionysian correlation of chance-necessity, not a probability distributed over several 
throws but all chance at once; not a final, desired, willed combination, but the fatal 
combination, fatal and loved, Amor fati.
860
 "The dice throw affirms becoming and it 
affirms the being of becoming." This is a question of difference, of the return of the 
new and, as such, of a possibility of creating new worlds. Affirming the multiplicity 
of chance, all at once or the fatal combination of the throw is the tragic play of 
innocence. The fatal coming together of numbers, the infinite combinations of all that 
has been and all that could have been, provides us with the notion of multiplicity that 
is open and changing, the eternal return of difference. 
 
What might the tragic play of innocence be? How does one play/ live such a game? 
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Nietzsche's dice throw as the affirmation of the unknown, is the affirmation of the 
multiplicity of chance all at once. The throw of the dice is also a 'choice to choose' 
with life, not against it; a "continuous choice" of undecided fate.
861
 In terms of cinema 
this would be the 'logic' of the irrational cut, or the Markoff 'chain', which introduces 
chance into the image-flow.
862
 It is also 'accepting' the will to power, the universal and 
primordial drive of all living things, a desire to live which is different from obedience 
to morality or law, from the will to survive, and from the individual will to be free or 
to control. This desire (to create and to resist the present; the will to create), in a way, 
is not ours; as unconscious, it 'belongs', so to speak, to the realm of pre-individual, 
pre-subjective, and non-human outside, yet which is also the immanent inside. We 
belong to 'it'. Thus, the need and necessity to recover the link to this desire (this 
world) is to recover the sense of creation – our capacity to act outside of what we 
know – beyond thinking and ordinary perception. It is the power of a life, the power 
to create difference, beyond the human condition and beyond transcendence; the real 
'shimmering' in the idea of becoming-child, taken to its full potential into the future of 
"creation" (which is essential for artistic invention, for new modes of ethical 




This is an aesthetic mode of existence, the belief in this world as it is. 
 
In Tarr's image-world there are those who blame (such as Irimiás and the police 
officer), and those who choose to choose (Estike, János, even Karrer). But even those 
who blame are not 'blamed' by the "glad tidings" of his films. Events happen in a kind 
of matter-of-fact way; people plodding along with the weather, wandering dogs and 
dreams that never come true. Both the human brokenness and vague heroism is 
enfolded in decelerated time and homogenous texture. Humans, animals, spaces, rain, 
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mud, sounds and light are all part of the 'universal', cosmic game of becoming. 
Moments unchained and rechained again, each being a throw of the dice, a choice to 
trust the unknowable, and a chance affirming necessity, 
 
against the […] morality of salvation and charity, a morality of life in which 
the soul is fulfilled only by taking to the road, with no other aim, open to all 
contacts, never trying to save other souls …864 
 
Mixing 'tragedy' with comedy, laughter with distress, fleeting from received opinions 
and beliefs, commentary, politics, morality; dancing with the world (and the viewer) 
gracefully and 'irresponsibly' in the moment of chance, is the game of trust which Tarr 
plays with the viewer. 
 
At the same time, of great length, each filmed as one shot, with constant but subtle 
shifts in the camera, the scenes are the combination of a "great formal beauty" and 
strange intimacy created by an affective distance – the endurance of the 'unknown'.865  
These singular departicularised "fact images" – abstract forms rather than filmed 
'reality' – cannot, however, be viewed from the point of either alienation or of sensus 
communis. Detached from the synthesising Whole, they require a different 
perspective; an acute (non)perception, both visual and auditory; "a pure contemplation 
without knowledge."
866
 The mundane, everyday actions here are not the moments of 
shared sense experience (the distribution of the sensible), but the shattering of
 
 the 
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 It is not a question of understanding or empathy but of affect-
thought that is an aesthetico-ethics tragic of becoming.
868




"Life alone," state Deleuze and Guattari, "creates such zones [of 
indetermination] where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and 




It is art that puts us in a direct relation with the virtual. 
 
The crystalline notions of fabulation and falseness mean the creation of the singular 
and the new, holding a 'truth' which is not pre-existent, but created. Art wrests from 
life the percepts and affects that 'force' us to see, to feel, and to think differently; and 
thus to dance, to choose, to become irresponsible, and imperceptible. 
 
This requires a new perspective, an archipelago-perspectivism that conjugates 
the panoramic shot and the tracking shot […]. It requires an acute 
[non]perception, both visual and auditory, […], and must replace the concept 
with the "percept", that is, with a perception in becoming. It requires a new 
community whose members are capable of trust or "confidence", that is, of a 
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Through tragic aesthetics (brought back/ and forth – through Deleuze – to sensation, 
outside representation, but also outside phenomenology) affect and thought is possible 
beyond words. Physicality/ materiality exists within immanence of the outside, 
beyond the division of subject and object, inside and outside. Aesthetics are the 
'figure' of a gap, of an immense wait, the photographic (real) becoming itself. In the 
rhythm in between images, the nothing that happens suspends movement and 
stillness, and the nothing that matters still-moving enfolds the ethics of "a life." 
Instead of the Kantian aesthetics of either the sublime or beautiful, which remains 
within our capacity to judge and to synthesise, Deleuze connects sensation with 
experimentation. As such, aesthetics would be the "space of intensity" and an 
"unjoined time" of experimenting/ creating and thinking; an untimely "form of 
intuition" that extracts sensation (percepts and affects) from representation. It allows 
for the matter of art to stand alone, and to resist human recognition and animation.
871
 
Thus, "the work of art leaves the domain of representation to become 'experience' (or 




For Deleuze, this is the intertwining machinic co-creation of mind and body, subject 
and object, sense and language, world and image, as affect actualised in the matter of 
poetic 'language' beyond words which, through cinema, is capable of reconnecting us 
to the world 'as it is'.
873
 Poetic language, as the language of art and cinema, a language 
of thought as creative process – an affective thinking with life – connects through a 
conceptual-affective persona born out of life's chaosmic matter outside meaning and 
representation which always ties it to a human subject. It is the language of Amor fati; 
"an undecided faith" beyond life understood as self-preserving organism, which takes 
us from our (human) minds and bodies into a realm of metamorphosis, into a shape/ 
mould of the unknown (sensible) body, starting to think the unthinkable. This 
aesthetic experimentation takes the figure of imagining and imaging the world "that 
consists of Visions and Auditions that no longer belong to any language." These 
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visions are not fantasies, but veritable Ideas that the artist sees and hears in the 
intensities […], in intervals.874 The aesthetics – not of judgment but of affect-thought 
– allows the (photographic/ cinematic) image to exist on its own as image-world 
(rather than of the world), and image-thought (rather than of thought). Such 
experimentalist aesthetics, against the "debilitating effects of clichés" and against 
transcendence of "aesthetic pieties", might release the potentialities of a life and 






To believe, not in a different world, but in a link between man and the world, 
in love or life, to believe this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none 
the less cannot but be thought: "something possible, otherwise I will 
suffocate." It is this belief that makes the unthought the specific power of 
thought, through the absurd, by virtue of the absurd.  Artaud never understood 
powerlessness to think as a simple interiority which would strike us in relation 
to thought. It is part of thought, so that we should make our way of thinking 
from it, without claiming to be restoring an all-powerful thought. We should 
rather make use of this powerlessness to believe in life, and to discover the 




As it is not 'I' who is thinking, 
 
What is required in order to think is not knowledge of the cogito or the transcendence 
of received ideas, but an orphaned intuition; a mode of unmediated access to the 
forces of a life, a certain aptitude of letting go and openness to the outside.
877
 The 
'stupid' emptiness of an ungodly belief, or a "bastard logic", assembling 
undetermined/ unforeseeable moments that open up onto new moments, carrying 
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multiple ways of being, ad infinitum. One step for life and one step for thought.
878
 
Cinema with its own 'cinematic logic' (machinic consciousness) can free us from what 
Deleuze calls "the representative image of thought"; the metaphysical, metaphoric and 
dialectical forms of thinking, towards opening up problems, and thus creating new 
concepts. As it unfolds, branches out and mutates, the image-thought carries the 
problems along with it, inspiring a need to create new concepts, not through external 
determinism but through a becoming.
879
 For thought to occur we need to 'be' in/with 
life-passively, being in or, even better, for this world.  Experimental thinking is 
possible only when it dissipates the illusion of transcendence, when it frees itself from 
the "dogmatic image."
880
 Creating new concepts/ thinking happens to us as a result of 
encounters with the unknown and the un-thought Outside. 
 
The images come to us, or in us.  We do not arrange them in a pre-conceived, 
symbolic communicative way. The 'I' feel of sensation, when the subject is in the 
midst of things, interfused with them, injected,
881
 where a 'contemplating' mind 
merges with an intense body, imagines new worlds. When recollection seizes it, the 
"internal vision warehoused in memory," becomes "vision in thought."
882
 When 
thinking happens to us, it is a thought-event. 
 
To think differently is to allow oneself to become affected, to open the senses to the 
unknown outside, to create 'passively' – that is, to act instead of reacting.883 Here 
thought is open to other than itself: to affect, intuition and belief. As the cinema 
affects the visible in such a way that contradicts all natural perception, Deleuze notes, 




Creating new modes of existence is not a question of resisting the present by 
going back to what we know (history), but by leaping into the future by 
"scrambling the planes, of going beyond [one's] own plane and [one's] own 
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condition, in order to finally express naturing Nature" – that is, to finally 




As when light that touches the surfaces indecisively sliding along met on the way 
objects' folds and creases, and the shadows embracing fragile moments of uncertain 
encounters merge in the curious still instant, unfolding blurry thinking. While the 
camera suspends the world, its movement erases the distance between object and 
subject, leaving the difference itself shivering in-between. 
 
'Opium […] thought gathers unique differences into a point, eliminates the 
background and deprives immobility of its task of contemplating and 
soliciting stupidity through its mime. Opium ensures a weightless immobility, 
the stupor of a butterfly that differs from catatonic rigidity; and, far beneath, it 
establishes a ground that no longer stupidly absorbs all differences but allows 





For perhaps that is the secret – to practise aesthetics as an affirmative play of 




What Tarr's films think is a life where the belief in this world is the choice of an 
aesthetical tragic becoming, and an attitude of "passive vitalism" as ethics of radical 
immanence. 
 
… the new way of thinking means an affirmative thought, a thought which 
affirms life and the will to life, a thought which finally expels the whole of the 





Cinema is a living brain, which works by "irrational connections." It thinks in-
between images in a kind of irrational lacunar zone, without before or after.  Tarr's 
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films think within shots as description – a free indirect discourse of the steppe,889 and 
in-between as non-relation. 
 
What carries life and art in the aesthetic-tragic figure of thought as difference, is the 
conceptual/ cinematic persona incarnated in the character. The characters affected 
through singular encounters, embody a mode of powerless politics (passive vitalism), 
where the virtual force of difference refrains from realisation, and thinking from 
falling back onto original 'models'. They point to life and carry belief in their 
exhausted bodies. The player-artist-child, thinking in between the affective and 
conceptual aesthetically. 
 
Most of Tarr's characters are played not by professional actors, but by artists, film 
directors, cinematographers, composers, set-designers, writers, painters; all with 
distinctive faces and features. As a critic observed, they seem to be matched by the 
scenery, weather and time, creating the necessary tension with their faces, voices and 
movements.
890
 In addition to the non-professional 'status' of the 'actors' –  who, 
similarly to Bresson's 'models', 'live the situation' rather than act – they are 'trapped' 
within the situation, creating it at the same time from what is available – the space and 
their own 'personalities'. "You can see in their eyes how they are in. They cannot 
escape from the situation," Tarr comments in an interview.
891
 Performing 'themselves', 
they become with the 'situation', as if the 'situation' has somehow created itself around 
them. They are seeing and hearing, intuiting not so much the world, but 'a life'; 
constructing a model for the "passive vitalism."
892
 Enduring 'what is', they resist 
stagnation. There is neither eagerness nor resistance in the way characters bodies give 
themselves to the 'action'. János in his kitchen preparing the meal, or in the streets 
delivering newspapers, does not imply, analyse, or suggest anything 'according' to the 
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character's psychology, or even to the demands of external circumstances. In a kind of 
absently present, yet precise manner, he attends to his chores in the same way the 
doctor (Sátántangó) staggers from his chair, 'bounded' by the heaviness of the 
drunken body; or the couple in Damnation who are engaged in, as if resigned to, a 
ritual of passionless lovemaking. Rather than existing in the world, they somehow co-
exist with it, being pulled by momentary encounters rather than by their own, or 
others', pre-determined motivations or goals; encounters in the process of 
actualisation that stretch over time but result in no outcome. The encounter between 
the doctor and Estike at night, or the hospital massacre, have no consequence in the 
overall 'picture', in the same way as the dance sequences or the close up of the beer 
glasses at the bar. On the other hand, each person has very strong, singular features; 
an extraordinary face, each distinct and unforgettable. Estike, János, Irimiás and 
Petrina, the doctor … memorable 'faces', 'imperceptible' expressions 'flickering' in the 
pores of the skin and in the absent looks, where other potentials (to become) seem to 
be folded. For Deleuze, this would be the way children are before they 'acquire' 
personalities; all distinctive by the way they smile, tie their shoelaces, look out of the 
window … little idiosyncrasies, or "singular essences" in Spinoza's terms. It would 
also resonate with the clandestine aspect of nomadic cinema, the 'consciousness' that 
there were no people, but always several people, an infinity of people, who remain to 
be unified, or should not be united, in order for the situation to change.
893
 Several or 
multiple, not molar but molecular, the bodies that 'people' Tarr's films are never one 
or many, but any-one-whoever. Everybodies and anybodies, these characters 'form' 
(un)natural connections with walls, animals, the rain, each other; creating other 
bodies, multiplying in a variety of not necessarily human becomings. Again, Tarr took 
his inspiration from Bruegel, the 'master' of inhumanly human diversity.
894
 Distinct 
faces carrying expressionless expressions; the intense looks and absent emotion 
inscribed in the characters' expressions are, for András Bálint Kovác, a history 
condensed in human faces.
895
 As Yvette Biró suggested, the uniqueness, the 
individual features of the profiles of different ages, and the varied social and ethnic 
characteristics, mingle with the sense of an unerring similarity, defining their bearing 
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that has brought them together.
896
 This is the 'history' of time out of joint however, 
without the timelines and without 'identities'. Memorable faces, 'never a mass of 
unprivileged people'
897
, are no longer the faces of the affection-image but the surface 
of the any-space-whatever which is also a singular texture of the face in becoming 
other, in becoming each/any other. This self, according to Deleuze, will live "its own 
life" – a never complete image, a fable and a myth – "always taken up once more, 
reassembled, ceaselessly expanding on the way."
898
 The close-up of a face is no 
longer a question of alienation but a deterritorialising (de-subjectifying, 
dehumanising) force of the face in the image-world, filled with affecting and affective 
bodies.
899
 Even the 'real' emotions visible in their eyes are already folded in the 
subjectless affect, echoing the pensive camerawork, and the inhuman vision-eye.
900
 In 
Damnation's scene, already mentioned in the first chapter, Tarr pans across a blank 
exterior wall, every so often interrupted by an open door. Inside, crowds of people, 
their hard faces as expressionless as the wall, stare disinterestedly out at the pouring 
rain. For some time, the alternating line of people and walls, accompanied by the 
haunting melody of an accordion, fills the screen. A group of people, but isolated, not 
forming a whole; as if arranged "on a plane of composition" by an undecided fate. 
Figure and space interchange as surface, both familiar and unrecognisable at the same 
time; heimlich and unheimlich, haunted by the Outside in a passage from seeing to 
enduring the seen. There is no figure(s) and background. One melting into the other, 
becoming wall, becoming face, becoming landscape. Becoming surface. In the faces-
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walls, independent, alienated, subjected to the slow, penetrating 'scans' of the camera, 
madness and helplessness show the real. The problem posed by those "anybodies", as 
Rajchman writes, "who can no longer be "qualified" either as individuals or as 
members of organic wholes" is that of a manner of being that would allow for a 
"community" of "singular essences" no longer subordinated to the "representation" or 
"imitation" of anything.
901
 Pure potentialities are folded within the any-space-
whatever. The departicularisation of 'any-' creates a sense of abstracted forms rather 
than 'reality' as it is being filmed, but also a sense of universal – any-place, any-one, 
not in some universalising norms or laws, but as immanent multiplicity in the 
potential for creating new modes of existence. This possible world, as Deleuze 
reminds us, 'is not real or not yet but it exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists 
only in expression – the face or the equivalent of the face.902 
 
Faces and landscapes, not personalities but singularities, every face with unique 
features, so unique that it paradoxically calls up (by way of their being unaccustomed 
to 'uniqueness', if not 'estranged ordinariness') the senseless uniformity of the 'face' 
obsessed world. 
 
The spaces, 'punctuated' by the blank, expressionless faces, become landscapes 
themselves; each singular and unforgettable. Not psychological portraits but singular 
bodies amongst many other bodies. They live with the space hesitantly, uncertainly 
and yet persistently; their 'actions' neither cultural nor natural, dispersed in a plurality 
of belonging to sets, "all incompatible and yet coexistent."
903
 In Werckmeister 
Harmonies, the slow, elaborate, and beautiful 360-degree camera movement reveals, 
one by one, the faces in the square, illuminated by diffused light. Sátántangó's pub 
dance scene could be a variation on Bruegel's Peasant Wedding (1567) and The 
Peasant Dance (1568). Individual 'personalities' with different faces and different 
looks are not just part of the crowd, although endowed with a strange sense of some 
primordial types.
904
 To André Bazin, this would be "a documentary of faces" where, 
in the "drama-through-the-microscope the whole of nature palpitates beneath every 
pore. The movement of a wrinkle, the pursing of a lip are seismic shocks and the flow 
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of tides, the flux and reflux of this [cosmic] epidermis."
905
 On the other hand, the 
expressionless and inscrutable, almost numb exhausted figures, 'resemble' Beckettian 
characters, moving by the force of machinic assemblage. The face and the eye are no 
longer organs that constitute an observing, rational human body. The face, Deleuze 
asserts,  is not a 'screen' for a person's character. Rather, it is a mask, underneath  
which there is another mask, and yet another; on and on, into infinity. Faces detached 
from their proper functions become spaces; bodies deprived of vitality are also a 
cinematic process of constitution of bodies, not that of presence but belief.
906
 For 
Tarr, it is another instance of getting closer to life than to cinema. This is the moment 
when the particular and the universal are indistinguishable, lost in the shimmer of 
light as it fleets from interpretation and from knowing. 
 
Tarr is not interested in the psychology of the characters but their relation to the space 
or situation that reveals their specific modes of eating, walking, or living. Apart from 
allowing the time to create its rhythms within the towns' lives, this is also a return to 
cinema without story; to the potentiality of the (visual – moving and still) image 
outside of narrative and, as such, to restoring the link to this world as it is. The slow, 
quotidian, day-to-day chores 'recorded' on black-and-white celluloid film, reminiscent 
of the first cinema experiences, far from appearing as just 'filmed reality', are stripped 
to almost abstracted forms. As such, rather than phenomenological presence, they 
offer the experience/ sense of material virtuality of what is not yet (a belief). It is the 
way of the Beckettian characters, whose existence lies in the ability to 'simply' carry 
on, and the intensely 'inhuman' choreography of the shots within shots, which texture 
the 'absurdities' of life, that take imaging away from both psychological and humanist/ 
subjective position/ perception. Tarr's characters are any-beings models/ automatons/ 
mediums, and more (or less) than 'just' human beings.
907
 This any-being is a forger 
and overman at the same time. Not motivated by a pre-existing set of rules or goals, 
they are resigned and open to the 'plodding', aimless movement of the stroll. The 
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'plodding along' might be the nonsensical gesture pointing toward the unknown and 
unforseeable force of life – thinking folded into the movement of the camera, and the 
stillness of in-between. The nameless and the nomad – extra-beings in the theatre of 
(real)phantasms
908
 – these characters prepare the way for the 'people to come'. They 
have the tendency, at once modest but also crazy, to 'become' everyone and 
everything, Deleuze writes: "an unattributable, mobile subject", who is "able to 
connect roles or possible lives without lapsing into identification."
909
 It is the 
schizophrenic, who lives the unliveable on the edge of total disintegration. 
 
The cinema of the time-image, populated not by characters as such but by actor-
mediums, who cannot act but are forced to witness 'passively' the unbearable and the 
beautiful, is a cinema of the seer, no longer an agent.
910
 Film thinks while the 
characters are seeing. A gentle postman, Valuska wanders through the streets at night, 
gazing at the world, whether staring into the inscrutable eye of the whale, or as a mute 
witness to violence.
911
 Karrer, the decadent hero of Damnation, circles the town in the 
hope of catching a glimpse of his lover and peeks from behind the various buildings 
and walls, which reveals the debris-ridden courtyards, crumbling apartment blocks, 
desolated landscapes, and rain-drenched walls of the destitute town. The doctor 
spends his time at his desk looking out of the window at the passing world around 
him, writing copiously into small school notebooks, each devoted to a particular 
inhabitant of the farm. Like Tarr’s long takes, he watches the world from afar, 
preferring to describe each minute detail rather than comment on or attempt to change 
its outcome. 
 
Schmidt … comes out through … the back door and stands … on top of … the 
path to … the sodic meadow. Futaki … carefully … slips out of … the house 
… crosses to the stables … and hides … by the wall. F. doesn't move … He 
waits … for a moment, then … he too … dashes … to the door, knocks, and 
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… comes quickly … after Schmidt. What a … hustle … It has started … to 
rain … It won't … stop … till … spring. (Sátántangó) 
 
Estike sits outside the house/ barn staring nowhere. Tarr says he finally decided to 
make Werckmeister Harmonies when he met Lars Rudolph, "whose haggard stare as 
Valuska certainly embodies the look of the film."
912
 Even the cardboard whale's eye 
seems somehow to 'embody' the satirical edge of the space between creation and 
destruction. 
 
"Tell me what you see. People are chattering about some Prince." 
"Certainly not, Mr. Árgyleán. A giant whale has arrived. This mysterious 
creature from the sea has come from the far-off oceans. Most definitely you 
have to see it too." 
"I don't like it at all, János." 
"Nothing wrong with it, Mr. Árgyleán. Just see what a gigantic animal … the 
Lord can create! How mysterious is the Lord that he amuses Himself with 
such strange creatures." 
"It will lead to trouble, János." (Sátántangó) 
 
The characters know how to see; often what they see 'is' in their eyes. Here the 
judging, rational eye relinquishes its perceptional power and becomes "the membrane 
of the external world", not an autonomous gaze directed towards it.
913
 When Estike 
walks with the body of the dead cat under her arm, advancing persistently/ relentlessly 
towards the camera, which is moving in the opposite direction, her inscrutable look 
lingering somehow on the silent contour of her lips, it seems even more 'unreadable'. 
Her sober expression is interrupted now and then by a grimace, as if in an effort to 
stop laughing, to keep a straight face. How do we 'take' these looks, not possible to 
'interpret' with the aid of film theory?
914
 What visions do the films 'think' with the 
characters? The characters are 'seers', not only because they point to tragic aesthetic, 
but "because they know how to extract from the event the part that cannot be reduced 
to what happens: that part of inexhaustible possibility that constitutes the unbearable, 
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the intolerable, the visionary's part."
915
 The camera, often positioned behind, is always 
moving among the characters but does not identify with any of them: their 'identities' 
are instead substituted with the director's aesthetic vision. In this way, the character 
losing his/ her identity enters into a 'free indirect' relationship with the poetic vision of 
the director, who affirms himself through him/ her while at the same time 
distinguishing himself from him/ her, allowing for objective and subjective to become 
'one'.
916
 A free-indirect vision.
917
 Moreover, we do not see what the character – in the 
way an individual or personality would – sees. We are caught in-between the human 
eye and the non-human camera presented in the circularity of unfolding space-time 
sequences, in the new "Erewhon" – the "nowhere" and "now here."918 Here the 
memory of film and memory of the viewer intertwine with the unknown Outside, 





Tarr's characters are visionaries but it is a labyrinthine 'view', neither or both 
subjective or/ and objective, where the film, the director, the viewer, and the outside, 
coincide and interact. This is the view without a point of view of perception, the view 
which (multiple, fragmented, schizophrenic) is the 'machinic' coming together of the 
human and inhuman eye. No longer either the status of a perceiving organ, nor a 
framing apparatus, it relishes seeing from its Euclidian geometry into the space of 
creating, and the metamorphosis of unlikely couplings and 'intuited' connections. 
Likewise, free from the Oedipal gaze of the Other, Tarr's vision, like that of his 
characters, is outside of any revelation; it persists and resists as affective expression of 
material intensity, crippling the brain's habitual capacity into non-thinking. Neither 
the empyrean of the blue skies, nor the netherworld of the underground's depth, it 
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glides over the surface, bringing forth the violated truth – the power of the false, and 
the force of life. It is a point of view constantly being transformed, metamorphosed 
into the 'creation of truth' (creation of the new), a constant production of 'shapes, 
reliefs and projections' – an art.920 An image-world that, like the world itself, is "just 
this multiplicity of viewpoints, each of which is a truth of a whole that is nothing 




This 'new race of characters', seeing rather than acting, are compelled to witness the 
world, yet are entirely unsure of what they witness, lost in the grip of some 
'uncertainty principle'. These characters do not 'change' anything, do not forward the 
narrative; they 'flow' with time, registering, seeing, recording. The creatures of the 'to-
ing and fro-ing' movement of the plastic fabulation are unconcerned even by what 
happens to them.
922
 Subjects-in-becoming, their normative individualities suspended 
in the process of individuation, and caught in-between form and content in the state of 
not-yet 'queer' subjectivity, are the figures of an aesthetic indecisiveness of becoming. 
 
[…] angels or saintly hypochondriacs, almost stupid, creatures of innocence 
and purity, stricken with a constitutive weakness but also with a strange 
beauty. Petrified by nature, they prefer … no will at all […]. They only 





The character without name or identity, a child, a poet and a forger, an orphan, an 
idiot and philosopher, they intimate this world beyond perception, beyond words, and 
beyond action. A spiritual automaton and cinematic persona folded into the 'shape' of 
nomadic subjectivity.
924
 No longer a character but a figure-image, seeing the non-
perceptible and thinking the un-thinkable. 
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This kind of character-figure, that might be referred to as a holy fool, who, like the 
Dostoyevskian "madman", is paralysed and stupefied by the situation or the problem 
beyond logic of comprehension, would also be a genuine thinker. According to 
Deleuze, it is the Russian idiot, the "underground man who possesses the necessary 
modesty" not to manage to know what everybody knows, who is able to venture to the 
non-thinking. A new, post-Cartesian 'idiot', or an ‘ethical’ figure "driven to 
uncertainty", ‘outside’ of  the pre-existing norms of perceptual and cognitive laws. It 
is also Nietzsche's player, giving him/herself to the undecided fate by radical 
dismissal of any other but chance-necessity's 'order'; an overman saying yes to life 
outside ressentiment and bad conscience.
925
 Impressionable, slow-witted János, the 
innocent, mentally handicapped Estike, a 'non-sobering' sardonic doctor, or the 
cloakroom attendant in Damnation, musing on the universal order of things, are all 
figures (of the speech-act) driven by uncertainty, on the verge of absurdity. Their 
words and their actions escape the structure of language, carrying on instead tragic 
thinking, in-between the words. Disappearing into the silent vision of the poetic 
assemblage of "ands", they merge a "supreme passivity with pure act of becoming-
active" – thinking.926  As if by no will of their own, they attract the forces of the 
unknown which pass through them leaving them somewhat perplexed and even 
paralysed, like the figure of János remaining frozen on the hospital bed at the end of 
Werckmeister Harmonies, or the doctor's withdrawal after discovering the ludicrous 
source of the distant bells. And yet, paradoxically, it is through their exhausted, 
battered, and dishevelled bodies that these 'powerless' figures recover belief in the 
world – "something or I suffocate" – the will to create and to think differently ("in 
other ways"), or otherwise.
927
 It is here that art meets philosophy. 
 
"The old idiot wanted truth, but the new idiot wants to turn the absurd into the 
highest power of thought – in other words, to create."928 
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926
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Thus, the idiots, drunkards, slow-witted, unable to react, nameless and almost 
genderless characters, by exhausting every possibility of action, 'go on' carrying the 
unknown 'yet to come' in their bodies and their looks inexhaustibly. Giving up the 
presumptions of common sense they turn their "idiocies" into "idiosyncrasies."
929
 
Experimenting freely with life not already given, they forge "conceptual relations."
930
 
They become the bearers of the free-indirect vision, silent messengers of life owned 
by no one and 'answerable' to nothing other than the art of living. This is not to say 
that children, drunkards or madmen are naïvely innocent or that they may be fitted 
with some super-human powers, but that a certain kind of powerlessness is needed in 
order to resist the reactionary, normative forces of bad conscience. It is not to promote 
degeneration or dismiss the importance of critical thinking, but to find a new sense of 
power and thinking, which might be, in the Bergsonian sense, a genuine creation, or a 
(non-organic) vital power of "a life" that accepts life's open character.
931
 In Spinozan 
terms, this would be an immanence of other powers in the composition of ourselves 
beyond any "politico-theology."
932
 Here desire and affect would be the driving 
(aesthetic) force or becoming-other, and immanent ethics – the real of "polyvocal 





Giorgio Agamben refers to a particular 'type' of character he calls an "assistant" (after 
Kafka) or  "helper." The assistants have no knowledge, no skills, and no "equipment" 
to offer help, but their smiles, looks, and very postures "seem[s] like a message."
934
 
Their 'existence' lies in "an inconclusive gesture, an unforeseen grace, a certain 
mathematical boldness in judgment and taste." They prefer to take walks. Seemingly 
'useless', these 'assistants' are endowed with a 'penetrating vision', which "recognizes 
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the men of the invisible realm."
935
 They 'help' to forget. As what is lost demands not 
to be remembered and fulfilled but to remain forgotten or "lost and therefore, for that 
reason alone, unforgettable."The assistant spells out the text of the unforgettable and 
translates it into the language of deaf-mutes. Their "gesticulations", coupled with the 
"impassive mime's face", make strange connections which require no knowledge or 
certainty but, rather, trust that something may come out. The characters of Béla Tarr's 
films seem like the perfect assistants. Anonymous and non-intending, serving no-one, 
'busy' preparing the world to come. 
 
In their motor-helplessness, their 'naïve' innocence, these character-figures are thus 
capable of 'truly' genuine thinking. Genuine thinking, which for Deleuze means 
philosophy, is necessarily antagonistic towards the combination of good sense and 
common sense. Genuine thinking does not attempt to represent or describe, but to 
make things happen by creating concepts. The simple János is in fact an articulate 
philosopher with a sense of poetry:
936
 "And now … We will have an explanation that 
simple folks like us can also understand about mortality. All I ask is that you step with 
me into the boundlessness where constancy, quietude, peace, and infinite emptiness 
reign …"937 His 'wonder-full' creative attempt to re-construct the perfect order of the 
universe with the 'bodies' of local drunks, folded into the elaborate choreography of 
camera and actors, brings out a strange sense of enchantment in the "evocation of the 
drunkenness of the universe", the eclipse and re-establishment of 'natural order',
938
 in 
what it is to create with chance, improvisation, and unpredictability. "Can you feel 
it?" János asks the companions-planets as the beginning of the eclipse is evoked. The 
drunken bodies, as Ian Johnson observed, hardly in tune with János' vision, and the 
'symbolic climax' undercut by the owner's sardonic order to leave the pub is off-set by 
the strange music filling the event, and which continues following Valuska 
disappearing into the night. "Deep emotion pierces everyone. They've escaped the 
deep weight of darkness."
939
 The way Valuska carries the moment, is it de-
construction? Construction? A moment-expression coming forth in a struggle 
enfolded in the peculiar velocity of bodies. At the end, the "boundlessness of the 
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infinite emptiness" becomes the space of creation, a fullness of potentiality. 
Oscillating on the verge of  order and disorder, beauty and ordinariness, pathos and 
sarcasm, this image is as perplexing and enigmatic as Sátántagó's cows. It does not 
make sense in relation to the film's narrative. Neither an 'allegory' of fascism, despite 
the interpretations, nor symbolic de-construction of the 'order', the film traverses 
beyond the dual state of anarchy and order; the choice seems no longer relevant in an 
open framework of 'powerless politics'. Philosophical thinking rather than philosophy 
is the not-knowing affirmation of the affect-though; a leap of faith perhaps, like the 
willingness of the drunkards to be orchestrated into the constellation of the universe, 
to play along with the game of cosmic chance. Thinking needs art. 
 
The innocent girl in Sátántangó, caught in the soulless, corrupted world of the small 
town, carefully prepares an uncompromising and tragic 'act' as she poisons her cat 
before taking her own life; an act which cannot be thought of in the context of the 
moral rectitude of good versus evil. The doctor, sealing off the window of his 
'observations' and barricading himself from the world at the end of Sátántangó, 
refuses to provide the outcome of his earlier 'investigations'. Caught in a world no 
longer possible to place within familiar structures of order or disorder, the characters 
become 'mediums' of potentialities, agents of 'things' to come. The forger, the 
'underground man', child and overman, no longer 'operating' within God's or Human 
truth, gives the self up to an impersonal and yet singular (a) life of becoming, a 'logic 




It is as if total and anarchic mobilising of the past now responds to the 




On the other hand, the seemingly helpless characters, Estike and János in particular, 
are those who in their belief (in this world) are also able to "choose to choose"; to act 
(rather than react). Despite 'evidence' to the contrary – Estike poisons herself, and 
János finishes his visionary 'journey' in the asylum – they are capable of not only 
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refusing/ resisting the power of structure, but of becoming imperceptible.
942
 
Clairvoyant-messengers, without a message, of the real. 
 
"Yes", she said to herself softly. The angels see this and understand. She felt 
serene, and the trees, the road, the rain and the night all breathed tranquillity. 
Everything that happens is good, she thought. Everything was, eventually, 
simple. She recalled the previous day and, smiling, she realised how things are 
connected. She felt that these events aren’t connected by accident but there's 
an indescribably beautiful meaning bringing them. And she knew she wasn't 
alone, for all things and people, her father upstairs, her mother, her brothers, 
the doctor, the cat, these acacias, this muddy road, this sky, this night down 
here depend on her, just as she herself depends on everything. She had no 
reason to be worried. She knew well that her angels had set out for her. 
(Sátántangó) 
 
The characters in Tarr's films become with the world, the rain, the wondering,  light 
and dark, dogs, mud, plaster falling of the walls … And every thing is a character, a 
player on a cosmic surface of becoming. It might be said that these are the figures of 




Thus, we cannot identify with the characters, nor judge the image from the position of 
a participating/ active viewer, but must accept the terms of  a 'visionary gaze' that 
ruptures dogmatic thought. Here the profound loss of ground that releases thought 
from the principle of identity/ unity replaces knowledge and 'faith' with belief in this 
world, which can reconnect men and women to 'what they see and hear'. Together 
with the director’s vision, "the inhuman eye of the camera, as Colebrook notes, 
liberates us from a fixed and moral notion of man, and allows us to access the larger 
material forces that have constituted us."
944
 Thus, becoming visionary as a viewer is 
to let go of the 'I' (eye) and become imperceptible with the sensation. Letting go of the 
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I and becoming imperceptible with sensation is to become affected as a visionary/ seer 
with the film-mind, where seeing without perceiving is an act of creation. This would 
not require a need for identification or criticism and thus allow the space to be open 
for experimentation, connections, and unforeseeable outcomes. It would become an 
encounter-event of ethics where the viewer becomes the philosopher. 
 
The 'seer' is a complex 'double' in 'creating' the seen and the invisible, actual and 
virtual, which is enfolded in the aesthetic of sensation (affect-thought). Image without 
Image, body without Organs, here pre-personal, non-subjective signs (percepts and 
affects) are actualised in the process of experience/ experiment where the unknown 
forces of creating 'merge' life and art. Here life and art encounter each other in the 
event of 'reciprocal' becomings of (dis)order, outside the represented and recognisable 
(molar) world in the image. Monstrous or beautiful, plucked out of the void, the 
staring shot enfolds a flesh-less being of sensation bubbling under the skin-image.
945
 
Neither subject nor object but something very different: a 'potential' world. In this 
sense the characters, in their different becomings (through exhaustion, vision, 
powerlessness) defy progress, preventing the virtual from realising, thus keeping 
thought and creating alive (moving), and belief in this world persistent. 
 
Thus, the visionary is the political (non)agent of powerless politics and of a passive 
vitalism: singular, a-subjective, non-organic, and impersonal becoming  that serves no 
other 'ideal' than to express an ontological movement of differentiating difference.  
Therefore, the powerlessness acquires a different 'meaning', as power-less but not 
powerless, which lies in resistance; that is, in the creative impulse, outside of common 
sense and the logic of predictable 'actions'. The will to power. It is a question of action 
as thinking and choosing different modes of life; an aesthetic rather than moral or 
teleological matter. For Deleuze, as mentioned earlier, this is a pre-hodological space 
before action, which does not point to an indecision of the spirit, but to an 
undecidability of the body. Here the obstacle does not allow itself to be determined in 
relation to goals and means but "is dispersed in a plurality of ways of being present in 
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the world, of belonging to sets, all incompatible and yet coexistent."
946
 The space 
traversed by the characters so intensely, becomes territorialised and deterritorialised at 
the same time, opening it towards a 'nomadic', even if unknown, future. This is no 
longer a question of activism versus passivism but a radical immanence where there is 
no distinction between subject/ object, mind/ body, self/ other, interiority/ exteriority, 
presence/ absence, "a carrying forward of the movement of immanence, that is a belief 
in this world as it is."
947
 The difference and change is possible through an infinite 
number of encounters and combinations that precede the eschatological ethics 
imposed by religious or philosophical/ dialectical systems. Moreover, it precedes the 
normative image of the (human) self  and of identity as an organic life that is tied to 
self-creating, autopoietic capacities brought out by art.
948
 Affect and thought is not 
owned by us but is that which happens to us from 'outside'; a result of a co-poietic 
relation with the world. Potentiality is played out by chance in an assemblage of as 
many differences as singularities, not necessarily human and organic, which assemble 
not through dialectics of the whole as unity, but through the model of a qualitative 
multiplicity, which changes qualitatively with every new connection. It is the dice 
throw. 
 
The visionary agent takes on the role of a 'bringer', who gestures (links) to this world 
via the outside. It is the agent of the  impossible as possibility, not of the nostalgic 
loss of gesture as 'mourned' by Agamben, nor the messianic belief of Derrida, but 
affirmative belief in this world as a figure-image: an 'operative field'
949
 of eventful 
connections between virtual and actual, the visible and invisible, the real and the 
imaginary, activity and passivity, spirit and body; an immanent plane of new signs. 
 
They point to nothing but themselves and the situation they are in or, better still, with, 
and at the same time bring forth the expression of becoming. "The percept mixes the 
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attractive and the repulsive, vitality and death."
950
 The viewer has to become a 
'visionary' in his/ her own right; to become a 'Dionysian machine', not to perceive but 




The characters create such a powerful and disarming intensity that, like Melville's 
Bartelby, they depart from the regime of social recognition, becoming singular 
'anybodies' whose answer to the rules of obedience is "I would prefer not to." 
Choosing a mode of existence/ life as "singular essences", no longer subordinated to a 




Their 'willingness'/ choice to 'exist' outside subjectivity (individual and social), 
rupture our everyday human perception and consciousness and, by depriving us of the 
position of a subject, create the space for becoming other as a 'subject' of nomadic 
subjectivity, a mode of being no longer based on identity.
953
 Therefore, the passivity, 
or what might be perceived as inertia and privation, desolate and without significance 
in Tarr's films, is actually the act of "tragic thinking"; a moment of grace where 
positions and oppositions do not take place. By refusing what the cliché (active-
reactive positions) suggests is interesting, the visionary (both the character and the 
viewer) is open to the outside, through holes, voids, white and black spaces. 
 
The 'intolerable' and 'unbearable', also predicated upon change, folded into a style of 
carefully fashioned, wondrous (archi)texture, 'travels' towards its potential. Becoming 




In the same way as an autonomous block of sensation 'wrests' the affects and percepts 
from life, the difficult image can 'wrest' the affect-thought from the plane of its 
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composition. In this way, the aesthetics (as style) take on a different meaning, outside 
the definitions (judgment) of art or beauty, becoming a (dis)organised rhizomatic 
body which produces difference; an aesthetico-ethical process of qualitative 
transformation, and an encounter/ event of becoming with/ the (non-familiar, 
unthought, non-recognisable) other.
955
 Béla Tarr's earthy intensity of run down, 
derelict surroundings, with excessive decay and exhausted lives, is not a return to the 
earthly origins of organic matter or to human forms. Rather, it is a means of 
recovering the aesthetic ability to think (new worlds) within this world immanently, 
without falling back onto the original model. The entropy (and the beauty) cannot be 
appreciated either aesthetically or critically. Neither social critique nor aesthetics of 
sensus communis, this would be the case of a tragic affirmation of life as multiplicity 
of human and non-human durations. As such, it carries a potential of something that 
might not comply to our (human) ideas of either progress or community, and whose 
actualisation is possible through affective intensity of image which enables an 
encounter with pre-personal signs. As the "science of the sensible", this inhuman 
aesthetics can be thought of as experiment/ experience (as difference) that is 
embedded in the 'real' world but open to the outside, beyond the given data of sense-
impressions, beyond human practices of meaning-making.
956
 Thus, thinking life 
through art takes both life and thinking beyond their existing modes and possibilities. 
 
In Werckmeister Harmonies, towards the end of the hospital massacre, two or three 
leaders enter the hospital room and rip down a shower curtain blocking their path. 
Standing in a bathtub, a naked, skeletal old man appears in a pool of light, his head 
lowered slightly. The gaze remains on the body, motionlessly staring, as if startled, 
for a while. And the crowd silently withdraws. Tarr's tropes of uncertainty, madness, 
fantasy, and unexpected beauty, all collide in this improbable shot. Moreover, almost 
a cliché itself, from the pathos of vulnerability exploited by film and media, to so 
many 'appropriations' of Psycho's (Hitchcock, 1960) shower scene, the image once 
again manages to flee recognition and once again takes us unawares, intensely and 
relentlessly. Perhaps due to the mute silence that accompanies the event, a kind of 
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ceaseless sublime intensity is felt, the pressure of the unspeakable which wants to be 
spoken.
957
 The image, as if returned from the dead (Holocaust? The war? Resurrection 
of apocalypse? An aftermath of the trauma?), shatters the present into so many shards 
that "like flaneurs, we labor to collect, each of us consigned to tracing different, 
incommensurable lines of this distended world-memory."
958
 And despite the seeming 
familiarity, it is not possible to recover the shattered consciousness into the logic of 
sensus communis. The thinking is taken outside itself into nowhere – now here. It 
arises in the gap where nothing happens, between our human time and infinity.
959
 An 
intensely horrific image of a man at his most vulnerable … More – a vision, an 
aesthetic (chance) encounter, and (dis)connection, which 'makes' the crowd withdraw 
and the viewer 'speechless'. No action determined by sensory motor schema is 
possible at a point where brains and bodies begin to be deterritorialised from rigid 
identities in the process of becoming. The 'fact image', stripped of all relations, 
becomes a pure potentiality; a life 'fixed' immanently as flickering expression. 
However 'teasing', it keeps from realising itself into any presupposed historical 
narratives, neither as excavated meaning of the past nor dialectically preconceived 
future. What wants to be remembered and what wants to be forgotten is a matter of 
non-chronological, non-linear time. The forces of Visions and Auditions tie the 
expectations into knots, resisting understanding. The photographic thinking of the still 
image becomes self-motion of thought. This is not sensory experience in opposition to 
the extra-sensory, but an experience in 'contact' with the outside, with the "delirious 
dimension", with "the unbearable."
960
 The truth can only be that which is created. The 
character, the viewer, and the image become 'visionary' in a "mobile and plastic 
creation of the self and the other as in between", a difference. Not confronting or 
'recognising' the other but becoming other (not in a psychological but ontological 
sense) which is already the case, as any being is always already a being in becoming. 
In this sense, as Patricia MacCormack notes, the subject cannot observe; he/ she is 
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folded as 'the structure self'.
961
 The aesthetic experimentation takes all narratives 
outside of the personal into singular, nameless becoming. 
 
A plane of composition is forged, which is also a plane of immanence: a formless, 
univocal, self-organising process always qualitatively differentiating from itself; a 
complex network of forces, particles, connections, relations, affects and becomings. 
 
Tarr's imagery traces life and thought invisibly and imperceptibly through the surfaces 
of misery, destruction, and inertia, in a truly unique way. One is never certain what to 
make of the endless returns and contradictory points of view. Expectancy is folded in 
the style of w(o)andering that is also waiting. Everything takes time and nothing 
happens in the end. The crowd at the hospital withdraws and we never find out what 
happens to them, as we will never know what happens to the farm collective. The 
camera lingers in futile anticipation on the empty space. When nothing happens, Yve 
Lomax observes, the virtual is trying to keep itself from realisation.
962
 Sometimes it 
returns as actualisation half way between – a becoming. 
 
There are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between 
unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively unformed, 
molecules, and particles of all kinds. There are only haecceities, affects, 




Nothing is when thinking happens to us. It takes the form of a shock. The shock: 
confusing, paradoxical, impossible, incommensurable – neither Eisenstein’s montage 
nor Brecht's distanciation. According to Deleuze, to shock is for the image to have the 
'power' to excavate thinking; to think anew, to annihilate any sense of pre-existent 
structure.
 964
 It is the affect at close range, a staring shot where nothing is certain but a 
process of creating, plodding along, neither progressing nor regressing, or moving in 
                                                 
961
 Particia MacCormack, 'An Ethics of Spectatorship: Love, Death and Cinema', in Deleuze and 
Schizoanalysis of Cinema, p. 130. 
962
 Lomax, Passionate Being: : Language, Singularity and Perseverance, IB Taurus Publishers, 
London and New York, 2009, p. 61. 
963
 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 266. 
964
 The shock, Deleuze writes, is not the kind that we find in the arbitrary violence of mainstream 
cinema, nor in the intellectual strategies of montage, as both rely on the action/ reaction sensory-motor 




both directions at once. The automatic movement of film and the staring stilled shot 
realise the artistic essence of the image "producing a shock to thought."
965
 Something 
makes us gasp, something intolerable and unbearable, something too powerful or too 
unjust, but sometimes also too beautiful, something that outstrips our sensory-motor 
capacities. A gap opens between perception and comprehension. "Something in the 
world forces us to think."
966
 Certain images (pure optical and sound situations) or 
signs (opsigns, sonsigns, …), provoke "vibrations", as Kant would have it, or 
sensations, according to Deleuze, between faculties, between imagination and reason, 
that put us in contact with the Outside.
967
 By opening a gap between imagination and 
reason, film is thinking tragically and photographically. As its own thought, it creates 
intuitive image-concepts, nonconceptual affects, or fractured perspectives, that meet 
directly with our own minds; and rather than reconciling the faculties into shared 
sensibility, it shatters common sense, crippling the brain's capacity to reconstitute any 
habitus, creating new and unknown pathways of thinking. The shock needs to be 
produced through the sensations of the unknown, the unthinkable 'lured' by the durée 
of image. The shock prevents re-action, which makes the character and the viewer 





Tarr's imaging appears as a somewhat blurry kind of shocking – the slow enduring of 
hallucinatory becoming. It can be a limit-situation, like the massacre in the hospital in 
Werckmeister Harmonies, or banal, like Karrer shaving his face, where the suspension 
of the world, by giving the visible to thought, replaces our regular vision (thought) of 
the world with a different view, beyond familiar definitions, opening up affective 
possibilities. Chance and improvisation are the essence of thinking. Teasingly verging 
on actualising, it is never actualised into truth.
969
 The cat torture scene is filmed with 
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the same 'disinterested' distance as preparing dinner, with no point of view or 
perception.
970
 The cinematic image takes on what we cannot think and reflects our 
initial 'incoherent' thoughts (unformulated linguistically) – those thoughts that are 
powerful but unnameable, uncontrollable.
971
 It is the violence pushed beyond 
"Oedipal" figures of disobedience, towards the 'mystery' of affirmation, the new 
notion of time, which beyond tragic "cycles of revenge", and which might allow for 
an "affirmation of Life", and the presubjective, presignifying violence that is 
inseparable from it.
972
 What forces us to think, Deleuze writes, quoting Blanchot, is 
"the 'inpower of thought', the figure of nothingness, the inexistence of a whole which 
could be thought."
973
 This is the moment when the sublime cannot be synthesised into 
human perception. Perhaps this is the moment of the radical, tragic thinking of total 
affirmation; not shared experience, but difference so alien it seems to the world locked 
in the habitual and deterministic structure of reacting. This shock-thought is the 
aesthetic of suspension and waiting which is never resolved, and where thinking, not 
judging, happens to us as a result of an encounter with the unthinkable (through art) 
which takes the sublime further into the realm of nonhuman aesthetics; an aesthetic 
happening-event without closure, and without promise; a process of becoming 
imperceptible. Unthinkable thinking without the Image. We need art in order to think. 
 
When nothing 'happens' we also encounter a different visuality. 
 
Tarr creates spaces that allow for the impersonal "pure memory" to float amongst and 
through things and situations, opening the senses to new and unforeseen encounters. 
Sleeping, daydreaming, forgetting, are the indirect forms making possible lateral 
connections that recall something entirely unrelated to our present situation. This is a 
space of haptic visuality, as already mentioned, which Laura Marks 'discovered' in 
intercultural cinemas.
974
 The formal and textual qualities: grainy, unclear images; the 
depiction of characters in states of sensory activity; close-to-the-body camera 
positions and panning across the surface of  objects; changes in focus; under- and 
over-exposure; and decaying images, are the formal strategies that evoke such 
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memory of the senses. Haptic visuality sees the world as though it were touching it: 
closely, unknowingly. Combined with non-chronological time and the non-human eye 
of the camera, it materialises thinking outside (human) consciousness: "[w]e are not in 
the world, we become with the world, we become by contemplating it."
975
 The rain, 
mud, vast landscapes, decrepit interiors of post-communist facilities (hospital, 
government office), black-and-white photography that might recall communism's 
greys, the play of light off bodies in bed, the drunken revelry of a fog-ridden dance, 
unflattering greys of blocks of flats and desolate roads, empty streets with dogs 
wandering in the rain, and a melancholic waltz running through the images. The films 
invite to be viewed with the muscles and skin as much as with the eyes. Tarr is much 
closer to the ground than Tarkovsky for instance, whose images are also visually 
intense. He is in our heads, pulling us along with movement, as if we were tracking 
the shot, as if we were there; aware, perceptive, but also captive.
976
 This kind of 
cinema implies a kinaesthetic way of experiencing space and images stored in our 
memory, which are embodied and haptic, as well as being virtual and imagined. It 
forgets as well as remembers, forging something we may have or have not seen 
before. Films force thought to think the unclear, blurry, dispersive outside. Such no-
place of orphaned, nomadic thinking, neither nostalgic nor traumatic, but in a sense 
'unmourned', and as such existing in a state of potentiality and belief. 
 
Haptic visuality also invites a kind of (non)identification in which there is a mutual 
dissolving of viewer and viewed, subject and object, where, Marks writes, looking is 
not about power but about yielding.
977
 Haptic images push us out of cinema's 
illusionary depth and invite our eyes to linger on the surface of the image. Rather than 
pull us into idealised space, they help us feel the (non)connectivity between ourselves, 
the image, and the world to which the image links us photographically. Like the 
characters, certain aesthetics bring forth the experience of force (of becoming-other) 
through collapsing the symbolic/ unified space of the familial/r. Forging false and 
nomadic 'landscapes', it puts truth into crisis. It puts identity into crisis. "I is an other." 
To become other is not to identify, identify with, become like or become the same as. 
Deleuze finds that the "I" only ever refers to contingent effects of interactions 
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between events, responses, memory functions, social forces, chance happenings, 
belief systems, economic conditions, and so on, that together make up life. It is a case 
of 'transcendental empiricism', where the impersonal virtual intensities actualise in 
situations: muddy street, old scraps of wallpaper falling off the wall, overflowing 
ashtrays, a drunk asleep in the corner, or the spider web. At the end of Damnation, 
Karrer, "snarling and swirling around like a belligerent wild dog", becomes the earth, 
the dog, the rain, the world. The powerless power therefore, is that which relents to a 
recognition of powerlessness: "to think the whole and to think oneself, thought which 
is always fossilised, dislocated, collapsed."
978
 To become (through) 'intensity' is thus 
to question one-self. 
 
The viewer, also free of identification, becomes any-body amongst other bodies 
affectively. 
 
The time-image 'forces' us to think by putting us in contact with the outside, and by 
allowing us to become haptically with the intensive time-space. Non-subjective, 
(in)human encounters with 'this world' – is an ethic of affect-thought. No longer a 
question of judgment or understanding but of metamorphosis. 
 
This is no more a question of passive versus active viewing, but rather of powerless, 
tragic thinking, where the viewer is 'shocked' into immobility; a kind of stupor of the 
unknown or the not-recognisable; not in the image itself but 'through' it, in the sense 
of it. Suspended between motion and stillness, in a sort of indecisive uncertainty, the 
spectator is free to create with the image-world; that is, to think and live differently 
without the need for overcoming or 'being otherwise'. Becoming-spectator is therefore 
an ethical position of seeing and hearing, which is a result of unforeseeable singular 
encounters, possible not through knowledge but intuition. Not reacting, but seeing in 
such encounter, is to allow for vision-thought to persist as difference in itself. 
 
The time-image's notion of cinematic experience as enduring is thus bound to a new 
way of seeing. Hallucinatory perception, dreams, blurry images difficult to recognise 
by common sense, create an 'atmosphere' conducive to vision. From the affect as 
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"quasi-traumatic" encounter, through a differential transformation of the faculties, to a 
visionary way of seeing; in going through "the unbearable" and enduring, the seen 
vision becomes visionary, provoking new thinking (outside and unknown). As Lisa 
Ackerwall writes, the faculty of vision no longer corresponds to the model of 
recognition – as the model of ordinary vision – but rather to "cognition" as visionary 




"The purely optical and sound situation" writes Deleuze, "evokes a function of 





In this way, despite Tarr's pledge of "going downwards" because "the whole fucked 
up world is over", he starts again from the middle, in a kind of Nietzschean positive 
negation, saying "yes" to life outside its human agency.
981
 'Going downwards' is an 
aesthetic choice, "becoming more simple, more pure."
982
 Still, in the evolving 
'simplicity' of the narrative, there remains an intensely choreographed image-world, 
imagining perhaps the world without the 'human condition'. No more stories, no more 
'investigations'. Just the seen and the heard. Karrer chooses to isolate himself for 
good, becoming in the process "less than human."
983
 In what might be seen as the 
ultimate degradation, and how most critics perceive it, the encounter/ relation with a 
dog at the end of Damnation might, paradoxically, be an act of liberation anticipating 
different relations between human and the world. Like a Deleuzian spark of a single 
mind and a pack of wolves
984
 outside of solidarity based on laws of obedience, or 
normative molar structures, communities other than Human, beyond the human 
condition, are possible. A blind monk, towards the end of Sátántangó, warning about 
approaching Turks in the ruins of a chapel, becomes an absurd materialisation of the 
film's opening – a 'heavenly', distant bell. In the last scene, the doctor is blacking out 
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the window. At the end of Werckmeister Harmonies, the image-world dissolves into 
the vision of the huge whale's body disintegrating in the centre of the square. There is 
no resolution, and no closure. Tarr sets the world in motion, then traverses it slowly 
and curiously, allowing his work to live on a personal or particular, as well as cultural 
or universal, plane of creative consciousness; as the 'collective brain' without 
necessity for the collective subject. The result is a profound loss of ground that 
releases thought from the principle of identity/ unity; that is, a return to the same 
plane or repetition which is difference. 
 
There are only necessities: there is no one who commands, no one who obeys, 




It is not that there are not positive actualised outcomes that make these films 
'hopeless'. On the contrary, the hope is in the lack of outcome, of non-existence of any 
original models. The change is time itself - unpredictable, impossible to foresee, the 
non-clock time. The 'hope', or rather belief, is in the movement of (e)motion and in 
stillness of thought, vibrating in-between, on the surface, in the style of virtual-
material force of untimely creation. The only way we can speak of Béla Tarr's cinema 
as being political is through his aesthetic vision, an artistic will to create, through the 
richness of distinct moments of memory and sensations that allow for a different 




In one of the most beautiful moments (in Sátántangó), the human poise and 
nonhuman camera come together in the poetical pause, where the aesthetic of 
immanence unfolds in a fragmentary imperceptible 'description', hovering gently 
above bodies asleep on the floor of the newly found location. While the silent and 
hypnotic camera watches over the sleepers, the voiceover gently narrates each dream. 
Chiaroscuro light, the owl perched in the window, and the singular moments of 
hesitation vibrate within the uncertain hope found in the desolated space of the half-
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ruined building. Here the trust in the unknown, grace, and "deep emotion", come 
together as sound-vision-thought …987 
 
Halics was pursued by a hunchback with a glass eye. And after all sorts of 
trials he ran into the river but he started to lose heart; every time he came up 
for air the little man hit his head with a long stick. And each time he shouted: 
"Now you'll get it." 
The schoolmaster persuaded a man wearing an old suit to go with him to 
somewhere he knows; the man agreed like someone who can't say no. He 
could hardly control himself and when they turned into a deserted park, he 
even pushed him to reach a bench surrounded by bushes. He made the man lie 
down and he jumped on him, kissed him on the neck … 
The ground trembled under Schmidt's feet. As if he was walking on the 
moors. He climbed up into a tree, but he felt that started to sink too. He was 
lying on the bed and tried to get the nightgown off his wife. But she started to 
yell, he jumped after her, the nightgown was torn. She laughed and the nipples 
on her enormous breasts were like two beautiful roses. 
Mrs. Halics was washing Mrs. Schmidt's back; the rosary on the rim of the tub 
slipped into the water like a snake. Mrs. Schmidt said she had enough, her 
skin was burning from the scrubbing, but Mrs. Halics pushed her back into the 
bath and went on scrubbing her back … 
Mrs. Kráner heard the noise from outside but she didn't know what it could be. 
She put on a fur coat and left for the engine-shed. She had almost reached the 
road when she had a bad feeling … 
Mrs. Schmidt was a bird flying over the clouds, happily. She saw that 
someone down there was waving at her … She felt the warmth of the sun on 
her back, she came down a bit. She wanted to snatch a bug. 
Futaki's shoulders were beaten with an iron bar. He couldn't move, he was tied 
to a tree. He stretched out and felt the rope loosen. He looked at his shoulders 
and saw a long wound; he turned his head, he couldn't stand seeing it … 
(Sátántangó) 
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Tarr replaces perception with vision, giving us access to this world as it is, where the 
belief in this world is a life immanent only to itself. Thinking the world differently, 
when 'belief' replaces 'knowledge of' the world, turns the world from something given 
into something to be explored, always to be constructed and created; again, this is not 
according to the measure of 'what is' but according to 'what this world is capable 
of'.
988
 Such thinking is inseparable from belief as tragic passive vitalism, that is, also 
an ethical choice. 
 
No longer bound by the signification that "perceives in order to read and reads in 
order to know", but by love (the encounter between desire and grace), the 'seeing' 
subjectivity "opens up to the potentialities of thought without a compulsion to convert 




An ethics of spectatorship ends the war of signification and shifts cinematic 




The screen does not love us, Patricia MacCormack writes. However, if we think of 
other, not necessarily conscious, relations between the image and the viewer – the 
virtual, momentarily fleeting intensities that involve other singularities in the 
assemblage of creating – we might think of reciprocal relations –  not in a 
phenomenological sense – but as forces in mobile systems which include the world, 
filming (photographing), viewing, and the outside (affect-thought). Hybrid aesthetic 
encounters.
991
 It would not be the 'love' of harmonious existence, but saying "yes" to 
life in the tragic sense of chance-necessity. 
 
Strange and (in)human, this 'love' is of the 'new health', neither the "morality of 
salvation" nor the schizo- of analysis. It is the love of the dice throw, of the 
unthinkable, the new, the risky ethics of singular encounters (outside the eye/I 
politics) in the multiplicity of relations (within and between) human and non-human. 
The Amor fati – the love of life that is of chance and necessity, undecided rather than 
pre-established, deterministic fate. The passion of 'passive vitalism', of the unknown, 
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"The power of art is ethical: the power not just to present this or that affect, but to 
bring us to an experience of 'affectuality' – or of the fact that there is affect", writes 
Colebrook.
993
 Tarr's imaging 'affectuate' in the empty time of celluloid: "nought as 




Neither identification, pity, or empathy, nor redemption … It is an altogether different 
connection from both within and on the surface; a connection of intensive moments, 
sympathising … Expressions merge for a tiny moment, enough to collide in 
divergence, producing change, after which 'nothing is going to be the same'. This is 
the freeing of the difference, which, as Foucault writes, 
 
requires thought without contradiction, without dialectics, without negation; 
thought that accepts divergence; affirmative thought whose instrument is 
disjunction; thought of the multiple – of the nomadic and dispersed 
multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of the same; 
thought that does not conform to a pedagogical model (the fakery of prepared 
answers) but attacks insoluble problems – that is, a thought which addresses a 
multiplicity of exceptional points, which is displaced as we distinguish their 




An ethics of immanence will disavow its reference to judgments of good and evil, 
right and wrong, as according to a transcendent model, rule, or law. Rather, the 
diversity of living things and particularity of events will demand the concrete methods 
of immanent evaluation (ethics) and immanent experimentation (creativity); a poetic 
embracing of vibrant matter. 
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The belief (in this world) is stored in looks and gestures, not seeking to know but able 
to see without perception; that is, to imagine a future without Future. This is the lived 
ethics of virtual becomings, outside of political or moral judgments, and possible 
through an aesthetics of immanent difference. Pragmatism as an attempt to transform 
the world, to think a new world or new man insofar as they create themselves.
996
 
'Empiricism' as expressing the logic of life itself.
997
 This is the ethics of radical 
difference, not difference from but difference as a creating force of (non-human) life 
as becoming without end and without destination.  
 
The ethics of resisting cliché (a dogmatic image of moral judgment) – in defence of  a 
'difficult' image …  
 
The ethics of 'hope', of belief in this world, and of "choosing to choose", is the 
question of non-human, vital reconnection with life; neither phenomenological nor 
cognitive but affective, thinking through the machinic assemblages of new 
connections being affected by bodies, images, impressions, weather, the screen …  
The ethics of encounter: the new, and becoming produced through singular encounters 
that affect each other. Leaps of faith folded in momentary intensities, vibrating 
polyvocally in the fleshless 'flesh' of the world's immanence. A 'powerless politics' of 
'passive vitalism', not of the organism as a self-creating vital entity, but that of a 
singular spark – 'a' life that "might or might not exist, that comes into being and 
passes away."
998
 It is the ethics of imperceptible becomings, of the force of potential 
that can only be 'sensed', emanating from the image. 
 
It is a 'hope', like that of Gerard Richter, "that something will emerge that is unknown 
to me, which I could not plan …"999 This is a becoming through the image, "that will 
inflect or deflect any creative force from simply realising itself."
1000
 This is the return 
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of the new (of) thinking, thinking that does not require a model or a destination; an 




All those apparently desolated and deprived also maintain an "undeteriorated dignity." 
This is not a social or critical commentary but the affirmation of life in a most 
difficult and most affirmative sense; the tragic. The deliberate delaying of the reason 
these people are gathered and waiting for challenges the spectators’ activity – the 
wait, exhaustion, the void – becomes a constructive energy,1002 and yielding grace.  
As McCormack writes, 
 
[g]race is the expression of openness which cannot know the effects of 
opening and which offers the self as available for an encounter of becoming 
with an element which is not knowable and hence not necessarily desirable. 





Watching this kind of film is like experiencing a hallucinatory vivacity, a "very 
special being in the world, on the edge of sleep." This very special being in the world 
"steers us closer to the shores of that "other locality" where Freud first took his 









Starting with life, 'writing' through art, and now returning to life again; extending 
aesthetics to life as a mode of existence (passive vitalism); a state of becoming where 
thought and creation are the means of an ethical choice (belief in this world and its 
power of transformation). 
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… Unity of life and thought … one step for life, one step for thought. Modes 




The will to power is 'tested' here not only through its various figures but also through 
'doing away with judgment'; by creating the situations – illogical and paradoxical – 
that persist where light mingles with darkness in the cosmic dance of shimmering 
becomings. 
 
The will to power as the will to dominate is blurred within the uncertain non-
dialectical movements in-between. There is never a clear sense of where it might be 
located and how it can be 'judged'. The violent force of the hospital massacre has only 
a vague connection to the implied; its obviousness – in relation to what it refers to – 
disappears somewhere between the deceptive strategic proceedings of Esther’s wife 
and the nonsensical/ hysterical threats of the invisible 'Prince' hiding in the belly of 
the cardboard whale. Valuska walking into the darkness of immense possibility is no 
longer bound to the human laws. Beyond choosing and non-choosing, looking in the 
eye of the whale, he is 'resign' to a chance-necessity suspended between the order of 
the eclipse and the massacre at the end of the film. A holy fool and celestial body, 
metamorphosed in the stillness of the moment, and whiteness of the hospital room at 
the end of journey. An uncanny scenario where the human Image is banished and a 
new sense of this world starts to feel itself from within(out) what is unknowingly 
another plane of  composition.  The will to power is also recognition of the power of 
the image, of the possibility of seeing (differently), outside the help of narrative, and 
of language. Is Estike's quiet gesture of straightening her skirt manifested later in the 
body laying itself to rest after taking the poison, the will to power? With no more real 
or apparent worlds, there remain bodies, as Deleuze points out – after Nietzsche – 
bodies that are nothing but forces, darker and more agitated world: bodies and 
qualities which are also bodies, breaths and souls are bodies, actions and passions 
themselves are bodies."
1007
 In this sense, the 'will to power' is the power to affect and 
be affected rather than act from the centre of consciousness. It is no more a reaction to 
obstacles but a relation between one force and another outside judgment.
1008
 "Beyond 
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good and evil" does not mean renouncing their existence, but rather than opposing, 
resenting, or accusing the "exhausted, descendent, and degenerating life", finding/ 
choosing a mode of life capable of transforming itself in relation to the forces it 
encounters, increasing the powers of life by opening new 'possibilities'
1009
 in the 
materiality of living thought. It is empowering through affect that allows for new, 
untried connections and genuine thinking. 
 
It is not a matter of judging life in the name of higher authority, which would 
be good, the true; it is a matter, on the contrary, of evaluating every being, 
every action and passion, even every value, in relation to life which they 





It is, above all, raising "the false to its highest creative or transformative powers"; an 
artistic will; the becoming-child of philosophy – becoming-artist.1011 Estike's choice, 
the dignity offered not so much to humanity but life, the intensity of encounters, the 
light revealing nothing, and the enacted eclipse, are acts of choice in the nonhuman 
becoming of man. Those who "choose to choose" affirm the potential of multiplicity 
in singular everyday gestures, as long as gestures keep themselves from realising, that 
is, stagnating into norms. They leap beyond rational and moral certainties into an 
open Whole, trusting the new and unknown. Tarr, in his artistic will to resist 
judgment, forges life where "there is no longer truth or appearance," but where the 
'truth' is created in the 'shape' of the New, in the mould of a delicate power of the 
false. These suspended moments of uncertain 'beings' (another film running within the 
stagnation and entropy) are the moments of belief in this world. This is the only 
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chance, Deleuze writes, "for art or life, the Nietzschean, Melvillian, Bergsonian, 


























                                                 
1012





 Without conclusion; as such 
 
 
… films are our only means of authenticating our lives. 
I really don’t know why I make films. 




If I knew the names of things of acts of places 
I would not write, I would name, and everything would be said. 




'I think of life, all the systems that I shall be able to build will never match my cries of 
a man engaged in remaking his life …' 





Has the desire to open up the photographic real, and to think differently about the 
image 'materialised' through the above Tarr-Deleuze or film/image-philosophy 
encounters?
1016
 Has the challenge to think in terms of 'doing' (creating, constructing 
and experimenting, where thinking happens to us from without) been achieved? I 
believe it has, if composing a number of planes where radical re-thinking of 'what is' 
(stillness and movement, art and life, politics and aesthetics) took the form of 
uncertain and unrealised becomings. And it has, if sensing the real photographically 
through the moving-still wondering in between 'aesthetics' and 'the real' encouraged 
different thinking and different writing. Begun from the middle, and moving 
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alongside the borders and edges of the labyrinthine irregular construction, in between 
theory and practice, the "writing of the image" has no ending. Neither contributing to 
nor reinforcing an overarching argument, this project aspires to invite further 
openings, (mis)interpretations and creations. Its expectation/ wish is to carry on 





The earthy materiality of minute detail is caught in the duration, becoming duration 
itself; a wo(a)ndering thought, an empty time. Particular and universal merge as 
photograph(ic) thought is enfolded in molecular becomings. Body becomes the 
intense of transforming body and static matter an ensemble of dancing molecules. The 
sounds of domestic spaces call the invisible forces of the desert, and monotonous 
heaviness is already seeded with a desire to fly. The space, traversed by the characters 
so intensely, becomes territorialised and deterritorialised at the same time, opening it 
towards a 'nomadic' future. Personal and political meet on a plane of creative 
consciousness becoming a collective brain. Leaps of faith are folded in momentary 
intensities, vibrating in the fleshless flesh of the world’s immanence. The rhythm and 
the passing time. Pulsating force of the earth and cosmic virtual floating resonance. 
Unresolved contradictions are not contradictory (they escape the dialectics of 
either/or), but encompass a paradox of immanence-life. 
 
As has become apparent throughout the thesis, bringing together Tarr’s difficult 
imagery and Deleuze’s equivocal concepts has been necessarily constructed around 
oppositions where mind and body, imaginary and real, self and other, could no longer 
function as ‘decidable’ qualities. Disjunctive (divergent) rather than dialectical (where 
one is replaced by another) synthesis of Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence allows 
the oppositions to coexist in the affirmation of both/and, rather than to be negated in 
the structure of either/or. Tarr’s imaging, both haptic and incorporeal, demanded, on 
the other hand, that such (seeming) oppositions remain unresolved. Thus, the 
paradoxes are embraced in the style of “nomadic distribution” where the oppositions 
are neither contradictory nor collapsed into one but where the difference (vibrating in-
between) lingers undecidedly with/in the rhizomatic web of multiplicity. 
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Tarr’s vision, outside any revelation, persists and resists as affective expression of 
material intensity, crippling the brain’s habitual capacity into non-thinking. A 
‘worlding’ or ‘thinging’ that becomes inhumanly unfamiliar, intolerable and 
excruciatingly beautiful, embraces mind/body tensions. Neither abstract, nor 
phenomenological flesh, the ‘matter-vision’, both an exhausted body and incorporeal 
virtual force, is encountered as the “unknown body” and de-subjectified experience.  
Hovering on the edge without either falling over or transcending the gap, Tarr 
balances on the verge of chaos, of total disintegration almost all the way, almost 
reaching the ‘void’, and yet returns again and again, only to start with a new vision 
repeated differently ‘ad infinitum’. The material, crude, everyday brute 'reality', is 
necessary to sustain the in-between, to become the extraordinary, to call forth the non-
definable, imperceptible virtual forces. A profoundly productive ‘negativity’ of non-
human humanism where the ‘order’ is created on the verge, in-between, and the 
intensity of desire is able to sustain itself without breaking down. Not opposing 
degradation or destruction with hope but by constructing such compositions where the 
'hope' would rise up precisely from degradation, entropy, and struggle, he stretches 
things to the point of impossibility, unthinkable, unimaginable. The force of the image 
grabs and repels, pulling us into the image-world-void, where neither affection/ 
cognition nor identification is possible. Intensity so great that it shatters every attempt 
to arrive at any commonsensical conclusions. Here it is not “I” who feels. Tarr’s 
incredibly uncanny ability to compose an image where impersonal and unintentional, 
subjectless expression would render itself visible in the style that enables the image to 
think the unthinkable and to sense the impossible, affirms all. Not either/or but both/ 
and. Haptic visuality and imperceptible affect, intense physicality and non-human, are 
becoming in the tragic aesthetics of ‘undecided fate.’ Tarr weaves the thread of this 
chance-necessity, balancing on the edge, keeping unforeseeable potential from ever 
realising and the ‘hopeless hope’ in this world, and this life, alive. Details vibrate in a 
web of relations where 'everything is connected to everything else', and yet the 
connection is of a fragmentary nature where the fragment (un)forms itself in the 
process of differentiation, not as part of the whole but as opening - a gap. Verging on 
the impossible, he keeps the gap open and alive, holding the resolution away. It is the 
politics of tragic aesthetics; the real(ism) where powerless and exhausted bodies force 
us to think, where the intolerable, unthinkable image-world is the sight-plane of 
transformation and becoming, where the power of the false as both creating and 
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diagnosing, resists doxa. It is both cinema of body and cinema of brain, being of 
becoming. 
Thus, thinking with Tarr’s imagery through Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema resulted 
in a style (fragmentary, poetical writing) and methodology (critical and creative) 
where the paradoxes are not resolved and the structure remains open; where the 
‘problem’ is allowed to express itself on its own, and the difference and change to 
happen through an infinite number of encounters and combinations. A ‘rhizomatic’ 
thinking without a fixed centre or order so much, as a multiplicity of expanding and 
overlapping connections. Thus, to think and write with the tensions, the critical and 
creative film philosophy project required the aptitude of a playful poetics of 
affirmation that is a ‘strategy’ of embracing rather than resolving. Outside of 
judgment, in “genuine thinking” without hope and without promise, the opposing 
forces needed to find their own (co)existence in the poetic meandering, encountering-
relating outside interpretation or explanation. Furthermore, unresolved paradoxes 
enabled experience of the real as immanent intertwining of the physicality/ 
materiality, its movement as time, and the virtual outside as actual-virtual becoming; 
as creating/ experimenting (tragic aesthetics) and as thinking (hallucinatory 
becoming) with films. Only through the paradox remaining open can the expression 




The thesis brought together photography and cinema in the image that is not realised 
in knowledge and thus has the capacity to disrupt/ affect and produce other 
'knowledges'/ thinking. It has been constructed as the plane of virtual potentialities, 
where the critical and creative interventions coexist in a variation of 'voices' and 
'visions', repetitions and intervals. This consisted of writing 'with' Tarr's film images 
philosophically in a Deleuzian sense of creating, bringing together film, photography 
and thinking with images as potentiality for new connections and new relations, while 
at the same time extending the theory toward practice (as writing) in order to collapse 
both into the process of emergence (new outcomes). The movement of reclaiming 
took the means of intuitive sensing rather than knowledge, and wished to function as 
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'active forgetting' and affirmative experimentation with what is yet to come, rather 




Béla Tarr's imaging fleets from so called 'new' aesthetics and politics alike, bringing 
forth impersonal, inhuman cosmic affects-thoughts, creating visual and aural 
landscapes in which one loses oneself and thus can see and feel in new and unforeseen 
ways. Existential and earthy, its aim is not to bring us to nature or to critique the 
world we live in. Nor is the choice of black and white celluloid the return to authentic 
or original forms of expressions. Tarr’s imagery traces life and thought invisibly and 
imperceptibly through the surfaces of misery, destruction, and inertia in a truly unique 
way. He  is not interested in representing or recording reality. His films are ‘realistic’ 
not in attention to social content, but rather through the invention of a new kind of 
image capable of showing the “intolerable”/ unimaginable for which neither language 
nor law pre-exists. It is also new materiality and new realism, a new time-image; the 
real which is both a material physicality and imperceptible sensations - percepts and 
affects, landscapes and faces, visions and becomings;
1018
 where physical and mental 
are entangled and (dis)connected in the ‘structure’ that remains open. Gestures and 
'brute reality', as well as dreams and memories, are events fluctuating between human 
and nonhuman in the poetic communication of ‘the false’. People, dogs, rain, moods, 
textures, details, neither particular nor universal but cosmic, enter into 'larger vision'. 
Spaces, places, movements, gestures, worlds, signs and bodies - a thousand tiny 
perceptions in an assemblage of actual and virtual expressions. They happen with the 
matter of the world and the spirit of vision as a multiple one.  Outside the history and 
humanism, intensely earthy in its virtual sensing/intuiting of a pre-personal, non-
organic life and its ‘tragic’/ecstatic thinking, this new time-image is material but 
where perception is decentred from the subject and disconnected from narrative. 
Neither abstract universal nor flesh of the world, it does not show what the world is 
but senses new worlds through vision that is thinking, tactile, visceral and non-human/ 
impersonal. Here the amnesiac reality embraces both a process of entropy – an eternal 
return of the same – and a potentiality of what is yet to come which lies in this world. 
It is a new sense of being-in-the-world, belief in this world by creating it, even if it 
seems devoid of meaning, even if it is destined to extinction. Neither social nor 
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cultural but ‘cosmic’, it deals with ‘the human condition’. This cinema – a uniquely 
intense and insistent vision, not exclusively confined to the sight, and devoid of 
judgment, is capable of extracting life itself as a complex potentiality in all its infinite 
variations different from the habitual and normative logic of existence. Its intention is 
not to save us or perfect us (or to damn or corrupt), but rather to complicate things, to 
create more complex nervous systems, and to release the potentialities of life - new 
worlds and new modes of existence within this world.
1019
 In the case of aesthetic this 
would be the question of the 'tragic' inhuman humanism where the (hu)man is only 
one mode of existence amongst many other, and where life gives meaning to itself in 
a (tragicomic) 'play' in which new forms are continually created and destroyed. An 
ethics, as Nietzsche would have it, not that of hubris but of the ever newly-awakened 




In the same fashion Deleuze demands a new logic which calls for a truly creative and 
experimental disposition towards life, outside of what is known and accepted, 
including art and politics. This new logic, or new kind of 'sense' is characterized by a 
principle of singular encounters, rather than on a-priori judgment. For him, as 
Colebrook points out, thought, the ethics of thinking in any form lies in how 
something works and what it can do, and not in any of its already given terms.
1021
 
Here art, life and philosophy merge in the process of virtual becoming imperceptible. 
 
Nomadic subjectivity instead of subject/ object, atheist metaphysics instead of spirit/ 
matter, intense singularities instead of intellect/ sensation, affect-thought instead of 
mind/ body, affirmation of this life or belief in this world rather than judgment based 
on transcendental moral oppositions, such is the Tarr/Deleuzian image-world in 
becoming. 
 
Not philosophical in the disciplinary sense but a disruption of a discipline, or 
experimental intervention (seen as a catalyst of expression rather than subjective or 
objective argument) this project is an assemblage of 'Ands', neither progressing nor 
advancing, but hesitating in between image and thought, matter and concept, in what 
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might be called a "fleeting and fragile perception;"
1022
 a desire to bring forth the 
virtual unknown differently. Not in order to develop a totalising argument but to 
experiment with thinking through the "non-standard aesthetics,"
1023
 of fractured 
immanence. Not in terms of what is accepted as aesthetics or politics but in collapsing 
the distinction between form and content, art and life. Here, by both the films' 
philosophy and my own thinking where 'I is another', the affects and concepts are 
teased out of the chaosmic texture of Tarr-Deleuze's image-worlds (filmosophy) in the 
formulation of a 'free-indirect discourse' which 'simulates' and which brings truth into 
question. 
 
Putting opposing concepts in 'conversation' created an encounter which would call 
forth the powers of the false, “suggesting to thought ‘something to incommunicate’, 
the unthought...”1024 It allowed the impersonal expression as difference to sustain the 
undecidability of a gap which is now autonomous as well as both/ and. Opposites 
brought into 'contact' interact, resist, overlap, 'becoming' on the surface, forming and 
'unforming', keeping the forces of chaosmos from dying. It is the logic of "And". Not 
the search for truth but affirmation of the world  is embedded in a process unfolding 
through the w(a)onderous aberrant movement and repetition of difference. Amnesiac 
reality and hallucinatory becoming come together in the space of “here and now” 
which is “nowhere” outside forms and subjects. Thinking with And instead of 
thinking Is, on the other hand, made it possible for both/and of the event to return to 
prevent it from settling into either/or. The point was to let the outside forces flow, co-
creating with or alongside them.  
 
The project thus mirrors both imaging and philosophy in a crystal where the films' and 
my own thinking chase each other in a repetition of a difference which wishes to carry 
on the unrealised power of becoming. 
 
Photographic thinking 
We do not need communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We 
lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in 
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Percepts, affects, sounds, words, haecceities, this is not a narrative-based argument or 
abstract reasoning but a w(a)onderous re-thinking – fractured, disconnected, aberrant, 
and fragmentary assemblage. Image, time, space, becoming… Photographic thinking, 
far from looking for the truths wishes to 'discover' the sense of image as life, as power 
of becoming, as thinking that takes thinking beyond itself; in "a joyful refusal of 
anything other than radical contingency and a force without promise".
1026
 Here the 
essence of the real and the photographic come together in an infinite 'fractality' of 
immanent becoming where nothing is given including the real. Photographic thinking 
produce a poetic-philosophical machinic connecting of images, sounds, theory and 
writing (as art/practice) in a constellation that takes photography as its model, but 
which is not itself photographic in the 'technical' sense.
1027
 In between exposing and 
developing, a practice of thinking keeps itself from realisation, intention, and 
fulfilment. A fugitive being. Not communicating but 'affectuating' – an ethical power 
of art. All sorts of encounters: memory and imagination, desire and loss, reality and 
dreams, all 'entangled' with each other and brought onto the surface of an image 
'(in)formed' this 'un-certain' film-philosophy project.  
 
Repetition, description, and point of view are intertwined, entangled in a framed space 
with no position from which to 'enter' the image. "To open up to the inhuman and 
overhuman … to go beyond the human condition …"1028 , bodies overcome through 
exhaustion are images in themselves – of potentiality, and a brain only an interval, a 
void between stimulus and response.
1029
  Both and in-between, an instant where 'both' 
collapses into in-betweenness, it is the terrifying meanwhile, the outside, which is also 
the inside that ‘yanks’ us out of the habitual human 'I' identity (psychology and 
perception) into the realm of unthinkable and unimaginable where encounter with the 
affect-thought is possible. Fragmentary and fractured identity in the last instance – 
being in becoming. Here material/ virtual opposition disappears in the interstice - 
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intolerable, unbearable, hallucinatory haptic, visceral seeing, turns into vision - the 
paradoxical intensity of in-between. The tensions that are 'captured' in the space of in- 
between cannot be resolved. They are exposed to each other in an encounter-event 
both too late and too soon. This space of affect-thought is necessary for keeping the 
movement of stillness from fixing and thinking-becoming from ever realising, to give 
the concepts life rather than meaning, to maintain the struggle of persisting (the real) 
rather than progressing. If a unity, it would be, through Deleuze, that of multiplicity of 
singular viewpoints in a whole that is expressive of this multiplicity.  
 
Thus, instead of connecting or synthesising the findings into meaningful progressions, 
the film philosophy project disrupts the linearity and disciplinarity of a discourse in 
favour of a construction that is a multiplicity of singular encounters. The lack of 
coherent structure (or fragmentary structure) repeats the style of non-linear montage 
and momentary exposures creating a rhisomatic intuiting in-between. "De-centering 
randomness".
1030





It is a new thought – and it is so by virtue of its mode of being or its relation to 
the real, not its aesthetic or technological determination. Far from being a 
sublimated tracing of the object, of its re-folds and folds, the folds of Being, it 




Aesthetico-ethical experiment  
The modern facet is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even 





Opening of the image-world requires belief in this world, and in experimental creating 
whose outcome cannot be known in advance. In order to discover the identity of 
thought and life, Deleuze suggests, we should replace the model of knowledge with 
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Such is the “effectual force” of Tarr’s audio-vision’s amazing sensibility where the 
border between order and disorder, sentimentality and profoundness, cynicism and 
empathy, total disintegration and belief, becomes ragged in the choice of amor fati. 
This is not sensory experience in opposition to the extra-sensory but an experience in 
'contact' with the outside, with the "delirious dimension," with "the unbearable." As 
both an aesthetic and ethical 'experiment', the difficult image persists, enduring in-
between affect and thought. Powerless, tragic thinking which creates new possibilities 
despite or in spite of itself, it is a Nietzschean “plural joy” or Deluzian “double 
becoming” merging ecstasy and image, chaos with order, one with many, the singular 
and the universal. 
 
Perhaps cinema is closest to philosophy in the sense that philosophy is life. If life is 
understood in a Nietzschean/ Deleuzian sense as impersonal becoming (as 'passive 
vitalism'), than philosophy like art (or science) creates with (or from within) life, 
creates fabulas or tragedies, not in search of truth but in affirmation of a thinking 
passion – a capacity to affect and to be affected. In this sense, passion must be the 
only truth, the only ethics life can be lived with. Without passion life is dead, so is art 
and thought. Philosophy as life creates life in becoming, in process, in transformation 
where becoming is not a simple unfolding of identity but where it produces difference 
at each new encounter. Life (not opposite to death) as art and as aesthetic thinking; 
perpetual creation of what is yet to come, never ending, never realised, never defined 
or known. Always unactualised potentiality, including a freedom for the end of a 
world (Deleuze), and the possibility of a world without human (Colebrook). The 
mystery of thought between sensation and sense, the pleasure of not knowing, of 
chance, of participating "in world's joyful birth of itself: a dancing star"
1035
 is 'the 
impossible' of a belief (in this world). 
 
Black-and-white, sodden, heavy, translucent image and poetic rhythm that unburdens 
life, between life-forsaken void and lifting spirit of creation. Satan’s tango of 
tragicomic mingling of the exhausted bodies brings forth the invisible transforming 
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potential, and the dance – an “inexhaustible Will.” Light mingles with darkness in 
non-expressionistic cosmic manner of becoming beyond good and evil. Outside good 
or evil, a pathological clinging to life, pathological insistence becomes the continual 
self-overcoming of man. The time and space (co)exist in the process of contrapuntal 
renderings of the polyphonic (non)structure. This is a haptic visuality where the 
touching eye is already disembodied (through the non-human eye of the camera), 
where the image thinks ’through’ the unthinkable and the viewer becomes through the 
unimaginable; where the world without meaning becomes a reservoir of unforeseeable 
potential, where rain, mud, light, texture, empty and disconnected spaces, exhausted 
bodies, and wandering dogs, become the “nonhuman landscapes of nature” and the 
“nonhuman becomings of man”.1036 An aesthetico-ethical experiment where “lying 
and trickery mingles with grace and chance” becomes a tragic vision that is also an 
exceptional kind of health. 
 
Spinozan expression: "one substance that expresses itself now as thought, now as 
matter and in all the different modes that make up the world,"
1037
 presents the ethic of 
thinking a potential that is not locked into the image of a meaningful world perceived 
by a unified subject. As human disorgan-ised “I” and cinematic/ photographic camera 
with its non-human 'perception' is able to bring forth, life activates thought, and 




The hopeless hope vibrates in-between, on the surface of this world, in the style of 
material-virtual power of untimely creation. Saying yes to life in a tragic sense of 
chance-necessity; such is Tarr’s films’ transforming potential, the power of which lies 
not in the actual outcome, but in the sense of the imperceptible real embedded in the 
aesthetics of a life. The eye can ‘touch’ but only after the subject becomes non “I”. 
This is materially expressive affectivity – “a jubilant communion of collapse and re-
emergence of the organic and inorganic, the a-temporal and a non-oriented spatial 
without the capacity for anchoring, signification, without knowledge, without 
reflection or structuration […], lived experience and liberated a-humanity.”1039 
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Thinking-life – an impersonal expression, resonating, vibrating, and (dis)connecting, 





Thinking does not provide consolation or happiness. Like a perversion, it 
languidly drags itself out; it repeats itself with determination upon a stage; at a 
stroke, it flings itself outside the dice box. At the moment when chance, the 
theatre, and perversions enter into resonance, when chance dictates a 





To sum up … 
The thesis can be seen as an encounter with images that are intensely difficult, that 
demand attention, slow time, force to think through endurance, scramble the faculties, 
and resist cliché. Everyday 'titbits', and profound events, equally important moments, 
enfolded in the black-and-white ‘reality’ of the photographic, break the continuity into 
imperceptible expressions. Brutal facts are at the same time the indescribable 
impersonal haecceities that speak to us from no one and no place, through the 
language of ‘things’ – through the vision of the nothing-matter. They interact, 
becoming together without merging, in the ‘confused’ perception of hallucinatory 
vision establishing a surface of “weightless immobility” that no longer absorbs all 
differences but allows them to “arise and sparkle as so many minute, distanced, 
smiling, and eternal events”.1042 The eye-body-brain feels the image but does not act 
or decide what to do. Earthy physicality, and material details, so ‘tangible’ and 
unfamiliar at the same time, suspend the viewer’s habitual perception and her/his 
synthesising ‘power’ of thinking. These are the moments when we are confronted 
with something outside ourselves, moments where we cannot comprehend what we 
'see' with what we know. These are the images that offer something different from the 
pleasure of instant gratification, an (e)motion between violence and contemplation.
1043
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Out of frustration, rejection, choked passages, too much beauty or pain the new 
becoming with the image is possible, each time differently, in a process forever 
delayed, forever yet to come. So long as the image keeps resisting 'what is' of 
representation, a life can be affirmed in its fleeting insistency of an instant, and the 
world becomes in its immanent belief as creation. Affect and intuition takes us out of 
the 'viewing' thresholds and opens up the space of becoming/ transformation. Belief 
replaces knowledge and carries on the never finished 'impossible' of creation. 
 
The play of 'ideas' and affects, matter and vision, conscious and unconscious sensing 
rather than judging, proceeding 'blindly' open to encounters, and forming the 
unnatural alliances, 'dancing in the fog', was an attempt to 'free' the discourse from 
authoritarian and molar systems, to keep becoming an artist-child-philosopher 
'uncompromisingly' and singularly.
1044
 Truly affirming life, like Tarr's nonconforming 
vision, real, tragic, humorous, and 'full of boring holes', which is not a matter of 
reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing forces. 
 
Poetic language is the language of art and cinema, a language of thought as creative 
process, an affective thinking with life. Conceptual persona born out of life's 
'chaocosmic' matter outside meaning and representation which ties it to a human 
subject. It is the language of Amor Fati, an undecided destiny beyond life 
anthropomorphised into a self-preserving order, that 'disfigures' us from familiar 
minds and bodies into a shape of the unknown mind-body starting to think the 
unthinkable.  
 
Am I thinking? Is thinking happening through me? Am I thinking because I'm 
questioning/ wondering and wandering? Am I thinking still, even if I cannot articulate 
the thought? What is new thinking after all? Am I in the 'new thinking' mode? How 
am I to express the movement of thinking captured into (un)thought? Am I not 
thinking yet? 
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Glossary of Deleuzian Terminology 
 
Actual/ Virtual 
For Deleuze actual and virtual are not opposed (ie. actual and virtual or reality, or real 
and imaginary) but both coexist as real. The virtual is not imaginary but real in the 
sense that it is the reservoir (potential) from which the actual is unfolded. Actual is 
not so much something that actually exists (as already formed system) but something 
that is already ‘pregnant’ in a sense with a richer potentiality. Actual and virtual 
circuit is conceptualized by Deleuze in Cinema 2 through the ‘image’ of crystal (the 
time-image) where actual and virtual (past/present, imaginary/real, memory/reality) 
exchange places becoming indiscernible. What he calls a “crystalline regime” is the 
actual which is already passing into virtual and virtual as a potential for actualization. 
The virtual image is not actualised directly, but appears in the form of another, 
different image, which "plays the role of virtual image being actualised in a third, and 
so on to infinity.”1045 Actual thus is unfolded from virtual potentiality and at the same 
time intuit different reality becoming virtual. What we see in the crystal, Deleuze 
says, is time itself, a perpetual foundation of non-chronological time. Time is the 
potential for different actualizations, the non-organic Life which has no end and is 
unforeseeable.
1046
 Crystal is forged in terms of splitting, exchange, and 
indiscernibility. The product of this doubling or splitting in two, this coalescence is 
(new) “vision”.1047 It is a production of time and also through (as) time, production of 
the new. The virtual thus is not merely the possible that can be realized, and 
actualization needs to be understood as something new rather than something that 
resembles the virtuality it embodies.
1048
 We cannot think virtual/ actual relation in 
terms of analogy, resemblance or transcendence but as a repetition of difference. The 
actual in this context would be that which renders visible or incarnates the virtual 
                                                 
1045
 Deleuze, Cinema 2, op.cit., p. 54 
1046
 Ibid., p. 79 
1047
 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical,  op.cit., p. 63 
1048
 Deleuze, Dialogues II, op.cit., p. 97 
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(difference) imperceptibly and as such creative rather than representation. The 
immanent virtual/actual coupling carries difference preventing the virtual power from 
ever realizing. It is becoming where the future ‘remains’ infinitely unpredictable, and 
thus is a question of immanent belief/vision rather than transcendent promise. Thus 
the virtual counterparts of our actual multiplicities make possible continued 
movement and change, even at the points where the world of actuality seems most 
rigid and oppressive. 
 
Affects and percepts 
Percepts are not perceptions and affects are not affections (feelings or emotions), but 
impersonal, nonrecognizable and a-signifying sensations . They are  independent 
‘beings’ that stand for themselves, outside any lived experience. Percepts are 
“independent of the state of those who undergo them” (they make visible the invisible 
forces) and affects, rather than arising from subjects, pass through them. Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to them as nonhuman landscapes of nature (percepts) and nonhuman 
becoming of man (affects).
1049
 They are created by art as “blocks of sensations” 
independent of the creator, character or viewer in the sense that artists (through a 
particular style: writer’s syntax, painter’s lines and colours, musician’s rhythms) 
intuit, ‘catalyse’ or bring forth percepts that in turn affect us in a non-personal way. 
Percept is not what we perceive but what we ‘see’ in the image when our sensory-
motor ‘mechanism’ is suspended.  Combray in Proust, or oceanic percepts in 
Melville, Cezanne’s landscapes, or any-spaces-whatever in cinema are examples of 
such percepts where the characters are becoming with the world by contemplating it 
(disappearing into the landscape or becoming ‘visionaries’).1050 In turn, we are 
affected not in a sense of understanding the meaning, or feeling empathy as such - not 
responding to what is outside me - but creating new connections, as becoming that 
happens to and through us. To be affected, thus, is not to feel the affect, but to become 
with the world/ image by contemplating it, that is by a certain attitude of non-acting or 
reacting, but allowing for ‘other’ forces to vibrate with ours. It is a question of 
(nonpersonal intensity and change through the force of the image, where the action of 
the body is suspended and the ‘self’ is produced from the “zone of 
                                                 
1049
 Deleuze and Guattari  What is Philosophy?, op.cit., p.169 
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indetermination”.1051 Thus, it could be said that percepts are visions that challenge the 
conventional notions of seeing and thinking, and affects enable molecular, 
imperceptible becomings through the encounter with the force of image as something 
that is not ourselves. “One become universe. Becoming animal, vegetable, molecular, 
becoming zero.”1052 Through a radical loss of ground, we “become universe”, and 
start thinking the unthinkable. In this sense art “wrests” percepts from perceptions and 
affects from affections, and increases our capacity to be affected and to affect, and 
consequently to think/ imagine different (other than personal or human) modes of 
existing with the world. For Deleuze and Guattari, the aim of art is thus to invent new 





“On a first, horizontal axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, 
the other of expression. On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of bodies, of 
actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other 
hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of 
incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then of a vertical axis, the 
assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and 
cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away.”1054  
Assemblages as conceived by Deleuze and Guattari, are complex constellations of 
objects, bodies, expressions, qualities and territories that come together as a body or a 
thing for a period of time. An assemblage is any number of "things" or pieces of 
"things" gathered into a single context. For example, a human body is an assemblage 
of genetic material, ideas, powers of acting and a relation to other bodies, or a tribe, is 
an assemblage of bodies.
1055
 A book is an assemblage of lines of articulations, strata 
and territories, lines of flights – pieces put together that can produce any number of 
effects.
1056
 Deleuze calls this “machinic assemblage” which is different from an 
organized and coherent whole. There is no beginning or end to assemblages, no pre-
existent structure or law. They are created from connections and interaction. There are 
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 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op.cit., p. 3-4. 
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judiciary assemblages, familial assemblages, detteritorialising assemblages (becoming 
animal), “machinic assemblages of movement images” (plane of immanence). The 
individual is constituted only by being assembled. Every machinic assemblage has 
two poles in a sense: one side faces a stratum that makes it a kind of organism, or 
signifying totality,  the other faces the body without organs. Every assemblage also 
refers to a field of desire in which it is constituted, each of us combine both molar 
(large social assemblages of reproduction), and molecular (local, individual desire of 
experimentation).  Thus individual experience oscillates between a retreat into 
preconceived forms of thinking and behaving, and freeing the force of affect thus 
recovering the power to feel and to think differently .
1057
   
 
Becoming  
“A becoming is neither one, or two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, 
the borderline or line of flight.  If becoming is a block (a line-block), it is because it 
constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man's land, a non-localizable 
relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the 
proximity of the other - and the border-proximity is indifferent to both contiguity and 
to distance.”1058  
 
In "becoming", one piece of the assemblage is drawn into the territory of another 
piece, changing its value as an element and bringing about a new unity. The process is 
one of deterritorialization in which the properties of the constituent element disappear 





"Becoming" is a process of change, flight, or movement within an assemblage 
understood not as an organic whole, but as relationships between the "discrete" 
elements of the assemblage. We can become as a result of encounters with bodies, the 
world, works of art, through the affective force that is impersonal and a-subjective. As 
Deluze and Guattari remind us we can be thrown into becoming by anything at all, by 
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the most unexpected, most insignificant of things.
1060
  It is neither the a question of 
identity nor identification, imitation, conforming to a model or establishing 
corresponding relations.
1061
 In becoming, one does not become another, rather each 
encounters the other and becoming is something (this something) between the two or 
outside the two. It is a question of assembling machines, contagion, symbiosis. We do 
not abandon what we are to become something else (imitation, identification), but 
another way of living or sensing haunts or is enveloped within our own and “puts it to 
flight”.1062 Becoming ‘effectuates’ from the ability to affect and to be affected, to 
form assemblages that nevertheless respect the heterogeneity of their components, 
blocks of becoming. A “block” is the encounter or the relation of two heterogeneous 
terms that mutually “deterritorialize” each other. In Deleuze's example, the wasp and 
orchid create a “becoming” or symbiotic emergent unit.1063  
Everything that exists is an effect of becoming, nothing is fixed and stable. Life is 
becoming, a change without purpose, particular goal or end-state. In both the actual 
and virtual sense, becomings: ‘becoming-animal’, ‘becoming-intense’ or ‘becoming-
imperceptible’, are not metaphors or imaginary terms (filiation) but real processes of 
virtual transformation, of symbioses of different ‘realms’, a radical change or 
potential. As Deleuze and Guattari write, concrete and always singular becoming is 
not a generality, it is a reality. Becoming produces nothing other than itself.
1064
  
Becoming cannot be ‘explained’ through history, or evolution understood by descent 
or filiation. For Deleuze, becoming 'moves through' every event,  it is simultaneously 
start-point, end-point, and mid-point of an ongoing cycle of production which he 
theorises though the Nietzschean concept of 'eternal return'. To become is not to 
progress or regress along a series.
1065
 Unlike history, becoming cannot be 
conceptualised in terms of past and future. Becoming is its own time, the real time in 
which change occurs. “Becoming-intense”, “becoming-molecular”, “becoming-
imperceptible,” “becoming—everybody/everything,” are the most radical, desirable 
becomings of absolute deterritorialisation, anorganic, asignifying, asubjective. In this 
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sense, becoming is one of the poles of the assemblage, where content and expression 
tend toward indiscernibility in the composition of an “abstract machine.” 
 
Conceptual persona  
The conceptual persona, as discussed by Deleuze and Guattari in What is 
Philosophy?, is the figure of thought which gives a concept its specific force, life. It is 
“what animates a concept.” It is something that 'happens' to the thinker/ philosopher. 
Conceptual personae are neither psycho-social types, nor philosophers themselves, 
but are like concepts created, and related to the plane of immanence. Descartes’s idiot, 
or Nietzsche's Zarathustra, Dionysus, the last man, are such personae. It could be 





Difference is usually understood either as 'difference from the same' or difference of 
the same over time, and as deriving from stable identities. To the contrary, Deleuze, 
rather than seeing difference as a difference between two things, thinks of difference 
as the continual movement of self-differing, a process of continual variation across 
time. Apparent identities are thus effects of difference, and are composed of endless 
series of differences. This is creative difference internal to a singular thing or event 
that is also a multiplicity of transformations, change in all changes repeating itself 
differently in becoming.   
For Deleuze there is no pre-existent identity; we can see evidence of difference in 
every aspect of reality. Difference is not grounded in anything else. The particularity 
or 'singularity' of each individual thing, moment, perception or conception testify to 
such difference.  
Deleuzian difference is stripped of all resemblance. It is a concept that has freed itself 
from similarity and contrariness, opposition and contradiction, a concept of 
productive virtual difference; a differentiating force without purpose, goal or end. It 
could be thought of as a desire, a “will to power” or “a life” outside identity, 
organism, life or death. It is a force of self-differing or a power to differ, a continual 
movement of repetition (of difference). In Difference and Repetition Deleuze gives an 
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example of Monet’s Water Lilies, a series of paintings where, according to Deleuze, 
each water lily repeats the first, but is never the same. Instead, it repeats the pure 
difference of the ‘original’. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, he speaks of the eternal 
return as ‘being of difference as such’.1067  
 
Expression 
“One can never assign the form of expression the function of simply representing, 
describing, or averring a corresponding content: there is neither correspondence nor 
conformity”.1068  
Deleuze came to the concept of expression through Spinoza for whom there is no 
world of set relations outside the ‘subject’ waiting to be expressed. Expression is in 
the world. It has nothing to do with representing, designating or describing of what 
already exists (a world of content) but a creative sensing or grasping of virtual 
potentialities, movements and relations. What is expressed cannot be dissociated from 
the act by which it is expressed. The world is a plane where different unfoldings or 
potentials of life are expressed as variations of difference in an open series of 
relations. As “impersonal worlding” or expressive immanence, expression can be seen 
as the creation of concepts (thinking) and power to act (‘expressive being’); a ‘result’ 
(intensity) of  intuiting and resonance rather than knowledge or understanding. As 
image, it is an image in time, not an image of something (representation). As 
asubjective and asignifying, it cannot be confused with expressionism (as in art). It 
has a primary relation to matter but this is the question of molecular material, which 
has the potential to harness unthinkable, invisible, nonsonorous forces.
1069
 Neither 
common form nor correspondence, it is a logic of power and a logic of movement 





The event is defined by an instantaneous coexistence of two heterogeneous 
dimensions in an empty time in which the future and the past perpetually coincide and 
encroach on one another, distinct yet indiscernible. The event is what comes, what 
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arrives; an emergent dimension not yet separated from those that precede it. The event 
is the coming intensity.
1071
 It is time going in both directions at once, something that 
happened and something that has not happened yet – something about to happen. It is 
what happens actually and the potential for something else. It is never what it is. In 
this sense the event is something that can never be really actualised. It is of the logic 
of immanence, a belief in this world. Event is not historical and it cannot be explained 
historically. It is affirmed not as resignation or acceptance of 'what is', but in 
recognition of its potentiality. It is becoming or haecceity. As François Zourabichvili 
observes,  the event is paradoxically both purely “expressible” and  an “attribute” of 
the world and its states of affairs. The event is both sides at once – in language, it is 
that which distinguishes the proposition; in the world it is that which distinguishes 
states of affairs.  It is thus inseparably both the sense of statements and the becoming 
of the world; it is that of the world which allows itself to be enveloped in language, 
thereby enabling the latter to function. “We can think of event as the condition under 
which thought thinks (the encounter with the outside that forces thought), and the 
special objecticities of thought (the plane is populated solely by events or becomings, 
and each concept is the construction of an event on the plane).“ 1072  
 
Free indirect discourse 
Free-indirect discourse is the term coined by Deleuze after Italian director, Pier Paolo 
Pasolini (free-indirect-style) It describes the operation of cinematic imaging where the 
director's 'vision' and the non-human camera's point of view come together as 
something new, which is then rendered 'visible' through the character's 'speech-act' or 
through the virtual percepts. In the formation of the ‘free indirect discourse’, of a free 
indirect vision, which goes from one to the other, either the author expresses himself 
through the intercession of an autonomous, independent character other than the 
author or any role fixed by the author, or the character acts and speaks himself as if 
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We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be 
thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought  within thought. It is 




For Deleuze, immanence is not immanence to something which still oscillates within 
the oppositionistic mode of thinking but immanence to itself, a ‘space’ of becoming 
where everything takes place as a process of relations, encounters and assembling. It 
is at once an infinite and finite virtual-material plane, populated by bodies and 
conceptual personae, thinking and nature. In a certain sense it is a chaos punctuated 
by the influx of perceptive, affective, intellectual instants which are aleatory and 
unrelated, chaos over which art, philosophy, and science “casts planes”.1075 It is the 
creation where creator and creation are one, one impersonal, non-subjective and 
singular (a) life that is also a creation of everything.
1076
 It is also a mode of 
overcoming hierarchical dichotomies of mind/ body, matter/ spirit, intellect/ 
sensation, transcendent/ immanent. Creation and thinking are not an attributes of 
transcendence but part of “this world” where “experimentation replaces interpretation, 
now molecular, nonfigurative, and non-symbolic”, and the unconscious no longer 
designates the hidden principle of the transcendent plane but is the process of the 
immanent construction.
1077
 Chaos, or what Deleuze calls chaosmos is thus both the 
intimate threat and the source of philosophical creation. Immanence is the belief in 
this world  as a world of divergence, heterogeneity and incompossibility where the 
state of completion or equilibrium will never take place. As a radical immanence, 
thought through the concept of univocity (Spinoza) it is what Deleuze calls 
“transcendental empiricism” or (with Guattari) a virtual “plane of immanence”, where 
the concepts come to life, where “one is said with a single meaning of all the 
multiple”, and where everything is unified as flux and modification.1078  As “pure 
difference” it is conceptualised through Nietzschean eternal return (affirmation of 
becoming) where the virtual potential is prevented from ever realising. It is a plane 
from which all concepts are created. Thus, a plane of immanence can be conceived as 
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a surface upon which all events occur, where events are understood as chance, 
productive interactions between forces of all kinds. As such, it is the field of 
becoming a 'space' containing all of the possibilities inherent in forces. On this plane, 
all possible events are brought together, and new connections between them are 
continuously made and dissolved. 
 
Intensity 
Deleuze uses the concept of 'intensity' to describe elements at the limits of perception 
and affection. He describes intensities as pure differences, forms of ontological 
difference that give rise to 'actual' or perceived entities.
1079
 As qualities of pure 
difference, intensities are virtual, though nonetheless real. They cannot be directly 
perceived or felt. Rather, as Deleuze suggests, they can only be felt, sensed or 
perceived in the ‘quality’ they give rise to. Deleuze uses the term 'extensity' or 




As ‘sentiendum’ – that which can only be sensed, or felt –  it is the being of the 
sensible. However, this sensing cannot be achieved through the ordinary exercise of  
sensibility. Intensity can be remembered, imagined, thought and said. As qualities, 
intensities are virtual yet real events which cannot be directly perceived or felt in the 
quality they give rise to. A virtual, intensity ‘exists’ nowhere in the extended that it 
constitutes. Deleuze invokes the concept of “body without organs”, “nonstratified, 
unformed, intense matter, [as] the matrix of intensity = 0.”1081 It is unthought within 
thought, a transcendental field or pure plane of immanence – a virtual, pre-subjective 
(a) life, an empty time. In philosophy intensity is ‘produced’ as the unthought and 
expressed as an abstract concept. In art, sensation is intimately related to the intensity 
of the forces that it does not represent; art ruptures extensive or everyday perception 
because it draws attention to singular 'intensities' (such as the vibrancy of a colour). 
As affect, neither subjective nor objective, it is both at once: we become in sensation 
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“Multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many and the one, but rather an 
organization belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in 
order to form a system.”1083  
As Jonathan Roffe has pointed out, multiplicity is arguably Deleuze's most important 
and most difficult concept to grasp because of the many different ways and contexts 
in which he creates it throughout his work. It can be found in almost all of his 
philosophical writing, and it is the basis for other concepts such as rhizome, 
assemblage, and 'concept'  itself. It is also one of Deleuze's most difficult concepts to 
grasp because of the many different ways and contexts in which he puts it to work.
1084
 
In the most basic sense it is a complex structure that does not reference a prior unity. 
Multiplicities are not parts of a greater whole that have been fragmented, and can not 
be perceived as a variety of expressions of a single concept or transcendent unity. 
Neither One nor Many, multiplicity refuses opposition in all of its forms. Moreover, 
multiplicity is considered as a multiplicity, and not multiplicity of something. There 
are virtual multiplicities (intensive movements of change) that are real without being 
embodied in the world and actual multiplicities (states of affairs), combinations of 
which constitute existence. It is the inter-fused world of virtual and actual emergences 
of all kinds. “Each individual is an infinite multiplicity, and the whole of Nature is 
multiplicity of perfectly individuated multiplicities.”1085 The virtual and actual 
multiplicities are interrelated and effect changes in each other in a way that the 
changes in actual situations also effect the change in virtual multiplicities. Thus any 
change to a particular multiplicity means a total change. Multiplicity is in the "and", 
and this AND  is neither one thing nor the other, but always in between. 
 
Outside 
Deleuzian outside, which he derived from Maurice Blanchot, cannot be confused with 
the outside exterior to something. For Deleuze, the Outside, beyond the difference 
between exterior and interior, is that which is unrespresentable (a field of relations 
outside of representation) and unthinkable (non-thought within thought), an empty 
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space of Aion. It is the “outside more distant than any external world because it is an 
inside deeper than any interior world: immanence”;  material and virtual force of 
potentiality; an unconscious as an immanent space (both real and imaginary) of desire 
that is not dependent on the Oedipal familial structures; a space ‘populated’ by the 
impersonal, pre-subjective, virtual forces of becoming; an absolute potentiality. As 
unconscious desire, this would be a force of positive production, not lack or negativity 
(as in a psychoanalytical structure). It is a transcendental field which Deleuze also 
calls the plane of immanence where nothing is presupposed, “the incessant to-ing and 
fro-ing of the plane, infinite movement.”1086 In cinema the outside is conceived in 
relation to the time-image where a whole, paradoxically thought of as a gap or interval 
(in-between), becomes the outside. Now it is an open whole where the common sense 
perception or understanding of things is suspended. 
 
Potentiality 
Potentiality cannot be confused with possibility which is something that can be 
predicated (that somehow ‘pre-exits’ representational real), that is something that 
ultimately remains the same. Possibility is something that can be 'realised'. Potential, 
on the contrary is a virtual force (a difference) which cannot be foreseen,  realized or 
represented.  It is a real force which can only be actualized in various modes in time. 
For Deleuze  real conditions are not those which must be presupposed by the actual 
but the potentials of life from which different conditions such as the brain, 
subjectivity or mind emerge. It is something that we neither perceive nor think, what 
we are not yet thinking (“we do not know what the body can do”). It is a question of 
belief (in this world) rather than knowledge, an affirmation of the relation with the 
outside. 
 
Powers of the False 
Powers of the false – the power to create – Deleluze sets against the dogmatic ‘image 
of thought’(an accepted definition of what it is to think, what is true and what is false) 
and against a normative fixed ‘model’ of existence (life as a fixed set of systems and 
rules). Following Nietzsche, who saw the false not as error or deception but as the 
highest value of creation, Deleuze argued that truth is not something that needs to be 
                                                 
1086
 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 59. 
312 
 
excavated, achieved or reproduced but has to be (is) created. Seen through the ‘eyes’ 
of creation, philosophy, art and cinema, each according to their own modes put Truth 
into question and raise falsehood to its highest affirmative power, which is not a 
question of form but of transformation. Affects and percepts in art, and  literature, the 
free-indirect-vision(ary) in cinema, and conceptual personae in philosophy, are the 
aesthetic figures of powers of the false or what Deleuze calls “intercessors”. By 
bringing forth (incarnating) the outside that affirms the powers of the false, they take 
seeing and thinking outside the ordinary habitual perceptions and everyday opinions, 
transforming expression and creating new concepts.
1087
 The certainty and fixed ideas 
of the transcendental otherworldly truth is replaced by the false of immanence, at once 
worldly and experimental. By destroying every model of the truth, the powers of the 
false shatter the system of judgement (through affect), and cannot be separated from 




The creation of truth is a process without predetermined points of departure or ends. 
This is not a dialectic in the sense of a negation that produces a higher unity, but a 
dialogue, an interrogation, where one term is able to question, interrogate, or falsify 
the other in a process of thinking as creation.
1089
 We can think of  powers of the false 
in terms of fabulation, as a meditation on critique, as a creation of concepts, as a 
practice of creative commentary which resonates with the Deleuzian-Guattarian 
concept of the rhizome.  Experimenting, belief in this world, simulation, time as 
becoming, and immanence are concepts affirming the false. Through such 
‘transformations’ as crystalline narration, false continuity – irrational cut, simulation 
of the story – metamorphosis, crystalline description – hallucinatory state, character – 
forger creating truth, cinema has become creator and producer of truth.  
 
Rhizome 
“Unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its 
traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very 
different regimes of signs and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to 
the One nor the multiple… It is composed not of units but of dimensions or rather 
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directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle [milieu] 
from which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes multiplicities.”1090  
As Deleuze and Guattari  discuss in A Thousand Plateaus, the rhizome is a new image 
of thought resisting the organizational structure of the root-tree system: seeking roots 
or ancestors, searching for the origins of "things", and looking towards the pinnacle or 
conclusion of those "things." They oppose it to an arborescent conception of 
knowledge, which works with dualist categories and binary oppositions. A rhizome  
establishes connections between all sorts of things, any point of a rhizome can be 
connected to any other but  is “composed not of units but of dimensions.”1091 It 
“brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states.” It works 
with ‘horizontal’ connections. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the rhizome “has 
neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and 
which it overspills.” The rhizome is a “self-vibrating region of intensities whose 
development avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or external end.” It 
could be thought of as a mode of theory, model of society or style of writing ‘forged’ 
by bifurcation, unforeseeable encounters, and non-communication; a real becoming in 
the middle. It is the interplay between rival sign systems in the production of new 
“variation[s], expansion[s], conquest[s], [and] offshoots.” 1092Thinking is thus 
experimentation. Rather than narrativise history and culture, the rhizome presents 
history and culture as a map (rather than trace) with no specific origin or genesis. For 
a "rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo".
1093
 The planar movement of the rhizome resists chronology 
and organization, instead favouring a nomadic system of multiplicity. As the One  
(n-1) dimension, it designates what is ‘real experience’ (of multiplicity),  which is 
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